Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, the word wisdom, that is, ordering and judging knowledge concerning other things, as in the chapter heading: for this name "wisdom" signifies this, as is clear in Book VI of the Ethics¹, speaking generally.

II. In the body there is one conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: Sacred doctrine is wisdom in the highest degree among all human wisdoms, not only in a genus, but simply.

And note that simply determines human wisdom, just as in a genus does as well: so that it is the case that sacred doctrine, both in relation to wisdoms in a genus and to human wisdom simply, is wisdom in the highest degree.

III. It is proved. Sacred doctrine treats most properly of God insofar as He is the highest cause: therefore sacred doctrine is wisdom in the highest degree, etc. — The antecedent is proved. It treats of God, not only as knowable through creatures, but insofar as He is known naturally to Himself alone: therefore most properly, etc.

IV. Concerning the antecedent and its proof, note that those things which are naturally hidden from us concerning God, just as they are more proper to God in knowing, so also in being. And therefore the science that determines about God according to those things which are known to God alone is a science about God from God's own proper attributes: and hence it is rightly said that it determines about God most properly. And since by means of such proper attributes are had the first and supreme foundations of divine causality, therefore it is said that it determines most properly about God inasmuch as He is the highest cause.

Yet here be careful: for the phrase as the highest cause can be expounded in two ways. In one way, so that as determines the formal ratio of God as He is the subject of sacred doctrine. And thus the assumption is false: since, as is clear in the following article, God inasmuch as He is God is the subject of it, and not inasmuch as He is the highest cause. – In the other way, so that as determines a certain special ratio of God, enclosed within the breadth of the conditions pertaining to the consideration of sacred doctrine, because it follows upon the deity. And thus it is true: for the text intends that sacred doctrine considers God most properly, and consequently also as the highest cause: which pertains to wisdom.

V. The consequence² is now proved. Judgment concerning lower things is had through a higher cause: therefore one who considers the highest cause of some genus is wise in that genus. Therefore, one who considers the cause that is simply the highest of the whole universe, namely God, is most wise. Therefore, if anyone considers God most properly as He is the highest cause, that person has the greatest wisdom among all, both in a genus and simply: which was the consequence to be proved.

The assumption is clear. – And the first consequence is indeed proved, because it belongs to the wise to judge and to order: this is made manifest in the genus of building, and in the genus of the whole of human life, with the authorities of Scripture joined to it, as is evident in the text. – The second, however, proved from the same source, is left in the middle ground, with understood the proportionality of the highest cause in a genus to wisdom in a genus, and of the highest cause simply to wisdom simply: and it is confirmed by the testimony of Augustine. In this deduction, moreover, wisdom simply is called wisdom most of all, so as to denote its excess over the wisdoms in a genus. – The third consequence, however, is left as self-evident. For if one who considers the highest cause simply, that is, God, is simply and most of all wise with respect to those who are wise in this or that genus; it must be that one who considers that same highest cause from its proper attributes is not only simply, but most of all wise, both with respect to those who are wise in a genus, and with respect to one who is wise simply; inasmuch as he transcends him in this, that he searches out the proper attributes of the highest cause, while the latter stops at what is common, and at those things which can be known through what is common. For all the reasons which metaphysics has concerning God are either common, if they are simple, such as being (ens), true, good; or composed out of what is common, if they are proper to God, such as pure act, first being (primum ens), etc.

VI. In response to the third, the praise of Hierotheus, the teacher of Dionysius, is adduced, namely that he was not only learning divine things according to the intellect, but undergoing them according to the affections: since the gift of wisdom is in the intellect formally, but in the will causally. And he is said to be undergoing from passion, in the way in which those vehemently moved with regard to something are said to be impassioned: in which is signified the greatest inclination of the will, now become habitual and connatural toward divine things, etc.