Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. - In the body, a single conclusion of two members, answering the question affirmatively: Sacred doctrine is more worthy, insofar as it is speculative, than all speculative sciences; and insofar as it is practical, than all practical sciences.

II. Before the conclusion is proved, note why those specifications are placed in the conclusion, namely, insofar as speculative and insofar as practical. For this was not done in vain. But, as is clear from the preceding article¹, this doctrine contains within itself two things: first, that it is a science of a higher order than the physical sciences; second, that it contains the conditions of the speculative and of the practical formally. On account of the first, there is no doubt that it is more worthy than the others, since it is posited as of a higher order. But with respect to the second there could be doubt; and therefore, although in the title the question was asked absolutely, in the response we came to what could fall under doubt; and it was answered that it, insofar as speculative, is more worthy than the speculative sciences, and insofar as practical, than the practical ones—leaving aside that which is evident, that absolutely it is the most worthy of all, because of a higher order.

III. It is therefore proved first with respect to the first part². Among the speculative sciences, one is more worthy than another on account of certitude and the dignity of its matter, from I de Anima³: this science excels in both respects; therefore. — The minor is proved with respect to its first part. This science is certain by an infallible divine light, while the others are certain only by a fallible human light; therefore it is more certain. Understand this as holding of itself, not of us, as is clear from the reply to the first objection. — With respect to the second part, however: this science concerns things exceeding human reason, whereas the others concern things subject to human reason; therefore it is concerned with what is more worthy. This argument is founded upon II Metaphys.⁴, just as the eye of the owl is toward the light of the sun, etc.: for there it is stated that things which exceed the power of our intellect are most manifest and most luminous in themselves. And hence, the proper natures of intellectual substances, which remain hidden because of their excellence, are more worthy than those conditions of the same substances which we can abstract from sensible things in metaphysics, etc. And therefore, since this science is about things of this surpassing kind, it follows that it is concerned with what is more worthy — not with more worthy beings, since no being is more worthy than God, but with the worthier conditions of beings.

The second part of the conclusion⁵ is proved. That practical science is the more excellent which is not ordered to a further end: but the end of this one is the ultimate end of all the ends of the other sciences: therefore. — The major is proved in the civil and military sciences. The minor, however, because the end of this science is eternal beatitude.

V. Note here that the major premise is understood not absolutely as it stands, but of subordinate practical sciences. For it is not true, among practical sciences that are disparate, that the more worthy is the one not ordered to a further end: for it is more worthy to minister to an art of a higher order, say that of the goldsmith, than to preside over an art of a lower order, say that of the potter. But among practical sciences of which one is subordinate to another, the major premise is without doubt true. And therefore in the text it was not subsumed absolutely that the end of theology is not subordinated to another: but two things were subsumed: that all other practical sciences are subordinated to this one, by saying that the ends of the other practical sciences are ordered to the end of this one; and that the end of this one is the last, etc. For thus the argument is complete, with every calumny excluded.

VI. But remember that here, first, there is that distinction of ends: namely, into the end of the reason for acting, or of the thing acted upon, and into the end of the one acting. For eternal beatitude is not the ultimate end of all who act, since many act against it by departing from virtue, and yet act rightly according to their arts; but it is the end of all reasons for acting, and of all things acted upon, because all things are ordered to the good of reason, which is in turn finally ordered to eternal beatitude. And therefore in the text it is carefully said that the ends of the other sciences are ordered to eternal beatitude—and it does not say the ends of those who know.

Remember the second division of the other distinction: namely, the intrinsic end and the extrinsic end. And understand that the extrinsic end of theology insofar as it is practical is beatitude, which is the ultimate end, that is, the vision of God; although its intrinsic end as such is to act. Nor does this stand in the way of the force of the argument made in the text, which speaks of the intrinsic end of the practical sciences: for the text speaks of the proximate end, whether outside or within. For with respect to the dignity of the practical, it makes no difference whether the end ennobling it is brought in from within or from without, provided it be proximate. Such is the case here: since, as the Author said in the preceding article, we are treating of our works insofar as by them we are ordered to the contemplation of God. The other sciences, however, teach one to act on account of this end only remotely. — Now this, namely, that this science insofar as it is practical has the same proximate end which it has insofar as speculative (though in another way, because extrinsically), belongs to this science because it is practical secundum quid: for if it were purely practical, to speculate would be remote from its end.

VII. The response to the second uses two distinctions. To receive is twofold: from a superior, or from an inferior. And this again in two ways: either on account of a defect or insufficiency in the receiver; or as supplying the defect of another, namely of our intellect in the case at hand.