Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title of this second article, note two terms: first, the term scientia; second, the term sacra doctrina. For scientia is taken here properly, as it is an intellectual virtue (VI Ethic.¹), and a habit of conclusions acquirable by demonstration from principles. And since subjects are such as are permitted by their predicates, it follows that sacra doctrina is taken here for revealed doctrine insofar as it consists of conclusions. Nor is it taken for the whole (for it would seem foolish to ask whether the whole of knowledge, embracing within itself both principles and conclusions, is science, since it is evident that the principles are not science): but for that doctrine absolutely, as in the first article², with respect added to its conclusions. So that the sense of the question is: Whether sacred doctrine, which we have shown to be necessary, has in regard to its conclusions the character of science; or not, but rather of opinion, etc. And thus the subject of the question and of the answering conclusion is entirely one and the same: and questions are equalized to true knowings, according to the teaching of II Poster.³

II. In the body, once the responsive conclusion has been set forth, he does three things: first, a single distinction is laid down; second, the responsive conclusion is qualified⁴; third, a corollary is drawn⁵.

The distinction is: Science is twofold, subalternating and subalternated, from I Poster.⁶ The difference between them is that the subalternating science proceeds from propositions known in themselves (per se nota), whereas the subalternated science proceeds from principles that are known not in themselves but through the light of the higher science: as is evident in arithmetic and music, geometry and perspective.

III. Concerning this distinction and difference, note that from the proper notion of science absolutely considered there arises this difference assigned in the text; and therefore it must be taken as the first and essential difference between the subalternating and the subalternated science; and from these all difficulties must be resolved, if the doctrine is true. Know, then, that it belongs to the notion of science absolutely, as distinguished from other habits or intellectual virtues, to have conclusions visible in another, that is, in principles; for all science necessarily arises from principles. And from this it follows that neither the subalternating nor the subalternated science has the evidence of its conclusions in itself, but aided by the habit of principles. Yet they differ in this: the conclusions of the subalternating science are visible from and in principles immediately, that is, without any other mediating habit; whereas the conclusions of the subalternated science are visible from and in principles that are known in themselves, but mediately, namely through the mediating scientific habit of the subalternating science. And this is the essential and per se difference between subalternating and subalternated science. The other conditions, however, are consequent ones; or they belong to such a subalternated science, not to the subalternated as such: for instance, that one says quia and the other propter quid; or that the object adds an extrinsic accidental difference. For this is the condition of subalternation with respect to the object, whereas that is the condition of subalternation with respect to principles, on account of the matter, as will be made clear below.

What is essential to every science properly so called, that is, discursive, is to have conclusions visible not in and from themselves, but in and from another. And five things are deduced from this. First, that every science is a science by its continuation to a higher habit. For only from that continuation does it have the evidentness of its conclusions; and as it is said in I Poster.⁷, one who does not have demonstration will not know the demonstrables. For demonstration is what continues, whether actually or in potency being of no concern here. – Second, that subalternated science is a science by continuation, or continuability, to the higher science, for the same reason. – Third, that the per se habit of the proximate principles of the subalternated science is the scientific habit of the subalternating science. – Fourth, that the subalternating and the subalternated sciences are not opposed necessarily on the part of the object, nor on the part of the subject, but rather on the part of the conditions of the middle term: namely, because the middle term in the subalternating science is joined immediately to principles known per se, but in the subalternated science mediately, through the mediation, namely, of a habit of another species. – Fifth, that the subalternated and the subalternating sciences are compossible in the same subject: because they are not opposed on the part of the subject. – And from these is deduced a sixth, that the proximate principles of the subalternated science can be known by two habits, namely, by the higher science, and by faith; as is expressly said in the text, when faith concerning the principles is posited in the corollary, and the light of the higher science concerning the same is posited in the distinction. But the higher science is their habit per se, because of the essential relation from which the subalternated science has that it is a science: whereas faith is their habit per accidens, because of the subject in which it resides, say, a perspectivist who is not a geometer.

One thing must be noted here: in the first and essential condition of a subalternated science, two things concur. The first is inevidence in itself, together with evidence from and in another; the second is the mediation of the proximate principles, which is the cause of that inevidence in itself. But the first of these is formal, and consequently is always and entirely required; the second, however, is material. For if that inevidence could be preserved with visibility in another without mediation, it would nonetheless be subalternated to it: because, as is already clear from what has been said, upon that mode of evidence rests the essential and per se difference between the subalternating and the subalternated. And hence it follows that the principles of the subalternated science need not possess propter quid by reason of the formal aspect of subalternation: but it suffices that they be propositions of that kind, inevident yet visible.

IV. The modified conclusion⁸ is: Sacred doctrine is a science, subalternated to the science of God and the blessed. – It is proved. A habit acquired from principles known in the light of the science of God and the blessed is a science subalternated to it: sacred doctrine is of this kind: therefore.

V. Corollary⁹ is: Sacred doctrine believes the principles revealed to it by God. – It is proved from the condition of the subalternating craftsman: music believes the principles handed down to it by arithmetic; therefore, etc.

VI. Concerning this article, note that the responsive conclusion has two parts: namely, that theology is a science; and that it is subalternated to the science of God. Against the first part, indeed, arguments are brought forward in many ways by Durandus, Aureolus, and Gregory of Rimini, as you have here from Capreolus¹⁰, from the conditions of knowing itself and of demonstration assigned in I Posterior Analytics¹¹ and VI Nicomachean Ethics¹² – From the side of the object. Because science is of necessary things: this one is of contingent things, for instance the Incarnation, predestination, glorification, etc. – From the side of the principles. Both because science proceeds from what is known through itself, and because the habit of the principles of a science is superior to the habit of the conclusion. – From the side of certitude. Both because one who knows knows that he knows, and because science is an intellectual virtue. And if it is said that the theologian knows that he knows by supposition, namely, if the articles of faith are true: therefore, says Aureolus, this is a science of consequences, and not of things consequent; of the necessity of the consequence, and not of the thing consequent; and, in short, of inferences, not of things. – From the side of the mode. Sacred doctrine, says Scotus, in III Sentences, dist. XXIV, qu. unica, is not handed down by a syllogistic discourse; but we give assent to all things equally, in such a way that we do not assent to one on account of another: therefore. The antecedent is made clear. Because although it is argued from I Corinthians chapter XV, and by the doctors, nevertheless no greater certitude is had of what is proved than of the one proving, or of what is proved and not proved but simply proposed: which does not happen in science. – Finally, from the side of the subject. Faith and science, according to you, do not stand together, says Scotus in the same place, and qu. III of the Prologue of the First Book: therefore.

VII. Against the second part, or the minor, of the argument brought forward¹³, it is argued in several ways¹⁴, by attacking two points: first, the diversity of our theology from the theology of God and the blessed; second, that that distinction which exists between them, whatever kind it may be, is not a distinction with the requisite conditions for a subalternating and subalternated science.

Scotus, therefore, in Book I of the Sentences, question III of the Prologue, attacks the first position in two ways. The knowledge of God cannot be other than one formally; therefore nothing is subalternated to it. The antecedent is evident: because the deity is not other than one formal ratio. — Moreover, concerning the same truths it is impossible that there be first a subalternating and a subalternated science, because where the latter ends, the former begins: these are about the same truths: therefore. — These two arguments are together insinuated by Aureol¹⁵ under another form, thus. The subject of the subalternated science adds something to the subject of the subalternating science; but the subject of our theology does not add anything: therefore.

Against the second, however, Scotus argues in two ways in the same place, and in Book III where cited above¹⁶. Subalternated science depends on the subalternating science as on a cause; but it does not depend thus on the science of the blessed; therefore it is not subalternated to it. The minor is proved: the cause of science is only the object, the power, the subject, or the light, none of which is that science of the blessed. — Furthermore, the subalternated and the subalternating sciences are compossible in the same subject; these are not compossible; therefore they are not so related. The minor is proved: because it would follow that one and the same person would be at once comprehensor and viator.

Finally, Durandus argues against the same point¹⁷. The subalternating science says propter quid, and the subalternated science says quia: these do not stand in that relation: therefore. The minor is proved. Because the articles of theology do not have a propter quid: and if they do, we say the same as the blessed; for instance, the propter quid of why Christ became incarnate, namely on account of human salvation, etc.

VIII. For the clarification of this difficulty, know two things. The first is that our theology can be considered in two ways: in one way in itself; in another way as it is in us wayfarers. If it is considered in itself, then without doubt it is a science subalternated to the science of the blessed with respect to evidence, since by its continuity with that science it takes on the character of a science, while it proceeds from principles known in themselves by the light of glory. And against this few or no arguments are effective: for the first arguments undermine only the claim that our theology as it is in us is not a science; the second, indeed, that it is not subalternated totally, not with respect to something. – But if it is considered as it is in us wayfarers, then the difficulties raised emerge. And it is thought that even according to St. Thomas, so taken, it would be a science only equivocally, as he himself seems to say elsewhere¹⁸; nor would it be subalternated except in a certain respect, namely with respect to evidence. And if these considerations are attended to, the solution of the question would be easy.

IX. It seems to me that holy Thomas must be interpreted differently, especially with regard to the second point¹⁹ For with regard to the first point, namely whether our theology, as it exists in us wayfarers, is or is not a science, either position can be maintained when properly understood: that it is not a science (that is, it does not possess the perfect character of science, because he does not truly know who cannot resolve things into evident principles; and this is what he intends wherever he hints at this); and that it is an imperfect science, by reason of our present state; for an imperfect science is not outside the scope of science. And this he affirmed here in so many words. And lest occasion be given for misunderstanding, since only this had been asked—whether it was a science—the answer was given affirmatively but with an adversative clause added, so that the complete answer would be conditional in a specifying way, and not absolute. For he did not prove that it is a science, but that it is a subalternated science, so that from the qualifying addition you might understand the imperfection it has in this state.

X. As to the second point, concerning subalternation, it seems to me that the text intends subalternation simpliciter. First, because it had made a distinction about such before the conclusion; second, because, as is clear from what has been said²⁰, subalternation with respect to evidence arises from the reason of the science. And therefore I judge that it must be held that our theology, in itself, is truly a science simply subalternate; but as it is in us wayfarers, it is a science imperfectly, yet simply subalternate.

But you, novice, when you dispute, take care lest you be deceived by taking theology in itself and our theology in itself to be the same. For these differ greatly. Since theology in itself is the science which the deity in itself is naturally born to bring forth: and this is the theology which God has of himself. But our theology is distinguished—if the term our signifies human nature simply—into the theology of the blessed and that of wayfarers. It need not, however, be distinguished if the term our signifies wayfarers: and it is so taken in the proposition at hand. Yet this can be taken both in itself and as existing in us wayfarers. You have this last distinction from the text itself, since in the corollary it speaks manifestly of our theology as existing in us wayfarers, whose it is to believe the principles; and in the responsive conclusion it spoke of the same in itself: for it belongs to it in itself to arise from principles known in themselves by the light of a higher science, etc.

XI. According to²¹ this, since all our terms, when transferred to God, are understood to be transferred with the imperfections removed, it follows both that the science of the blessed is such by reason of its evidence and certitude, not as regards the imperfection of its discursive reasoning; and that subalternation is transferred to the science of God not as regards demonstratively proving the principles of the subalternated science by discursive demonstration, but as regards their evidence, and the causality of the knowledge of them in others. Hence it is not required, on account of subalternation, that the principles of our theology be conclusions of the theology of the blessed: but it is enough that they be evident propositions of the theology of the blessed. Just as if geometry existed without discursive reasoning, it would have the same evidence concerning the principles of perspective that it now has, but not in the same way: and it would be subalternating no less. Therefore, since theological conclusions proceed from the articles of faith as from principles that are not evident in themselves, but are so in the science of God and of the blessed, it follows that it has the essential constitutive condition of a subalternated science²²; and that it is a science by its continuation to the science of God and of the blessed; and that the habit whereby its principles are known per se is the divine science, while the habit whereby they are known per accidens is faith; and that it is not opposed to the science of the blessed on the part of the object or of the subject, but negatively according to evidence and inevidence; and that they can coexist simultaneously in the same subject. Nor is the judgment the same concerning subalternated science and faith. For the divine light absolutely speaking is the per se formal ratio of this knowledge, insofar as it is scientific: but the veiled divine light is the per se ratio of the assent of faith, which is per accidens, as was said²³, the habit of the principles of these. And therefore the habit of the principles will not remain in the fatherland: but the science acquired from them will remain, according to that saying of Jerome²⁴: Let us learn on earth, etc.

XII. Whence, in reply to the arguments brought in opposition against the first part²⁵, we answer each one individually, for the sake of beginners.

And to the first it is said that the Incarnation and other things of this kind, which are contingent in themselves, insofar as they fall under this science are necessary; just as they are necessary as known by God, as will be made clear in question XIV²⁶

To the second, it is already clear that this science is from things known per se, that is, from evident things, mediately: and this suffices, according to that passage of the first book of the Topics²⁷: demonstration is from things known per se, or from those which have taken their certainty through them. – The habit of the per se principles of this science is also higher than the science itself; whatever may be said of the habit per accidens, that is, of faith; which can be called a higher science with respect to adhesion, though not with respect to evidence.

To the third, it is said that the theologian knows that he knows, not conditionally, but subalternately: this is not merely to know the inferences, but the things inferred from principles made evident in the higher science. Nor can more be drawn from such inevidence than that such knowing is not perfect unless it is continued with the higher science—which we not only concede but teach. – And likewise we say that subalternate science, so long as it is not continued with the science subalternating it, is not an intellectual virtue, but an incipient intellectual virtue: and therefore it pertains to the same species of virtue, namely science.

To the fourth, which is Scotus's, the antecedent is denied. For in Sacred Scripture demonstrations are handed down virtually; and another habit is generated from faith, from the deduction of conclusions from the articles of faith. Nor is it true that we assent to all equally, or in the same manner. For we assent to the articles not on account of anything else; but to conclusions, concerning which alone this science is, we assent on account of the articles. And when it is said that we assent equally to what is proved and what is proposed simply, it is answered: If all things to be believed were proposed simply, our theology would indeed be a science in itself, because its conclusions are by their nature apt to be deduced from the articles of faith; but with respect to us it would not be a science but faith; and we would assent to all not only equally, but in the same manner. But since in fact the articles are proposed to us as simply to be believed, while the rest are to be deduced from the articles, therefore we do not assent in the same manner to principles and conclusions. Nor do we assent equally to conclusions proved and unproved: on account of which such diversity of opinions is tolerated in sacred doctrine concerning those not proved. And therefore it is a science not only in itself, but also with respect to us; imperfect, however.

Finally, it is already clear that we do not posit faith and science about the same thing at once: because faith is about the articles, while science is about conclusions.

XIII. To the arguments against the second part²⁸, it is answered that a science of God, if adequate, cannot be other than one; if inadequate, however, it can be multiplied. Such is theology. – Or one may say—and better, though it comes to the same thing—that the antecedent is simply false. For the unity of a science requires both the unity of the formal ratio of the object as a thing and the unity of the formal ratio of the object as an object, as will be clear in the following article²⁹. In the case at hand, although the deity is one formal ratio of the object of both theologies as a thing, yet in each theology the formal ratio of the same object as an object is different and distinct. For God as clearly seen is set before the blessed; but God as revealed, abstracting from clarity and obscurity, is set before our theology taken absolutely.

To the second it is said that our theology and that of the blessed are not about the same truths: as is manifestly evident in the truths of the articles of faith, which are the concern of the theology of the blessed, not of ours.

And by these things the response to the form of Aureol's argument is clear. It may indeed be granted that the subject of our theology adds in some way to the subject of the theology of the blessed, if the subject of our theology is taken as the whole aggregate of the subject both as a thing and as an object: for thus the subject is God as revealed; and it is evident that revelation adds an accidental difference. But if one stubbornly insists, on the side of the object as a thing, that such an addition be required in the subject of the subalternated science, the assumption is denied universally; though in certain cases it holds true. Nor is the opposite stated in I Poster.³⁰: rather, it is taught there that one science does not descend into another unless its subject falls under the other's subject simply or in this way; which we grant when we say that the science of the blessed descends into ours, because the formal subject as a thing is entirely the same in both, and the object of this science falls under the object of that one.

As for the remaining objections against the second point, it is said that this science depends on the theology of the blessed as on a light, and that they are compossible together in the same subject. Nor does it follow that the same person is at once wayfarer and comprehensor; rather, he is at once comprehensor, and one possessing the science he acquired on the way, but in another manner—not only because of the exclusion of discursive reasoning, but also because of the perfection he obtains from its continuation into the science of the blessed.

At the very end, Durandus's claim is denied that theological conclusions do not have a propter quid, whatever may be said of their principles. And if we say that we and the blessed know the same propter quid, still not in the same way: because they know it evidently, whereas we without evidence. But if it be said that the principles must have a propter quid, the answer given at ³¹ is that it suffices that they are not evident in the subalternated science, but in the subalternating one. And this is said of the propter quid taken properly: for there is no purely theological proposition which does not in some way have a propter quid.

And thus the answer to all objections is clear.