Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title of this first article, note three terms. First, the word necessary. For it is taken in two ways in V Metaphysics¹: simply, and for an end. Here it is taken in the second way. - Second, the word physical² disciplines. For science can be called physical or natural—which is the same thing—in two ways: objectively, and thus it is one part of science, distinct, VI Metaphysics³, as opposed to mathematics and metaphysics; and effectively, because of itself it is naturally born from the natural principle of the sciences, that is, the light of the agent intellect. And in this way it is distinguished as natural as opposed to supernatural. And it is taken in this way in the matter at hand, where all knowledge acquirable by the light of the intellect is called physical discipline. - Third, the words another doctrine. It does not say science, opinion, or faith: that this must be well noted will appear when we come to raise the doubt⁴.

II. In the body there are two conclusions responsive to the question, in the affirmative. The first is: It is necessary for human salvation that there be a doctrine received through revelation concerning many things that exceed human reason. - The second is⁵: It is necessary for human salvation that there be a doctrine through revelation concerning those things about God which can also be investigated by natural reason.

III. Before the conclusions are proved, so that the distinction and sufficiency of the conclusions may be evident, note two distinctions. The first is from I Contra Gentiles, chapter III. There are two principal genera of things knowable about God: some are demonstrable; others are knowable only through revelation. These latter are the Trinity of Persons, the beatitude promised to us, the mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption: but those that are demonstrable are that God is one, immortal, etc. On account of the things that are revelable only, the first conclusion was posited; on account of the demonstrable ones, however, the second was posited. - The other distinction is from V Metaphysics⁶ What is necessary for an end is twofold: necessary for being (esse), and necessary for well-being (bene esse). In the first conclusion, what is necessary is taken in the first way; in the second, in the second way.

IV. These things having been premised, the first conclusion is proved from the text. Ordered to God as an end unknown by natural reason, yet to be attained by one's own intention and action, man needs supernatural instruction, by which he may know that end and direct his operations toward it: man is of this sort: therefore. — The minor is proved from chapter 64 of Isaiah.

V. Concerning this conclusion a doubt immediately arises: what is meant here by the name sacred doctrine or discipline. For it is understood either as faith, or as theology. If faith, two inconveniences follow. The first is that the same thing would be asked twice over: for in IIa IIae, question 2, article 3, it is asked whether believing something supernatural is necessary for salvation. The second is that sacred doctrine would be taken equivocally in this and in the following articles: for it is clear that in them it is not taken for faith. — If theology, it would follow that faith without theology would not suffice for man's salvation: which is false. The inference is evident: because the text says that that doctrine is necessary for human salvation. But the falsity of the consequent is evident in itself, and is convicted by the reason assigned in the text: namely, that man can direct his intentions and actions to a supernatural end through the knowledge of faith.

VI. To this it must be said that sacred doctrine is taken neither for faith, as distinguished against theology, nor for theology, as distinguished against faith; but it is taken for knowledge revealed by God, whether formally or virtually, insofar as it has the character of a discipline and of teaching, abstracting from the character of what is believed and what is known. For the knowledge by which we have need unto salvation, insofar as it is received in man from God teaching, is teaching and discipline, according to that saying of John VI⁷: Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me. And of this knowledge it is said in this conclusion that it is necessary for salvation. And since knowledge of this kind, insofar as it is a revealed discipline, abstracts both from the character of believing and of knowing, and from the character of the revealed thing formally—that is, in itself—and virtually—that is, in its principles—therefore in this place, where the question concerns revealed doctrine apart from the physical disciplines, it is not permissible to descend determinately to any of these.

And so something else is asked here formally, and something else will be asked below in IIa IIae: because here the question concerns doctrine, there concerning believing. And sacred doctrine is taken univocally here and in the following article. Nor does it follow that theology, as distinguished against faith, is necessary; but that theology, as it abstracts from faith and science, is necessary for salvation; which is evidently true, on account of the reason assigned in the text. Nor does this avail: faith suffices: therefore theology is not required: both because theology, as taken here, is contained within faith, as animal within man; and because this science, according to Augustine, XIV On the Trinity⁸, not only nourishes, defends, and strengthens faith, but begets it. And truly it is so on the side of the things to be believed. For faith, although it is from God infusing an inclination to believe, is nevertheless from hearing through the word of Christ with respect to the things to be believed, as is had in Romans X, in the text⁹ and in St. Thomas¹⁰. And thus theology is contained within faith, as begetting it. And if it is inferred: therefore every adult believer believing explicitly etc. is a theologian: it must be said that not simply; but he is a participant in theology in a qualified sense etc., namely according to its principles etc.

VII. Concerning this part, it must be noted that Scotus, in I, question 1 of the Prologue to the First Book of the Sentences, disagrees neither with the conclusion nor with the argument: but with the cause why that end is naturally hidden from us. For we say that that end is naturally hidden from us because it is a supernatural end of our soul: and therefore, however perfectly the nature of our soul might be known to us as regards its natural aspects, it would never be known under the aspect by which it is ordered to such an end; because both the end and that aspect of the soul lie beyond the range of natural things. He, however, holds that this end is natural to our soul, though to be attained supernaturally. And yet he holds it to be naturally unknown: because our soul is not naturally known to us, at least in this present state, under that proper and special aspect by which it is ordered to that end.

VIII. That this end is natural, he proves in three ways. First, by the authority of Augustine (in the book On the Predestination of the Saints¹¹): Therefore, to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of human beings; but to have it belongs to the grace of the faithful. – Second, from appetite. Man naturally desires that end which you call supernatural; therefore it is natural to him. – Third, from the notion of naturalness. A potency, when compared to an act, is either natural, or violent, or neutral; and there is no supernaturalness there: therefore the intellect, or the soul, is naturally ordered to the vision of God, or to fruition. The antecedent, as to its affirmative part, is explained: because a potency either inclines toward such an act, or resists such an act, or is neutrally disposed: if in the first way, it is natural; if in the second, violent; if in the third, neutral. As to the negative part, it is explained thus. The difference between naturalness and supernaturalness is considered in the comparison of the potency to an agent impressing itself naturally or supernaturally upon such a potency: therefore, when the potency is compared to the act, there is no supernaturalness. The consequence, moreover, is proved from the fact that the soul inclines toward every perfection of its own, and especially toward its highest perfection, which is the act of fruition of God, etc.

IX. To make the difficulty of this matter evident, know that among us power is either natural, or violent, or obediential: and this both in relation to act and to agent: nor is there any neutral power in the nature of things, artificial powers being set aside, as will be said in the question on Neutral Power¹² in accordance with this article. Now obediential power is called the aptitude of a thing for whatever God may ordain to be done in it. And in accordance with such a power, our soul is said to be in potency toward the promised beatitude, and the supernatural end, and other things of this kind.

X. Hence, to the first argument of Scotus¹³ it is said that Augustine did not say that the ability to have faith is natural to man, but that it belongs to the nature of men. For it is one thing for a power to be of the nature, and another for it to be natural: the first signifies the subject of the power, the second the mode of the power. And therefore the first is true in the matter at hand; the second, however, false. Indeed, that obediential power for faith and charity is in the nature of men, because they possess an intellective nature; but not in the nature of a lion, since it is repugnant to it. And this was Augustine's meaning. – To the second, the antecedent is denied. – To the third, however, the assumption is denied, both as regards the third member of the affirmative part and as regards the negative part. For supernaturalness is also considered by comparing the power with its act: since there are certain acts which are simply supernatural by their genus, such as grace, glory, and other things of this kind, as will be made clear in another question¹⁴.

XI. But the second conclusion¹⁵ is proved. The discipline by which men more commonly¹⁶, more quickly, and more safely arrive at the knowledge of divine things that are demonstrable is necessary for man: revealed doctrine is of this kind: therefore. – All this is evident in the text; and more fully in Book I Contra Gentiles, chapter IV.

XII. In response to the second objection, note that the argument was this: Every being is knowable through the physical disciplines; therefore nothing remains knowable through revealed doctrine; and consequently it is not necessary. – The first consequence is proved: because nothing is known except what is true, which is convertible with being. But the antecedent is evident from Book VI Metaphysics¹⁷, and inductively.

To this, however, a twofold reply can be given, according as the antecedent can be distinguished in two ways. First thus: Every being, with respect to all that is knowable in it; or not with respect to all, but only to what is abstractible from sensible things, is knowable through the physical disciplines. In the first sense it is false; in the second, true. – Second thus: Every being in every respect; or not in every respect, but insofar as it can be illumined by the light of the agent intellect, is knowable through the physical disciplines. In the first sense it is false; in the second, true. – And although the argument admits both replies, it nevertheless pleased the Author to employ the second reply, not the first explicitly: partly so that he might resolve the opposing difficulties from what is proper to this article itself, namely by the light of divine revelation; and partly because the first reply had already been given in the body of the article, in the first conclusion.

XIII. Nevertheless, Scotus, in the First Book, question 1 of the Prologue, in his solution to the second argument on behalf of the philosophers, censured this response: because according to it the necessity of theology, which that argument intended to undermine, is not preserved. – He proves this as follows. From this response nothing else is obtained except that the same thing is known through theology and through the other sciences, though in a different way; just as through astrology and through physics it is known that the earth is round. Therefore necessity is not preserved, but only the distinction of theology from the others. The consequence holds, by the proportionality you assigned: since once that conclusion, "the earth is round," is known through one of those sciences, the other is not necessary with respect to knowing that conclusion, although it remains distinct from it.

XIV. To this it is answered that a diversity in the mode of knowing is accompanied by a diversity of the object formally taken, that is, of the formal ratio of the object (though at times there is also some identity, in a certain respect, of a conclusion), if the ratio is adequate to the mode. Or at least it is accompanied by a diversity of many knowable truths, if the ratio is inadequate, as is clear below, art. 3¹⁸ Hence the same things, taken under diverse ratios of knowing, induce a diversity among things knowable. And therefore, by saying that there is a diverse ratio of what is knowable, he implicitly intimated also an otherness of the things knowable, which he had already expressed in the first conclusion. And for this reason the antecedent is denied: for from this answer, although explicitly only a diversity of the mode of knowing is contained, implicitly there is contained also a diversity of the things knowable.

But by way of the example from astrology, although it could be said that assimilation in all respects is not required of examples, nevertheless, following the example, it is said that, just as astrology coincides with physics in some conclusion by a different light than physics, and not in all conclusions, so theology, by a different light, considers the same truths as the other sciences, and other truths about the same things. And thus, just as astrology, although it coincides as to subject matter with some conclusion of physics, yet because it considers them by a different light, and consequently other truths, is not only distinct but a necessary science, so too theology is distinct from the others, and necessary.