Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title needs a reminder of what is handed down in III de Anima¹, where two powers concurring in understanding are posited in our soul: one active, called agent intellect; and the other passive, called possible intellect. For this is what is now called into doubt concerning angels: namely whether the intellective power of angels is distinguished into two potencies, active namely and passive, or not. For this is to ask whether in them there are an agent intellect and a possible intellect.

II. In the body of the article he answers the question negatively with a single conclusion, namely: In angels there is neither agent nor possible intellect, except equivocally. – It is proved. The reason for the necessity of each intellect has no place in angels: therefore.

The antecedent is declared first as to the possible intellect; second, as to the agent intellect. For the possible intellect is posited on account of potency to a twofold act, namely to first act and to second act: which has no place in an angel as to natural things, of which the discussion is. – But the agent intellect is posited on account of a defect of the intelligible, namely because it is necessary that the intelligible in potency be transferred to the order of intelligibles in act. Which also has no place in angels: because their proper intelligible is an immaterial quiddity intelligible of itself, as light is of itself visible.

III. Regarding the reasoning proving that there is no possible intellect in angels, the objections of Scotus occur, in the Second, dist. III, last qu.², directly intending to refute it thus. In angels there is a potency receptive of intelligible species: therefore in them there is a possible intellect. The consequence is proved: because it makes no difference whether the receptive potency precedes the received act in duration, or in nature only, in which you posit that the intellect of the angel differs from our possible intellect. – And it is confirmed. Because if God had given intelligible species to man, he would none the less have a possible intellect, as is plain in Christ.

IV. Against the reasoning adduced about the agent intellect³, Scotus argues, ibid., showing the minor to be false, and the opposite to conclude. For the first, that is, adequate, object of the angelic intellect, which you say to be intelligible in act, is either some singular thing or a universal. Not a singular: because no singular virtually contains all things knowable by an angel. Therefore it is some aspect universal by predication to all things knowable by an angel. And since such things are not only immaterial, but also sensible, which are intelligible in potency; therefore the first object of the angelic intellect will be abstracted from the intelligible in potency. Therefore it is not of itself wholly intelligible in act. Therefore an agent intellect must be posited in them.

V. Against the conclusion⁴ he also presses, ibid., thus. An active potency that belongs to perfection in an inferior creature is not to be denied to a superior creature: the agent intellect is of this kind: therefore. – Moreover, the most noble nature ought to have those powers by which it can acquire its perfection for itself, if it does not have it. Therefore angelic nature ought to have an agent and a possible intellect, so that it can acquire for itself cognition, of universals indeed, if it did not have it implanted; and of singulars, which it does not have congenitally.

VI. To these objections it is easy to reply, if the nature of the angels is considered. For as is plain from the preceding questions⁵, the nature of the angel is intermediate between pure act and pure potency in the genus of the intelligible; and it has so much perfection that from what it has of perfection and actuality there flows an intellect not unformed but formed with the natures of all things naturally knowable by the angel; as is plain from what was said above⁶, and is asserted in concord by philosophers Peripatetic as well as Platonic; although from what it has of potentiality it is compared to the formed intellect as recipient to received. Just as in sensible things it comes from the actuality of a nature that properties flow from it; and from potentiality it comes about that they are received in it.

– And because nature, as it does not fail in necessaries, so does not abound by giving superfluities; therefore for no such thing, for which a proper perfection is born to follow by way of a natural sequel that cannot be impeded, was it necessary for nature to be solicitous to give it powers by which it could acquire for itself its proper perfection. For since such a nature is so constituted that its perfection necessarily accompanies it, powers would be superfluously added by which it could naturally acquire the perfection that it cannot naturally lack. – From this root too it manifestly comes about both that the angelic intellect has no motive object as to first act; and that its intellect is never naturally in a state of potency, and consequently needs nothing active.

VII. To the objections to the contrary about the possible intellect⁷, it is said that they are worth nothing, because they do not distinguish between per se and per accidens. For receptive potency is twofold. One is per accidens coeval with its act: and of such the objections proceed, which imagine the angelic intellect to be like our intellect, to which it can happen that it has coeval species. – But another is per se coeval with its perfection, namely because it is naturally inseparable from it, as figure with respect to the heaven: and such cannot be called possible, since it is never in a state of potency. Hence it would be ridiculous to say that the heaven is possible with respect to its figure, among the philosophers, as is plain in IX Metaphys., text. XVII⁸. And such a potency is in the intellect of the angel.

VIII. To the objections about the agent intellect⁹, it is said that they err first, because that object which is posited as adequate by predication is not a universal abstracted from sensibles, either wholly or partially, but is made such by this very fact, that its species are naturally implanted in angels. And therefore there is no need to posit any agent for its abstraction. – They err second, because the necessity of positing an agent intellect is not on the part of the object insofar as it is universal by predication; but insofar as it is in the nature of things actually perfective and motive of the intellect: for it is posited so that it may cooperate with the object in actuating the possible intellect. But it is plain from what was said¹⁰ that there is no such object, namely in the aspect of motive, with respect to an angel; unless perhaps its own substance, or that of some other higher Intelligence, which are evidently intelligible acts.

– They err third, since the object adequate by predication is common to all intellects, namely being or the true; and hence the proper things of no intellect are to be hunted for in it. But the proper object of each intellect is being and the true modified in its per se first motive, or quasi-motive, object: as to our intellect is related the quod quid erat esse of a sensible thing, and to any angel is related its own substance. And by such objects intellects are distinguished from one another, and their proper conditions are taken. Hence it could be said, and rightly, that the object first and per se adequate, in the aspect of natural motive, of any angelic intellect, is a thing singular in being, namely its own essence.

– And when it is objected that it does not virtually contain all things: it must be said that there is no need for the object to contain all things virtually, but it suffices that it contain, representatively, all things naturally knowable, according to the conditions naturally knowable by such an intellect. And this belongs to the essence of the angel, in diverse ways however with respect to diverse things: since it represents higher things as it were as an effect represents its cause, but lower things conversely as it were as a cause its effect. And universally it virtually contains the representative species of both higher and lower things, although not their natures. And this last suffices: since it suffices that the first object virtually contain the cognitions of all things; for it is proper to the divine object to contain both the cognitions and the natures of all things.

IX. As to the objections against the conclusion¹¹, the answer is now plain from what was said¹². For it is false that the agent intellect pertains to the perfection of human nature simply: rather it pertains to its perfection insofar as it is an imperfect nature, indeed most imperfect, in the genus of intellectual things. Since it pertains to the perfection that is acquisitive of one's proper perfection; which presupposes its natural absence; which manifestly implies imperfection. Hence that proposition, an active potency that belongs to perfection etc., is not true except of perfection simply: since many things pertain to the perfection of inferior things which would be imperfections in superior things.

It is also plain to be false that in every nature there are to be posited powers by which it could acquire its perfection, if it lacked it. Since this has place only in those that can naturally lack their perfection: otherwise it would be necessary to posit an agent and possible intellect even in God.

As to the cognition of singulars, there will be discussion below¹³. For now, however, it is denied that the intellect of the angel is in natural potency to any first act, whether it be a universal object, or a singular subject¹⁴.