Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. It requires only that we note that substance stands for the essence, and not for the substantial being (esse) of the angel. And that this question is posed against the philosophers who hold that in altogether immaterial substances, such as the Intelligences, there is no accident; as Averroes holds, in Metaphys. XII, comm. xxv.

II. In the body, a single responsive conclusion is given, proved in three ways. The conclusion is this: Neither understanding nor the action of any creature is its substance.

• This conclusion has two parts: one concerns understanding with respect to the angel; the other concerns any action whatever, with respect to any created substance whatever. And St Thomas intends to prove both parts by the first argument; but by the other two¹, he stays with understanding.

The first argument, then, is this. Only pure act is its own actuality: only God is pure act: therefore only God is his own actuality. But to act is the proper actuality of a power, just as being (esse) is the proper actuality of an essence: therefore only God is his own being and his own acting.

– The major proposition has two exponents: namely, Pure act is its own actuality; and, Nothing other than pure act is its own actuality. And as to this second one, it is proved in the text thus. Everything other than pure act has some admixture of potentiality: therefore it is not its own actuality, because actuality is repugnant to potentiality.

III. Concerning this argument, a doubt arises about the truth of the propositions assumed, and about their efficacy in inferring what is intended. And the reason for doubting is that the assumed propositions must be understood either formally or materially.

If formally, two inconveniences follow. The first is that the first exponent of the major involves a contradiction in terms, saying, pure act is its own actuality. For if it is its own actuality, formally speaking, then something of the pure act has the character of what actuates, and something has the character of what is actuated. – The implication holds: because the formal character of act is relative; and if it terminates in the intrinsic things of the thing, as is said here by that pronoun its own, it is necessary that its term, namely, the potency or the potential, be in the same thing. And thus it is not pure act.

The second inconvenience is that action and power, being (esse) and essence, taken formally and most commonly, would claim for themselves from their proper formal characters this: that one of them, namely action, would be the actuality of the other, namely of the power; and likewise being with respect to essence. The implication is evident: because St Thomas's procedure is founded on this proposition, as is evident in the text, if it is understood formally.

– And it is confirmed: because when St Thomas says, action is the proper actuality of a power, as being is of an essence, he intends this either of them in general or in particular. Not in particular, because he could not have argued from this commonly to God and creature, as he did: therefore in general. – But that conceding this proposition is inconvenient is evident from this, that it would follow that wherever these were found formally, the one would be act and the other potency: otherwise they would not be in it according to their formal characters.

But if they are to be understood materially, then too two inconveniences follow. First, a begging of the question in the major, in saying, only pure act is its own actuality, that is, operation: for this is just what is called into doubt; and what is denied by the followers of the opposite opinion, as is evident of Averroes, Metaphys. XII, comm. xxv. – Second, the nullity of St Thomas's procedure. For it would not be easy to imagine how this procedure could have any appearance, not to say truth, if the character of act and potency were cut away: since the whole of it is founded on these.

IV. Concerning the second exponent of the major², namely, Nothing other than pure act is its own actuality, a doubt arises: since its proof seems inefficacious. For either he intends here to conclude a merely formal distinction; or a formal and real distinction together. Not the first, because from this the intended conclusion would not be had, as is evident of itself: therefore the second. But this does not follow.

First, because that assumed proposition, Actuality is repugnant to potentiality, is true of formal identity, but not of real identity: for it can be that the same thing is actual and potential, as is evident of the very essence of an angel, which is a certain actuality, and potential with respect to existence. – Second, because from having some admixture of potency, the exclusion of all actuality does not follow, but only of pure actuality: for it is not valid to say, A has some admixture of potency, therefore it is not act; but, therefore it is not pure act.

And yet St Thomas assumed this, saying: whatever has something of potency is not its own actuality. – And it is confirmed from that word its own, which imports the same as proper, thus. The proper actuality of a thing having some admixture of potency is defective and in a way potential, since it is not pure act: therefore it has no repugnance to being identified with the thing which is act in such a way that it has some admixture of potency. The implication is evident, because of the proportion they have to one another.

V. For the evidence of this argument of St Thomas, it must be known first that two formal characters can be related to real identity in four ways. For either of themselves they claim real identity for themselves: and these, wherever they are found, are really the same, like the character of being and the character of good, and the like. – Or of themselves they claim non-identity or real distinction, like the character of whiteness and of sweetness: and such, wherever they are found, are distinguished really. – Or of themselves they claim neither. And this happens in two ways: because some are indifferent to real identity and diversity; others, however, incline more towards diversity than identity. For there are some formal characters of things which, neither of themselves nor from the conditions that would accompany them if they were found left to themselves, would have any per se union; as is evident of the characters of justice and wisdom.

– But there are some which, though of themselves they claim neither, yet of themselves claim some per se conjunction between them; and from the conditions concomitant with them, so far as it depends on them, if they were found alone, that conjunction would demand a real distinction of the extremes. And such are the characters of power and operation. For neither of themselves do they have real identity: otherwise in all things they would be really the same. Nor of themselves do they have real diversity: otherwise in God they would be distinguished really.

Nor of themselves do they abstract from all conjunction between them: rather, even of themselves they have a certain per se conjunction, as of a proper perfection and that whose perfection it is. And if these characters are considered alone, so far as it depends on their own merits, this conjunction is not per se in any other way than by the nature of act and potency: for in no other way, even if licence of imagining were given, can a per se conjunction of such things be imagined.

But from the fact that they would be conjoined per se as act and potency, it follows further that they would be distinguished really: for if they were really the same, they would already be conjoined identically; and thus neither would be the act of the other. For although one thing could perhaps be understood as the act of itself, by understanding one as two, yet it is impossible that the same thing be the act of itself: but in the conjunction of certain things per se as act and potency, the one is not only understood but is truly act, and the other truly the potency of it.

VI. It must be known second that for two things to be related as act and potency happens in two ways: namely, formally and virtually. Formally, when one is so found in the thing conjoined to the other that it actuates the other in reality. Virtually, however, when two things are indeed one identically, yet have such formal characters that, if they were conjoined, abstracting from that by which they are one identically, the one would actuate the other in reality. And in this way power and operation are related: for in some things operation actually actuates the power in reality, and the operative power is perfected by it, as is evident in us; but in others power and operation are the same thing, and for this reason operation cannot perfect the power in reality. Yet operation does not thereby cease to be such a being that, if it were not preempted by that which identifies it with the power, it would actuate it in reality. And therefore it can be said that they are then related to each other as act and potency virtually, or conditionally. Just as we say that eternity and immutability are related as caused and cause, not formally, because eternity is not caused in reality by immutability, since they are the same; but virtually, because if it were caused, it would be caused by immutability.

VII. From these things, both the force of St Thomas's argument and the answer to the objections are evident. The force of the argument³ consists in this. Things that are related as proper act and proper potency are not the same except in pure act: power and operation are related as proper act and proper potency: therefore. – The major is founded on this, that such things, wherever they are found with the character of act and potency, are distinguished from each other really.

Therefore, by the destruction of the consequent, if they are not distinguished really, they are not preserved as conjoined as proper act and proper potency. Therefore either each of them will have in that thing the character of potency, which is impossible: or each the character of act. – Or: therefore that in which such things are identified without the remainder of act and potency is either pure act, and the intended conclusion is had; or pure potency: for these two alone, per se speaking, are the proper characters and causes excluding the admixture of act and potency.

But it is impossible that it be pure potency: because such a thing contains act neither formally nor virtually; rather it is the most imperfect of all beings. Therefore it is pure act, which eminently contains in itself both the character of act and the character of potency; and by reason of being act, has actuality; but by reason of being pure, excludes all imperfection of potentiality.

VIII. To the objections to the contrary⁴ it is said that the assumed propositions are to be understood formally: but with the formal understanding of the propositions stands the distinction stated above⁵ between actually and virtually, as is evident in the example adduced and similar ones.

And it is also expressly taught by Aristotle in Caeli II⁶, who, upholding this proposition, the motion of the heavens begins from the east, not materially but formally, explains it in two ways: namely, actually, and so he says it is false, because according to him, the motion of the heavens never began; or virtually, that is, if it were to begin, it would begin from the east, and so he says it is true.

Likewise, therefore, in the matter at hand, pure act is its own actuality can be distinguished, formally understood, as actually, or virtually: and in the first way it seems to involve a contradiction, as was touched on in objecting; but in the second way it is most true. And without doubt it is in this sense that such propositions are made by the doctors: for they do not intend to say that pure act is that which actuates itself; but that it is that which would actuate itself, if it were actuable.

As when we say that God is his own perfection, we do not intend that God is that which perfects himself; but that which would perfect himself, if he were perfectible.

But that common proposition, operation and power are related as act and potency, is understood of power and operation in general: but the same distinction must be used, namely actually or virtually. And thus it does not follow either that in God they are found with the character of act and potency; or that the argument is inefficacious: since, as we have declared in showing the force of the argument⁷, this suffices.

IX. From these things it is also evident what is to be said to the second doubt⁸. For all things are solved by a single distinction: namely that it is one thing to speak of act and potency absolutely; and another of proper act and proper potency. For although one thing that is not pure act can have the character of act and potency with respect to different things, yet it is impossible for one thing to be proper act and proper potency, unless it is pure act, which eminently pre-contains these: since if they are found actually, they would be distinguished really, or the same thing would be the proper act of itself, which is not intelligible. It is said, therefore, that St Thomas intends to infer a real distinction: and that that proposition, actuality is repugnant to potentiality, is true as to real identity, if potentiality is compared with the proper actuality of which we speak. – And likewise, although this consequence is not valid, A has some admixture of potentiality, therefore it is not any actuality; yet this one is valid, therefore it is not the proper actuality, with respect to which it is potential.

– And likewise, although nothing prohibits a thing having something of potency from being a defective act, yet it is impossible for it to be its own act, even a defective one: because then, as has been said many times, it would not be its own act, though it might be understood as such.

X. Note, however, carefully that the aforesaid propositions can be applied in two ways to the intention of St Thomas. First, to show that the angel is not his own operation, because he is potential with respect to it. And thus in this procedure it would be supposed that the angel is in potency with respect to operation: and from this a real distinction from it is proved.

– Second, to show that in the angel there is no character of identification between power and operation, which are related as proper act and proper potency. And according to this, it is supposed that the angel is not pure act: and the real distinction of the angel from his operation is proved, because the character of identity of act and the proper potency of that act is nothing but purity of act. And to this, not to the first, the adduced propositions are to be applied: since in the first way, something would in a way be supposed that is to be proved; but in the second, the procedure is rendered efficacious, as is evident from what has been said.

XI. The second argument⁹ is one leading to the impossible, thus. If the understanding of the angel were his substance, then it would be subsistent: therefore only one: therefore one angel would be distinguished neither from another, nor from God. – The second consequence is proved: because subsistent understanding cannot be but one. Which is proved: because no subsistent abstract can be but one.

XII. Concerning this argument a manifold doubt arises. First, it is doubted about the first consequence, namely: If the understanding of the angel were his substance, it would be subsistent.

For either to subsist is taken there simply. And thus that consequence is indeed excellent: since, speaking of complete substance, which is the subject here, this categorical is necessary, substance is subsistent. But then the second consequence is worth nothing, namely, It is subsistent, therefore only one, as is evident in the following doubt. – Or to subsist is taken there in itself, cutting away everything posterior. And thus that consequence is worth nothing: because that categorical is not necessary, but contingent, substance is subsistent in itself abstractly.

For the perfection simply imported by the name of substance is indifferent to subsisting in itself, as happens in God; and to subsisting in something contracting it to a nature mixed with potency, as happens in angels and other complete substances; just as understanding happens to be substance, namely in God, and accident, namely in us.

XIII. Second, it is doubted whether that consequence: The understanding of the angel is subsistent, therefore only one, is to be understood by reason of matter, or by reason of form.

Not by reason of form, because it does not hold in all cases. For it is not valid to say, A is subsistent, therefore it is only one in species and number (for it is of such unity that the discussion is here), as is evident of the quidditative predicates of the substances themselves: for such a thing is common to many substances according to species, and yet subsists; for it cannot be denied that some essential predicate is common to many angels, and yet subsists in them. And thus it is not valid to say, such a thing is subsistent, therefore it is one only in species and number. Likewise, if whiteness and blackness were subsistent, it would not be valid to say, color is subsistent, therefore it is only one according to species and number.

Nor by reason of matter either. First, because it would be necessary to assign that condition in the understanding of the angel, by reason of which it would hold: which is not done here. – Second, because the proof assumed in the text is universal, and for this reason signifies that the discussion is not by reason of matter.

XIV. Third, concerning that categorical assumed for the proof of the second consequence, namely: Subsistent understanding cannot be but one, a doubt arises: since it is either not to the point, or it is false. This is proved by distinguishing first the term to understand; second, its conjunction with the term subsistent. For to understand can stand either for pure understanding; or for understanding of such a kind, that is, of so great a perfection, such as the natural intellection of Gabriel posits.

If it is understood of understanding simply, granted that the proposition is true, it is not to the point: since angelic understanding is not pure understanding, but of such a kind. – But if it is understood of contracted understanding, it infers nothing else but that such understanding, say of Gabriel, is one in species and number, just as his substance is. And thus the last consequence, namely that one angel would not be distinguished from another nor from God, would be worth nothing.

Likewise, to understand, in whatever way it stands, can subsist in two ways, namely formally, and identically: formally, if by its proper perfection it claims for itself to subsist; identically, if to subsist does not belong to it according to its proper character, but from that to which it is conjoined. An example of each way is had in the case posited¹⁰, if whiteness and blackness were to subsist: for then color would subsist identically, whiteness and blackness formally.

Either, therefore, in that proposition it is intended that understanding subsistent formally cannot be but one: and thus it is not to the point, since the understanding of the angel would not be conceded to subsist thus. – Or it is intended that understanding subsistent identically cannot be but one: and thus in the matter at hand it is false, as can be evident from the example given. And in this way Averroes would say that the understanding of the angel is subsistent: namely because it is the same as the substance of the angel.

XV. Fourth, concerning that other more universal proposition assumed, namely: Any subsistent abstract is only one, a doubt arises, as to what kind of abstraction it is understood of: whether, namely, according to the mode of signifying, or according to the mode of being. If according to the mode of signifying, it is not to the point. First, because the act of understanding is not signified abstractly by this name to understand; but by this name intellection. Second, because the question concerns things and the real modes of things, and not modes of signifying.

But if it is understood of abstraction according to being, it is either of abstraction from the receptive; or of abstraction from anything posterior to its whole formal character. If in the first way, the proposition is false, as is evident in the case posited of color: for then color would be an abstract from every recipient, and yet would be multiplied in subsistent whiteness and blackness. – But if it is understood in the second way, granted that it would be true, it would infer nothing else but that intellection precisely cut off from every contracting thing, if it subsists, is only one; and that intellection of such a kind, that is, of so great a perfection, abstracting from everything posterior to its own proper character, if it subsists, is only one: just as it follows from it that, if color precisely were to subsist, there would be only one; and if such a color, say whiteness, were to subsist, there would be only one whiteness. And thus the intended conclusion would not follow: because with this it stands that there would be many intellections distinct in species, just as it stands that there would be many subsistent colors distinct in species; although there could not be a purely numerical multitude.

XVI. Concerning the last consequence in the same argument, namely: Therefore it would not be distinguished from the substance of God, a doubt arises: since it does not seem valid. For it could be preserved that subsistent understanding would be distinguished from the substance of God by this, that the understanding of God would be not only understanding, but willing, and whatever is in God: but subsistent understanding would be nothing but understanding.

– And it is confirmed: because from the fact that to subsist is attributed to some thing, no intrinsic perfection is added to it; as is evident, if we imagine whiteness to subsist by divine power; for subsistent or non-subsistent it would be of the same intrinsic character, although it would be differently related to being sensed, to depending on a subject, to acting and being acted upon, and the like.

To these objections it must be answered in this order: first to the fourth, second to the second¹¹, third to the third¹², fourth to the first¹³, and fifth to the fifth¹⁴, because the order of doctrine so requires, that we descend from the more universal and formal to the less universal and material.

XVII. To the fourth doubt, then¹⁵ it is said that in that universal proposition, Every subsistent abstract cannot be but one, two terms are posited on the side of the subject, the term abstract, and the term subsistent. And the term subsistent signifies a mode of being: but the term abstract a mode of conceiving. So that the sense of the proposition is: Every thing abstractly conceived, or conceivable, if it so subsists abstractly, cannot be but one.

And the discussion is of abstraction in general from anything whatever contracting or contractive, whether that be receptive, or an essential difference, etc. And the proposition so understood lacks ambiguity, nor has it any counter-instance: since color conceived abstractly both from differences and from subjects, if it subsisted in such abstraction, would be only one. For it could not be multiplied formally: because it would abstract from formal differences. And materially by no means: both because it would abstract from the numerically distinguishing things; and because it would not be possible to assign by what the one would be distinguished from the other, since in both there would be nothing else but color and subsistence.

– Nor is abstraction according to the mode of conceiving beside the point; on the contrary, it clarifies the point greatly. First, because the discourse concerns abstraction of the concept on the side of the thing, and not only on our side. Second, because these hidden matters are intimated by what is better known to us in this way: just as a formal character taken in the abstract is not multiplied if it is taken alone, so too, if it is posited as subsisting in itself in reality, it is shown to exclude multitude. – How this proposition yields the intended conclusion of St Thomas is clear from what follows.

XVIII. To the second doubt¹⁶ it is said that that consequence can be taken in two ways. First, as it stands: and so it is good by reason of matter. In another way, according to what it implicitly carries: and so it is good by reason of form. For if it is formed thus, If understanding is subsisting, then it is only one, it does not hold by reason of form, because this is false: everything subsisting is only one. But it holds by reason of matter, not a special matter, that is, that of understanding, but a general one, that is, that of being abstract: so that in the matter of abstracts this is true: everything subsisting is only one. And because understanding is among the things conceived abstractly, although it is signified not by a noun but by a verb in the infinitive mood, the consequence therefore holds. – But if this consequence is formed explicitly according to what it implicitly contains, thus: If understanding in its abstraction were to subsist, it would be only one, it is good by reason of form. And since its categorical, by whose power it holds, is not this, namely, everything subsisting is only one, but this, namely, every abstract subsisting thing is only one, which alone St Thomas assumed, it must therefore be understood formally in the sense explained.

XIX. To the third doubt¹⁷, which is very difficult, I shall say with God's help what occurs to me. For since the whole difficulty consists in this, whether the discourse is about understanding or about such understanding, we have only two ways, incompatible with each other, of which I see that one or the other must be chosen in order to resolve this difficulty. The first is to deny what the objections suppose, namely, that there is given understanding and such understanding, by abstracting the act of understanding from extrinsic things and stopping precisely at its intrinsic ones: for understanding is not such except either subjectively, as divine, angelic, or human; or objectively, because it terminates at such and such an object. – And according to this, the reply to the objections is very easy: for the present discourse is to be understood of intellection according to its intrinsic features only. And thus the argument would stand: for if the understanding of the angel taken precisely, abstracting from everything extrinsic, namely, subject and object, were, formally speaking, nothing but pure intellection, it follows that, if it were to subsist in such abstraction, it would be pure subsisting understanding; and on that account it would be only one, as is clear from what has been said¹⁸.

But since this reply is less consonant with reason, – first, because all intellection, indeed every immanent act, would be one most specific species, speaking intrinsically, since the account is the same for all; and thus all willing would be of one species, and likewise all seeing, all hearing, etc.; second, because something of the same most specific species would be connaturally common to all the Intelligences and to us; third, because for intellection to be such objectively is not to be such extrinsically, as will now¹⁹²⁰ be shown: – hence it can be said in another and more reasonable way, conceding what the objections suppose, namely, that there are given intellection and such intellection intrinsically, that the discourse of St Thomas is to be understood formally and per se²¹; and that this suffices for the point²².

XX. Now for the evidence of the first, it must be known that intellection can be contracted in three ways: first, by subjects, when it is distinguished into angelic and human; second, by objects, when it is distinguished by being terminated at such and such an object; third, by its own dividing differences, as a genus is divided, or an analogue by its modes. – And the division by subjects is manifestly extrinsic and per accidens: otherwise the same thing would be the per se difference of several things not placed in subalternation; for example, human would be per se a difference of intellection, volition, vision, and other similar things.

The division by objects, however, happens in two ways: namely, according to secondary objects; and this is manifestly extrinsic and per accidens. – And according to primary objects; for example, when intellection is divided into an act of understanding proportioned to the intelligible shining forth in the phantasm, or proportioned to that shining forth in itself. And of such a division I would believe that it is per se and essential: not that I think that objects, even primary ones, are per se differences of the act of understanding (for objects are extrinsic, whereas the differences must be intrinsic to the things constituted by them, since the difference is a part of that which is the being of the thing); but I judge that the essential differences of the act of understanding are taken in relation to such objects, so that they are not separable from such an order. And this can reasonably be said: for understanding itself cannot be separated from its order to its formal object; for if it is asked, what is understanding? it will not be possible to answer except that it is a vital operation concerning the true, or something similar. Now we have learned that the per se differences of some superior are to be taken to be those which diversify that from which the superior formally consists: for the differences of animal are those that diversify it insofar as it is sensitive.

And so, because intellection consists of something not separable from such an object, it follows that its per se differences will be things essentially regarding the diverse per se aspects of such an object: and thus intellection will be like a genus formally divisible by essential differences, or modes. – Nor does it follow from this that the same thing would be the difference of several. For although one thing is the object of the act of understanding and of willing, it is nevertheless presented to each under another formal aspect; to the act of understanding as the species of the true, to willing as the species of the good. Hence the formal object of each is not the same. – So much for the first.

XXI. As to the second²³, it must be said that although the understanding of the angel taken precisely, abstracting from extrinsic things, includes in itself intrinsically two things, namely, that it is understanding, and that it is such, say, proportioned to an intelligible in itself having something of potentiality; it includes nevertheless, beyond these, a mode of perfection, since according to each aspect it posits something of perfection. And since subjects are to be taken so as to be consonant with predicates; and, for the point at hand, to be²⁴ a substance is a predicate pertaining to perfection: therefore the understanding of the angel is here taken, not insofar as it is understanding absolutely (for understanding absolutely abstracts from substance and accident; and so no understanding, insofar as it is understanding, subsists); nor is it taken insofar as it is such (for, as was deduced in the objecting, the intended conclusion would not be concluded); but it is taken insofar as it is understanding having so much of perfection simply. I say simply, as it is distinguished from itself as having something of imperfection mixed in. And thus the understanding of the angel is taken in a middle way between understanding absolutely and such understanding: so that, when it is assumed, if the understanding of the angel were a substance, the term the understanding of the angel supposits for the very act of understanding, and for the mode of its perfection simply.

And the sense is: If the understanding of the angel is of such perfection that it is a substance, then etc. – And thus the discourse is preserved as formal and per se. Formal, indeed, because the discourse concerns angelic understanding as to what belongs to it from the perfection of its understanding. Per se, however, because being perfect is not an accidental predicate, nor one drawing a thing outside its own account; but belongs to each thing within its formal latitude, as was said more fully in qu. IV²⁵.

XXII. As to the third²⁶, it must be said that, as was touched on in the objecting, this procedure could seem insufficient on two counts only: either because it is left undiscussed whether the understanding of the angel, insofar as such, is a substance; or because the distinction concerning subsisting formally and identically is passed over. But that neither of these is an obstacle is made clear.

And as to the first, it is easily evident. First, because, since to be a substance is a predicate expressing perfection simply, if the understanding of the angel according to all that in it which expresses perfection simply is not a substance, then a fortiori it will be less a substance according to that in which it has something of imperfection mixed in; and it is evident that insofar as it is such, it contains something of imperfection. – Second also, because the understanding of the angel insofar as it is such is a subject foreign to a predicate expressing perfection simply, such as substance is: and therefore it is no wonder if it was omitted in a teaching that proceeds from proper principles.

– Nor does it matter that the predicate is not substance absolutely, but the substance of the angel: for if understanding is the substance of the angel, it follows that it is a substance, which is a predicate expressing perfection simply. This is also what is principally intended in this question: for if it is a substance, without doubt it is its own, that is, the substance of the one understanding.

That the second is no obstacle, however, is declared thus. We can imagine that subsisting, or being a substance, belongs to some formal aspect in four ways: first, as a superior to its inferior, as it belongs to man; second, as an inferior to its superior, as it belongs to being; third, as an intrinsic mode, as we say that infinite wisdom subsists; fourth, identically, as we say that the relations in God are substances. And if we wish to consider rightly, the first mode was altogether beside the point: for it is evident of itself that understanding is not inferior to substance. And likewise the second mode was foreign: because substance is not inferior to understanding. For it is evident that neither are the differences of substance differences of the act of understanding, nor conversely are the differences of the act of understanding differences of substance.

Hence only two modes remained. Now either mode, if it were believed to be attributed per se to the understanding of the angel, is sufficiently excluded by this argument: because either of these would pertain to the greatest perfection of understanding itself. For if subsisting belongs per se to the understanding of the angel as its mode of being, or identity with substantiality, it has this from its perfection simply: since each of these posits perfection simply. – To exclude either of them per accidens, however, was not necessary.

First, because being a substance or an accident belongs to no thing per accidens, but these are always essential conditions of things. Second, because only in this way could it be said that understanding subsists per accidens, because identity with substance does not belong to it on its own part, but on the part of substance: but this was foreign to the point, because the substance of the angel, it has already²⁷ been declared, is a thing of finite perfection and is not pure act, and on that account does not have in itself whence to claim for itself identity with everything that belongs to it; for it is on account of these conditions that the substance of God is whatever it has.

XXIII. And through these things the reply to the objections²⁸ is now clear, and wherein the force of St Thomas consists²⁹. For although it is an argument leading to the impossible, the middle term on which it is based is nevertheless the cause of the conclusion. For it is founded on the quantity of perfection of the understanding of the angel itself: and he intends that, if it is of such perfection as to claim substantiality for itself, it will not be compatible with multitude, but will be only one. And he proves the implication: because it would subsist thus in its abstraction; but what subsists wholly abstract is only one.

Hence it is manifestly clear from what has been said that the distinction concerning subsisting identically and formally is no obstacle, nor is that concerning such understanding. And that that categorical is taken thus: Understanding subsisting from its perfection is only one.

XXIV. To the first doubt³⁰ it is said that that consequence is intended of subsisting in itself, or abstractly. And that its categorical is not this, substance is subsisting in itself, precisely; but this: the substance of the angel, for example of Gabriel, is subsisting in itself: for the predicate of the antecedent is this whole, namely the substance of the angel, as is clear in the text.

But this does not save the consequence: because according to this it would not follow, therefore the understanding of the angel would be subsisting in itself as understanding, but, in itself as the substance of the angel; whereas it is evident that the first must be inferred, and not only the second, as is clear from what has been said. – That the sophism of Amphibology would be committed here is declared by the example posited above³¹: for if whiteness were subsisting, color would be a thing subsisting in itself, because it would be whiteness, which would subsist in itself; yet color would not be subsisting in itself, but contracted in whiteness.

And similarly substance, a predicate common to God and creatures, is the substance of Gabriel, which subsists in itself: yet it does not follow, therefore it is abstractly subsisting in itself. – And if it is said that these instances have no place in the matter at hand, because it is clearly evident that understanding and substance cannot be related as superior and inferior, since the differences of neither can be per se differences of the other: this is easily blunted by objecting that, although this is evident, it is not evident that understanding and immaterial substance are not related as being and good, whose per se differences³², although they are formally other, nevertheless coincide identically.

And thus, just as this is not valid, goodness is the same as the substance of the angel, which subsists in itself, therefore it is subsisting in itself; so neither is it valid of understanding.

XXV. It must therefore be said otherwise, first noting how these two modes of subsisting are related to each other, and in relation to substance. Subsisting in another, as animal in man, and subsisting in itself, as man would if he subsisted separately, are related as imperfect and perfect in the same genus (for it is far more perfect to subsist in itself than to beg subsistence from another, as is evident of itself); and as prior and posterior, because that which is per se, in any genus, is prior to that which is through another, as is clear from Physics II, text LXVI³³. – These are compared to substance in this way: that subsisting either in itself or in another follows upon being a substance, unless imperfection prevents it, for example because it is a part of substance rather than a substance: but subsisting in another follows upon being a substance that is formally perfectible, or individually contractible; whereas subsisting in itself follows upon being a substance so complete that it excludes any contracting thing, formal as well as material.

XXVI. With these things standing, it is said that, just as in the antecedent two things are contained, one explicitly, namely, if the understanding of the angel were a substance, and the other implicitly, namely, if the understanding of the angel is of such perfection that it claims for itself being a substance; so in the consequent two things are to be understood, one explicitly, namely, therefore it would be subsisting, taking the term subsisting commonly, the other implicitly, namely, therefore it would subsist in itself. And as the explicit follows from the explicit, so the implicit from the implicit.

And that that is contained in the antecedent is clear from what has been said³⁴. And from the fact that it is known per se that these two perfections simply are, in themselves, disparate: they do not have, from their own accounts, nor from the fact that they are perfections simply, whence they should be joined: but if they are joined, it arises from the magnitude of the perfection of one or of both.

That from this implicit one that other follows, however, is clear from two things. First, because if understanding is posited as of such perfection that it claims for itself the most perfect nature, such as the nature of substance is, it follows that it also claims for itself the most perfect mode of that nature, such as subsisting in itself is. – Second, because since understanding is a perfection simply, and on that account independent of matter according to account and according to being; if it is posited in the nature of things with so great a perfection within its own account that it claims for itself identity with so most perfect a nature, one extraneous to it in itself; a fortiori it is supposed to be of such perfection that it excludes from itself determinability formally and materially, since both import imperfection; and on that account, that it belongs to the order of things not begging being from some contracting thing.

And in such things the consequence is manifestly clear: for if it is a substance, it cannot be anything but a substance so perfect that it does not await being from a contracting thing; and consequently it must subsist in itself.

Taking the consequence, therefore, both according to what is explicitly and what is implicitly contained, since the predicate of the consequent is not simple but contains two, namely subsisting in itself, the predicate of the antecedent too must be composite. And thus its categorical will be, as it were, of a copulated subject and predicate, and will be this: Substance of such perfection is the reason for subsisting in itself.

XXVII. To the fifth³⁵ doubt it is said that subsisting is taken in two ways: in one way, as it signifies only an affirmation of being in the nature of things, and a negation of being sustained in another in any way whatever; in another way, subsisting imports a certain natural mode of a being, to which such a negation and such an affirmation are naturally annexed. In the matter at hand the discourse is not about subsisting in the first way, but in the second: for we speak of the natural subsistence of understanding itself, which is substantiality, and posits perfection simply, and belongs to it only from the highest perfection of understanding itself.

Hence to the objection to the contrary it is said that, if understanding were to subsist naturally, it would be of as much perfection as the act of understanding can have: because it would be modified by no limitation of its own latitude; just as subsisting humanity, according to Plato, would claim for itself the whole perfection of man. And consequently, since understanding is a perfection simply, and on that account is apt to be of perfection simply infinite, it would be necessary that subsisting understanding be infinite. And on that account it would identify with itself every other perfection simply: and thus it would be God himself. – Hence it is false that, if understanding were to subsist, it would be so pure understanding that it would not be willing: on the contrary, it would be both willing and will and deity, etc.

To the confirmation, however, it is said that it equivocates on subsisting. For although subsisting in the first way does not increase intrinsic perfection, to claim subsistence for itself nevertheless posits great perfection: and in perfections simply it argues infinite perfection. – This is also clear from the fact that, since understanding from its own account is not of the genus of substance, if it is of such perfection as to claim for itself this perfection simply which is to be a substance, there is the same reason for it to identify with itself, from that same perfection of its own, every other perfection simply.

For what greater reason is there for this one than for another? And thus understanding would be pure act, etc. – And this distinction concerning subsisting, with this last confirmation, is to be noted: for by that the Scotists³⁶, and by this the Averroists³⁷ are refuted.

XXVIII. The third argument³⁸ is this. If the understanding of the angel were a substance, there could not be degrees in understanding perfectly and less perfectly. – The consequence is proved: because such degrees are reckoned according to diverse participation in understanding itself.

Concerning this argument, first the sense of the consequent is to be noted. For the consequent inferred can have two senses. One is, that in the same angel there could not be more perfect and less perfect understanding. And so the consequence is plain, because the substance of one and the same angel does not admit of more and less. But how the consequent is impossible, I do not see: since no reason appears compelling a diversity of more and less in understanding in the same angel. – The other sense, therefore, and the one intended by St Thomas, is that there would not be diverse degrees of understanding simply.

And this consequence is confirmed on the preceding argument³⁹: for if understanding were to subsist, it would be only one, and on that account would exclude distinction into many degrees.

XXIX. Second, concerning this argument a doubt is raised, because the consequence does not seem to be formally valid. For this is not valid: substantiality is substance or subsists, therefore it is not distinguished into diverse degrees of substantiality; and yet substantiality is a perfection simply, as understanding is. – That this consequence is not valid of substantiality is evident of itself: because substantiality is found in all angels and in complete substances, with so great a diversity of degrees according to more and less perfect.

XXX. To this it is briefly said that the consequence is excellent formally: and that if substantiality were to subsist in its abstraction, it would be only one, nor would it be compatible with diversity of degrees. But the argument is mistaken, because it equivocates on the subsisting of substantiality. For it happens in two ways. In one way, that from its perfection which it expresses, cutting off every admixture of imperfection, it subsists thus abstract: and in this way, as was said, it is only one.

In the other way, as having something of imperfection mixed in from its per se dividing differences, such as are all the differences in the genus of substance: and so the objection proceeds. And therefore it is not against the point. – This perfection simply alone, namely substantiality, however, has both modes of subsisting possible: because all its differences and per se modes constitute some substance in some substantial being, and consequently subsisting.