Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. It requires only that we note that substance stands for the essence, and not for the substantial being (esse) of the angel. And that this question is posed against the philosophers who hold that in altogether immaterial substances, such as the Intelligences, there is no accident; as Averroes holds, in Metaphys. XII, comm. xxv.

II. In the body, a single responsive conclusion is given, proved in three ways. The conclusion is this: Neither understanding nor the action of any creature is its substance.

• This conclusion has two parts: one concerns understanding with respect to the angel; the other concerns any action whatever, with respect to any created substance whatever. And St Thomas intends to prove both parts by the first argument; but by the other two¹, he stays with understanding.

The first argument, then, is this. Only pure act is its own actuality: only God is pure act: therefore only God is his own actuality. But to act is the proper actuality of a power, just as being (esse) is the proper actuality of an essence: therefore only God is his own being and his own acting.

– The major proposition has two exponents: namely, Pure act is its own actuality; and, Nothing other than pure act is its own actuality. And as to this second one, it is proved in the text thus. Everything other than pure act has some admixture of potentiality: therefore it is not its own actuality, because actuality is repugnant to potentiality.

III. Concerning this argument, a doubt arises about the truth of the propositions assumed, and about their efficacy in inferring what is intended. And the reason for doubting is that the assumed propositions must be understood either formally or materially.

If formally, two inconveniences follow. The first is that the first exponent of the major involves a contradiction in terms, saying, pure act is its own actuality. For if it is its own actuality, formally speaking, then something of the pure act has the character of what actuates, and something has the character of what is actuated. – The implication holds: because the formal character of act is relative; and if it terminates in the intrinsic things of the thing, as is said here by that pronoun its own, it is necessary that its term, namely, the potency or the potential, be in the same thing. And thus it is not pure act.

The second inconvenience is that action and power, being (esse) and essence, taken formally and most commonly, would claim for themselves from their proper formal characters this: that one of them, namely action, would be the actuality of the other, namely of the power; and likewise being with respect to essence. The implication is evident: because St Thomas's procedure is founded on this proposition, as is evident in the text, if it is understood formally.

– And it is confirmed: because when St Thomas says, action is the proper actuality of a power, as being is of an essence, he intends this either of them in general or in particular. Not in particular, because he could not have argued from this commonly to God and creature, as he did: therefore in general. – But that conceding this proposition is inconvenient is evident from this, that it would follow that wherever these were found formally, the one would be act and the other potency: otherwise they would not be in it according to their formal characters.

But if they are to be understood materially, then too two inconveniences follow. First, a begging of the question in the major, in saying, only pure act is its own actuality, that is, operation: for this is just what is called into doubt; and what is denied by the followers of the opposite opinion, as is evident of Averroes, Metaphys. XII, comm. xxv. – Second, the nullity of St Thomas's procedure. For it would not be easy to imagine how this procedure could have any appearance, not to say truth, if the character of act and potency were cut away: since the whole of it is founded on these.

IV. Concerning the second exponent of the major², namely, Nothing other than pure act is its own actuality, a doubt arises: since its proof seems inefficacious. For either he intends here to conclude a merely formal distinction; or a formal and real distinction together. Not the first, because from this the intended conclusion would not be had, as is evident of itself: therefore the second. But this does not follow.

First, because that assumed proposition, Actuality is repugnant to potentiality, is true of formal identity, but not of real identity: for it can be that the same thing is actual and potential, as is evident of the very essence of an angel, which is a certain actuality, and potential with respect to existence. – Second, because from having some admixture of potency, the exclusion of all actuality does not follow, but only of pure actuality: for it is not valid to say, A has some admixture of potency, therefore it is not act; but, therefore it is not pure act.

And yet St Thomas assumed this, saying: whatever has something of potency is not its own actuality. – And it is confirmed from that word its own, which imports the same as proper, thus. The proper actuality of a thing having some admixture of potency is defective and in a way potential, since it is not pure act: therefore it has no repugnance to being identified with the thing which is act in such a way that it has some admixture of potency. The implication is evident, because of the proportion they have to one another.

V. For the evidence of this argument of St Thomas, it must be known first that two formal characters can be related to real identity in four ways. For either of themselves they claim real identity for themselves: and these, wherever they are found, are really the same, like the character of being and the character of good, and the like. – Or of themselves they claim non-identity or real distinction, like the character of whiteness and of sweetness: and such, wherever they are found, are distinguished really. – Or of themselves they claim neither. And this happens in two ways: because some are indifferent to real identity and diversity; others, however, incline more towards diversity than identity. For there are some formal characters of things which, neither of themselves nor from the conditions that would accompany them if they were found left to themselves, would have any per se union; as is evident of the characters of justice and wisdom.

– But there are some which, though of themselves they claim neither, yet of themselves claim some per se conjunction between them; and from the conditions concomitant with them, so far as it depends on them, if they were found alone, that conjunction would demand a real distinction of the extremes. And such are the characters of power and operation. For neither of themselves do they have real identity: otherwise in all things they would be really the same. Nor of themselves do they have real diversity: otherwise in God they would be distinguished really.

Nor of themselves do they abstract from all conjunction between them: rather, even of themselves they have a certain per se conjunction, as of a proper perfection and that whose perfection it is. And if these characters are considered alone, so far as it depends on their own merits, this conjunction is not per se in any other way than by the nature of act and potency: for in no other way, even if licence of imagining were given, can a per se conjunction of such things be imagined.

But from the fact that they would be conjoined per se as act and potency, it follows further that they would be distinguished really: for if they were really the same, they would already be conjoined identically; and thus neither would be the act of the other. For although one thing could perhaps be understood as the act of itself, by understanding one as two, yet it is impossible that the same thing be the act of itself: but in the conjunction of certain things per se as act and potency, the one is not only understood but is truly act, and the other truly the potency of it.

VI. It must be known second that for two things to be related as act and potency happens in two ways: namely, formally and virtually. Formally, when one is so found in the thing conjoined to the other that it actuates the other in reality. Virtually, however, when two things are indeed one identically, yet have such formal characters that, if they were conjoined, abstracting from that by which they are one identically, the one would actuate the other in reality. And in this way power and operation are related: for in some things operation actually actuates the power in reality, and the operative power is perfected by it, as is evident in us; but in others power and operation are the same thing, and for this reason operation cannot perfect the power in reality. Yet operation does not thereby cease to be such a being that, if it were not preempted by that which identifies it with the power, it would actuate it in reality. And therefore it can be said that they are then related to each other as act and potency virtually, or conditionally. Just as we say that eternity and immutability are related as caused and cause, not formally, because eternity is not caused in reality by immutability, since they are the same; but virtually, because if it were caused, it would be caused by immutability.

VII. From these things, both the force of St Thomas's argument and the answer to the objections are evident. The force of the argument³ consists in this. Things that are related as proper act and proper potency are not the same except in pure act: power and operation are related as proper act and proper potency: therefore. – The major is founded on this, that such things, wherever they are found with the character of act and potency, are distinguished from each other really.

Therefore, by the destruction of the consequent, if they are not distinguished really, they are not preserved as conjoined as proper act and proper potency. Therefore either each of them will have in that thing the character of potency, which is impossible: or each the character of act. – Or: therefore that in which such things are identified without the remainder of act and potency is either pure act, and the intended conclusion is had; or pure potency: for these two alone, per se speaking, are the proper characters and causes excluding the admixture of act and potency.

But it is impossible that it be pure potency: because such a thing contains act neither formally nor virtually; rather it is the most imperfect of all beings. Therefore it is pure act, which eminently contains in itself both the character of act and the character of potency; and by reason of being act, has actuality; but by reason of being pure, excludes all imperfection of potentiality.

VIII. To the objections to the contrary⁴ it is said that the assumed propositions are to be understood formally: but with the formal understanding of the propositions stands the distinction stated above⁵ between actually and virtually, as is evident in the example adduced and similar ones.

And it is also expressly taught by Aristotle in Caeli II⁶, who, upholding this proposition, the motion of the heavens begins from the east, not materially but formally, explains it in two ways: namely, actually, and so he says it is false, because according to him, the motion of the heavens never began; or virtually, that is, if it were to begin, it would begin from the east, and so he says it is true.

Likewise, therefore, in the matter at hand, pure act is its own actuality can be distinguished, formally understood, as actually, or virtually: and in the first way it seems to involve a contradiction, as was touched on in objecting; but in the second way it is most true. And without doubt it is in this sense that such propositions are made by the doctors: for they do not intend to say that pure act is that which actuates itself; but that it is that which would actuate itself, if it were actuable.

As when we say that God is his own perfection, we do not intend that God is that which perfects himself; but that which would perfect himself, if he were perfectible.

But that common proposition, operation and power are related as act and potency, is understood of power and operation in general: but the same distinction must be used, namely actually or virtually. And thus it does not follow either that in God they are found with the character of act and potency; or that the argument is inefficacious: since, as we have declared in showing the force of the argument⁷, this suffices.

IX. From these things it is also evident what is to be said to the second doubt⁸. For all things are solved by a single distinction: namely that it is one thing to speak of act and potency absolutely; and another of proper act and proper potency. For although one thing that is not pure act can have the character of act and potency with respect to different things, yet it is impossible for one thing to be proper act and proper potency, unless it is pure act, which eminently pre-contains these: since if they are found actually, they would be distinguished really, or the same thing would be the proper act of itself, which is not intelligible. It is said, therefore, that St Thomas intends to infer a real distinction: and that that proposition, actuality is repugnant to potentiality, is true as to real identity, if potentiality is compared with the proper actuality of which we speak. – And likewise, although this consequence is not valid, A has some admixture of potentiality, therefore it is not any actuality; yet this one is valid, therefore it is not the proper actuality, with respect to which it is potential.

– And likewise, although nothing prohibits a thing having something of potency from being a defective act, yet it is impossible for it to be its own act, even a defective one: because then, as has been said many times, it would not be its own act, though it might be understood as such.

X. Note, however, carefully that the aforesaid propositions can be applied in two ways to the intention of St Thomas. First, to show that the angel is not his own operation, because he is potential with respect to it. And thus in this procedure it would be supposed that the angel is in potency with respect to operation: and from this a real distinction from it is proved.

– Second, to show that in the angel there is no character of identification between power and operation, which are related as proper act and proper potency. And according to this, it is supposed that the angel is not pure act: and the real distinction of the angel from his operation is proved, because the character of identity of act and the proper potency of that act is nothing but purity of act. And to this, not to the first, the adduced propositions are to be applied: since in the first way, something would in a way be supposed that is to be proved; but in the second, the procedure is rendered efficacious, as is evident from what has been said.

XI. The second argument⁹ is one leading to the impossible, thus. If the understanding of the angel were his substance, then it would be subsistent: therefore only one: therefore one angel would be distinguished neither from another, nor from God. – The second consequence is proved: because subsistent understanding cannot be but one. Which is proved: because no subsistent abstract can be but one.

XII. Concerning this argument a manifold doubt arises. First, it is doubted about the first consequence, namely: If the understanding of the angel were his substance, it would be subsistent.

For either to subsist is taken there simply. And thus that consequence is indeed excellent: since, speaking of complete substance, which is the subject here, this categorical is necessary, substance is subsistent. But then the second consequence is worth nothing, namely, It is subsistent, therefore only one, as is evident in the following doubt. – Or to subsist is taken there in itself, cutting away everything posterior. And thus that consequence is worth nothing: because that categorical is not necessary, but contingent, substance is subsistent in itself abstractly.

For the perfection simply imported by the name of substance is indifferent to subsisting in itself, as happens in God; and to subsisting in something contracting it to a nature mixed with potency, as happens in angels and other complete substances; just as understanding happens to be substance, namely in God, and accident, namely in us.

XIII. Second, it is doubted whether that consequence: The understanding of the angel is subsistent, therefore only one, is to be understood by reason of matter, or by reason of form.

Not by reason of form, because it does not hold in all cases. For it is not valid to say, A is subsistent, therefore it is only one in species and number (for it is of such unity that the discussion is here), as is evident of the quidditative predicates of the substances themselves: for such a thing is common to many substances according to species, and yet subsists; for it cannot be denied that some essential predicate is common to many angels, and yet subsists in them. And thus it is not valid to say, such a thing is subsistent, therefore it is one only in species and number. Likewise, if whiteness and blackness were subsistent, it would not be valid to say, color is subsistent, therefore it is only one according to species and number.

Nor by reason of matter either. First, because it would be necessary to assign that condition in the understanding of the angel, by reason of which it would hold: which is not done here. – Second, because the proof assumed in the text is universal, and for this reason signifies that the discussion is not by reason of matter.

XIV. Third, concerning that categorical assumed for the proof of the second consequence, namely: Subsistent understanding cannot be but one, a doubt arises: since it is either not to the point, or it is false. This is proved by distinguishing first the term to understand; second, its conjunction with the term subsistent. For to understand can stand either for pure understanding; or for understanding of such a kind, that is, of so great a perfection, such as the natural intellection of Gabriel posits.

If it is understood of understanding simply, granted that the proposition is true, it is not to the point: since angelic understanding is not pure understanding, but of such a kind. – But if it is understood of contracted understanding, it infers nothing else but that such understanding, say of Gabriel, is one in species and number, just as his substance is. And thus the last consequence, namely that one angel would not be distinguished from another nor from God, would be worth nothing.

Likewise, to understand, in whatever way it stands, can subsist in two ways, namely formally, and identically: formally, if by its proper perfection it claims for itself to subsist; identically, if to subsist does not belong to it according to its proper character, but from that to which it is conjoined. An example of each way is had in the case posited¹⁰, if whiteness and blackness were to subsist: for then color would subsist identically, whiteness and blackness formally.

Either, therefore, in that proposition it is intended that understanding subsistent formally cannot be but one: and thus it is not to the point, since the understanding of the angel would not be conceded to subsist thus. – Or it is intended that understanding subsistent identically cannot be but one: and thus in the matter at hand it is false, as can be evident from the example given. And in this way Averroes would say that the understanding of the angel is subsistent: namely because it is the same as the substance of the angel.

XV. Fourth, concerning that other more universal proposition assumed, namely: Any subsistent abstract is only one, a doubt arises, as to what kind of abstraction it is understood of: whether, namely, according to the mode of signifying, or according to the mode of being. If according to the mode of signifying, it is not to the point. First, because the act of understanding is not signified abstractly by this name to understand; but by this name intellection. Second, because the question concerns things and the real modes of things, and not modes of signifying.

But if it is understood of abstraction according to being, it is either of abstraction from the receptive; or of abstraction from anything posterior to its whole formal character. If in the first way, the proposition is false, as is evident in the case posited of color: for then color would be an abstract from every recipient, and yet would be multiplied in subsistent whiteness and blackness. – But if it is understood in the second way, granted that it would be true, it would infer nothing else but that intellection precisely cut off from every contracting thing, if it subsists, is only one; and that intellection of such a kind, that is, of so great a perfection, abstracting from everything posterior to its own proper character, if it subsists, is only one: just as it follows from it that, if color precisely were to subsist, there would be only one; and if such a color, say whiteness, were to subsist, there would be only one whiteness. And thus the intended conclusion would not follow: because with this it stands that there would be many intellections distinct in species, just as it stands that there would be many subsistent colors distinct in species; although there could not be a purely numerical multitude.

XVI. Concerning the last consequence in the same argument, namely: Therefore it would not be distinguished from the substance of God, a doubt arises: since it does not seem valid. For it could be preserved that subsistent understanding would be distinguished from the substance of God by this, that the understanding of God would be not only understanding, but willing, and whatever is in God: but subsistent understanding would be nothing but understanding.

– And it is confirmed: because from the fact that to subsist is attributed to some thing, no intrinsic perfection is added to it; as is evident, if we imagine whiteness to subsist by divine power; for subsistent or non-subsistent it would be of the same intrinsic character, although it would be differently related to being sensed, to depending on a subject, to acting and being acted upon, and the like.

To these objections it must be answered in this order: first to the fourth, second to the second¹¹, third to the third¹², fourth to the first¹³, and fifth to the fifth¹⁴, because the order of doctrine so requires, that we descend from the more universal and formal to the less universal and material.

XVII. To the fourth doubt, then¹⁵ it is said that in that universal proposition, Every subsistent abstract cannot be but one, two terms are posited on the side of the subject, the term abstract, and the term subsistent. And the term subsistent signifies a mode of being: but the term abstract a mode of conceiving. So that the sense of the proposition is: Every thing abstractly conceived, or conceivable, if it so subsists abstractly, cannot be but one.

And the discussion is of abstraction in general from anything whatever contracting or contractive, whether that be receptive, or an essential difference, etc. And the proposition so understood lacks ambiguity, nor has it any counter-instance: since color conceived abstractly both from differences and from subjects, if it subsisted in such abstraction, would be only one. For it could not be multiplied formally: because it would abstract from formal differences. And materially by no means: both because it would abstract from the numerically distinguishing things; and because it would not be possible to assign by what the one would be distinguished from the other, since in both there would be nothing else but color and subsistence.

– Nor is abstraction according to the mode of conceiving beside the point; on the contrary, it clarifies the point greatly. First, because the discourse concerns abstraction of the concept on the side of the thing, and not only on our side. Second, because these hidden matters are intimated by what is better known to us in this way: just as a formal character taken in the abstract is not multiplied if it is taken alone, so too, if it is posited as subsisting in itself in reality, it is shown to exclude multitude. – How this proposition yields the intended conclusion of St Thomas is clear from what follows.

XVIII. To the second doubt¹⁶ it is said that that consequence can be taken in two ways. First, as it stands: and so it is good by reason of matter. In another way, according to what it implicitly carries: and so it is good by reason of form. For if it is formed thus, If understanding is subsisting, then it is only one, it does not hold by reason of form, because this is false: everything subsisting is only one. But it holds by reason of matter, not a special matter, that is, that of understanding, but a general one, that is, that of being abstract: so that in the matter of abstracts this is true: everything subsisting is only one. And because understanding is among the things conceived abstractly, although it is signified not by a noun but by a verb in the infinitive mood, the consequence therefore holds. – But if this consequence is formed explicitly according to what it implicitly contains, thus: If understanding in its abstraction were to subsist, it would be only one, it is good by reason of form. And since its categorical, by whose power it holds, is not this, namely, everything subsisting is only one, but this, namely, every abstract subsisting thing is only one, which alone St Thomas assumed, it must therefore be understood formally in the sense explained.

XIX. To the third doubt¹⁷, which is very difficult, I shall say with God's help what occurs to me. For since the whole difficulty consists in this, whether the discourse is about understanding or about such understanding, we have only two ways, incompatible with each other, of which I see that one or the other must be chosen in order to resolve this difficulty. The first is to deny what the objections suppose, namely, that there is given understanding and such understanding, by abstracting the act of understanding from extrinsic things and stopping precisely at its intrinsic ones: for understanding is not such except either subjectively, as divine, angelic, or human; or objectively, because it terminates at such and such an object. – And according to this, the reply to the objections is very easy: for the present discourse is to be understood of intellection according to its intrinsic features only. And thus the argument would stand: for if the understanding of the angel taken precisely, abstracting from everything extrinsic, namely, subject and object, were, formally speaking, nothing but pure intellection, it follows that, if it were to subsist in such abstraction, it would be pure subsisting understanding; and on that account it would be only one, as is clear from what has been said¹⁸.

But since this reply is less consonant with reason, – first, because all intellection, indeed every immanent act, would be one most specific species, speaking intrinsically, since the account is the same for all; and thus all willing would be of one species, and likewise all seeing, all hearing, etc.; second, because something of the same most specific species would be connaturally common to all the Intelligences and to us; third, because for intellection to be such objectively is not to be such extrinsically, as will now¹⁹²⁰ be shown: – hence it can be said in another and more reasonable way, conceding what the objections suppose, namely, that there are given intellection and such intellection intrinsically, that the discourse of St Thomas is to be understood formally and per se²¹; and that this suffices for the point²².

XX. Now for the evidence of the first, it must be known that intellection can be contracted in three ways: first, by subjects, when it is distinguished into angelic and human; second, by objects, when it is distinguished by being terminated at such and such an object; third, by its own dividing differences, as a genus is divided, or an analogue by its modes. – And the division by subjects is manifestly extrinsic and per accidens: otherwise the same thing would be the per se difference of several things not placed in subalternation; for example, human would be per se a difference of intellection, volition, vision, and other similar things.

The division by objects, however, happens in two ways: namely, according to secondary objects; and this is manifestly extrinsic and per accidens. – And according to primary objects; for example, when intellection is divided into an act of understanding proportioned to the intelligible shining forth in the phantasm, or proportioned to that shining forth in itself. And of such a division I would believe that it is per se and essential: not that I think that objects, even primary ones, are per se differences of the act of understanding (for objects are extrinsic, whereas the differences must be intrinsic to the things constituted by them, since the difference is a part of that which is the being of the thing); but I judge that the essential differences of the act of understanding are taken in relation to such objects, so that they are not separable from such an order. And this can reasonably be said: for understanding itself cannot be separated from its order to its formal object; for if it is asked, what is understanding? it will not be possible to answer except that it is a vital operation concerning the true, or something similar. Now we have learned that the per se differences of some superior are to be taken to be those which diversify that from which the superior formally consists: for the differences of animal are those that diversify it insofar as it is sensitive.

And so, because intellection consists of something not separable from such an object, it follows that its per se differences will be things essentially regarding the diverse per se aspects of such an object: and thus intellection will be like a genus formally divisible by essential differences, or modes. – Nor does it follow from this that the same thing would be the difference of several. For although one thing is the object of the act of understanding and of willing, it is nevertheless presented to each under another formal aspect; to the act of understanding as the species of the true, to willing as the species of the good. Hence the formal object of each is not the same. – So much for the first.

XXI. As to the second²³, it must be said that although the understanding of the angel taken precisely, abstracting from extrinsic things, includes in itself intrinsically two things, namely, that it is understanding, and that it is such, say, proportioned to an intelligible in itself having something of potentiality; it includes nevertheless, beyond these, a mode of perfection, since according to each aspect it posits something of perfection. And since subjects are to be taken so as to be consonant with predicates; and, for the point at hand, to be²⁴ a substance is a predicate pertaining to perfection: therefore the understanding of the angel is here taken, not insofar as it is understanding absolutely (for understanding absolutely abstracts from substance and accident; and so no understanding, insofar as it is understanding, subsists); nor is it taken insofar as it is such (for, as was deduced in the objecting, the intended conclusion would not be concluded); but it is taken insofar as it is understanding having so much of perfection simply. I say simply, as it is distinguished from itself as having something of imperfection mixed in. And thus the understanding of the angel is taken in a middle way between understanding absolutely and such understanding: so that, when it is assumed, if the understanding of the angel were a substance, the term the understanding of the angel supposits for the very act of understanding, and for the mode of its perfection simply.

And the sense is: If the understanding of the angel is of such perfection that it is a substance, then etc. – And thus the discourse is preserved as formal and per se. Formal, indeed, because the discourse concerns angelic understanding as to what belongs to it from the perfection of its understanding. Per se, however, because being perfect is not an accidental predicate, nor one drawing a thing outside its own account; but belongs to each thing within its formal latitude, as was said more fully in qu. IV²⁵.

XXII. As to the third²⁶, it must be said that, as was touched on in the objecting, this procedure could seem insufficient on two counts only: either because it is left undiscussed whether the understanding of the angel, insofar as such, is a substance; or because the distinction concerning subsisting formally and identically is passed over. But that neither of these is an obstacle is made clear.

And as to the first, it is easily evident. First, because, since to be a substance is a predicate expressing perfection simply, if the understanding of the angel according to all that in it which expresses perfection simply is not a substance, then a fortiori it will be less a substance according to that in which it has something of imperfection mixed in; and it is evident that insofar as it is such, it contains something of imperfection. – Second also, because the understanding of the angel insofar as it is such is a subject foreign to a predicate expressing perfection simply, such as substance is: and therefore it is no wonder if it was omitted in a teaching that proceeds from proper principles.

– Nor does it matter that the predicate is not substance absolutely, but the substance of the angel: for if understanding is the substance of the angel, it follows that it is a substance, which is a predicate expressing perfection simply. This is also what is principally intended in this question: for if it is a substance, without doubt it is its own, that is, the substance of the one understanding.

That the second is no obstacle, however, is declared thus. We can imagine that subsisting, or being a substance, belongs to some formal aspect in four ways: first, as a superior to its inferior, as it belongs to man; second, as an inferior to its superior, as it belongs to being; third, as an intrinsic mode, as we say that infinite wisdom subsists; fourth, identically, as we say that the relations in God are substances. And if we wish to consider rightly, the first mode was altogether beside the point: for it is evident of itself that understanding is not inferior to substance. And likewise the second mode was foreign: because substance is not inferior to understanding. For it is evident that neither are the differences of substance differences of the act of understanding, nor conversely are the differences of the act of understanding differences of substance.

Hence only two modes remained. Now either mode, if it were believed to be attributed per se to the understanding of the angel, is sufficiently excluded by this argument: because either of these would pertain to the greatest perfection of understanding itself. For if subsisting belongs per se to the understanding of the angel as its mode of being, or identity with substantiality, it has this from its perfection simply: since each of these posits perfection simply. – To exclude either of them per accidens, however, was not necessary.

First, because being a substance or an accident belongs to no thing per accidens, but these are always essential conditions of things. Second, because only in this way could it be said that understanding subsists per accidens, because identity with substance does not belong to it on its own part, but on the part of substance: but this was foreign to the point, because the substance of the angel, it has already²⁷ been declared, is a thing of finite perfection and is not pure act, and on that account does not have in itself whence to claim for itself identity with everything that belongs to it; for it is on account of these conditions that the substance of God is whatever it has.

XXIII. And through these things the reply to the objections²⁸ is now clear, and wherein the force of St Thomas consists²⁹. For although it is an argument leading to the impossible, the middle term on which it is based is nevertheless the cause of the conclusion. For it is founded on the quantity of perfection of the understanding of the angel itself: and he intends that, if it is of such perfection as to claim substantiality for itself, it will not be compatible with multitude, but will be only one. And he proves the implication: because it would subsist thus in its abstraction; but what subsists wholly abstract is only one.

Hence it is manifestly clear from what has been said that the distinction concerning subsisting identically and formally is no obstacle, nor is that concerning such understanding. And that that categorical is taken thus: Understanding subsisting from its perfection is only one.

XXIV. To the first doubt³⁰ it is said that that consequence is intended of subsisting in itself, or abstractly. And that its categorical is not this, substance is subsisting in itself, precisely; but this: the substance of the angel, for example of Gabriel, is subsisting in itself: for the predicate of the antecedent is this whole, namely the substance of the angel, as is clear in the text.

But this does not save the consequence: because according to this it would not follow, therefore the understanding of the angel would be subsisting in itself as understanding, but, in itself as the substance of the angel; whereas it is evident that the first must be inferred, and not only the second, as is clear from what has been said. – That the sophism of Amphibology would be committed here is declared by the example posited above³¹: for if whiteness were subsisting, color would be a thing subsisting in itself, because it would be whiteness, which would subsist in itself; yet color would not be subsisting in itself, but contracted in whiteness.

And similarly substance, a predicate common to God and creatures, is the substance of Gabriel, which subsists in itself: yet it does not follow, therefore it is abstractly subsisting in itself. – And if it is said that these instances have no place in the matter at hand, because it is clearly evident that understanding and substance cannot be related as superior and inferior, since the differences of neither can be per se differences of the other: this is easily blunted by objecting that, although this is evident, it is not evident that understanding and immaterial substance are not related as being and good, whose per se differences³², although they are formally other, nevertheless coincide identically.

And thus, just as this is not valid, goodness is the same as the substance of the angel, which subsists in itself, therefore it is subsisting in itself; so neither is it valid of understanding.

XXV. It must therefore be said otherwise, first noting how these two modes of subsisting are related to each other, and in relation to substance. Subsisting in another, as animal in man, and subsisting in itself, as man would if he subsisted separately, are related as imperfect and perfect in the same genus (for it is far more perfect to subsist in itself than to beg subsistence from another, as is evident of itself); and as prior and posterior, because that which is per se, in any genus, is prior to that which is through another, as is clear from Physics II, text LXVI³³. – These are compared to substance in this way: that subsisting either in itself or in another follows upon being a substance, unless imperfection prevents it, for example because it is a part of substance rather than a substance: but subsisting in another follows upon being a substance that is formally perfectible, or individually contractible; whereas subsisting in itself follows upon being a substance so complete that it excludes any contracting thing, formal as well as material.

XXVI. With these things standing, it is said that, just as in the antecedent two things are contained, one explicitly, namely, if the understanding of the angel were a substance, and the other implicitly, namely, if the understanding of the angel is of such perfection that it claims for itself being a substance; so in the consequent two things are to be understood, one explicitly, namely, therefore it would be subsisting, taking the term subsisting commonly, the other implicitly, namely, therefore it would subsist in itself. And as the explicit follows from the explicit, so the implicit from the implicit.

And that that is contained in the antecedent is clear from what has been said³⁴. And from the fact that it is known per se that these two perfections simply are, in themselves, disparate: they do not have, from their own accounts, nor from the fact that they are perfections simply, whence they should be joined: but if they are joined, it arises from the magnitude of the perfection of one or of both.

That from this implicit one that other follows, however, is clear from two things. First, because if understanding is posited as of such perfection that it claims for itself the most perfect nature, such as the nature of substance is, it follows that it also claims for itself the most perfect mode of that nature, such as subsisting in itself is. – Second, because since understanding is a perfection simply, and on that account independent of matter according to account and according to being; if it is posited in the nature of things with so great a perfection within its own account that it claims for itself identity with so most perfect a nature, one extraneous to it in itself; a fortiori it is supposed to be of such perfection that it excludes from itself determinability formally and materially, since both import imperfection; and on that account, that it belongs to the order of things not begging being from some contracting thing.

And in such things the consequence is manifestly clear: for if it is a substance, it cannot be anything but a substance so perfect that it does not await being from a contracting thing; and consequently it must subsist in itself.

Taking the consequence, therefore, both according to what is explicitly and what is implicitly contained, since the predicate of the consequent is not simple but contains two, namely subsisting in itself, the predicate of the antecedent too must be composite. And thus its categorical will be, as it were, of a copulated subject and predicate, and will be this: Substance of such perfection is the reason for subsisting in itself.

XXVII. To the fifth³⁵ doubt it is said that subsisting is taken in two ways: in one way, as it signifies only an affirmation of being in the nature of things, and a negation of being sustained in another in any way whatever; in another way, subsisting imports a certain natural mode of a being, to which such a negation and such an affirmation are naturally annexed. In the matter at hand the discourse is not about subsisting in the first way, but in the second: for we speak of the natural subsistence of understanding itself, which is substantiality, and posits perfection simply, and belongs to it only from the highest perfection of understanding itself.

Hence to the objection to the contrary it is said that, if understanding were to subsist naturally, it would be of as much perfection as the act of understanding can have: because it would be modified by no limitation of its own latitude; just as subsisting humanity, according to Plato, would claim for itself the whole perfection of man. And consequently, since understanding is a perfection simply, and on that account is apt to be of perfection simply infinite, it would be necessary that subsisting understanding be infinite. And on that account it would identify with itself every other perfection simply: and thus it would be God himself. – Hence it is false that, if understanding were to subsist, it would be so pure understanding that it would not be willing: on the contrary, it would be both willing and will and deity, etc.

To the confirmation, however, it is said that it equivocates on subsisting. For although subsisting in the first way does not increase intrinsic perfection, to claim subsistence for itself nevertheless posits great perfection: and in perfections simply it argues infinite perfection. – This is also clear from the fact that, since understanding from its own account is not of the genus of substance, if it is of such perfection as to claim for itself this perfection simply which is to be a substance, there is the same reason for it to identify with itself, from that same perfection of its own, every other perfection simply.

For what greater reason is there for this one than for another? And thus understanding would be pure act, etc. – And this distinction concerning subsisting, with this last confirmation, is to be noted: for by that the Scotists³⁶, and by this the Averroists³⁷ are refuted.

XXVIII. The third argument³⁸ is this. If the understanding of the angel were a substance, there could not be degrees in understanding perfectly and less perfectly. – The consequence is proved: because such degrees are reckoned according to diverse participation in understanding itself.

Concerning this argument, first the sense of the consequent is to be noted. For the consequent inferred can have two senses. One is, that in the same angel there could not be more perfect and less perfect understanding. And so the consequence is plain, because the substance of one and the same angel does not admit of more and less. But how the consequent is impossible, I do not see: since no reason appears compelling a diversity of more and less in understanding in the same angel. – The other sense, therefore, and the one intended by St Thomas, is that there would not be diverse degrees of understanding simply.

And this consequence is confirmed on the preceding argument³⁹: for if understanding were to subsist, it would be only one, and on that account would exclude distinction into many degrees.

XXIX. Second, concerning this argument a doubt is raised, because the consequence does not seem to be formally valid. For this is not valid: substantiality is substance or subsists, therefore it is not distinguished into diverse degrees of substantiality; and yet substantiality is a perfection simply, as understanding is. – That this consequence is not valid of substantiality is evident of itself: because substantiality is found in all angels and in complete substances, with so great a diversity of degrees according to more and less perfect.

XXX. To this it is briefly said that the consequence is excellent formally: and that if substantiality were to subsist in its abstraction, it would be only one, nor would it be compatible with diversity of degrees. But the argument is mistaken, because it equivocates on the subsisting of substantiality. For it happens in two ways. In one way, that from its perfection which it expresses, cutting off every admixture of imperfection, it subsists thus abstract: and in this way, as was said, it is only one.

In the other way, as having something of imperfection mixed in from its per se dividing differences, such as are all the differences in the genus of substance: and so the objection proceeds. And therefore it is not against the point. – This perfection simply alone, namely substantiality, however, has both modes of subsisting possible: because all its differences and per se modes constitute some substance in some substantial being, and consequently subsisting.

The title is clear. – In the body of the article he does four things. First, he proposes the responsive conclusion: namely that neither the action of an angel, nor the action of any creature, is its being (esse). – Second, he distinguishes a twofold kind of action: namely of the immanent and of the transient. – Third, he proves the proposed conclusion as to transient action. – Fourth, as to immanent action.

II. And the middle term assumed to prove the point about transient action is that it is an outflow from the agent into act: but being (esse) is signified, that is, is the thing signified, within the agent itself, as the signification also shows: for the term signified belongs on the side of the thing, and not only on the side of the mode of signifying.

As to immanent action, the middle term is that immanent action is infinite simply, or in a certain respect, that is, in some genus: but the being (esse) of each thing is finite, and determined to a certain genus and to a certain species, namely of the thing whose it is: therefore they are not the same. – The major is declared by distinguishing a twofold kind of immanent action, one pertaining to the intellective part, the other to the sensitive part: for the first is infinite simply, because its object extends to all things; but the second is infinite in a certain respect, because its object extends only to certain species. And everything is clear in the text.

III. On this reasoning, note that immanent operation can be taken in two ways: namely in general, for example to understand, to see, etc.; and in particular, or as contracted to this or that subject, for example human understanding, bovine seeing, etc. In the matter at hand the discussion is not about these in general, because then there would be no difference between them and being (esse) in general: but the discussion is about them as contracted to subjects. So that his intention is that, because the being of the human is of a determinate species, whereas human understanding is not, but is infinite, therefore they are not the same.

Note secondly that being determined, or being in some species, happens in two ways: in one way per accidens, or extrinsically; in another way per se, and intrinsically. In the matter at hand the discussion is not about extrinsic, or per accidens, specification, because then the reasoning would be worth nothing, as is very easily plain to anyone who runs through it: but about intrinsic and essential specification.

So that his intention is that, because the being of the human is essentially determined to the species of man; whereas human understanding is not essentially in the species of man, but can be essentially specified by all species of being or of the true, and hence is infinite and simply indeterminate; therefore they are not the same. And the case is similar in other things. – And from this it is plain how conformably to St Thomas we have spoken in the preceding article¹, in not admitting that to understand is an atomic species. For if it were a formally indivisible perfection, it would already be essentially determined to a certain species: and on the opposite of this the present reasoning is founded.

IV. On the foundation of this reasoning there is a doubt. For it can be believed to be twofold: namely either this, Of whatever things the essential specific differences are different, those are different things; or this, Those of which one is of a determinate species, whereas the other can be essentially determined to several species, are different things. – And if indeed the first proposition is the foundation of this reasoning, one must concede that every formal and specific distinction is real: which is not accepted even by the Thomists who hold that a relation is the same as its foundation; nor does it seem consonant with the doctrine of St Thomas². For as the good is distinguished formally from being, so the species of the good and the per se differences of the good are distinguished formally from the species and differences of being: and yet they are the same really.

But if this proposition is said to be false, and this argument is founded on the second proposition, a similar ambiguity returns, and perhaps a greater. Both because the second proposition does not differ from the first except in one respect. For in the first, the otherness alone of specific differences is stated as the cause of real distinction: in the second, otherness and plurality, namely because on the one side there is one constituting difference, on the other side there are several specific differences; for this is how the being of the human and to understand are related.

Now it seems very difficult whence the plurality of other differences has it that it makes a real distinction from the thing of one other difference, if the unity of another difference does not suffice for this. For that plurality effects nothing other than that that to which it belongs is related as a generic nature, just as the unity of a difference makes the thing to which it belongs be related as a specific nature: nor does any reason appear why a thing of one species could not be the same as a thing of a generic nature of another order, if it can be the same as a thing of a specific nature of another order.

– And because the proposition cannot be accepted even by the aforesaid Thomists. For whiteness is of one certain species: but the relation that is posited as identified with it is indifferent to many species, since it is divided into the relation of likeness and of unlikeness, etc. – And it is confirmed. Because to whatever the plurality of specific differences is not repugnant, to that neither are three differences more repugnant than four or ten. And therefore, if something can be one thing and yet be in two species, a thing will be able, no less, to be one and to be in all the species of one genus.

V. To this doubt it is said that the procedure of St Thomas is founded directly and proximately on the second proposition, without however the denial of the first: so that the proximate foundation is this proposition, What is essentially determined as to specific being is not a thing essentially determinable by several specific beings. This proposition seems to be known per se: otherwise one and the same thing would be an essence formally complete with the ultimate formal completion, and would not be complete with the ultimate formal completion; which implies contradictories at once.

And although in this it makes no difference whether the thing is posited as determinable by one specific being or by several, as a generic nature is specified by several; yet more impossibilities follow from the second than from the first. For if it is posited that a specific thing of one order is identically a specific thing of another order, nothing follows but this, that what is essentially determined by the ultimate formal determination is essentially determinable by another formal determination: and thus it would be ultimately determined, and not ultimately determined.

But if it is posited that a specific thing of one order is identically a generic thing of another order, besides the aforesaid untoward consequence two others follow: namely that what is formally determined by the ultimate determination would be a nature essentially formable by many differences; and that it would be two opposed natures, because it would be the same as the two extreme differences dividing that generic thing. Just as if surface were the nature of color, it would follow that one and the same surface would be whiteness and blackness: because every surface would be identically color, and hence this surface would be not only such a color, say whiteness, but would be identically every color; which implies contradiction. Just as if someone were to posit that color signifies one in number, and yet is a genus.

From this it can be plain that, although both propositions are perhaps true, yet only those that speak of the identity and distinction between a specific thing and a generic thing of another order belong to the matter at hand of necessity; which have greater evidence.

VI. Hence to the objections to the contrary³ I think nothing else is to be said, but that the present discussion is to be limited by two or three conditions. The first is that here we speak of real differences, that is, those adding some real aspect. And by this the objections about the good, and the like, are excluded: since they do not add a real thing, but only a relation of reason.

– The second is that we speak of identity per se: since per accidens is excluded from art. And by this are excluded the imaginings of those who speak into the air, feigning that some things are the same really, and that the same thing is essentially determined by the ultimate difference, and determinable by another ultimate difference of another order. For this, speaking per se, is not intelligible. But per accidens, granted that it would not imply contradiction, yet for no reason does such a per accidens seem to be posited: since nature, so far as is possible, abhors the per accidens, and always tends to the per se.

– The third condition is to be added by those who hold that relation is the same as its foundation: namely that the present discussion is about absolutes. But let those who add this third condition consider how they can escape the aforesaid untoward consequences⁴, and above all the third, since the aforesaid were deduced not on account of absolute or respective subject-matter, but from the reasons of the ultimate difference of genus and species, which are common to absolutes and respectives.

In the title note that, since a power is an active or passive principle of operation, it contains two things in itself: namely, the relation of principle; and an absolute thing, which is the proximate reason of acting or undergoing. In the present case the question is not about the relation but about the absolute thing. So the sense of the title is: Whether a power, taken not as a relation but as the absolute thing it signifies, is the same as the substance of the angel.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering in the negative, and it is universal, covering the angel as well as any creature whatever, namely: No operative power, whether of an angel or of any creature, is its substance. – And it is proved thus. The being (esse) of no creature is its operation: therefore the substance of no creature is its operative power.

The antecedent is clear from the preceding article. – The consequence, however, is deduced because, according to the diversity of acts, there must be a diversity of proper powers: for each proper act corresponds to a proper power. But operation and being (esse) are diverse acts, whose proper powers are the substance and the operative power. Therefore the substance and the operative power are diverse.

III. Concerning the aforesaid reasoning a doubt arises on many counts. And first, about that proposition: The diversity of acts requires a diversity of powers¹. For the talk is either of diversity absolutely, or of a certain kind. If absolutely, it concludes nothing: because a distinction among things produced does not infer a distinction among principles, save perhaps a formal distinction of powers, which does not suffice for the point at issue. – If of a diversity of a certain kind, it is either of a formal one: and so again it does not infer the point at issue. Or of a real one: and so it is manifestly false, because with a diversity of real acts there stands the unity of a power, as is clear in the visual power and others; indeed even with a real contrariety of acts, as is clear from II Caeli, comm. XVIII.

IV. Again, the talk is either of every act or of a certain kind. If of every act, an infinite regress manifestly follows: since the operative power is itself a certain act, in your view, since it is posited as an accident, and as subjectively in the soul; and so, if every act requires a proper power, another prior power will precede; and since that one too would be a certain act, it would require another prior one, and so on to infinity. – But if of an act of a certain kind, it will not be easy to assign what kind. For if it is said that the talk is of ultimate acts, one discovers that this is a kind of evasion, because then an ultimate act, inasmuch as it is an ultimate act, would have this property, namely to require a proper power. But this is false: since, as is clear in XI Metaphys.², and II de Anima³, and III Physic.⁴, every act that comes to be per se comes to be in a proper power; but it is evident that not every act that is the per se terminus of some action is an ultimate act; since every absolute accidental form is ordered to some operation.

– But if it is said that the talk is of an act of such a kind, that is, of an act per se awaited by that whose act it is, this is found to be false from the statement of St Thomas, who here subsumes under these propositions that esse is such an act with respect to essence. For it is evident that essence does not await being, nor does any intermediate process of coming to be intervene in order to join such an act to such a power; rather they are generated and corrupted by the same generation.

V. There is also a third ground for doubt from the subsumed propositions, namely: Essence is the proper power with respect to being, and the operative power with respect to operating⁵. For if these propositions are true, together with what was said before, it manifestly follows that, just as operating and being (esse) are always distinguished formally and really, so too every essence will always be distinguished really from every operative power. Which implies a contradiction. Both because no essence of any accidental form would be an operative power: and so heat would not be a heating power. And because no operative power would have being: since it would not be an essence.

VI. Concerning the conclusion itself there are many doubts and objections, inasmuch as it posits that no created substance is the immediate principle of any operation⁶. For either he understands this universally, of the principle both active and passive; or of the active only. If of both, it follows that substance can be the proximate subject of no change. But this is unfitting. Both because the opposite appears in prime matter. – And because this cannot be saved except by positing in every substance certain potential accidents connate with the substance itself, by whose mediation it would be changeable by diverse changes. But this is arbitrary and irrational: because plurality is not to be posited without necessity; for nature does as much as it can from fewer things, as is clear in I Physic.⁷

But if the talk is of the active principle only, it follows that it is supposed here that all the powers of the sensitive and intellective part are active, on the ground that they are operative powers. And yet in II de Anima⁸ the senses are manifestly said to be passive powers; and likewise the possible intellect, in the Third Book of the same work⁹.

VII. Next, against this there are the objections of Scotus¹⁰, in the Second Book, dist. XVI, and in the Fourth, dist. XII¹¹. And first he argues thus. What is ordered to an end, the more immediately it is ordered to it, the more nobly it is ordered: a created substance is ordered in the noblest way to the end to be attained through operation: therefore it will operate immediately.

– And it is confirmed. Because operating immediately belongs to the less noble form, namely the accidental, and to the nobler form, namely the Deity: therefore it belongs also to the intermediate form, namely the created substantial form. – And it is confirmed a second time. Because otherwise an intellectual substance would be blessed per accidens: which is unfitting. The consequence is proved: because it would be the subject of beatitude through a receptive intermediary, in which beatitude would be received, if that intermediary were separated from the substance.

VIII. Second, thus. A substance must be produced by a substance also as by the principle by which the agent acts: therefore substance is an active principle as that by which: which is nothing other than an active power.

– And this is confirmed. Because in your view, the form in which what is generated is assimilated to the generator is the reason and principle of generating: therefore the generative power in any substance is the substance.

And if it is said, conceding that substance is the active principle by which operation and generation proceed, not the proximate but the first, as is said in the definition of nature¹²; and that operative power names the proximate principle: against this there are many objections. First because it cannot be denied that substance is the immediate principle of such an operative power, which you posit to be an accident.

And because it also cannot be denied that substance is the immediate principle of substantial production. For either substantial production is elicited immediately by the substantial form, or by an accidental form. If by the substantial, the point is established. If by an accidental form, then either by its own power: and not so, as is evident of itself. Or by the power of the substance, because it is its instrument: and that this too is false is shown in four ways. First, because an instrument, in your view, moves only when moved by the principal agent: therefore there is some operation of the substance by which it moves the accident to act: which is the principal point intended.

– Second, because the principal and the instrumental cause are ordered essentially as superior and inferior. But it is evident that the superior cause reaches the effect prior by nature to the inferior; and if it is a natural cause, whatever or as much as it can, it acts naturally prior to the inferior. In that prior, therefore, the substance was produced immediately by the substance. And consequently, in the second sign of nature, in which the action of the secondary cause terminates, no substance is produced, unless the same thing is produced twice.

– Third, because where the instrument does not extend, there the action of the principal agent must reach: but the action of an accident does not reach the essence of bare prime matter: therefore the substantial generation that takes place in it must be elicited immediately by the substance. – Fourth, because when an accident is said to cause substance in the power of the substance, the term in the power adds either something absolute or something relative. If absolute, since that would be an accident, the same question will arise. If relative, it is manifestly clear that an accident cannot make a substance from a superadded respect: since a relation does not bestow active power. And that relation too would be an accident.

And because it cannot be denied that substance, in its own order, is the immediate principle of some proper operation, as is clear from the account of the superior principal cause, as we said. – And it is confirmed. Because although God, in the view of the philosophers, causes only by means of second causes, nevertheless he himself is the immediate cause of the proper operation in his own order. Therefore the created substance and the accidental form will stand likewise, granted that it causes only by means of an accident.

IX. Third, he argues by leading to the impossible. Because it would follow that by divine power an intellectual substance could be made without intellect, and conversely: because every prior absolute can be made without another absolute really distinct from itself.

And if it is said that this cannot be done because of the necessary connection between them, from this the point is rather established, for two reasons. First, because that connection is considered not according to the connection of a power to its act (because every power is a power of contradiction, as is said in IX Metaphys., text. XVII¹³), but according to the connection of an active cause naturally to its effect (whence in your view also the powers flow from the essence). Therefore the substance is immediately active: which is the principal point intended. – Second because, since God can supply the place of every extrinsic cause, however necessary such a connection may seem, God will nevertheless be able to make the one without the other.

X. Fourth, he argues from admitted facts and experience. We admit in the first place that an angel understands its own substance through itself: therefore the essence of the angel is the proximate principle of intellection. – We also experience that heated water cools of itself: therefore its own substance is the proximate principle of the cooling.

XI. For the clarity of the present matter, some distinctions must be noted. The first is about act. One kind is adequate to a power, as to understand with respect to the intellect, and to see with respect to sight: another is inadequate, as such an understanding, say to understand an ox, and such a seeing, say of something white. – In the present case the talk is only of adequate acts: since it is verified only of these that powers are distinguished by acts.

The second is about the gradation of things. For some things are intended by nature with primary intention as acts, others as powers: although it happens that things intended as acts have something of power mixed in, and likewise things intended as powers have something of actuality mixed in. And the former are per se primarily and essentially acts: and for this reason are simply located in the coordination of acts. The latter are per se primarily and essentially powers: and consequently are simply located in the order of powers. So that one must imagine that, just as in the genus of substance one finds certain things intended by nature per se primarily as principles of others, so in any genus there are certain things intended per se primarily by nature as the proximate principles of others.

And if this is so, from it we get a third distinction, of act and of power. Because each is twofold. For of acts, one is per se primarily act and secondarily power; another conversely. And likewise of powers, one is per se primarily power and secondarily act; another the reverse. Although in these there is a certain latitude. Because passive powers are acts only modally, inasmuch as some of them inhere in subjects: for from this they have a certain mode of act. But active powers are indeed acts, yet of such a kind that they are essentially intended, and produced in nature for this, to be principles of operations. And for this reason they are located essentially in the genus of principles.

In the present case, therefore, the talk is of an act per se primarily intended in the account of act, and of a power per se primarily intended in the account of power. – That such things are given in nature would require a special question. Yet it readily appears that they can reasonably be posited. Since all practical habits, as Aristotle taught in the Ethics¹⁴, are such things: because they exist for nothing other than to operate. Similarly the formal significates of the powers of the soul exist for nothing other than to operate.

XII. With these things presupposed, to the objections made against the reasoning of St Thomas¹⁵ the reply is that the present talk is of a real diversity, not of just any, but a formal one; not of any acts whatever, but of adequate ones, and per se primarily intended in the account of act. For such a total diversity requires a diversity of powers, inferring it not a posteriori but a priori: since the adequate act is the end of the power, and from II Physic.¹⁶ it is expressly clear that to assign the reason and condition of what is for the end from the end is to give the cause a priori; indeed the foremost cause in natural things, because natural things are for the sake of an end. And therefore that argument, a distinction among things produced does not argue a distinction among principles, is a sophism of Accident: since the acts of powers distinguish powers not as effects but as ends.

XIII. As to what is objected against the subsumed propositions¹⁷, it is said that, as is clear from the words of St Thomas in the reply to the last argument, esse is not taken here universally, as it is something common to the first act, substantial and accidental; but only for substantial being. And the reason is that here it is taken as totally distinguished from the being which is given through operating: but accidental being is not such, because to operate is to have a certain accidental being. And therefore it is no wonder if the accidental form is the proximate principle of being and operating: because both its being and its operating are a certain accidental being. But operating and substantial being do not stand thus, as is evident of itself: because the one is substance, and the other accident.

XIV. To the objections against the conclusion¹⁸, answering in order, the reply is that the present talk, properly speaking, is only of operative power, whether operating is said actively or passively, provided there be a true operation there. And by this all purely receptive powers are excluded, that is, those which have something as act without the mediation of any operation; such as the power of a subject with respect to its proper property, and universally with respect to those things which are per se connate to a thing. Hence it does not seem unfitting to posit such potentialities connate to the substances of things. Nor are beings multiplied without necessity. Since, as is clear in XII Metaphys., in texts XXVI and XXVII¹⁹, in any genus one must give a proper power and a proper act, which are as the principles of that genus²⁰. For from this it manifestly follows that one of two things must be said: either that substance is reductively in the other genera, as power is reduced to the genus of act; or that these connate powers are given. And since the first is unfitting, as even Scotus himself admits²¹, the second must be said. – Nor can that text of Aristotle be answered by saying that he speaks of objective power. Since he expressly speaks of power and act as they are principles of what is in a genus: but it is evident that objective power is not a principle of the thing; rather it is the thing itself, as it is possible to be. – As to what is objected about the power of matter, the reply is clear from St Thomas²², who intends that the power of matter is toward substantial being (esse), with no intervening operation that would be truly an operation, and hence an accident, between matter itself and the substantial form: since in the instant of generation nothing is in matter but the substantial form, with what follows upon it.

XV. To the first argument of Scotus²³ it is said that being the principle of operation happens in three ways: namely either as proximate only, or as principal only, or as proximate and principal together. And that to elicit operation as the proximate principle only is of imperfection: because it must be of the genus of accident. To elicit operation as proximate and principal together is of the highest perfection: because it posits in the thing the perfection of substance and accident. But to elicit as principal only is intermediate: and therefore it reasonably belongs to a created substance, which is intermediate between God and accidents.

Hence to the first it is said that a substance must be ordered to the end in the noblest way, one that is nevertheless possible. But immediacy through the exclusion of an intermediate power is a way impossible for a created substance. – And by this the reply to the first confirmation is clear: namely, that by reason of the excessive perfection it would have, it is repugnant for a created substance to be the proximate principle of operation; since it would be proximate and principal together.

To the other confirmation, unless we wish to abuse words, the consequence is denied: since to operate by means of its own power as that by which is not to operate per accidens.

– And to the proof, it is denied that beatitude is related to the power of an intellectual substance, and to the intellectual substance itself, as color to the surface and the corporeal substance; so that, just as color would inform the surface if it were separated from the body, so beatitude would inform the power if it were separated from the substance. For I say that this conditional is false: since beatitude is essentially a vital operation, which is not intelligible to be except of a living thing. Also because beatitude cannot be except in one who is blessed: but it cannot be imagined that a separated power would be blessed, as a surface would be colored. Hence not only the antecedent and consequent of that conditional are impossible, but also the conditional itself.

XVI. To the second argument of Scotus²⁴, it is conceded that a substance must be made by a substance as by a principal cause, but not a proximate one. – And to the first instance, about the causation of an accident by a substance, it is said that no accident is caused by a substance immediately through an intermediate operation. With this, however, it stands that many accidents follow upon the substance both in the genus of efficient cause and of material cause, by way of natural consequence. And in this way the substance is the cause of its properties and powers.

To the instance about the proper causality of the principal and superior cause, it can be said in two ways. First, by denying that the substance and its operative power are, properly speaking, principal and instrumental cause, superior and inferior: and therefore the objections have no place. And the reason for the denial can be that the substance and the operative power concur not as two causes, but as a cause and, as it were, a condition of the cause. – Second it can be said (admitting that they stand not as superior and inferior cause, but in a way as principal and instrumental) that an instrument is twofold, conjoined and separate: and again among conjoined instruments there is latitude, since heat and the augmentative power can be called conjoined instruments of the soul, yet the power is the more conjoined instrument. Nor is it necessary that every conjoined instrument be moved by the principal agent: rather, that it operate principally, with the principal agent concurring in that operating. Since, taking instrument in this broad sense, it suffices to have this condition of an instrument. – Hence there is no need to answer the objections otherwise, which suppose that the substance and the operative power stand as two causes.

XVII. As to what is touched on, however, about the proximate eliciting principle of substantial generation²⁵, it is said that, in reality, instantaneous substantial generation is not an operation, but is the terminus of the generation that changes matter up to this point. Hence there is no need to seek another principle of it: rather that same one which generated in the whole preceding time generates in the last instant of that time, terminating its action.

And when it is asked how an alteration, or any accident, makes a substance by the power of the substance: – what is that power? Briefly I say it can be said in two ways. First, it is said by some that it is a certain intentional thing, in the way in which the intention of color is said to be in the air. And that although it is an accident according to being (esse), it is nevertheless causally substance, not as the principal cause, but as a force in a way instrumental; which, it is evident, can be less perfect than the effect, as is clear of the forms of seeds, and is approved in XII Metaphys., text. XL²⁶. – Second it is said that the accident itself, by the very fact that it is conjoined to such a substance, is its conjoined organ, and is its power; nor need another power be added. And this I think true in those things which are not true instruments, but the accident and the substance are one cause.

XVIII. To the third argument²⁷ it is said first that that absolute proposition, things really distinct are separable from one another, is false; even in his own doctrine. Since the essential parts taken together, in his view²⁸, are really distinguished from the whole; and yet one could not be made without the other.

Then it is said that the necessary connection between a substance and its power, granted that it were from active causality, would nevertheless not infer that the substance is the immediate principle of any operation, as is clear from what was said²⁹. – Nor does it infer that God can separate them, because he can supply the place of an efficient cause. Since this is understood of the efficient cause properly, namely through an intermediate operation: but the substance is not such with respect to its property, as is already clear from what was said³⁰.

XIX. To what he objects about the essence of the angel³¹, it is said that the substance of the angel is not the eliciting principle of intellection, but the power is. And although the substance concurs in intellection without an intermediate intelligible species, it does not concur as eliciting, but as the source³² of the intellect in act with respect to itself, as will be clear below³³.

XX. To the last, about the cooling of hot water³⁴, it is said in two ways. First, that the principle of that cooling is the form by means of the coldness which has remained in it in some degree: since it cannot be totally stripped of it. – Nor does it matter that that coldness is less than the heat introduced. For although it is less formally, it is nevertheless greater radically or virtually, because of the proper substantial form, its root, of which it is the power and property. And it can happen that the whole in a way undergoes action from the whole, because of the contrariety of the active qualities existing in the whole in continual conflict.

Second it is said, and better, that it cools per se from the generator; and from its proper form only by way of consequence, in the way in which a heavy thing by weighing down breaks what prevents it from descending, and is moved downward. For one must imagine, and so it is, that just as downward motion would naturally follow upon the form of a heavy thing generated outside its place, unless something prevented it; so upon the form of water there follows being cold in such perfection; and if it is impeded from such perfection, the motion of cooling follows, once the preventing factor is removed. And just as a heavy thing by weighing down sometimes overcomes what prevents it, so the cold by chilling overcomes the hot that prevents it, when that hot is deprived of the agent that was sustaining it. And again, just as downward motion follows a heavy thing by means of weight, so the cooling follows water by means of that coldness of which it cannot be stripped.

That it happens in one of these two ways, which are very close, is clear from this, that unless it is said so, one will have to have recourse to extrinsic causes, say the container. But this cannot reasonably be said. Both because the water becomes colder than the container. And because if the container were removed, or posited as neutral, the hot water would nonetheless cool: an evident sign of which is that hot water placed in a container that is not hot grows lukewarm. Hence the container, and any other extrinsic cause, cannot be posited except as a cause per accidens, as removing what prevents. For one must posit nature, which is an intrinsic principle, as the cause of some natural accident, as is clear in II Physic.³⁵

The title needs a reminder of what is handed down in III de Anima¹, where two powers concurring in understanding are posited in our soul: one active, called agent intellect; and the other passive, called possible intellect. For this is what is now called into doubt concerning angels: namely whether the intellective power of angels is distinguished into two potencies, active namely and passive, or not. For this is to ask whether in them there are an agent intellect and a possible intellect.

II. In the body of the article he answers the question negatively with a single conclusion, namely: In angels there is neither agent nor possible intellect, except equivocally. – It is proved. The reason for the necessity of each intellect has no place in angels: therefore.

The antecedent is declared first as to the possible intellect; second, as to the agent intellect. For the possible intellect is posited on account of potency to a twofold act, namely to first act and to second act: which has no place in an angel as to natural things, of which the discussion is. – But the agent intellect is posited on account of a defect of the intelligible, namely because it is necessary that the intelligible in potency be transferred to the order of intelligibles in act. Which also has no place in angels: because their proper intelligible is an immaterial quiddity intelligible of itself, as light is of itself visible.

III. Regarding the reasoning proving that there is no possible intellect in angels, the objections of Scotus occur, in the Second, dist. III, last qu.², directly intending to refute it thus. In angels there is a potency receptive of intelligible species: therefore in them there is a possible intellect. The consequence is proved: because it makes no difference whether the receptive potency precedes the received act in duration, or in nature only, in which you posit that the intellect of the angel differs from our possible intellect. – And it is confirmed. Because if God had given intelligible species to man, he would none the less have a possible intellect, as is plain in Christ.

IV. Against the reasoning adduced about the agent intellect³, Scotus argues, ibid., showing the minor to be false, and the opposite to conclude. For the first, that is, adequate, object of the angelic intellect, which you say to be intelligible in act, is either some singular thing or a universal. Not a singular: because no singular virtually contains all things knowable by an angel. Therefore it is some aspect universal by predication to all things knowable by an angel. And since such things are not only immaterial, but also sensible, which are intelligible in potency; therefore the first object of the angelic intellect will be abstracted from the intelligible in potency. Therefore it is not of itself wholly intelligible in act. Therefore an agent intellect must be posited in them.

V. Against the conclusion⁴ he also presses, ibid., thus. An active potency that belongs to perfection in an inferior creature is not to be denied to a superior creature: the agent intellect is of this kind: therefore. – Moreover, the most noble nature ought to have those powers by which it can acquire its perfection for itself, if it does not have it. Therefore angelic nature ought to have an agent and a possible intellect, so that it can acquire for itself cognition, of universals indeed, if it did not have it implanted; and of singulars, which it does not have congenitally.

VI. To these objections it is easy to reply, if the nature of the angels is considered. For as is plain from the preceding questions⁵, the nature of the angel is intermediate between pure act and pure potency in the genus of the intelligible; and it has so much perfection that from what it has of perfection and actuality there flows an intellect not unformed but formed with the natures of all things naturally knowable by the angel; as is plain from what was said above⁶, and is asserted in concord by philosophers Peripatetic as well as Platonic; although from what it has of potentiality it is compared to the formed intellect as recipient to received. Just as in sensible things it comes from the actuality of a nature that properties flow from it; and from potentiality it comes about that they are received in it.

– And because nature, as it does not fail in necessaries, so does not abound by giving superfluities; therefore for no such thing, for which a proper perfection is born to follow by way of a natural sequel that cannot be impeded, was it necessary for nature to be solicitous to give it powers by which it could acquire for itself its proper perfection. For since such a nature is so constituted that its perfection necessarily accompanies it, powers would be superfluously added by which it could naturally acquire the perfection that it cannot naturally lack. – From this root too it manifestly comes about both that the angelic intellect has no motive object as to first act; and that its intellect is never naturally in a state of potency, and consequently needs nothing active.

VII. To the objections to the contrary about the possible intellect⁷, it is said that they are worth nothing, because they do not distinguish between per se and per accidens. For receptive potency is twofold. One is per accidens coeval with its act: and of such the objections proceed, which imagine the angelic intellect to be like our intellect, to which it can happen that it has coeval species. – But another is per se coeval with its perfection, namely because it is naturally inseparable from it, as figure with respect to the heaven: and such cannot be called possible, since it is never in a state of potency. Hence it would be ridiculous to say that the heaven is possible with respect to its figure, among the philosophers, as is plain in IX Metaphys., text. XVII⁸. And such a potency is in the intellect of the angel.

VIII. To the objections about the agent intellect⁹, it is said that they err first, because that object which is posited as adequate by predication is not a universal abstracted from sensibles, either wholly or partially, but is made such by this very fact, that its species are naturally implanted in angels. And therefore there is no need to posit any agent for its abstraction. – They err second, because the necessity of positing an agent intellect is not on the part of the object insofar as it is universal by predication; but insofar as it is in the nature of things actually perfective and motive of the intellect: for it is posited so that it may cooperate with the object in actuating the possible intellect. But it is plain from what was said¹⁰ that there is no such object, namely in the aspect of motive, with respect to an angel; unless perhaps its own substance, or that of some other higher Intelligence, which are evidently intelligible acts.

– They err third, since the object adequate by predication is common to all intellects, namely being or the true; and hence the proper things of no intellect are to be hunted for in it. But the proper object of each intellect is being and the true modified in its per se first motive, or quasi-motive, object: as to our intellect is related the quod quid erat esse of a sensible thing, and to any angel is related its own substance. And by such objects intellects are distinguished from one another, and their proper conditions are taken. Hence it could be said, and rightly, that the object first and per se adequate, in the aspect of natural motive, of any angelic intellect, is a thing singular in being, namely its own essence.

– And when it is objected that it does not virtually contain all things: it must be said that there is no need for the object to contain all things virtually, but it suffices that it contain, representatively, all things naturally knowable, according to the conditions naturally knowable by such an intellect. And this belongs to the essence of the angel, in diverse ways however with respect to diverse things: since it represents higher things as it were as an effect represents its cause, but lower things conversely as it were as a cause its effect. And universally it virtually contains the representative species of both higher and lower things, although not their natures. And this last suffices: since it suffices that the first object virtually contain the cognitions of all things; for it is proper to the divine object to contain both the cognitions and the natures of all things.

IX. As to the objections against the conclusion¹¹, the answer is now plain from what was said¹². For it is false that the agent intellect pertains to the perfection of human nature simply: rather it pertains to its perfection insofar as it is an imperfect nature, indeed most imperfect, in the genus of intellectual things. Since it pertains to the perfection that is acquisitive of one's proper perfection; which presupposes its natural absence; which manifestly implies imperfection. Hence that proposition, an active potency that belongs to perfection etc., is not true except of perfection simply: since many things pertain to the perfection of inferior things which would be imperfections in superior things.

It is also plain to be false that in every nature there are to be posited powers by which it could acquire its perfection, if it lacked it. Since this has place only in those that can naturally lack their perfection: otherwise it would be necessary to posit an agent and possible intellect even in God.

As to the cognition of singulars, there will be discussion below¹³. For now, however, it is denied that the intellect of the angel is in natural potency to any first act, whether it be a universal object, or a singular subject¹⁴.

The title is clear. – In the body of the article there is one responsive conclusion: In angels there is only intellective cognition. It is proved in four ways. First, by the following reason. In angels, of the powers of the soul there are only those that are not acts of a body: therefore in them there are only intellect and will: therefore in them there is only intellective cognition. – The antecedent is plain, because angels do not have naturally united bodies. – The first consequence is declared by distinguishing a twofold kind of potencies of the soul: namely organic and non-organic. – The second is left known per se.

Second, it is proved by the authority of Averroes, XII Metaphys., comment. XXXVI. – Third, it is proved from the congruity of the order of the universe: namely because the lowest part is wholly sensible, and the middle partly of the sensitive genus and partly of the intellective genus; hence it remains that the highest is wholly intellective. – Fourth, from the names, because they are called Minds and Intellects, the same is urged.

II. On the first consequence a doubt occurs: for it seems bad, from the fact that in angels there is also a motive potency, which is not the act of any body.

To this it is briefly said that, as is plain in III de Anima¹, the motive according to place, on the part of the soul, coincides with the appetitive; although on the part of the body it adds something. Hence since in angels there are no bodies, their motive power coincides with the appetitive. Therefore Aristotle and Averroes said, in the place cited², that the Intelligences move by loving and desiring intellectually. And therefore the consequence was excellent: for the motive power, as it is not an organic power, does not differ from intellect and will.

It can also be said, and more safely, that, because exclusion is not made of concomitants, the motive potency is not excluded by the affirmation of intellect and will alone: for it is their inseparable companion.