Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title needs the most careful annotation. For one must note that, since motion is a name common to motion and to change, this question can be understood in three ways. First, of the simple acquisition of place: namely, whether an angel acquires place in an instant. – And this sense is not to the purpose. And its solution is evident: for an angel can in an instant apply himself to a place, if previously he had been nowhere. In a second way it can be understood of the acquisition of place following upon the angel's stay in another place. And this in two ways. First, so that the question is about the measure of the passage from one to the other: or, what is the same, about the measure of the ceasing of the prior place and the acquisition of the posterior. – And this question also has an evident solution: for it is agreed that such a measure is that of an instant. Nor is it asked in this sense by St Thomas: and for that reason the many arguments of Gregory, recited by Capreolus in the sixth distinction of the Second Book¹, since they pertain to this sense, are not against St Thomas. For they infer nothing else than that the term to which is acquired in an instant, in which the term from which is also left: the opposite of which we are believed to hold. In another way, therefore, it can be understood of the comparison of the proper measure of the acquisition of the term to which with the proper measure of the term from which: namely, whether these two measures are related as instant and instant; or as time and time; or as instant and time. And this is the present question, which St Thomas intends to discuss. Hence to ask whether the motion of an angel is in an instant, in the matter at hand, is to ask: Whether the measure of an angel's passage from place to place is such that the measure of the acquisition of the term to which is related to the term from which as an instant to a time. And this is very much to be noted.

II. In the body of the article he does five things: first, he relates a certain opinion; second, he attacks it; third, he replies according to his own opinion, at: But it is necessary to assign; fourth, he shows what kind of time it is in which an angel is moved, at: In the continuous indeed; fifth, he shows how such a time differs from common time, at: But that time. III. As to the first, he relates four propositions of the opinion. The first is that, when an angel is moved, in the whole preceding time he is in the term from which, but in the last instant he is in the term to which: and by this, he is moved instantaneously. – The second is that between the two terms there is no medium; just as there is none between a time and the terminus of a time. – The third is that there is no last now to be given in which he was in the term from which; just as there is none in generation, etc. – The fourth is that there is a last time to be given in which he was in the term from which. – And this is the opinion which Scotus follows².

As to the second, the first proposition is attacked by the following argument. Every instantaneous change is the terminus of some motion: but the motion of an angel is not the terminus of any motion: therefore it is not an instantaneous change. – The minor is known per se. – The major, however, is proved from the agreement between motion and rest as to measure, in that whatever is moved throughout some whole time is otherwise and otherwise at any point of that time: and similarly whatever is at rest throughout some whole time is in the same condition at any point of it. For from this agreement two modal propositions follow. One is: It is impossible for something to be at rest throughout some whole time, and to be otherwise at the last point of it. The other is: It is possible for something to be moved throughout some whole time, and to be otherwise at the last point of it. From these, moreover, the major is manifestly evident. As to the third, the responsive conclusion is this: The motion of an angel is necessarily in time. And it is proved thus. In the motion of an angel there are two nows: therefore there is time there. – The antecedent is evident, because in his motion, as in any other, one must assign a prior and a posterior: but in the motion of an angel that prior cannot be a time, but is the last now in which he was in the term from which, and the posterior is another now, as is evident from the refutation of the preceding opinion. – The consequence, however, is proved from this, that wherever there are many nows, there is necessarily time. As to the fourth, it is said that the continuous motion of an angel is in continuous time: but discontinuous motion is in discrete time. – And it is proved: because time has its continuity from motion.

As to the fifth, it is said that each time measuring the motion of an angel is other than the time measuring the motion of the heaven: because the motion of an angel does not depend on it. IV. Concerning the refutation of the first opinion, a doubt arises about that proposition on which St Thomas's argument is founded, namely: It is impossible for something to be at rest throughout some whole time, and in the last instant of that time to be otherwise. And similarly about that one: Everything at rest throughout some whole time is in the same condition at any instant of it. The doubt, I say, is whether they are true by reason of form, or by reason of matter. For if they are said to have truth by reason of form, they must be verified in every matter. And yet it has many instances against it. For this is not necessarily true: Everything which is moved throughout some whole time is moved at any instant of it. Both because in no instant is it moved. And because in the first instant it is not otherwise now than before: otherwise it would follow that there would be given a first having been changed in motion. – Nor, again, is whatever is white, or a man, throughout some whole time, a man or white at any instant of it: but it can be that in the last instant of it it is not, as is evident in the corruption of all permanent things; for of these it is truly asserted that in the whole preceding time they are, and that in the last instant they are not. But if it is true by reason of matter, so that it is verified only in these terms, namely in rest and being in the same condition, then one must, first, give the reason why it holds in this matter, and not in others. – Then one must exclude the instances which Scotus brings against this, in the second distinction of the Second Book, qu. XI, which you also have recited in Capreolus, in the sixth distinction of the Second Book³. V. And the first instance is about the instantaneous transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ, although in the whole preceding time the bread was at rest.

The second, however, is about air that is dark and suddenly illuminated: for in the whole preceding time it was at rest under darkness. – And if it be said, he says, that illumination is the terminus of local motion, this does nothing. Both because this is per accidens. And because God could instantaneously produce a luminous body present to air that was at rest in darkness throughout the whole preceding time. And because from this one does not escape the fact that, on the part of the subject, the air was at rest throughout the time in the truth of the matter, and yet in the last instant is otherwise.

The third instance is about the angel himself: for from this proposition it would follow that an angel at rest for some time would never be moved afterwards. – The sequel is proved. For supposing that he is at rest for one hour, either he will begin to be moved in the last instant of that hour; and this not, according to you: or in some instant mediate or immediate to it. Not mediate: because then in the intermediate time he would have been at rest. Nor immediate: because an instant is not immediate to an instant. – And if it be said that he begins in an instant of discrete time, let it be asked what in our time corresponds to that instant: namely, whether the last instant of the hour; or the time immediately following; or some mediate instant. And since nothing can be assigned but the time immediately following, it follows that an angel at rest cannot begin to be moved instantaneously: which is unfitting.

VI. For the clarification of this difficulty, first the sense of the proposition must be seen; then the question must be answered⁴.

As to the first, it must be known that some think two distinctions are tacitly understood in the aforesaid propositions. One is about the term in some whole time: namely first, or not first. The other is about the term at any instant: namely intrinsic, or extrinsic. And they say that the proposition is to be qualified thus: Everything at rest throughout some whole time first, that is, adequately, is in the same condition at any intrinsic instant of it. And in this way they say that the proposition is known per se; and that it was thus assumed by St Thomas. But, with their leave be it said, they seem not to know their own words. For in St Thomas, in their judgment, it is not obtained from this proposition that, if something is such, say a man or white, throughout some whole time, it must be also such in the last instant of it. And yet if this proposition were to be understood thus, it is evidently clear that whatever is a man in some time adequately, is a man at any instant of it. – Nor could the distinction about the intrinsic and extrinsic instant provide an escape. For the first opinion, which St Thomas refutes, did not say that something is at rest throughout some whole time, and in the last intrinsic instant is otherwise, as is evident in the text. – Since, therefore, the intention of the Doctor is to be gathered from the subject on which he speaks; and it is manifestly evident that the first opinion judged the motion of an angel to be related to his preceding rest as the instant of generation to the time of the previous alteration; and it is agreed that neither is that alteration measured by that whole time first, nor is that instant of generation intrinsic to the time as measuring the alteration: the consequence is that, if St Thomas intends to refute the aforesaid position effectively, he must assume the proposition univocally with his adversary; otherwise the question would be only about words. VII. It must be known, therefore, that in the whole time can be distributed in two ways. First, over parts only: so that it is the same to say in some whole time, and, in every part of that time. Second, over parts and over whatever are of it: and thus it is the same to say in some whole time, and, in every part and at every instant of it. And although the proposition is in use in both ways, in the matter at hand it is nevertheless understood in the first sense by philosophers and theologians: otherwise it would be a contradiction in the adjunct to say, when fire comes to be from water, in the whole of that time there is water, and in the last instant there is fire. And in this sense it is agreed that the first opinion said that an angel is at rest throughout some whole time, and in the last instant of it acquires a new place. And since St Thomas intends to contradict it really, and not apparently, it must therefore be said that the term in the whole time is distributed in the same sense. So that the controversy is whether this proposition, A is at rest throughout some whole time, that is, in every part of some time, and in the last instant of it is otherwise, is possible. For the first opinion reckoned it possible, and founded its position upon it: St Thomas, however, reckons it impossible. – And so much for the first.

VIII. As to the second⁵, it is said that this proposition is true by reason of matter, but not by reason of form: that is, it is not verified in all terms, but in these. And each is explained. First, the negative part: because from being such throughout some whole time, it is not formally inferred that one is also such at the last instant of that time. For this conditional is not necessary, if he is a man in some hour, then at the end of that hour he is a man: indeed in fact its falsity appears in the hour measuring his corruption. – The reason why it does not hold formally is evident: namely because the whole time preceding its terminus is compared to it as prior to posterior; nor is it necessary that, if it is such in the prior measure, it persist such in the posterior.

The affirmative part, however, is explained by noting that, since the intention of St Thomas is to treat of the natures and of what naturally belongs to the angels themselves, as much according to the state of nature as of grace, the discourse here is not about the logically possible or impossible, and with respect to the divine power; but about the physically possible, in which attention is paid to what befits the order of things, miracles set aside, not to what God can do. And this is always to be attended to in examining the natures of things, for those following the doctrine of St Thomas. It is said, therefore, that it is impossible, according to the order of natural things, for something to have being (esse) at rest throughout some whole time, and at the end of it to be otherwise. For every having been made in the account of a term to which, or every terminus, is preceded, according to the course of nature, by some becoming: for the order of things, experience being witness, has it that nothing new comes to be so suddenly per se without some way leading to that terminus having preceded. And therefore, since to have some being under rest is not a way to otherness, whether acquisitive or by loss, but to have that being in motion is, because this is to acquire or to lose; the consequence is that what is at rest throughout some whole time is in the same condition at the terminus of it, otherwise it would have come to a terminus toward which it had not proceeded; whereas what is otherwise at the terminus than before arrives at the terminus by a preceding motion. IX. To the instances adduced⁶ against the proposition thus understood, the reply is easily evident from what has been said. For what is adduced about transubstantiation fails in two ways. First, because that is not natural, but exceedingly miraculous; and by this, it pertains to the power of God. – Second, in this, that transubstantiation has no opposed rest, unless we wish to abuse words: since it is not even a motion itself. X. To the second instance, about illumination, it is said that illumination is the terminus of local motion. And in replying to the objections against this, to the first I say that, although illumination, absolutely, terminates local motion per accidens (since we know that the parts near the solar body are of perpetual light, with no approach or recession of the sun from them concurring); nevertheless new illumination, of which alone the present discourse can be to the purpose, is per se the terminus of local motion, not per se primarily, but per se secondarily, according to the course of nature. – And from this the reply to the second is evident: namely that it is not to the purpose, because it speaks of the power of God, not of the course of nature. – To the third, however, it is said that, although the air is at rest according to absolute being (esse) in the whole time preceding the presence of the sun, it is nevertheless not at rest according to relative being: because it is continually otherwise and otherwise toward the sun, according to near or distant being. But because there is not per se motion toward a relation, as is said in V Physics⁷; but something can be continually otherwise according to relative being, on account of a motion not in itself, but in another having some order to it: therefore it stands that the air is neither at rest under darkness nor moved, but, having it continually, is otherwise on account of the motion of another, according to respective being leading to the exclusion of darkness and the acquisition of light. And each of these is posited rationally enough. For because there is no motion toward a relation, therefore neither rest, since they have to come to be about the same thing: but in place of motion there is being otherwise, and in place of rest being in the same condition. And because the privation of light, namely darkness, is not rooted in any form contrary to light, but in the relation of distance or absence between the diaphanous and the luminous; the consequence is that the air, without motion in itself, is continually otherwise according to dark being, consequently upon this, that it is continually otherwise according to being near to the sun, through the motion of the sun itself.

XI. The third instance then fails in many ways, not understanding the mind of St Thomas, who speaks of the proper measure of angelic motion; and of being otherwise or in the same condition in the last instant in the account of a term to which, and not in just any way; and of motion, not through the simple acquisition of the term itself, but as we expounded in the title⁸. Hence that instance equivocates, first, about the motion of an angel, understanding by the name of motion the acquisition of the term. – Second, agreeing with it even in its vocabulary, I say that an angel can in the last instant of some time be in some place both as in a term to which, and as in the beginning of motion. As in the beginning of motion indeed, because he can, after having been nowhere, in one instant of his own time, coexisting with the last instant of some hour, apply himself to a place: for then in the whole hour he was nowhere, and in the last of it he is here; which, according to St Thomas⁹, is not to be moved, but having been changed. As in a term to which, however, because an angel can in two immediate instants of his own time apply himself successively to different places; so that those two instants coexist with one hour, in such a way that the second coexists with the last instant of the hour, and the first with the whole preceding time.

And if it be said that this is what the first opinion said, and that it is attacked here by St Thomas; the reply is that it is not true, but this is believed from a bad understanding of St Thomas. For as was said in the title, the present question is about the comparison of the proper measure of the term to which with the proper measure of the term from which. And the first opinion said that they are related as an instant and the time immediately preceding: and therefore no last instant is given in the term from which, etc. St Thomas, however, holds that they are related as an instant and an immediate instant; and that a last be given in the term from which. – And if it happens that those instants coexist with our time, in the aforesaid way, this is per accidens, and coexistently; and not as in their proper measure. And again, that even in such a contingency (speaking coexistently, and not measuringly) the angel would not be said to have been at rest in the whole preceding time, but to have begun motion, and thus in the last to be in the term to which: or, in the whole preceding time not to have been moved, but in the last to begin motion. And because Scotus and others did not notice this, therefore they did not understand him, attacking what they did not know.

XII. Concerning the fourth part and the fifth¹⁰, where St Thomas posits that the motion of an angel is not measured by the time which is the measure of the first motion, but by another, whether continuous or discrete, the doubt is manifold: namely about the nature of such discrete time, and the necessity of positing it; and similarly about the diversity of such continuous time from common time. And since these partly pertain there, and were treated in qu. X¹¹, and partly would have to be treated separately in a special question; therefore here I have judged that only those objections are to be brought forward which hold on the side of angelic motion. Scotus, therefore, in the second distinction of the Second Book, qu. XI¹², argues against discrete time in three ways, first. Because plurality is not to be posited without necessity: but no reason compels us to posit such a time. Which is explained in three ways. First, because an angel is in place, according to you, by operation. Either, then, a transient one or an immanent one. If an immanent one, it is measured by the aevum: if a transient one, it is measured by common time, or by an instant. – Second, because whatever is saved by discrete time can be saved by continuous time. – Third, because just as it is not unfitting that angels agree with bodies in some corporeal condition of the same account in some way, namely to be in place; so it is not unfitting, according to such being, that they be measured by the same measure by which like conditions in bodies are measured.

XIII. Second, he argues specially against the otherness of such continuous time. Because if it were posited, it would have to be posited chiefly for this reason, that the motion of an angel does not depend on the motion of the heaven. But this does nothing to the purpose. Both because measuring of a quale by a quale, or of a quantum by a quantum, does not require essential dependence; but it suffices that the quantity of this can be made certain with sure knowledge from that. – And because the walking of Peter after the resurrection cannot be imagined to be measured by any other time than common: and yet it does not depend on the motion of the heaven, which will not then be. – And also because the rest of the heaven will be measured by common time: and yet the motion of the heaven will not be. – And also because, in the time of Joshua, the heaven standing still¹³, the motions which were made in the interim were measured by common time.

XIV. To these it is briefly said, that the necessity of positing discrete time, from the nature of angelic operations that follow one upon another, was shown in qu. X¹⁴. – The necessity, however, of positing a continuous time other than common time is assigned by St Thomas here from this, that the mutability of something does not depend on the motion of the heaven.

In replying to the objections on the other side, it is said that the first instance¹⁵ assumes something false on both sides. For neither are the natural immanent operations of an angel measured by the aevum, but by discrete time: nor are the transient operations which they have according to the common course (which I say on account of the movers of the spheres), as such, measured by common time or its instant, as is said in the text. – The second instance also assumes something false. For without discrete time it cannot be saved that a last being of angelic operation be given. Nor can it be saved that they have measures proportioned to themselves: for it is unfitting that angelic operations, which follow one another immediately in such a way that both, each whole at once, nevertheless exist successively, be fitted to the measuring of our time; since, as is evident, neither is our time according to any part whatever all together, nor is our instant stable. – The third instance likewise supposes something false, namely that an angel is the subject of ubi itself and of local motion, as is evident from what has been said¹⁶.

XV. To the first objection, however, specially against continuous motion¹⁷, it is said that it is true that the independence both of the motion and of the mutability of some mobile is the reason why it is not measured by the motion of the heaven. And to the reason on the other side it is said, that a quantum's being measured by a quantum happens in two ways: namely per se, and per accidens. And although for being measured per accidens certainty of knowledge suffices, yet for being measured per se by something, it is required to depend per se on it; not in the genus of efficient cause, as in qu. X, last art., to the last, the Author taught; but in the genus of formal cause, in the way in which the simpler among beings are per se exemplars of the rest, so that the others cannot equal their simplicity and perfection, much less exceed it. For it cannot be understood how measurability by A could be present in something from its nature, and yet it not depend on A. Hence also in X Metaphysics, text. XXI¹⁸, Aristotle says that the measurable is indeed referred to the measure, but the measure is not referred to it. – Hence there is no unfitness in saying that the walking of Peter after the resurrection is not measured per se by common time, just as is also the motion of the angel, of which we speak: because it can be swifter than the motion of the heaven, etc. – The standing of the heaven then, if it had the account of rest, would be said to be measured rationally by potential common time. But since it will have not the account of rest, but of miraculous fixation, therefore the standing heaven is rather measured by the aevum, inasmuch as there is no potency in it to the removal of the state of fixation. – In the time of Joshua, however, it is not established that the first mobile stood, but only the solar body: hence the instance is not to the purpose. Although it could also be said, the cessation of the first motion being conceded, that a miracle does not take away that the lower motions by their nature depend on the first: although, because this dependence is with respect to an extrinsic thing, the divine power can suspend or supply it.