Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. – In the body of the article he does two principal things. First, he proposes a responsive conclusion having two parts, namely: An angel can be moved locally, but equivocally with respect to a body. Second, he declares and proves it together, with regard to three points: the first is that motion does not belong to a body and to an angel for the same reason; the second is what the motion of an angel itself is¹; the third, of what kind it is².

II. As to the first, he introduces this argument. A body is in place as contained and commensurate: therefore its motion is necessarily according to the requirement of place: and hence, from the continuity of the place there is continuity of motion, and from its prior and posterior there is before and after in motion. But an angel is in place as containing the place, not commensurate with it: therefore his motion is not necessarily according to the requirement of place, nor continuous. – The premises are evident from what was said in the preceding question³, and from VI Physic.⁴

III. Two doubts nevertheless remain here. The first is that St Thomas in this procedure argues from the destruction of the antecedent to the destruction of the consequent; and hence seems to proceed sophistically. – The second is whether that causal proposition is true, that continuity redounds from magnitude or space into motion by the fact that the mobile is commensurate with that magnitude. For on this depends the solution of a manifold question: namely whether an indivisible can be moved as the subject of true continuous local motion; and whether the divisibility of space alone is a sufficient reason for the continuity of motion, etc. And since this doubt is proper to VI Physic., it is to be discussed there, God willing; where the opinion and arguments of Scotus on this, in II Sent., dist. II, qu. IX, will be examined.

To the first doubt, however, it must be said for now that the procedure of St Thomas is founded on that rule handed down in I Poster.⁵: if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation; which holds in proper causes, such as he supposes himself to be assuming here.

IV. As to the second⁶, he intends this: The motion of an angel is a virtual contact of diverse places successively. – And it is declared with regard to two points. Both that it is a contact: because to be in place is nothing other than virtually to touch the place. And that it is of diverse places: because he cannot be at once in several places, and hence diverse places must be touched successively. But since it can happen that diverse places are touched not at once, with a middle rest intervening, and then such contacts would not be called the motion of the angel; therefore the term successively is added, that is, being related immediately and consecutively.

V. As to the third⁷, he intends this: The motion of an angel can be continuous, and not continuous. – And each part is declared: because he can, by leaving the whole place at once, transfer himself to another; and he can, by leaving one gradually, acquire another by continuously occupying part of it.

VI. Concerning the aforesaid, note diligently that the mind of St Thomas expressly, and without doubt, holds that local motion, properly speaking, does not belong to spiritual substances: but just as, abusively and equivocally, using names as many do, spiritual substances are said to be in place, so also to be moved locally. Hence for them to be moved is not to be the subject of motion, just as to be placed is not for them to be the subject of ubi; but virtually to touch diverse places, in the genus of efficient cause.

And from this it is evident, first, that the labor of Scotus, in the place cited⁸, was vain, in proving that an angel can truly be moved locally, because he is receptive of some genus, and not indeterminate nor unlimited, etc. For he supposes what he never proved, namely that an angel is receptive of the definitive ubi itself according to substance, as was said in the preceding question⁹. – It is evident, second, that the opinion of those does not seem consonant, who either attribute to St Thomas that spiritual substances are truly moved locally by local motion; or, suspecting this of his mind, assert it as true; and, what is more, glory in understanding St Thomas.

VII. Concerning the continuity of an angel's motion a doubt occurs, whether there is only one operation there, or many. For if there is one, by it he will be in only one place: and thus he would be moved and not moved at once; because he would be in diverse places on account of the motion, and would be in only one place on account of the unity of the operation. – It follows also that angelic motion would be badly defined by the diversity of contacts: since unity of operation entails unity of contact.

But if there are necessarily many operations there, it follows that the motion is not continuous. – And it would follow also that an angel could not maintain or continue the same operation from place to place: which a man nevertheless can.

VIII. To this it is said that, when an angel is said to be moved with continuous motion, it happens that both only one and many operations intervene. For the evidence of which, two distinctions are to be noted. The first is this. It can be understood in two ways that an angel is continuously applied to diverse places: in the first way, so that place and patient accompany each other as to unity and diversity; in another way, so that with diversity of places there is unity of patient. For a third way, namely with diversity of patients there is unity of place, is not to the purpose: because local change does not intervene there, of which we are now speaking. – The second distinction is that for an operation to be one or many happens in two ways: in one way, according as it proceeds from the operator; in another way, according as it terminates in the patient. And this in two ways: namely either in order to something extrinsic to the patient itself; or according to the patient itself.

For from these it is evident first that, whether an angel is said to be moved from the fact that he carries the same stone from place to place, or from the fact that he moves one great body of water gradually, part after part, continuously, there always intervenes diversity of contact and of operation on the part of the patient; either in order to the extrinsic only, namely magnitude or space, as when he carries the stone; or in order to the extrinsic and according to the patient itself, as when he moves the water in the aforesaid way. But that diversity of operation on the part of the operator concur in this continuity, I see to be neither necessary nor impossible: for to save the description of angelic motion, such diversity of contacts on the part of the patient suffices. – Nor does it follow from the unity of the operation that through it he does not touch diverse places continuously: just as from the unity of the placed body it does not always follow that it is in the same place. But just as when a body is moved, in any part of time, and at whatever instants, it is in diverse places (otherwise it would be at rest); yet in single instants it is in one place adequate to it: so an angel operating with one operation on his own part, but a manifold one on the part of the patient, simply or in a certain respect, at whatever instant regards one place; yet in single parts of time, and in any two instants, attains diverse places.

IX. In the reply to the first, a doubt occurs, in that St Thomas seems contrary both to himself and to the truth, when he says that an angel can be said to be moved while he is at the term from which or to which. For in I Sent., dist. XXXVII, qu. IV, art. 1, ad 3, he says that an angel is moved in neither term, but in the succession of one to the other. And the reason is that the motion of an angel is not composed of motions, but rather of completed changes; and hence the parts of his motion are not motions, and consequently he is not moved in either term. – And it is confirmed. Because the motion of an angel is compared to being (esse) at the terms as number to units, in St Thomas¹⁰: and consequently, just as a number cannot be said to be, one unit alone existing, so neither can an angel be said to be moved, one term alone existing. And so, just as continuous motion does not exist upon the arrival of its term, so neither does the motion of an angel: the opposite of which is said here.

X. For the solution of this difficulty, two things are to be attended to. The first is that the terms of angelic motion are of the nature of instantaneous changes in this respect, that in them are found at once becoming and having become, as is said in VI Physic.¹¹. So that any term whatever of angelic motion can be distinguished into becoming and having become: and inasmuch as it contains in itself the having become, the negative is verified, namely that in it the angel is not moved; inasmuch as it contains in itself the becoming, the affirmative is verified, namely that in it the angel is moved. And rightly, because the term from which of angelic motion has not the character of a part of motion, nor the character of term from which, except in relation to the succeeding term; and conversely for the term to which: yet according to such relations the succession of terms is attended to, and consequently angelic motion.

– Second, it is to be attended to that, since motion is of the genus of successive things, and not of permanent ones, angelic motion is related not as a permanent number but as a successive number. Now it is established that a successive number sufficiently is, if it is in the succession of its units. Hence it does not require the units of which it is composed to be at once, but to be in successive act. – And from these the reply to the objections is evident.

Nor impute to me that, in the place that is the term from which, I said there is a relation to the term to which, when the angel, leaving the stone in which he was, has applied himself to the empyrean heaven.

But rather take from my words that in the angel himself operating about one term there is an act mixed with potency, inasmuch as, by operating about it, he will operate immediately about the other. And similarly the operation about the term to which has necessarily two things: namely to succeed the preceding, terminating the aforesaid potency; and what it is absolutely: and sometimes a third, namely a potency mixed in for the succeeding operation.

The title is clear. – In the body he does four things: first, he distinguishes the motion of an angel into continuous and non-continuous; second, he answers the question with an affirmative conclusion concerning continuous motion¹; third, he answers the question as to non-continuous motion, with a negative conclusion²; fourth, he gives the cause of the resulting difference between the motion of an angel and the motion of a body, with respect to the intermediate³. As to the first, nothing needs to be added: because from the preceding article the distinction repeated here is manifest.

II. As to the second, the conclusion is this: An angel by continuous motion necessarily passes through all the intermediates. – And it is proved from the account of the intermediate, from V Physic. And its account is adduced from IV Physic., as is evident in the text. III. As to the third⁴, the conclusion is this: An angel by non-continuous motion cannot pass through all the intermediates. – And it is proved thus. The intermediates between any extreme places are infinite: therefore by discontinuous motion either all cannot be passed through, or infinite things will be counted in act. But for infinite things to be exhausted by actually counting them is impossible. Therefore it is impossible that all the intermediates be passed through by discontinuous motion. The antecedent is proved both as to indivisible places and as to divisible places, by reason and by example: which are sufficiently evident in the text. – The consequence, however, is deduced from the fact that the infinity of places is not exhausted by any mobile whatever, except on account of the continuity of motion. And rightly: since potential infinity can be equaled by potential infinity, and they can correspond to one another; so that, just as in places there are infinite parts and infinite terms in potency, so in what corresponds to it there is a potential infinity of parts and terms, so that parts are equated with parts and terms with terms. The force of the proof stands therefore in this. Infinite places can be exhausted by any mobile whatever only by the continuity of motion: therefore by discontinuous motion they are either not passed through; or, if they are said to be passed through, they will be actually numbered, since the single places will actually terminate the partial changes that make up the discontinuous motion. IV. As to the fourth⁵, since from what has been said it follows that an angel can pass from extreme to extreme, no intermediate being passed through, when he is moved by discontinuous motion; indeed it is necessary that in such motion he omit some intermediate; and on the other hand it is established that a body cannot pass from extreme to extreme except through all the intermediates: the reason of this difference is given, that a body is contained under place, in act or in potency, according to the whole or parts; but an angel contains the place. etc. V. Concerning the antecedent assumed for the second conclusion⁶, a little question occurs, how it is true that between any two divisible places there are infinite intermediate places: since it plainly appears that between two halves of some continuum only one intermediate is found, namely the indivisible which is the common term to which they are joined; and no divisible intermediate is found between them.

To this it must be said briefly, that it is one thing to speak of two parts of a continuum, and another of two places; since, formally speaking, they are not two places which, as such, are not positionally distant. And therefore two parts of a continuous magnitude can be taken in two ways. In one way, on the side by which they are continued or contiguous: and so, since they are in the same place, they cannot have the character of two places, nor can there be local motion between them. But if they are taken on the side by which they in some way are distant from each other, thus there can be local motion from one to the other, and between them there are infinite intermediates, both divisible and indivisible, as is evident from the account of the continuum. And because St Thomas was speaking formally of the plurality of places as several, and not of the parts of a continuum absolutely; therefore he said very well that between any two places there are infinite intermediate places; and did not say that between any two parts there are infinite parts.

VI. Concerning the second conclusion, note that Scotus, in the second distinction of Book II, last question, holding that an angel cannot acquire by instantaneous change a term distant from the term from which, unless the intermediate be passed through, argues with this reason. An order prefixed by a superior agent seems necessary for any inferior agent, when it has action about such ordered things: but the order of the parts of the universe, according to which positional distance is considered, is prefixed by God to every created power: therefore when an angel moves himself through such bodies, he cannot without such order transfer himself from one to another. – And it is confirmed: because otherwise no distance or distinction whatever would hinder his action.

To this it is said briefly, that the minor is simply false: since such an order is not prefixed to an immaterial power, inasmuch as it is motive in discontinuous motion. Since on its own part it is free from the laws of positional distance, as being of a higher order: nor on the part of the effect is it bound to that order, since they are posited as discontinuous. – To the confirmation, however, it is said that neither the distance of places from one another nor their distinction hinders the succeeding operation from being able to terminate at the other: since, the operation having been released from one place, it is related indifferently and without distance to any place.

The title needs the most careful annotation. For one must note that, since motion is a name common to motion and to change, this question can be understood in three ways. First, of the simple acquisition of place: namely, whether an angel acquires place in an instant. – And this sense is not to the purpose. And its solution is evident: for an angel can in an instant apply himself to a place, if previously he had been nowhere. In a second way it can be understood of the acquisition of place following upon the angel's stay in another place. And this in two ways. First, so that the question is about the measure of the passage from one to the other: or, what is the same, about the measure of the ceasing of the prior place and the acquisition of the posterior. – And this question also has an evident solution: for it is agreed that such a measure is that of an instant. Nor is it asked in this sense by St Thomas: and for that reason the many arguments of Gregory, recited by Capreolus in the sixth distinction of the Second Book¹, since they pertain to this sense, are not against St Thomas. For they infer nothing else than that the term to which is acquired in an instant, in which the term from which is also left: the opposite of which we are believed to hold. In another way, therefore, it can be understood of the comparison of the proper measure of the acquisition of the term to which with the proper measure of the term from which: namely, whether these two measures are related as instant and instant; or as time and time; or as instant and time. And this is the present question, which St Thomas intends to discuss. Hence to ask whether the motion of an angel is in an instant, in the matter at hand, is to ask: Whether the measure of an angel's passage from place to place is such that the measure of the acquisition of the term to which is related to the term from which as an instant to a time. And this is very much to be noted.

II. In the body of the article he does five things: first, he relates a certain opinion; second, he attacks it; third, he replies according to his own opinion, at: But it is necessary to assign; fourth, he shows what kind of time it is in which an angel is moved, at: In the continuous indeed; fifth, he shows how such a time differs from common time, at: But that time. III. As to the first, he relates four propositions of the opinion. The first is that, when an angel is moved, in the whole preceding time he is in the term from which, but in the last instant he is in the term to which: and by this, he is moved instantaneously. – The second is that between the two terms there is no medium; just as there is none between a time and the terminus of a time. – The third is that there is no last now to be given in which he was in the term from which; just as there is none in generation, etc. – The fourth is that there is a last time to be given in which he was in the term from which. – And this is the opinion which Scotus follows².

As to the second, the first proposition is attacked by the following argument. Every instantaneous change is the terminus of some motion: but the motion of an angel is not the terminus of any motion: therefore it is not an instantaneous change. – The minor is known per se. – The major, however, is proved from the agreement between motion and rest as to measure, in that whatever is moved throughout some whole time is otherwise and otherwise at any point of that time: and similarly whatever is at rest throughout some whole time is in the same condition at any point of it. For from this agreement two modal propositions follow. One is: It is impossible for something to be at rest throughout some whole time, and to be otherwise at the last point of it. The other is: It is possible for something to be moved throughout some whole time, and to be otherwise at the last point of it. From these, moreover, the major is manifestly evident. As to the third, the responsive conclusion is this: The motion of an angel is necessarily in time. And it is proved thus. In the motion of an angel there are two nows: therefore there is time there. – The antecedent is evident, because in his motion, as in any other, one must assign a prior and a posterior: but in the motion of an angel that prior cannot be a time, but is the last now in which he was in the term from which, and the posterior is another now, as is evident from the refutation of the preceding opinion. – The consequence, however, is proved from this, that wherever there are many nows, there is necessarily time. As to the fourth, it is said that the continuous motion of an angel is in continuous time: but discontinuous motion is in discrete time. – And it is proved: because time has its continuity from motion.

As to the fifth, it is said that each time measuring the motion of an angel is other than the time measuring the motion of the heaven: because the motion of an angel does not depend on it. IV. Concerning the refutation of the first opinion, a doubt arises about that proposition on which St Thomas's argument is founded, namely: It is impossible for something to be at rest throughout some whole time, and in the last instant of that time to be otherwise. And similarly about that one: Everything at rest throughout some whole time is in the same condition at any instant of it. The doubt, I say, is whether they are true by reason of form, or by reason of matter. For if they are said to have truth by reason of form, they must be verified in every matter. And yet it has many instances against it. For this is not necessarily true: Everything which is moved throughout some whole time is moved at any instant of it. Both because in no instant is it moved. And because in the first instant it is not otherwise now than before: otherwise it would follow that there would be given a first having been changed in motion. – Nor, again, is whatever is white, or a man, throughout some whole time, a man or white at any instant of it: but it can be that in the last instant of it it is not, as is evident in the corruption of all permanent things; for of these it is truly asserted that in the whole preceding time they are, and that in the last instant they are not. But if it is true by reason of matter, so that it is verified only in these terms, namely in rest and being in the same condition, then one must, first, give the reason why it holds in this matter, and not in others. – Then one must exclude the instances which Scotus brings against this, in the second distinction of the Second Book, qu. XI, which you also have recited in Capreolus, in the sixth distinction of the Second Book³. V. And the first instance is about the instantaneous transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ, although in the whole preceding time the bread was at rest.

The second, however, is about air that is dark and suddenly illuminated: for in the whole preceding time it was at rest under darkness. – And if it be said, he says, that illumination is the terminus of local motion, this does nothing. Both because this is per accidens. And because God could instantaneously produce a luminous body present to air that was at rest in darkness throughout the whole preceding time. And because from this one does not escape the fact that, on the part of the subject, the air was at rest throughout the time in the truth of the matter, and yet in the last instant is otherwise.

The third instance is about the angel himself: for from this proposition it would follow that an angel at rest for some time would never be moved afterwards. – The sequel is proved. For supposing that he is at rest for one hour, either he will begin to be moved in the last instant of that hour; and this not, according to you: or in some instant mediate or immediate to it. Not mediate: because then in the intermediate time he would have been at rest. Nor immediate: because an instant is not immediate to an instant. – And if it be said that he begins in an instant of discrete time, let it be asked what in our time corresponds to that instant: namely, whether the last instant of the hour; or the time immediately following; or some mediate instant. And since nothing can be assigned but the time immediately following, it follows that an angel at rest cannot begin to be moved instantaneously: which is unfitting.

VI. For the clarification of this difficulty, first the sense of the proposition must be seen; then the question must be answered⁴.

As to the first, it must be known that some think two distinctions are tacitly understood in the aforesaid propositions. One is about the term in some whole time: namely first, or not first. The other is about the term at any instant: namely intrinsic, or extrinsic. And they say that the proposition is to be qualified thus: Everything at rest throughout some whole time first, that is, adequately, is in the same condition at any intrinsic instant of it. And in this way they say that the proposition is known per se; and that it was thus assumed by St Thomas. But, with their leave be it said, they seem not to know their own words. For in St Thomas, in their judgment, it is not obtained from this proposition that, if something is such, say a man or white, throughout some whole time, it must be also such in the last instant of it. And yet if this proposition were to be understood thus, it is evidently clear that whatever is a man in some time adequately, is a man at any instant of it. – Nor could the distinction about the intrinsic and extrinsic instant provide an escape. For the first opinion, which St Thomas refutes, did not say that something is at rest throughout some whole time, and in the last intrinsic instant is otherwise, as is evident in the text. – Since, therefore, the intention of the Doctor is to be gathered from the subject on which he speaks; and it is manifestly evident that the first opinion judged the motion of an angel to be related to his preceding rest as the instant of generation to the time of the previous alteration; and it is agreed that neither is that alteration measured by that whole time first, nor is that instant of generation intrinsic to the time as measuring the alteration: the consequence is that, if St Thomas intends to refute the aforesaid position effectively, he must assume the proposition univocally with his adversary; otherwise the question would be only about words. VII. It must be known, therefore, that in the whole time can be distributed in two ways. First, over parts only: so that it is the same to say in some whole time, and, in every part of that time. Second, over parts and over whatever are of it: and thus it is the same to say in some whole time, and, in every part and at every instant of it. And although the proposition is in use in both ways, in the matter at hand it is nevertheless understood in the first sense by philosophers and theologians: otherwise it would be a contradiction in the adjunct to say, when fire comes to be from water, in the whole of that time there is water, and in the last instant there is fire. And in this sense it is agreed that the first opinion said that an angel is at rest throughout some whole time, and in the last instant of it acquires a new place. And since St Thomas intends to contradict it really, and not apparently, it must therefore be said that the term in the whole time is distributed in the same sense. So that the controversy is whether this proposition, A is at rest throughout some whole time, that is, in every part of some time, and in the last instant of it is otherwise, is possible. For the first opinion reckoned it possible, and founded its position upon it: St Thomas, however, reckons it impossible. – And so much for the first.

VIII. As to the second⁵, it is said that this proposition is true by reason of matter, but not by reason of form: that is, it is not verified in all terms, but in these. And each is explained. First, the negative part: because from being such throughout some whole time, it is not formally inferred that one is also such at the last instant of that time. For this conditional is not necessary, if he is a man in some hour, then at the end of that hour he is a man: indeed in fact its falsity appears in the hour measuring his corruption. – The reason why it does not hold formally is evident: namely because the whole time preceding its terminus is compared to it as prior to posterior; nor is it necessary that, if it is such in the prior measure, it persist such in the posterior.

The affirmative part, however, is explained by noting that, since the intention of St Thomas is to treat of the natures and of what naturally belongs to the angels themselves, as much according to the state of nature as of grace, the discourse here is not about the logically possible or impossible, and with respect to the divine power; but about the physically possible, in which attention is paid to what befits the order of things, miracles set aside, not to what God can do. And this is always to be attended to in examining the natures of things, for those following the doctrine of St Thomas. It is said, therefore, that it is impossible, according to the order of natural things, for something to have being (esse) at rest throughout some whole time, and at the end of it to be otherwise. For every having been made in the account of a term to which, or every terminus, is preceded, according to the course of nature, by some becoming: for the order of things, experience being witness, has it that nothing new comes to be so suddenly per se without some way leading to that terminus having preceded. And therefore, since to have some being under rest is not a way to otherness, whether acquisitive or by loss, but to have that being in motion is, because this is to acquire or to lose; the consequence is that what is at rest throughout some whole time is in the same condition at the terminus of it, otherwise it would have come to a terminus toward which it had not proceeded; whereas what is otherwise at the terminus than before arrives at the terminus by a preceding motion. IX. To the instances adduced⁶ against the proposition thus understood, the reply is easily evident from what has been said. For what is adduced about transubstantiation fails in two ways. First, because that is not natural, but exceedingly miraculous; and by this, it pertains to the power of God. – Second, in this, that transubstantiation has no opposed rest, unless we wish to abuse words: since it is not even a motion itself. X. To the second instance, about illumination, it is said that illumination is the terminus of local motion. And in replying to the objections against this, to the first I say that, although illumination, absolutely, terminates local motion per accidens (since we know that the parts near the solar body are of perpetual light, with no approach or recession of the sun from them concurring); nevertheless new illumination, of which alone the present discourse can be to the purpose, is per se the terminus of local motion, not per se primarily, but per se secondarily, according to the course of nature. – And from this the reply to the second is evident: namely that it is not to the purpose, because it speaks of the power of God, not of the course of nature. – To the third, however, it is said that, although the air is at rest according to absolute being (esse) in the whole time preceding the presence of the sun, it is nevertheless not at rest according to relative being: because it is continually otherwise and otherwise toward the sun, according to near or distant being. But because there is not per se motion toward a relation, as is said in V Physics⁷; but something can be continually otherwise according to relative being, on account of a motion not in itself, but in another having some order to it: therefore it stands that the air is neither at rest under darkness nor moved, but, having it continually, is otherwise on account of the motion of another, according to respective being leading to the exclusion of darkness and the acquisition of light. And each of these is posited rationally enough. For because there is no motion toward a relation, therefore neither rest, since they have to come to be about the same thing: but in place of motion there is being otherwise, and in place of rest being in the same condition. And because the privation of light, namely darkness, is not rooted in any form contrary to light, but in the relation of distance or absence between the diaphanous and the luminous; the consequence is that the air, without motion in itself, is continually otherwise according to dark being, consequently upon this, that it is continually otherwise according to being near to the sun, through the motion of the sun itself.

XI. The third instance then fails in many ways, not understanding the mind of St Thomas, who speaks of the proper measure of angelic motion; and of being otherwise or in the same condition in the last instant in the account of a term to which, and not in just any way; and of motion, not through the simple acquisition of the term itself, but as we expounded in the title⁸. Hence that instance equivocates, first, about the motion of an angel, understanding by the name of motion the acquisition of the term. – Second, agreeing with it even in its vocabulary, I say that an angel can in the last instant of some time be in some place both as in a term to which, and as in the beginning of motion. As in the beginning of motion indeed, because he can, after having been nowhere, in one instant of his own time, coexisting with the last instant of some hour, apply himself to a place: for then in the whole hour he was nowhere, and in the last of it he is here; which, according to St Thomas⁹, is not to be moved, but having been changed. As in a term to which, however, because an angel can in two immediate instants of his own time apply himself successively to different places; so that those two instants coexist with one hour, in such a way that the second coexists with the last instant of the hour, and the first with the whole preceding time.

And if it be said that this is what the first opinion said, and that it is attacked here by St Thomas; the reply is that it is not true, but this is believed from a bad understanding of St Thomas. For as was said in the title, the present question is about the comparison of the proper measure of the term to which with the proper measure of the term from which. And the first opinion said that they are related as an instant and the time immediately preceding: and therefore no last instant is given in the term from which, etc. St Thomas, however, holds that they are related as an instant and an immediate instant; and that a last be given in the term from which. – And if it happens that those instants coexist with our time, in the aforesaid way, this is per accidens, and coexistently; and not as in their proper measure. And again, that even in such a contingency (speaking coexistently, and not measuringly) the angel would not be said to have been at rest in the whole preceding time, but to have begun motion, and thus in the last to be in the term to which: or, in the whole preceding time not to have been moved, but in the last to begin motion. And because Scotus and others did not notice this, therefore they did not understand him, attacking what they did not know.

XII. Concerning the fourth part and the fifth¹⁰, where St Thomas posits that the motion of an angel is not measured by the time which is the measure of the first motion, but by another, whether continuous or discrete, the doubt is manifold: namely about the nature of such discrete time, and the necessity of positing it; and similarly about the diversity of such continuous time from common time. And since these partly pertain there, and were treated in qu. X¹¹, and partly would have to be treated separately in a special question; therefore here I have judged that only those objections are to be brought forward which hold on the side of angelic motion. Scotus, therefore, in the second distinction of the Second Book, qu. XI¹², argues against discrete time in three ways, first. Because plurality is not to be posited without necessity: but no reason compels us to posit such a time. Which is explained in three ways. First, because an angel is in place, according to you, by operation. Either, then, a transient one or an immanent one. If an immanent one, it is measured by the aevum: if a transient one, it is measured by common time, or by an instant. – Second, because whatever is saved by discrete time can be saved by continuous time. – Third, because just as it is not unfitting that angels agree with bodies in some corporeal condition of the same account in some way, namely to be in place; so it is not unfitting, according to such being, that they be measured by the same measure by which like conditions in bodies are measured.

XIII. Second, he argues specially against the otherness of such continuous time. Because if it were posited, it would have to be posited chiefly for this reason, that the motion of an angel does not depend on the motion of the heaven. But this does nothing to the purpose. Both because measuring of a quale by a quale, or of a quantum by a quantum, does not require essential dependence; but it suffices that the quantity of this can be made certain with sure knowledge from that. – And because the walking of Peter after the resurrection cannot be imagined to be measured by any other time than common: and yet it does not depend on the motion of the heaven, which will not then be. – And also because the rest of the heaven will be measured by common time: and yet the motion of the heaven will not be. – And also because, in the time of Joshua, the heaven standing still¹³, the motions which were made in the interim were measured by common time.

XIV. To these it is briefly said, that the necessity of positing discrete time, from the nature of angelic operations that follow one upon another, was shown in qu. X¹⁴. – The necessity, however, of positing a continuous time other than common time is assigned by St Thomas here from this, that the mutability of something does not depend on the motion of the heaven.

In replying to the objections on the other side, it is said that the first instance¹⁵ assumes something false on both sides. For neither are the natural immanent operations of an angel measured by the aevum, but by discrete time: nor are the transient operations which they have according to the common course (which I say on account of the movers of the spheres), as such, measured by common time or its instant, as is said in the text. – The second instance also assumes something false. For without discrete time it cannot be saved that a last being of angelic operation be given. Nor can it be saved that they have measures proportioned to themselves: for it is unfitting that angelic operations, which follow one another immediately in such a way that both, each whole at once, nevertheless exist successively, be fitted to the measuring of our time; since, as is evident, neither is our time according to any part whatever all together, nor is our instant stable. – The third instance likewise supposes something false, namely that an angel is the subject of ubi itself and of local motion, as is evident from what has been said¹⁶.

XV. To the first objection, however, specially against continuous motion¹⁷, it is said that it is true that the independence both of the motion and of the mutability of some mobile is the reason why it is not measured by the motion of the heaven. And to the reason on the other side it is said, that a quantum's being measured by a quantum happens in two ways: namely per se, and per accidens. And although for being measured per accidens certainty of knowledge suffices, yet for being measured per se by something, it is required to depend per se on it; not in the genus of efficient cause, as in qu. X, last art., to the last, the Author taught; but in the genus of formal cause, in the way in which the simpler among beings are per se exemplars of the rest, so that the others cannot equal their simplicity and perfection, much less exceed it. For it cannot be understood how measurability by A could be present in something from its nature, and yet it not depend on A. Hence also in X Metaphysics, text. XXI¹⁸, Aristotle says that the measurable is indeed referred to the measure, but the measure is not referred to it. – Hence there is no unfitness in saying that the walking of Peter after the resurrection is not measured per se by common time, just as is also the motion of the angel, of which we speak: because it can be swifter than the motion of the heaven, etc. – The standing of the heaven then, if it had the account of rest, would be said to be measured rationally by potential common time. But since it will have not the account of rest, but of miraculous fixation, therefore the standing heaven is rather measured by the aevum, inasmuch as there is no potency in it to the removal of the state of fixation. – In the time of Joshua, however, it is not established that the first mobile stood, but only the solar body: hence the instance is not to the purpose. Although it could also be said, the cessation of the first motion being conceded, that a miracle does not take away that the lower motions by their nature depend on the first: although, because this dependence is with respect to an extrinsic thing, the divine power can suspend or supply it.