Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear from what has been said¹: for the question is asked directly about the possible according to the power of things.

In the body of the article he answers the question with a single conclusion: Several angels cannot be together in one place. – It is proved thus. It is impossible for two total and immediate causes to be together causes of the same effect: therefore it is impossible for several angels to be together in the same place.

The antecedent is proved by induction, both in efficient causes and in formal causes. Then by that particle total, or perfect, the objection about several men immediately hauling a ship is excluded. – The consequence, however, is proved from the fact that for an angel to be in a place is nothing other than to contain the place perfectly and immediately, in the genus of efficient cause.

II. Concerning this conclusion, note that it can be understood in two ways: namely of natural power, and of logical power. And if it is understood of logical power, it has many objections. Partly because no contradiction appears in several angels being bound by divine power to one and the same place: indeed in fact perhaps this is so with several souls of the damned of altogether equal demerit. – Partly because confusion of operations, although it is a certain inconvenience following from the fact that angels are in the same place, is nevertheless not clear that it is altogether impossible². – Partly because two bodies being together in the same place is not so impossible; although, were we not to hold this by faith, we would say that it implies contradiction.

But if it is understood of natural power, three things stand in the way. The first is the middle term assumed by St Thomas. For that proposition, it is impossible for two complete immediate causes of the same order to be together causes of the same thing, is verified of the logically impossible: since it is founded on this, that otherwise two contradictories would follow, namely that the same thing would at once depend and not depend on its per se cause. The inference is evident: because, the duality of per se causes standing, on the one hand it follows, therefore the effect depends on both, because they are posited as its per se causes in being or in becoming; on the other hand it follows, therefore the effect depends on neither. The inference is evident: because it does not depend on that cause with which removed it would be or come to be no less; but although either of them be removed, the effect would be or come to be; therefore it depends on neither. Therefore it implies contradiction. – The second is that it is not inconvenient for two effects of diverse kinds to be produced at once in one and the same place, according to the same parts, by agents of diverse kinds: for one and the same thing, according to the same part, can be made hot by one agent, and made white by another, and made sweet by another. Therefore several angels will also be able, even naturally, to be together in the same place. – The third is that according to this the presence of order does not seem to be a sufficient reason for existing in place: since several angels can be thus present to one and the same place, since confusion of operations does not follow from this.

III. To this it is briefly said, in my judgment, that the conclusion is to be understood not of logical power, but of natural power. I am moved to this, however, on the part of the middle term assumed by St Thomas: since that middle term has place only in the natural way in which an angel is in place, namely through his operation; while it is nevertheless established that demons are placed by being acted upon rather than by acting. – I am moved also on the part of the conclusion proposed in the text: for he made a categorical proposition of inherence, namely that two angels are not together in the same place; and not a modal proposition of the possible. – I am moved third by the custom of St Thomas, who always was accustomed to determine from what is proper to the matter at hand, and about what is proper to it. For here we ask, as we said in the title³, what the order of things holds, not what God's power can do.

IV. Hence reply must be made to the objections to the contrary⁴. And to the first it is replied in two ways. First, that since two such causes are related as causes of the same kind distinct only in number, as is evident, it is said that there is no contradiction there. Partly because it does not seem to be granted by all that this effect is per se from this cause; because, as they say, this effect could exist, and not from this cause. Partly because, perseity being granted, contradiction does not follow, but superfluity: for it does not follow that it depends on both and on neither, but that it depends on both inasmuch as they are united; with which it is consistent that both of these be false, it depends on both, and, it depends on neither. These points are made clear and evident if you suppose two luminous bodies of the same kind and power, equally near to some medium which, according to its whole self, is first illuminable perfectly, that is, to the highest degree, by either of them. And lest this supposition be denied, or be dissimilar to the matter at hand, let those two luminous bodies be placed by God's power in the same place. Then let it be asked, whether the illuminated medium will be illuminated by one, or by both, etc.: for this is precisely the case we are disputing. Hence since such a supposition does not imply contradiction, but could be posited in being by God's absolute power; it follows that to posit two total causes, etc., is not a logical but a physical impossibility. Wherefore, in such a case, those two luminous bodies would be related as parts of one luminous body, exceeding by double, or more, in its activity the passive power to which it is brought near: from which it is evident that the effect would depend not on the parts divisively, but as they are united in one. And so, in the matter at hand, it would depend on two agents not as they are two, but as they are united: yet they would be two. – Second it is said, that it is one thing for several angels to be together in the same place, and another for several angels to be naturally together in the same place: for the first does not imply contradiction, granted that the second would imply contradiction, on account of the reason adduced. And thus either part could be sustained, according to this distinction. For which reason St Thomas assumed a conclusion of inherence, but a major concerning the impossible: logical, indeed, speaking of such causes as they are several; physical, however, speaking of the same several causes, but not inasmuch as several.

To the second objection it is said that, since an angel is per se in place as operating on the thing operated upon, just as the things operated upon happen to be really and formally diverse, and yet one in subject; so it is not inconvenient for several angels to be in the same place materially, though not formally.

To the third it is said that, just as it cannot naturally happen that two perfect natural agents of the same order, etc., be equally and immediately near to one and the same patient in the same respect; so it is naturally impossible for two Intelligences to be present to one and the same place according to the same passive power. And the reason in both cases is that nature no less than intellect shrinks from superfluities, as idle. Hence the presence of order is not on this account barred from being a sufficient reason for placing the angel⁵.

V. Concerning the proof of the consequence⁶, a doubt occurs: for the assumed proposition, namely, an angel is in place after the manner of a perfect container, does not seem necessary. For perfection of causality is either a condition necessarily required for an angel to be in place, or a condition necessarily concomitant with it: but neither can be said: therefore, etc. That it is not necessarily required is evident from two things. Partly from the several men hauling a ship, each of whom, setting aside corporeity, would be said to be there. Partly from what St Thomas said above⁷, that an angel is in place by the application of his power immediately in whatever way. – That it is not necessarily concomitant is evident from the fact that angels are of finite power; and can immediately produce an effect of the same kind in place. For from these two it manifestly follows that it is possible for some effect, say the local motion of some mass to be shaken, to have to be produced, for which the motive powers of several angels are required.

VI. To this it must be said that, since the present question is about natural power, and not logical, it suffices if that proposition is necessary with physical necessity, that is, as in the majority of cases. And since these matters are very remote from the senses, it suffices if this proposition is known to us from reasonable middle terms, as is evident from II Caeli⁸ and XII Metaphys.⁹ For it is fitting to reason that every angel should hold so much dignity among causes as to be free of this imperfection which is to be a partial cause: since this dignity is believed to be attributed by nature to all the stars; how much more to immaterial causes, the least of which incomparably exceeds every corporeal cause. – To this is added that good angels, upheld by divine power, are applied to these places: and therefore St Thomas said that they suffice for all things to which they are sent, in I Sent., dist. XXXVII¹⁰.

Hence to the objections to the contrary no other reply is needed. For we admit that that proposition is not necessary with logical necessity, but physical. And again that its necessity, such as it is, is known to us only probably. And therefore it could be sustained, if it is ever found said by Saints or illustrious Doctors that several angels are in the same place; which Richard¹¹ seems to think.