Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. Yet one thing must be noted in it: the term can expresses the natural power of the angels themselves, and the ordinary power of God himself; for here we are not examining what God's power can do absolutely in this matter, but what the order of things holds.

In the body of the article he does five things: first, he answers the question; second, from this he excludes a certain error; third, he removes a certain objection; fourth, he infers how differently a body, an angel, and God are in place; last, from what has been said he solves the arguments.

II. As to the first, the responsive conclusion has three parts, and it is this: An angel is not everywhere, but in one particular place. – And the several parts are proved. First, that he is not everywhere, from the difference between the power of an angel and the divine power: because the one is finite, the other infinite; the one is a particular cause, the other the universal cause of all things.

Then the second and third parts are proved together, namely that he is in one place, and that he is in a particular place, as follows. An angel can have only one particular effect: therefore he can be only in one particular place. – The antecedent is proved as to the first part: because whatever is compared to some one power is compared as one. As to the third, however, thus: as universal being stands to God's universal power, so some particular being stands to the power of an angel; therefore, etc. – The consequence, moreover, is proved: because an angel is in place only through the application of his power to the place.

III. Concerning this part a manifold doubt arises. And first, in the proof of the second part of the conclusion: for either a falsehood is assumed there, or the point intended is not proved, both on the side of the predicate of the proposition assumed and on the side of the subject. For when it is said: whatever is compared to some one power is compared as one, either the discussion concerns every power universally, or some power, say a created one. If some power, three difficulties follow. First, that what is to be proved is assumed. – Second, that St Thomas would have inferred badly from this proposition the proportionality of universal being to the power of God, and of particular being to the power of an angel. – Third, that the restriction would be unreasonable, or at least ambiguous. For this proposition could perhaps be restricted on two heads: namely, by the difference between natural and voluntary power; or between finite and infinite power. But it can be restricted by neither ground. For an angel too is an agent by purpose: and hence, if the proposition holds only of natural power, it will not serve the purpose. And the ground of finite and infinite does nothing for the unity and plurality of the effect: for natural power, whether finite or infinite, is determined to one; voluntary power, whether finite or infinite, is related to opposites, as is clear from Metaphys. IX¹. Therefore.

But if it is understood universally of every power, a question emerges. Both because from this it follows that the divine power is determined to one. And because from this it also follows that a power acting by purpose is determined to one.

IV. Second, it is doubtful of what unity of power the discussion is here: real, namely, or formal, or both together. If real only, the instance is manifest from the generative, spirative and creative power of God, which are one thing, and yet it is not determined to one.

But if the discussion is of formal unity, then the proposition, although true, does not serve the purpose. For to posit in angels many powers distinct only formally is not unfitting: say a motive power, a custodial power, and so on for others, according to the diverse formal aspects of the effect. And so by this reasoning the point intended would not be proved: for it could be said that an angel, although according to one power he is in only one place, nevertheless according to several powers is in several places. For it is not unfitting that one and the same agent use several powers at once: as is clear of the soul, which at once hears and sees and performs the operations of the vegetative and intellective part, being one, according to St Thomas².

And by the same reasoning it is obtained that he does not understand it of the real and formal together: for this member is inferred from the preceding one, as is clear.

V. Third, it is doubtful of what unity of effect the discussion is: namely, formal or numerical. If formal, the point intended does not follow: for from the formal unity of the effect, numerical unity does not follow.

If numerical, either it is understood of one in number simply or entirely. And then this is false: for thus it would follow that an angel could not move at once two discontinuous pebbles; since their motions would be distinct in number, from the distinction of the subjects, nor could they be called one in number except perhaps in a certain respect.

Or it is understood as one in number in any way whatever; in which way even a heap of stones is one. And thus too it seems to be false.

Both because it would follow that God could not produce several things in number, as several. – And because between an angel and God there would be no difference in producing at once one thing or several, but only more or less. And similarly there would be no difference between them in existing in one place or in several, but only in greater or lesser. For every power is determined to one in number according to this: but the divine power to one, that is, the whole universe; the others to particular things each. But this is manifestly unfitting: for God can produce several things at once, as several, and be in several places at once.

– And because the opposite of the principal intended point would follow: namely, that an angel can be in several places at once. For if such numerical unity is possible in the effect of the angel himself, since this unity does not require continuity, then for the same reason by which he can move at once two stones a cubit apart, he can move stones ten cubits apart; since in acting upon them there is no need to act at once upon the intervening distance. And so he could move at once two pebbles, one in Rome and the other in France: and consequently he would be in many places.

VI. For the evidence of these difficulties, it must be known that an effect can be compared to its cause in two ways: first, as object to power; second, as effect to cause. For example, what is heated is compared to the heating power as a possible object; and as an effect carried into execution. In the first way the comparison is considered between the formal aspect of the effect and the aspect of operating belonging to the cause itself; in the second way what is considered is the supposit or individual of the effect itself, and the operation of the cause in exercised act.

VII. Since, then, the assumed proposition³ could be interpreted in these two ways, it is said that, if this proposition is interpreted in the first way, it is equivalent to this: from one, inasmuch as one, only one proceeds; which is understood of the formal unity both of the cause and of the effect. And it is universally true: for every power regards one formal aspect in its adequate object; otherwise it would not be one formally. – Nor does it follow from this⁴ that a rational power is not toward opposites; or that the divine power cannot produce several things formally, unless it were formally multiplied: for both the rational power and the divine power regard one thing per se primo. And of the rational power, indeed, it is clear from Metaphys. IX⁵, where it is said that a rational power acts one of the opposites per se primo, but the other per se secundo. Of the divine power, however, it is clear, because it regards being (esse) per se primo, and the rest inasmuch as they are modes of being and participations; and therefore it can produce several things formally under being; just as sight too can see several species of colors, yet under one genus.

And by this the instance concerning the formal multiplication of the angelic power⁶ is excluded. For it is said that in an angel there is one operative power: but its formal unity is not considered according to those specific formal aspects, but according to some generic or analogous aspect, under which many specific formal aspects are comprehended. Hence it is not only really, but also formally, the same power by which the angel guards, presides, moves, and does whatever he does.

And thus that proposition is true in this sense: yet it is not thus principally intended, since we intend to conclude the numerical unity of place. I said, however, principally, because secondarily it is thus intended: for, as is said in Metaphys. V⁷, what is one in number per se is also one in aspect.

VIII. Since, then, in the second sense⁸ this proposition is principally intended, for its evidence it must be known that, just as on the side of the cause the usual distinction is found between a total cause and partial causes, that is, between a cause which in its order suffices alone, and causes which require the concurrence of several of the same order, as is clear of several men hauling a ship, and of one alone hauling a boat; so proportionally on the side of the effect a distinction can be made, so that one is a total effect, and another a partial effect. So that, just as the partial causes of some effect are called such, not any two causes even of the same kind, but only those which concur both in the same genus of cause and in the same order to complete one cause of that order (for the sun and a man are not partial causes of Socrates: but several men hauling a ship are called partial causes of the hauling, because they combine to complete one perfect hauler, and hence obtain the force of one total cause, the higher causes nevertheless concurring in their own orders); similarly the partial effects of some power are called such, not any two effects of it, but only those which are produced to complete one total effect. And hence the aspect of a partial effect is distinguished from the aspect of a total effect in this, that the former necessarily comes about as part of another, the latter, however, absolutely. – Second, it must be known that a total effect can be compared to some power in three ways: namely as deficient, as excessive, and as adequate. For example, with respect to the motive power of a man, the movable is threefold: one adequate, one exceeding, and one less, so that he can move more than it. – The third distinction is about coming to be at once, or successively.

IX. For from these three distinctions the interpretation of that proposition is obtained. For it is to be interpreted thus: Whatever is compared as a total and adequate effect (or quasi-adequate), and at once, to a power one really and formally, is compared as one in number. And thus it is universally true of every power, whether finite or infinite, whether natural or free. Hence St Thomas too in this article, immediately after this proposition, subjoined that universal being corresponds to the divine power, as its quasi-adequate effect. – But note that, although these three conditions are to be understood in that proposition absolutely, the second is nevertheless not needed if it is contracted to the angelic power: because it cannot produce at once even two deficient effects. The third too is not needed if it is contracted to the infinite power: for whatever that power can produce successively, it can also produce at once, unless there is repugnance on the side of the effect.

X. Nor from this does any of those three difficulties follow which were brought forward in objecting⁹. First, it does not follow that God could not produce several things in number as several: for that one in number which corresponds to his power as adequate effect is compatible with the whole possible latitude, numerical as well as formal. For it is universal being: hence, just as with the determination of the creative power to one formally, that is, to being (esse), it stands that it can produce several things formally, according to several modes of being; so with the determination of the same power in exercised act to one in number, that is, the universe, there stands this multitude of things from which the universe arises.

Nor does it obstruct this determination that God could have produced at once, outside this universe, another universe, or another creature. Both because this universe, and whatever things, and however many, and in whatever way they are posited as produced separately and apart, will necessarily be parts of universal being; although they would not be parts of this or that universe. On this account St Thomas in the text notably did not assign to the divine power the universe as its adequate effect, but universal being: nor did he say, whatever is made by some one power etc., but whatever is compared; so as to suggest that he was speaking of an adequate or quasi-adequate effect, which it is clear no being made or makeable is, with respect to the divine power, but only universal being. – And because, as was said in the title of the question¹⁰, the discussion here is of the ordinary power, from which only one universe can emanate, as an adequate effect including in itself many deficient and partial effects.

XI. The second difficulty also does not follow. For to attain some partial effects happens in two ways: first, according to that alone in which they agree; second, according also to those things in which they are distinguished. And in this the divine and angelic power differ: for the angelic power attains many partial effects according to that alone in which they are united; but the divine power attains in all the parts of the universe also those things in which they are distinguished. And therefore an angel can make at once only one in number, but the divine power several: because the former does not attain several except as one, whereas the latter attains several as one and as several. On this account St Thomas in the text, suggesting both, said two things: both the agreement of the angelic and divine power, in that they are determined to one in number; and the difference, in that the divine is determined to such a one in number, from which it necessarily follows that it attains several under that one. For from the fact that universal being is attained, it follows that multitude, as multitude, is attained: because it belongs to the aspect of the universe to have not only many as one, but many as many; that is, not only that in which many agree, namely order, but those things in which they are distinguished. The angelic power, however, is determined to one such, from which multitude does not follow: because it is determined to particular being.

XII. To the third difficulty, finally, it is said that, although an angel can move two discontinuous stones as partial movables of one total motion, arising from two partial passive motions; he could not nevertheless move them as two total movables, that is, so that neither would be moved as a co-part of the other. As is clear in one hauling a small piece of wood and able to haul at once one other equal to it: for he could haul both at once, as two partial movables hauled by the same action; yet he could not, while he hauls one, by another action haul the other separately.

How great a distance can be interposed between two partial effects, however, we do not have for certain. It seems necessary, nevertheless, that, just as the other finite natural powers have a certain sphere of their activity, beyond which they cannot operate immediately (for it happens that something is coagulated at once, as is said in de Sensu et Sensato¹¹); so the angelic power has a certain sphere of its activity, within which it regards whatever things it moves at once as existing in one place. Nor could it move at once those very things, if one of them were posited outside the sphere of its activity. And therefore it is denied that there is the same reasoning for a small and a great distance of partial effects from one another. Hence it does not follow that an angel can be at once in different places.

XIII. Concerning that proposition, namely: to an angel there can be attributed an indivisible or a divisible place, greater or lesser, according as he voluntarily applies his power¹², a doubt arises, whether an angel can be in a divisible place however small, or however great. For Scotus, in II Sent., dist. II, qu. VI, holds the negative part: and he proves in two ways that an angel cannot be in a place however small, although he concedes it for a punctual place. First, from the thirty-fifth of Euclid's Book I, where it is said that whatever can be in one of equals can also be in the other, if the figure does not repugn. From this, says Scotus, it follows that an angel can be in a place however long: because it is always possible to find a quadrangle more narrowly equal to any given square.

– Second, by natural reason: because it would follow that the angel is of infinite power. The consequence is proved: because, the angel's power being determined to the greatest place, to be able to apply it to a smaller is of some measure of active power; and to be able to apply it yet to a smaller is to be able more and more perfectly, and so on to infinity; therefore, if he can always transfer himself to a place however smaller, he will be of infinite power.

St Thomas, however, holds three things in this matter. First, that he can be in an indivisible place.

– Second, that he cannot be in a place however great. Because his power is finite; nor can the choice of his will be efficacious except according to the strength of nature. – Third (and in this Scotus disagreed with him), that an angel can be in a place however small. For without doubt he can operate in a place however small, since there is no repugnance on the side of the effect or of the power etc., as is clear of itself: for motion, local at least, does not determine for itself a minimum place, as is clear from Physic. VI¹³; hence in a place however small it can be caused by an angel.

XIV. To Scotus's reasons, however, one can easily reply. To the first, indeed, that Euclid's proposition is not to the purpose: for it manifestly speaks of being in place commensuratively, wishing that everything commensurable with one of two equals be commensurable with the other, unless the figure obstruct; which it is ridiculous to bring to bear upon the purpose. – Although it could also be said in the second place that it is one thing to be able to be in a place however long simply; and another to be able to be in a place however long with respect to a given magnitude: just as it is one thing to be able to increase to infinity simply; and another to be able to increase to infinity according to parts removable from a given line, as is clear from Physic. III¹⁴. For although a length infinite simply could not correspond to an angel, what would nevertheless be infinitely long by the restrictions of an assigned square could correspond to an angel as one place: for such a length would be simply finite in length, and never, whatever excrescence were made, would exceed a certain quantity. And hence, unless the length were stretched so far as to go out of the sphere of the angel's activity, by the same reasoning by which he could operate upon the square, he could also upon the quadrangle. But if it went out of the sphere of activity, there is then the reason why he could not be in it: for the going out beyond the sphere would obstruct, just as Euclid says that the figure would obstruct some corporeal thing.

To the second reason it is said that it is false that to be able to apply himself to a smaller and to a smaller place is of greater power: for this is not from the quantity of power, but depends on freedom, as St Thomas says. Hence although to apply himself to the whole place is of some measure of power, because no effect can be unless it is from some measure of power; yet to apply himself to a greater or lesser place within his own sphere does not, per se speaking, demand a greater or lesser power, but freedom in the use of it.

XV. And by this it is clear what, according to St Thomas, is to be held about the other ambiguity, which Scotus raises at the end: namely, whether, if an angel is in a place, he is of necessity in so great a place determinately, say of one palm. For he himself reckons that each part of the question yields no unfitting result. From the sayings of St Thomas, however, the negative manifestly follows, so that the opposite affirmative would bring in something unfitting: because it would follow that the breadth of the use of the angelic power would not be free, but natural, like the application of the soul to the body, though in another kind of cause.