Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. – In the body he does two things: first, he answers the question with a single conclusion; second, from that conclusion he deduces, as it were, three corollaries.

As to the first, the conclusion is this: An angel is in a place, but equivocally with respect to a body. – The second part is proved directly thus. A body is in place by quantitative contact: therefore an angel is in place by virtual contact. – The consequence holds, because there is no dimensive quantity in an angel.

As to the second part, he excludes from the location of an angel three properties of a body inasmuch as it is located: namely commensuration, positioning, and passive containment, as is clear in the text.

II. Concerning the proof of the conclusion laid down, two things are to be noted. First, that although the question is formally whether an angel is in a place, the intention of the theologians who ask it is nevertheless to inquire about the mode in which an angel is in place: for this alone falls under doubt. And therefore St Thomas took care of the first part of the conclusion only implicitly, and answered the second directly.

Second, that the force of St Thomas's conclusion consists in this. Everything that is in a place is in it by reason of its quantity. Now quantity is twofold, of power and of bulk. Therefore what has quantity of bulk can be located by reason of that; but what lacks it can be in place only on account of quantity of power. – Again, since neither quantity is actually a reason for being in place except through its actual union with the place, it follows that, just as a body is not actually located unless it is joined to the place by quantitative touch, so a spiritual thing is not actually in place unless the quantity of power is joined to the place by virtual contact. And for this reason both are said to be located equivocally.

III. Concerning what has been said, many doubts arise. And first, a doubt arises about the conclusion: what does St Thomas intend by contact or virtual application¹? For he intends either a first act or a second. If a first act, either absolute or relative. If a second act, either immanent or transient. But none of these four can be said. Therefore. For that it is not an absolute first act is proved in two ways. First, because everything absolute in an angel is either a substance or a quality altogether immaterial, and for this reason abstracts from place. – Second, because the touch of power according to first act is reckoned with respect to being (esse); and for this reason, with respect to the conjunction that holds between form and matter, whether substantial or accidental. Between these, since quantitative touch is only perhaps per accidens, speaking per se there is only virtual contact according to substantial or accidental being. But it is evident that nothing of an angel formally gives being to place or receives it from place. Therefore.

That it is not a relative first act is proved from this: every relation newly coming to something follows upon some change; but it is not apparent what and of what sort is that change which this relative form follows. For it is not necessary that it follow a becoming according to substance, or quantity, or quality, or local motion: because it is not necessary that an angel come to be in a place, nor that it be moved to a place, in order to be in place. These things are evident if it is supposed that the angels were created before corporeal creation, as many Doctors have held. For on this hypothesis, at least conditionally, it is evident that, when corporeal creation was afterwards created, the angels did not begin to be in place merely by the fact that a place which was not, is: because there would be no greater reason from this why this one should be in this place and that one in that. Nor was it necessary that they be moved then by local motion, because they were nowhere: for to be moved locally presupposes being in place.

That it is not an immanent second act is evident. Both because every immanent action of an angel is altogether immaterial. – And because understanding or willing a place does not suffice for someone to be in place.

That it is, finally, not a transient action can be proved in many ways. First, from the fact that every transient action involves motion or a formal or local change in the subject into which it passes: but it is not easy to imagine how any of these belongs to an angel with respect to the empyrean heaven². – Second, because this seems contrary to St Thomas in the Quodlibets, Quodlib. I, qu. III, art. 1, where, expressly expounding that proposition, namely, an angel is in a place only by operation, he says that if by operation we understand motion, the proposition is not true; but if by operation we understand any union of power, the proposition is true. Therefore, in his view, the contact of power in this matter signifies something other than transient action³. – Third, against this there are six arguments of Scotus, in II Sent., dist. II, qu. VI, which you have from Capreolus, dist. II, qu. I⁴.

IV. For the clarification of this ambiguity, as far as he who enlightens every man coming into this world shall deign to grant, it must be known that all, both philosophers and theologians, who concede that angels are immaterial substances, agree in this, that an angel is in place not by quantity of bulk, nor by quantitative contact, but by virtual quantity and contact. And further all seem also to agree in this, that this contact is a relation of the presence of the angel to the place, causally or formally. But the difference of opinions, and the difficulty, consists in assigning what is the foundation of that presence. For its evidence exceeds the capacity of the human mind: because from the sacred utterances we have it that angels are somewhere, and it does not appear how they touch that place. Therefore five things here occur to be considered: first, in how many ways we imagine from sensible things that a located thing is present to a place; second, which presence among those enumerated is certain and which doubtful⁵; third, we shall apply them to angels⁶; fourth, we shall see what is the mind of St Thomas, and so the question will be answered⁷; fifth, the objections will be satisfied⁸.

V. As to the first, the presence of a thing existing in a place to the place is twofold, namely circumscriptive and definitive. The first imports the commensuration of the quantitative parts of the located thing to the parts of the place. The second imports only limitation or determination to a place, that is, to be so here that it is not elsewhere. And this is subdivided into substantial presence and causal presence. Now substantial presence is the name given to the relation of presence by which a substance, even an indivisible one, is formally present to this place in such a way that it is not present to another, even if it could have no causality with respect to the place. Causal presence, however, according to the threefold state of the efficient cause, is distinguished into three: namely the presence of order, the presence of approximation, and the presence of operation. The presence of order is the name given to the relation of proportion which holds between agent and patient, when they are in proximate and immediate power, prepared and sufficient for the work, all impediments being excluded. The presence of approximation is the name given to the relation of the approximation of an immediately acting agent to an immediate patient, which precedes the action at least in the order of nature. The presence of operation is the name given to the relation of the agent to the thing acted upon immediately, inseparable from the action, such that either it is the very respect imported in the action, or it is not without it⁹. – These three modes of presence can be illustrated, by way of example, in a sailor and a ship. For the sailor is present to the ship first by the presence of order existing between his power and the ship, as it is steerable by him. He is next present to it according to approximation, since he is understood to be approximated to the ship prior in nature to his operating. Third, he becomes present to the ship according to actual operation; whether this relation of presence accompanying the operation be the same as the relation of mover to moved, or be distinguished from it, as has been said.– So much for the first.

VI. As to the second¹⁰, it must be known that of these five presences only three are certain, namely the circumscriptive, that of order, and that of operation. The other two are exceedingly ambiguous, and coincide: and on account of them there arises this whole difficulty. And as to circumscriptive presence, there is no need to labor: for it is known by sense. – The presence of order, however, is established from this: that if there were no body, and one intellectual substance could receive something from another, before it was understood that one acts on the other, there would be between them an order of the active to the passive, by which the one could act, with proximate power freed and prepared, and the other receive. For this presence follows the notions of proximate active and passive power, impediments removed, etc.; and it is found as much in corporeal as in spiritual things. – The presence of operation is manifest: for an immediate agent, by an immediacy of supposit, must be without distance from the patient as long as it acts, as is evident in VII Physics¹¹ by a long argument.

VII. The remaining two presences have ambiguity, on account of reasons on both sides. And for the affirmative side concerning substantial presence¹², the strongest reason is that such a presence is not an impossible thing: since it does not imply a contradiction that a substance be thus present to a place. Therefore it is to be posited in so difficult a question. – The antecedent is declared, not only as to the possible but as to fact, thus. A particular substance, for example this earth, located in this place, for example in this vessel, if its quantity were separated from it by the intellect, would nevertheless be in this vessel in such a way that it is not elsewhere: which is to have a relation of substantial presence to this place. Therefore there is given a substantial presence, by which an indivisible substance is present to a place, all habitude of active to passive, or the converse, being set aside.

VIII. For the negative side, the reason is that this position is not intelligible. For every relation, whether coming intrinsically or extrinsically, requires some foundation: but such a relation of substantial presence has no foundation: therefore it is a fiction to posit it.

The major is proved. First, inductively.– Second, because otherwise any relation could be attributed to anything at will, since no foundation is to be required which would be the reason why this belongs to it in respect of act or potency. – Third, because every relation belongs either to every being or to some. If to every being, its reason is to be assigned from being inasmuch as being: as is evident of the relation of intelligibility and of appetibility. If to some, the reason is to be assigned why to those rather than to others, from a foundation found in those and not in the others. – Fourth, because to be able to have a certain relation is a predicate demonstrable of a thing, although to have it in act is perhaps contingent. Therefore it has in the subject a necessary cause, by which it is inferred a priori, and by which it is present in it: otherwise it would be present contingently. Now that cause is either the foundation, or the foundation is had from it. The minor is proved. For the foundation of such a relation is either something absolute found in the pure substance, or something absolute with some extrinsic thing connoted. But neither can be posited. Therefore. – For that it is not something absolute is evident by distinguishing what is found in the pure substance: namely the notion of substance, and its limitation; and likewise its power, and its limitation. For substance inasmuch as substance does not found this relation. First, because not every substance can found it. Next, because those who posit it confess, according to the Parisian article CCXIX, that substance is not the reason for being in place definitively. – Nor, inasmuch as limited, whether to genus or to species or to the singular, does it have this either. For limitation is said equivocally of essential or entitative determination, and of determination to place. For the modes of being, and the essential and individual differences, contract to such and this being; and not to being in place, or the locable, except when being is contracted by what is quantified with quantity of bulk; for then it is manifestly contracted consequently to the locable. But through the other modes of being, since it is not contracted per se primo to the locable, one must assign how it is contracted consequently. And since this cannot be assigned, it remains that it is a fiction. – A like judgment holds of the power of a substance (which is posited as really the same with the substance), and its limitation. For the entitative limitation of a power is a limitation to such and so great an effect, not a local one.

That the foundation and reason of such a relation is not the substance with something else connoted is proved. Such an extrinsic thing can be only either a negation or a relation. But it is not a relation: because, again, by asking after its foundation the same question will return. – A negation, however, does not appear to the purpose, except that of non-distance; so that it might perhaps be thought that a substance not distant from a place founds the relation of presence to the place. But this is nothing. For such a negation belongs to an indivisible substance even when existing nowhere, as is evident: and thus it would happen that a substance existing nowhere is present to this place: and for this reason it would be nowhere, and would be here, which implies a contradiction.

IX. If these things are true, it is evident that the imagination of those who posit such a relation¹³ is founded on a falsehood. For it believes that, just as this water existing in a vessel has two things, namely that it is there definitively and is there circumscriptively, so it has two foundations, namely quantity founding circumscription, and substance founding definition: whereas from what has been said it is had that there is only one foundation here, namely quantity, by whose mediation this water is both defined and circumscribed here. And from this it further follows that, just as with this water, color set aside, it implies a contradiction that it be visible, so, quantity set aside, that it be locable. And this, speaking as we now speak of substance, with all active and passive power set aside in whatever way. And so that position is simply impossible.

X. To the example that is adduced of this water existing in a vessel, quantity being removed by the intellect, etc., it is said that the imagination is deceived in this. For, quantity set aside, that water would remain nowhere, since it would have no habitude to place; but it would remain with the negation of distance from that place and from any other. And therefore there is no need to ask where it has gone: but the vessel would be found full of air, the water having been rendered indivisible, and existing nowhere. Nor is this astonishing, but consequent upon the hypothesis made. Just as if it were posited that quantity is removed from Socrates, one would have to confess consequently that he would not have integral parts, namely heart, liver, head, etc., because an indivisible substance would remain; and yet we imagine that Socrates would remain. Hence these imaginings are not to be believed.

XI. For the affirmative side also, concerning the presence of approximation of agent to patient, preceding the action¹⁴, the strongest reason is that for an agent to act on an immediate patient, and for an agent to be together with an immediate patient, are one thing and another: and they have among themselves an order of nature: and since action is not prior to simultaneity, it remains that simultaneity is prior to action.

The several points are declared. The first: when it is said, from VII Physics¹⁵, that agent and patient, being immediate, must be together, if to be together is nothing other than that one acts and the other is acted upon, then in saying, agent and patient must be together, we would say nothing other than, the agent must act and the patient be acted upon: which is ridiculous. Therefore these differ among themselves. – Then the second is declared, namely that these are ordered among themselves. For where there is plurality without order, there is confusion. – Finally the third is declared, namely that action is not prior to simultaneity. For the agent is not proximate to the patient because it acts; but because it is approximated to the patient, therefore it acts.

XII. For the negative side, the reason is that such a presence preceding operation either coincides with those mentioned¹⁶; or is a pure fiction. For either both, namely agent and patient, are corporeal; or both spiritual; or one spiritual and the other corporeal. If both are corporeal, the simultaneity preceding action is quantitative contact, as is evident in VII Physics¹⁷: but this belongs to the presence of circumscription. – If both are spiritual, even if license for imagining were granted, the simultaneity preceding action is the presence of order, not of any kind, but of such a kind, namely immediate, etc.¹⁸ And rightly: because, as Augustine taught¹⁹, order does in spiritual things what position does in corporeal ones: and therefore, just as the approximation of agent to patient in bodies is reckoned according to position, so in spirits it is according to order. – If, however, one is spiritual and the other corporeal, that approximation cannot be imagined to be positional: because the spiritual is unpositionable. It must therefore coincide with the approximation of order, and with approximation according to substance: for it would not be easy to imagine a third thing. And if what has been said before²⁰ is true, so that substantial presence is a fiction, it remains that only the presence of order can be understood as preceding operation. – And so that presence of approximation coincides with the presence of order; and adds in corporeal things presence according to quantitative contact. Or it is a pure fiction, if something else be said to be.

XIII. The reason adduced for the affirmative side²¹ is satisfied from what has just been said, by conceding that the simultaneity of agent and patient is other than the operation, and that it is prior in nature to the operation. But it is denied that it is anything other than the presence of order, speaking in general. Descending, however, to corporeal things, it is denied that it is other than the presence of order and position: for these two suffice for the one to act immediately, and the other to be acted upon immediately. Positional presence is required, because they are quanta; but that of order, because they are active and passive.

XIV. And since the negative side of each of these ambiguities treated²² is more consonant with reason; and from what is known to us seems resolutely to quiet the intellect; therefore I judge that the negative side is to be held. And so we shall accept only three presences: according to position, according to operation, and according to order.

XV. But a doubt remains concerning the presence according to operation, whether formally, speaking in general, between an agent in act and a patient, besides the relations of agent and patient, there is a relation of presence to each other²³; of presence, I say, not preceding but accompanying the operation; by which relation the agent itself is formally said to be present to the patient, and conversely.

For if it is posited, since such a presence is a relation of equiparance, and for this reason requires a foundation of the same kind in both extremes, a question arises about its foundation, and then about its inseparability from operation. Nor do I see how these questions can be satisfied, the things said above standing.

If, however, it is not posited, we shall suffer no difficulties: since there is no necessity of positing it. For from the notion of agent and patient, as such, no relation of equiparance needs to arise or accompany. – And from this there is had a reason for the negative side: because plurality is not to be posited without necessity. It suffices therefore that between agent and patient there be, first, simultaneity according to the presence of order; second, according to operation. And in bodies a third occurs, according to quantitative contact. – So much for the second.

XVI. As to the third²⁴, a brief answer must be given. Although some (among whom is Scotus, in II Sent., dist. II²⁵) have held that an angel is in place by substantial presence, according to which they say that the approximation of agent to patient is also reckoned; yet because a presence of this kind is posited arbitrarily and without reason, indeed contradicts what is known to us from the senses, as is clear from what has been said²⁶; and because angels are incorporeal and immaterial substances, and consequently alien to situal presence: they can be present to a place in only two ways, namely according to the presence of order, or according to the presence of operation. – So much for the third.

XVII. As to the fourth²⁷, concerning the mind of St Thomas, different people say different things. Some think that his opinion consists in these two propositions. The first is: Only transient operation is for an angel the reason for being in place. The second is: The substance of an angel is so joined to this place that it is distant from another place. For they imagine that, just as quantity is the reason why a corporeal substance is in place; and together with this, the corporeal substance itself, by means of quantity, is in place in such a way that it truly is distant from another place and nearer to a different one; so transient operation is the reason for an angel's existing in place, yet the angel himself is defined to the place by that operation in such a way that he is more distant from a place that is farther off than from one that is near. – Others, however, do not consent to the first proposition, but say that either transient operation, or any relation signified by way of transient operation, is the reason for the angel's being in place; on account of the words of St Thomas from the Quodlibets cited above²⁸. As to the second proposition, they affirm the first part, namely that the substance of the angel is joined to the place, and not only his operation.

Both parties ground the second proposition on the express words of St Thomas, in the Third Part, qu. LII, art. 2, who says that the soul of Christ was in the place of hell in two ways, namely by operation and by substance; but in the other places by operation, or effect, only. – And in Quodlibet VI, art. 2, replying to the first argument, which runs: If an angel acted by the command of the will, he could act on what is near just as on what is distant, and so he would not need to descend from heaven to earth in order to operate here; he says that, because the mover must be together with the thing moved by it, as is said in VII Physic., therefore the substance of the angel must in some way be joined to the things which he moves. – From these it is clearly gathered that even in the case of spiritual substances the mode of being in place by substance is distinguished from the mode of being in place by operation; and that both belong to a spiritual substance. Indeed, from the second authority distance and nearness also seem to be gathered, as laid down in the second proposition.

XVIII. To me, however, it occurs to say that three things are sought: the reason for being in place; the thing existing in place²⁹; and the mode according to distance and nearness³⁰. – The first, according to St Thomas, is virtual quantity touching the place. This touch, however, is nothing other than presence according to operation, and presence of order; whether both concur together, or one of them³¹.

But two things must be carefully noted here. First, that the presence of order is not distinguished from the presence of operation as potency from second act, but rather as a habit from second act. For it is not from the fact that an angel can operate somewhere that he is said to be there. But over and above the ability, the presence of order adds: on the part of the angel's substance, the negation of situal distance, in the way in which it can belong to him, as will be said below³²; on the part of the intellect, practical knowledge of such a work on this body, as to be carried out by himself; on the part of the executive power, readiness, so that his power is neither held back or impeded by some superior power, nor occupied with another work, but is held prepared and ready for this one; on the part of the will, the choice of the aforesaid preparation for carrying out this work on this body: for this is the character of a habit, that one operates when he wishes.

Second, it must be known that, just as there are two kinds of operations, since some are with continuous exterior action, like moving, while others are content with intermittent exterior action, like presiding, guarding, and the like: so there are two ways in which angels happen to be present to a place according to operation. In one way, because they actually reach bodies by exterior operation. In another way, because they actually attend and devote themselves so that what has been begun may turn out well, although they do not continuously do anything there by exterior operation. And in this way the angels who guard men, or preside over provinces or places, are said to be there. For one who guards or presides need not always do something in the one guarded or ruled: but he must always be watchful, take care and devote himself to this, and now remove obstacles, now advance matters, now await the outcome of the affair so as to provide for what occurs, etc.

XIX. As to the second³³, namely, when an angel is said to be somewhere, what thing is it that exists in place: it is said that not only the operation, or effect, of the angel is in place, but without doubt the substance itself; yet in different ways. For the operation is in the body as a perfection in what is perfectible; the substance of the angel, however, is there as a thing by itself, having apart its own subsisting. For what is located is not the same, according to substantial or accidental being (esse), as the place itself: since neither is in any way the accident or the substance of the other.

But it must be noted that, just as an angel happens to operate on a body in two ways, namely immediately by immediacy of supposit, and mediately; so he can be said in two ways to be in place by means of operation, namely by power and by substance. In the body on which he operates immediately, he is by operation and by power, because he reaches it by his power; and by substance, because he reaches it immediately by immediacy of supposit, the negation of situal distance concurring as a cause or condition without which not. In the body, however, on which he acts mediately, he is by operation and by power; but not by substance.

XX. The third³⁴, namely, whether the substance of an angel existing in place is distant from another place, needs a distinction. For distance can be taken in two ways: first, properly, for local or situal distance; second, for distance between agent and patient as such, that is, in the proportion between this and that, so that the one acts and the other undergoes action from it. If we speak of distance in this second way, then it is manifestly clear that an angel is nearer to one place than to another: because this is nothing other than being an agent proportioned to the one more than to the other. But if we speak of situal distance, then a distinction must be made between per se and per accidens, and per accidens in two ways, according to the teaching of the Philosopher, VIII Physic., text. LII³⁵: and three things must be said. First, that an angel is not per se distant from or near to any place. – Second, that an angel, according to himself, is not per accidens distant from or near to any place; as whiteness, quantified per accidens, being in one place, is per accidens distant from another place. – Third, that an angel is per accidens distant from or near to some place according to the body in which he is; so that the distance does not redound upon the angel himself, but is predicated of him by reason of the body in which he is. And thus he is near to the place near that body, and is distant from the one that is distant; just as, in Aristotle³⁶, the mover of the lower sphere is said to be moved per accidens by the motion of the higher.

XXI. And from these considerations it is clear how the various sayings of St Thomas are to be understood³⁷. For what he said in the Third Part about the soul of Christ, he said because he held that it operated immediately in one part of hell, but mediately in the others. Not that it sent a messenger: but that, by means of the effect which it had in the limbo of the Fathers, it descended to the others; since by the powerful descent to the limbo of the Fathers it both confounded the damned and gave hope to those to be purged, etc., as is clear from the words of St Thomas in the reply to the third, in the same place. – It can also be understood in another way that the soul of Christ was in only one place of hell according to substance: namely because it was distant from the other parts per accidens, in the manner explained above, and yet by the power of the divinity it produced an effect in those places.

What he said in Quodlibet VI, however, he said on account of the simultaneity of order, which precedes operation and excludes that situal distance per accidens.

XXII. From these considerations, the reason is also clear why St Thomas, in Quodlibet I, distinguished the contact of power from operation³⁸: namely because the contact of power is reckoned not only according to exterior operation continuously exercised, but also according to care and attention to following up what has been begun, etc. Hence in the same place he immediately adds that by operation not only motion is to be understood, but any union by which he touches a body by his power, whether by presiding or by containing. And he means not the substantial containment by which the lower things are naturally contained eminently in the higher (because in that way every angel would be everywhere): but the containment which is fitted to belong to forms, which is to hold the parts of a body together; for in this way the soul contains the body, as is said in I de Anima, text. XC³⁹ (in sign of which, when it departs the parts dissolve, etc.). The assistance of the angel, therefore, in holding a body together as to some being or operating, is containment sufficient for the angel to be said to be there.

XXIII. Nor from these should you impute to me that I have said that angels are located, according to St Thomas, by the presence of order alone. For this has not yet been reached; rather, we have come only to this, that an angel is present to a place in two ways, according to operation and according to order; and that this presence naturally precedes the other, because it is the very approach of the agent to the patient. Whether such a presence suffices for an angel to be said to be in place⁴⁰, I should think a distinction must be made, since an angel's being in place happens in two ways. In one way, completely: and so the presence of order does not suffice. In another way, incompletely: and so it suffices. For when the presence of order alone is there, the presence of the angel to the place is indeed begun, but not completed: whereas when he actually begins to operate, then he is completely present. And in accordance with this, the diverse sayings of the theologians could be interpreted, now of being in place completely, now of being in place incompletely.

XXIV. About the intention of St Thomas, however, it is not clearly established. For both in that I Quodlibet⁴¹ and here, he notably said that an angel is in place by the application of angelic power in whatever way to the place: and consequently, since this mode of application is not outside in whatever way, it seems to be included by him. And truly it is so to be expounded, unless it stands in the way that the mode of application of which he speaks is such that two angels cannot at once have it with respect to the same place: whereas it seems that the presence of order with respect to the same place can belong to several angels at once. – Second, it may stand in the way that in the reply to a certain argument in the aforesaid Quodlibet⁴² it is said that, as to being in place, operating is prior by nature to being in place. Therefore he did not hold that the presence of order, which is prior by nature to operation, suffices for being in place: for then he would be in place before he operated.

But to this it can be said in two ways. First, that according to St Thomas the presence of order is included under the presence according to operation in whatever way. For, as is clear from what has been said⁴³, it can vary in three ways: either according to continued exterior operation; or according to continued attention, with exterior operation interrupted, along with the remaining conditions, as was said above; or according to habitual application, which the presence of order imports. And so, taking operating commonly as actual or habitual, it is clearly established that operating is not prior to being in place⁴⁴, indeed they are the same: but in the way in which they are distinguished by reason, operating is prior, because it is the reason for being in place. – Second, it can be said that the response of St Thomas is to be understood formally, that is, as it voids the force of the argument, even granted that by operation actually exercised alone an angel would be in place, whatever may be the case about this: for that response must be admitted by all, whatever may be the case about the conclusion. Hence also Scotus, in the XXXVII distinction of the First, feigning a presence of immensity between God and the ubique, admits that the power of God has the term of its operation prior by nature to his immensity's having a co-present term.

As to the first obstacle, what is to be said will be discussed in the third article of this question. Let it therefore suffice now to know that the relation of the presence of a spiritual substance to a place always pertains to a transient action, or even passion, actually or habitually exercised. – As far as I have been able to grasp up to now, so much for the fourth.

XXV. As to the fifth⁴⁵, as has already been said⁴⁶, Scotus argues in many ways against St Thomas: and since these are treated at length by Capreolus, in qu. I, dist. II, on II Sent., I have thought they should be touched on briefly. And first, he argues that there is a substantial presence, in two ways. First, ad hominem. Because St Thomas in this First Part, qu. VIII, art. 1, posited it, and now denies it: therefore. – Then, simply. The operative power of an angel stands either mediately or immediately to the action in place. If mediately, let the question be asked about that medium, and so on. If immediately, then the substance of the operator is immediate to the place; and what was intended is obtained.

XXVI. But the reply to these is clear from what has been said. To the first, indeed, from what was said in qu. VIII⁴⁷. – To the second, from what has now⁴⁸ been shown. For immediacy of supposit, and local non-distance, are conceded: for each is a condition of presence both according to order and according to operation. For the argument leads only to these: and not to any positive substantial presence, as the arguer feigns, and by no reason proved this but supposed it.

XXVII. Second, he argues that operation is not the reason for an angel's being in place, in three ways. First, by leading to an absurdity in three ways. Namely, that an angel would frequently be nowhere: because in the empyrean heaven he does nothing. – And that an angel moving the heaven would be in the whole heaven: because he moves the whole primarily, because it is proportioned to him, so that if a star were added to the sphere, he would move it with labour, II Caeli, text. LXXI⁴⁹. – And that an angel would be in place commensuratively: because his operation is in place commensuratively per accidens, and he himself is there only through it.

Second, ostensively. The reason for being in place is in the angel formally: otherwise the angel would not be formally in place. But transient operation is not in the angel formally. Therefore.

Third, by the authorities of Damascene⁵⁰, which say that an angel operates and is in place. Therefore in an angel operating is one thing, and being in place another: otherwise each would be said superfluously.

XXVIII. But to these also the reply is easily made from what has been said. First, what is reckoned an absurdity, namely that an angel be nowhere, is not absurd: indeed, as Aristotle, I Caeli, text. C⁵¹, said, those blessed beings are not apt to be in place. – As to what is mixed into the argument about operation concerning the empyrean heaven, it can be resolved in many ways. First, that angels' being in the empyrean heaven is a metaphorical expression, because they are in glory, for which the empyrean heaven was sanctified. A sign of which is that, as the Master adduces in distinction II of the Second, that heaven is said to be full of angels, which can be understood only metaphorically. – Second, that the angels in the empyrean heaven do operate, but what kind of operation it is lies hidden from us. – As to what is said by some, that they are there by adornment, or something of the kind, which is a relation signified by way of operation, I think it said more imaginatively than reasonably: for the mode of signifying that comes from us contributes nothing to this question. If, therefore, in reality a mere respect, without any operation touching the place in act or in habit, can be posited in the angel, by which the angel would be formally present to the place, then substantial presence, impugned above⁵², is already posited in reality; the angel is already posited in place, and not as operating in what is operated on; and everything we have said collapses. – But if someone does not think this ignorance of the operation reasonable, he must embrace the first reply, if he fears to deny the authority of Gregory Nazianzen⁵³. For he says that we say abusively that angels are in place: since we ought to say that they operate in place.

The consequence of the other absurdity is denied. For, as is clear in VIII Physic.⁵⁴, the mover of the heaven is not primarily in the whole heaven, but in the equinoctial circle, whose motion is the swiftest. Nor in the whole of that, but in the eastern place, as is clear in II Caeli⁵⁵: because there the right is determined by the nature of the thing, not materially but formally, as Averroes says, and well, in II Caeli, comm. XV. – Nor need one ask where he rests: since he does not need place, nor does he rest, but is altogether immovable.

The consequence of the third absurdity is also null, as is clear of itself. For an effect per accidens in such a way does not redound upon the cause: indeed, as St Thomas says, an angel is per se in place not simply, but as operating.

To the ostensive argument it is said that, although the major is true of being in place locally, it is not so of being in place equivocally, namely as operating in it, as is clear.

To the authority of Damascene it is said that, on account of our mode of understanding, by which we apprehend and name higher things after the manner of lower ones, since here operating in place is one thing and being in place another, he coupled being and operating when speaking of them. Hence there they are not distinguished in reality, but only in reason, conceiving that mode by way of operation, and by way of presence.

The title is clear. Yet one thing must be noted in it: the term can expresses the natural power of the angels themselves, and the ordinary power of God himself; for here we are not examining what God's power can do absolutely in this matter, but what the order of things holds.

In the body of the article he does five things: first, he answers the question; second, from this he excludes a certain error; third, he removes a certain objection; fourth, he infers how differently a body, an angel, and God are in place; last, from what has been said he solves the arguments.

II. As to the first, the responsive conclusion has three parts, and it is this: An angel is not everywhere, but in one particular place. – And the several parts are proved. First, that he is not everywhere, from the difference between the power of an angel and the divine power: because the one is finite, the other infinite; the one is a particular cause, the other the universal cause of all things.

Then the second and third parts are proved together, namely that he is in one place, and that he is in a particular place, as follows. An angel can have only one particular effect: therefore he can be only in one particular place. – The antecedent is proved as to the first part: because whatever is compared to some one power is compared as one. As to the third, however, thus: as universal being stands to God's universal power, so some particular being stands to the power of an angel; therefore, etc. – The consequence, moreover, is proved: because an angel is in place only through the application of his power to the place.

III. Concerning this part a manifold doubt arises. And first, in the proof of the second part of the conclusion: for either a falsehood is assumed there, or the point intended is not proved, both on the side of the predicate of the proposition assumed and on the side of the subject. For when it is said: whatever is compared to some one power is compared as one, either the discussion concerns every power universally, or some power, say a created one. If some power, three difficulties follow. First, that what is to be proved is assumed. – Second, that St Thomas would have inferred badly from this proposition the proportionality of universal being to the power of God, and of particular being to the power of an angel. – Third, that the restriction would be unreasonable, or at least ambiguous. For this proposition could perhaps be restricted on two heads: namely, by the difference between natural and voluntary power; or between finite and infinite power. But it can be restricted by neither ground. For an angel too is an agent by purpose: and hence, if the proposition holds only of natural power, it will not serve the purpose. And the ground of finite and infinite does nothing for the unity and plurality of the effect: for natural power, whether finite or infinite, is determined to one; voluntary power, whether finite or infinite, is related to opposites, as is clear from Metaphys. IX¹. Therefore.

But if it is understood universally of every power, a question emerges. Both because from this it follows that the divine power is determined to one. And because from this it also follows that a power acting by purpose is determined to one.

IV. Second, it is doubtful of what unity of power the discussion is here: real, namely, or formal, or both together. If real only, the instance is manifest from the generative, spirative and creative power of God, which are one thing, and yet it is not determined to one.

But if the discussion is of formal unity, then the proposition, although true, does not serve the purpose. For to posit in angels many powers distinct only formally is not unfitting: say a motive power, a custodial power, and so on for others, according to the diverse formal aspects of the effect. And so by this reasoning the point intended would not be proved: for it could be said that an angel, although according to one power he is in only one place, nevertheless according to several powers is in several places. For it is not unfitting that one and the same agent use several powers at once: as is clear of the soul, which at once hears and sees and performs the operations of the vegetative and intellective part, being one, according to St Thomas².

And by the same reasoning it is obtained that he does not understand it of the real and formal together: for this member is inferred from the preceding one, as is clear.

V. Third, it is doubtful of what unity of effect the discussion is: namely, formal or numerical. If formal, the point intended does not follow: for from the formal unity of the effect, numerical unity does not follow.

If numerical, either it is understood of one in number simply or entirely. And then this is false: for thus it would follow that an angel could not move at once two discontinuous pebbles; since their motions would be distinct in number, from the distinction of the subjects, nor could they be called one in number except perhaps in a certain respect.

Or it is understood as one in number in any way whatever; in which way even a heap of stones is one. And thus too it seems to be false.

Both because it would follow that God could not produce several things in number, as several. – And because between an angel and God there would be no difference in producing at once one thing or several, but only more or less. And similarly there would be no difference between them in existing in one place or in several, but only in greater or lesser. For every power is determined to one in number according to this: but the divine power to one, that is, the whole universe; the others to particular things each. But this is manifestly unfitting: for God can produce several things at once, as several, and be in several places at once.

– And because the opposite of the principal intended point would follow: namely, that an angel can be in several places at once. For if such numerical unity is possible in the effect of the angel himself, since this unity does not require continuity, then for the same reason by which he can move at once two stones a cubit apart, he can move stones ten cubits apart; since in acting upon them there is no need to act at once upon the intervening distance. And so he could move at once two pebbles, one in Rome and the other in France: and consequently he would be in many places.

VI. For the evidence of these difficulties, it must be known that an effect can be compared to its cause in two ways: first, as object to power; second, as effect to cause. For example, what is heated is compared to the heating power as a possible object; and as an effect carried into execution. In the first way the comparison is considered between the formal aspect of the effect and the aspect of operating belonging to the cause itself; in the second way what is considered is the supposit or individual of the effect itself, and the operation of the cause in exercised act.

VII. Since, then, the assumed proposition³ could be interpreted in these two ways, it is said that, if this proposition is interpreted in the first way, it is equivalent to this: from one, inasmuch as one, only one proceeds; which is understood of the formal unity both of the cause and of the effect. And it is universally true: for every power regards one formal aspect in its adequate object; otherwise it would not be one formally. – Nor does it follow from this⁴ that a rational power is not toward opposites; or that the divine power cannot produce several things formally, unless it were formally multiplied: for both the rational power and the divine power regard one thing per se primo. And of the rational power, indeed, it is clear from Metaphys. IX⁵, where it is said that a rational power acts one of the opposites per se primo, but the other per se secundo. Of the divine power, however, it is clear, because it regards being (esse) per se primo, and the rest inasmuch as they are modes of being and participations; and therefore it can produce several things formally under being; just as sight too can see several species of colors, yet under one genus.

And by this the instance concerning the formal multiplication of the angelic power⁶ is excluded. For it is said that in an angel there is one operative power: but its formal unity is not considered according to those specific formal aspects, but according to some generic or analogous aspect, under which many specific formal aspects are comprehended. Hence it is not only really, but also formally, the same power by which the angel guards, presides, moves, and does whatever he does.

And thus that proposition is true in this sense: yet it is not thus principally intended, since we intend to conclude the numerical unity of place. I said, however, principally, because secondarily it is thus intended: for, as is said in Metaphys. V⁷, what is one in number per se is also one in aspect.

VIII. Since, then, in the second sense⁸ this proposition is principally intended, for its evidence it must be known that, just as on the side of the cause the usual distinction is found between a total cause and partial causes, that is, between a cause which in its order suffices alone, and causes which require the concurrence of several of the same order, as is clear of several men hauling a ship, and of one alone hauling a boat; so proportionally on the side of the effect a distinction can be made, so that one is a total effect, and another a partial effect. So that, just as the partial causes of some effect are called such, not any two causes even of the same kind, but only those which concur both in the same genus of cause and in the same order to complete one cause of that order (for the sun and a man are not partial causes of Socrates: but several men hauling a ship are called partial causes of the hauling, because they combine to complete one perfect hauler, and hence obtain the force of one total cause, the higher causes nevertheless concurring in their own orders); similarly the partial effects of some power are called such, not any two effects of it, but only those which are produced to complete one total effect. And hence the aspect of a partial effect is distinguished from the aspect of a total effect in this, that the former necessarily comes about as part of another, the latter, however, absolutely. – Second, it must be known that a total effect can be compared to some power in three ways: namely as deficient, as excessive, and as adequate. For example, with respect to the motive power of a man, the movable is threefold: one adequate, one exceeding, and one less, so that he can move more than it. – The third distinction is about coming to be at once, or successively.

IX. For from these three distinctions the interpretation of that proposition is obtained. For it is to be interpreted thus: Whatever is compared as a total and adequate effect (or quasi-adequate), and at once, to a power one really and formally, is compared as one in number. And thus it is universally true of every power, whether finite or infinite, whether natural or free. Hence St Thomas too in this article, immediately after this proposition, subjoined that universal being corresponds to the divine power, as its quasi-adequate effect. – But note that, although these three conditions are to be understood in that proposition absolutely, the second is nevertheless not needed if it is contracted to the angelic power: because it cannot produce at once even two deficient effects. The third too is not needed if it is contracted to the infinite power: for whatever that power can produce successively, it can also produce at once, unless there is repugnance on the side of the effect.

X. Nor from this does any of those three difficulties follow which were brought forward in objecting⁹. First, it does not follow that God could not produce several things in number as several: for that one in number which corresponds to his power as adequate effect is compatible with the whole possible latitude, numerical as well as formal. For it is universal being: hence, just as with the determination of the creative power to one formally, that is, to being (esse), it stands that it can produce several things formally, according to several modes of being; so with the determination of the same power in exercised act to one in number, that is, the universe, there stands this multitude of things from which the universe arises.

Nor does it obstruct this determination that God could have produced at once, outside this universe, another universe, or another creature. Both because this universe, and whatever things, and however many, and in whatever way they are posited as produced separately and apart, will necessarily be parts of universal being; although they would not be parts of this or that universe. On this account St Thomas in the text notably did not assign to the divine power the universe as its adequate effect, but universal being: nor did he say, whatever is made by some one power etc., but whatever is compared; so as to suggest that he was speaking of an adequate or quasi-adequate effect, which it is clear no being made or makeable is, with respect to the divine power, but only universal being. – And because, as was said in the title of the question¹⁰, the discussion here is of the ordinary power, from which only one universe can emanate, as an adequate effect including in itself many deficient and partial effects.

XI. The second difficulty also does not follow. For to attain some partial effects happens in two ways: first, according to that alone in which they agree; second, according also to those things in which they are distinguished. And in this the divine and angelic power differ: for the angelic power attains many partial effects according to that alone in which they are united; but the divine power attains in all the parts of the universe also those things in which they are distinguished. And therefore an angel can make at once only one in number, but the divine power several: because the former does not attain several except as one, whereas the latter attains several as one and as several. On this account St Thomas in the text, suggesting both, said two things: both the agreement of the angelic and divine power, in that they are determined to one in number; and the difference, in that the divine is determined to such a one in number, from which it necessarily follows that it attains several under that one. For from the fact that universal being is attained, it follows that multitude, as multitude, is attained: because it belongs to the aspect of the universe to have not only many as one, but many as many; that is, not only that in which many agree, namely order, but those things in which they are distinguished. The angelic power, however, is determined to one such, from which multitude does not follow: because it is determined to particular being.

XII. To the third difficulty, finally, it is said that, although an angel can move two discontinuous stones as partial movables of one total motion, arising from two partial passive motions; he could not nevertheless move them as two total movables, that is, so that neither would be moved as a co-part of the other. As is clear in one hauling a small piece of wood and able to haul at once one other equal to it: for he could haul both at once, as two partial movables hauled by the same action; yet he could not, while he hauls one, by another action haul the other separately.

How great a distance can be interposed between two partial effects, however, we do not have for certain. It seems necessary, nevertheless, that, just as the other finite natural powers have a certain sphere of their activity, beyond which they cannot operate immediately (for it happens that something is coagulated at once, as is said in de Sensu et Sensato¹¹); so the angelic power has a certain sphere of its activity, within which it regards whatever things it moves at once as existing in one place. Nor could it move at once those very things, if one of them were posited outside the sphere of its activity. And therefore it is denied that there is the same reasoning for a small and a great distance of partial effects from one another. Hence it does not follow that an angel can be at once in different places.

XIII. Concerning that proposition, namely: to an angel there can be attributed an indivisible or a divisible place, greater or lesser, according as he voluntarily applies his power¹², a doubt arises, whether an angel can be in a divisible place however small, or however great. For Scotus, in II Sent., dist. II, qu. VI, holds the negative part: and he proves in two ways that an angel cannot be in a place however small, although he concedes it for a punctual place. First, from the thirty-fifth of Euclid's Book I, where it is said that whatever can be in one of equals can also be in the other, if the figure does not repugn. From this, says Scotus, it follows that an angel can be in a place however long: because it is always possible to find a quadrangle more narrowly equal to any given square.

– Second, by natural reason: because it would follow that the angel is of infinite power. The consequence is proved: because, the angel's power being determined to the greatest place, to be able to apply it to a smaller is of some measure of active power; and to be able to apply it yet to a smaller is to be able more and more perfectly, and so on to infinity; therefore, if he can always transfer himself to a place however smaller, he will be of infinite power.

St Thomas, however, holds three things in this matter. First, that he can be in an indivisible place.

– Second, that he cannot be in a place however great. Because his power is finite; nor can the choice of his will be efficacious except according to the strength of nature. – Third (and in this Scotus disagreed with him), that an angel can be in a place however small. For without doubt he can operate in a place however small, since there is no repugnance on the side of the effect or of the power etc., as is clear of itself: for motion, local at least, does not determine for itself a minimum place, as is clear from Physic. VI¹³; hence in a place however small it can be caused by an angel.

XIV. To Scotus's reasons, however, one can easily reply. To the first, indeed, that Euclid's proposition is not to the purpose: for it manifestly speaks of being in place commensuratively, wishing that everything commensurable with one of two equals be commensurable with the other, unless the figure obstruct; which it is ridiculous to bring to bear upon the purpose. – Although it could also be said in the second place that it is one thing to be able to be in a place however long simply; and another to be able to be in a place however long with respect to a given magnitude: just as it is one thing to be able to increase to infinity simply; and another to be able to increase to infinity according to parts removable from a given line, as is clear from Physic. III¹⁴. For although a length infinite simply could not correspond to an angel, what would nevertheless be infinitely long by the restrictions of an assigned square could correspond to an angel as one place: for such a length would be simply finite in length, and never, whatever excrescence were made, would exceed a certain quantity. And hence, unless the length were stretched so far as to go out of the sphere of the angel's activity, by the same reasoning by which he could operate upon the square, he could also upon the quadrangle. But if it went out of the sphere of activity, there is then the reason why he could not be in it: for the going out beyond the sphere would obstruct, just as Euclid says that the figure would obstruct some corporeal thing.

To the second reason it is said that it is false that to be able to apply himself to a smaller and to a smaller place is of greater power: for this is not from the quantity of power, but depends on freedom, as St Thomas says. Hence although to apply himself to the whole place is of some measure of power, because no effect can be unless it is from some measure of power; yet to apply himself to a greater or lesser place within his own sphere does not, per se speaking, demand a greater or lesser power, but freedom in the use of it.

XV. And by this it is clear what, according to St Thomas, is to be held about the other ambiguity, which Scotus raises at the end: namely, whether, if an angel is in a place, he is of necessity in so great a place determinately, say of one palm. For he himself reckons that each part of the question yields no unfitting result. From the sayings of St Thomas, however, the negative manifestly follows, so that the opposite affirmative would bring in something unfitting: because it would follow that the breadth of the use of the angelic power would not be free, but natural, like the application of the soul to the body, though in another kind of cause.

The title is clear from what has been said¹: for the question is asked directly about the possible according to the power of things.

In the body of the article he answers the question with a single conclusion: Several angels cannot be together in one place. – It is proved thus. It is impossible for two total and immediate causes to be together causes of the same effect: therefore it is impossible for several angels to be together in the same place.

The antecedent is proved by induction, both in efficient causes and in formal causes. Then by that particle total, or perfect, the objection about several men immediately hauling a ship is excluded. – The consequence, however, is proved from the fact that for an angel to be in a place is nothing other than to contain the place perfectly and immediately, in the genus of efficient cause.

II. Concerning this conclusion, note that it can be understood in two ways: namely of natural power, and of logical power. And if it is understood of logical power, it has many objections. Partly because no contradiction appears in several angels being bound by divine power to one and the same place: indeed in fact perhaps this is so with several souls of the damned of altogether equal demerit. – Partly because confusion of operations, although it is a certain inconvenience following from the fact that angels are in the same place, is nevertheless not clear that it is altogether impossible². – Partly because two bodies being together in the same place is not so impossible; although, were we not to hold this by faith, we would say that it implies contradiction.

But if it is understood of natural power, three things stand in the way. The first is the middle term assumed by St Thomas. For that proposition, it is impossible for two complete immediate causes of the same order to be together causes of the same thing, is verified of the logically impossible: since it is founded on this, that otherwise two contradictories would follow, namely that the same thing would at once depend and not depend on its per se cause. The inference is evident: because, the duality of per se causes standing, on the one hand it follows, therefore the effect depends on both, because they are posited as its per se causes in being or in becoming; on the other hand it follows, therefore the effect depends on neither. The inference is evident: because it does not depend on that cause with which removed it would be or come to be no less; but although either of them be removed, the effect would be or come to be; therefore it depends on neither. Therefore it implies contradiction. – The second is that it is not inconvenient for two effects of diverse kinds to be produced at once in one and the same place, according to the same parts, by agents of diverse kinds: for one and the same thing, according to the same part, can be made hot by one agent, and made white by another, and made sweet by another. Therefore several angels will also be able, even naturally, to be together in the same place. – The third is that according to this the presence of order does not seem to be a sufficient reason for existing in place: since several angels can be thus present to one and the same place, since confusion of operations does not follow from this.

III. To this it is briefly said, in my judgment, that the conclusion is to be understood not of logical power, but of natural power. I am moved to this, however, on the part of the middle term assumed by St Thomas: since that middle term has place only in the natural way in which an angel is in place, namely through his operation; while it is nevertheless established that demons are placed by being acted upon rather than by acting. – I am moved also on the part of the conclusion proposed in the text: for he made a categorical proposition of inherence, namely that two angels are not together in the same place; and not a modal proposition of the possible. – I am moved third by the custom of St Thomas, who always was accustomed to determine from what is proper to the matter at hand, and about what is proper to it. For here we ask, as we said in the title³, what the order of things holds, not what God's power can do.

IV. Hence reply must be made to the objections to the contrary⁴. And to the first it is replied in two ways. First, that since two such causes are related as causes of the same kind distinct only in number, as is evident, it is said that there is no contradiction there. Partly because it does not seem to be granted by all that this effect is per se from this cause; because, as they say, this effect could exist, and not from this cause. Partly because, perseity being granted, contradiction does not follow, but superfluity: for it does not follow that it depends on both and on neither, but that it depends on both inasmuch as they are united; with which it is consistent that both of these be false, it depends on both, and, it depends on neither. These points are made clear and evident if you suppose two luminous bodies of the same kind and power, equally near to some medium which, according to its whole self, is first illuminable perfectly, that is, to the highest degree, by either of them. And lest this supposition be denied, or be dissimilar to the matter at hand, let those two luminous bodies be placed by God's power in the same place. Then let it be asked, whether the illuminated medium will be illuminated by one, or by both, etc.: for this is precisely the case we are disputing. Hence since such a supposition does not imply contradiction, but could be posited in being by God's absolute power; it follows that to posit two total causes, etc., is not a logical but a physical impossibility. Wherefore, in such a case, those two luminous bodies would be related as parts of one luminous body, exceeding by double, or more, in its activity the passive power to which it is brought near: from which it is evident that the effect would depend not on the parts divisively, but as they are united in one. And so, in the matter at hand, it would depend on two agents not as they are two, but as they are united: yet they would be two. – Second it is said, that it is one thing for several angels to be together in the same place, and another for several angels to be naturally together in the same place: for the first does not imply contradiction, granted that the second would imply contradiction, on account of the reason adduced. And thus either part could be sustained, according to this distinction. For which reason St Thomas assumed a conclusion of inherence, but a major concerning the impossible: logical, indeed, speaking of such causes as they are several; physical, however, speaking of the same several causes, but not inasmuch as several.

To the second objection it is said that, since an angel is per se in place as operating on the thing operated upon, just as the things operated upon happen to be really and formally diverse, and yet one in subject; so it is not inconvenient for several angels to be in the same place materially, though not formally.

To the third it is said that, just as it cannot naturally happen that two perfect natural agents of the same order, etc., be equally and immediately near to one and the same patient in the same respect; so it is naturally impossible for two Intelligences to be present to one and the same place according to the same passive power. And the reason in both cases is that nature no less than intellect shrinks from superfluities, as idle. Hence the presence of order is not on this account barred from being a sufficient reason for placing the angel⁵.

V. Concerning the proof of the consequence⁶, a doubt occurs: for the assumed proposition, namely, an angel is in place after the manner of a perfect container, does not seem necessary. For perfection of causality is either a condition necessarily required for an angel to be in place, or a condition necessarily concomitant with it: but neither can be said: therefore, etc. That it is not necessarily required is evident from two things. Partly from the several men hauling a ship, each of whom, setting aside corporeity, would be said to be there. Partly from what St Thomas said above⁷, that an angel is in place by the application of his power immediately in whatever way. – That it is not necessarily concomitant is evident from the fact that angels are of finite power; and can immediately produce an effect of the same kind in place. For from these two it manifestly follows that it is possible for some effect, say the local motion of some mass to be shaken, to have to be produced, for which the motive powers of several angels are required.

VI. To this it must be said that, since the present question is about natural power, and not logical, it suffices if that proposition is necessary with physical necessity, that is, as in the majority of cases. And since these matters are very remote from the senses, it suffices if this proposition is known to us from reasonable middle terms, as is evident from II Caeli⁸ and XII Metaphys.⁹ For it is fitting to reason that every angel should hold so much dignity among causes as to be free of this imperfection which is to be a partial cause: since this dignity is believed to be attributed by nature to all the stars; how much more to immaterial causes, the least of which incomparably exceeds every corporeal cause. – To this is added that good angels, upheld by divine power, are applied to these places: and therefore St Thomas said that they suffice for all things to which they are sent, in I Sent., dist. XXXVII¹⁰.

Hence to the objections to the contrary no other reply is needed. For we admit that that proposition is not necessary with logical necessity, but physical. And again that its necessity, such as it is, is known to us only probably. And therefore it could be sustained, if it is ever found said by Saints or illustrious Doctors that several angels are in the same place; which Richard¹¹ seems to think.