Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. – In the body of the article there is one responsive conclusion, namely: Angels do not have bodies naturally united to them. – It is proved thus. There are some perfect intellectual substances, not needing to receive knowledge from the senses: therefore there are intellectual substances separated from bodies. Such we call angels. Therefore the conclusion.

The antecedent is proved. For in any genus in which something imperfect is found, something perfect must pre-exist: but in the genus of intellectual substance something imperfect is found, needing the senses for the acquisition of knowledge, because it is in potency in the genus of intelligibles, as is evident of the human soul: therefore, etc.

The consequence, for its part, is proved thus. In the antecedent we assumed two things, namely the term intellectual substances, and the term perfect without need etc. And so it is proved first that, inasmuch as they are intellectual substances, it does not belong to them to be united to a body; then it is proved that neither inasmuch as they are such substances do they have this. The first, then, is proved thus. To understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal power: therefore being united to a body is not of the nature of intellectual substance as such: therefore it does not belong to every intellectual substance. This last consequence is proved: because what is accidental to some nature is not found universally in it. And it is made clear by the example of wings with respect to an animal. – The second is proved thus. It is accidental to an intellectual substance to be united to a body on account of imperfection and need of knowledge, as is evident of the soul of man: but this is not found in perfect substances: therefore the conclusion.

II. Concerning the antecedent and its proof, a threefold doubt occurs. First, there is doubt about the terms assumed, namely perfect and imperfect, how they are taken in that proof, when it is said: In whatever genus something imperfect is found, in the same genus something perfect must pre-exist. For either this proposition is founded on that principle: act is naturally prior to potency. And not on this one. For the truth of that principle is certified only from this, that what is in potency must be reduced to act by what is in act: which has no place in the matter at hand. For from this principle nothing can be concluded except that there is some intellectual substance which is in act so as to reduce to act our soul, which is in potency: and such is the agent intellect, whatever it may be. – Or it is founded on that other principle, namely: of the differences of the same genus, one must be related as a habit and perfection, the other as a privation and imperfection. And this too is not sufficient for the matter at hand. For from this nothing else can be concluded except that there is some intellectual substance more perfect than the human soul according to the nature of its species: but whether that more perfect species has complete knowledge implanted in it from itself or not, is not sufficiently concluded from this principle; because it is possible for there to be a more perfect species, and yet for it not to have knowledge in such a way.

And this is confirmed from sensitive nature. In it, since sensitive nature is found imperfect in imperfect animals, it follows that there are more perfect animals, that is, having more perfect sensitive powers. Yet it does not follow from this that there are animals having congenital sensible species, whether interior or exterior. So, then, it will be in the matter at hand.

III. Second, there is doubt about another term assumed there, namely the term in the same genus¹. For either genus is taken strictly. And not so: because it would follow that this argument would hold only on the supposition that angels are in a genus; which is not conceded by all, and indeed seems to differ from the Peripatetics². – Or genus is taken for coordination, according to the custom by which we are wont to say in the genus of beings, and in the genus of intelligibles, etc. And if it is so taken, the intended conclusion is not reached, although something true is assumed. For it will be said that that perfect intellectual substance, which must pre-exist in the genus of intelligibles, is the glorious God: and hence it is wrongly inferred, such we call angels.

IV. Third, concerning the antecedent itself a small doubt occurs. For it is said in the plural that there are some intellectual substances etc.: and yet from the proof adduced nothing can be inferred except in the singular, therefore there is some perfect intellectual substance etc. That antecedent therefore seems wrongly concluded.

V. For the clarification of these doubts, it must be noted that the force of the argument assumed to prove the antecedent consists in this, that whenever there is some nature distinguishable by several modes or essential differences, it is necessary that, if it is found according to the more imperfect mode or difference, it be found also according to the more perfect. And the reason for this is manifold. First, because, since both are possible, nature is no more solicitous about imperfect things than about perfect ones. Second, because the more imperfect things are for the sake of the more perfect. Third, because the divisive members of a pluralizable nature are either simultaneous in nature, as is evident of the differences dividing a genus on the same level, from the Postpraedicamenta³: or one is related as prior and the other as posterior, as happens in the division of an analogous term; and so the posterior also implies the prior.

VI. This being so, it is said to the first doubt⁴ that the proposition is here taken from the second foundation. And to the objection to the contrary the reply is twofold. First, that because these two, namely an intellectual nature more perfect than the whole human soul, and an intellectual nature so perfect that it does not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things, are convertible with each other, St Thomas for that reason left the effectively concluded antecedent as established. – And this convertibility is made clear from what will be said below, when it will be shown in qu. LXX⁵ that the intellective soul needs a body, on account of understanding itself, only in man. And it can also be gathered from the words of Aristotle in III de Anima, at the end⁶. And it can be proved by reason: but I do not wish to dwell on it now.

Second, it is said that, granting that above the soul of man there were some intellectual substances not having knowledge implanted by nature, the argument nevertheless concludes the intended point. For to have congenital knowledge is a mode possible according to the nature of intellectual substance, and it is perfect: therefore, if there are imperfect modes of having intellectual nature, a perfect mode of having the same must be found; and hence, there are intellectual substances not needing the acquisition of knowledge.

And by this the reply to the confirmation is evident. For the reasoning is not similar in intellectual and in sensitive nature in this respect: namely that in intellectual nature the mode of having it with fullness of power and of species from within is a mode possible in nature; whereas the mode of having sensitive nature so perfect that it has sensible species implanted as well is a mode impossible in nature. And therefore the argument proceeds in intellectual nature: but not in sensible nature.

VII. To the second doubt⁷ it is said that, in whatever way genus is taken, the intended conclusion is reached. First, because God is not enclosed in the coordination of intellectual substances: for He is not a part of the universe, but its separate good, as is said in XII Metaphys., text. LII⁸. Second, because, by restricting the minor, namely in the genus of created intellectual substances, the proposition nevertheless follows, as is evident to one who runs through it.

VIII. To the third doubt⁹ it is said that St Thomas used the plural number, not from the force of this argument precisely; but from this argument together with what was said above, in the preceding question¹⁰, about the number of intellectual substances.

IX. Concerning the proof of that consequence, namely, It is accidental, therefore it does not belong universally¹¹, one can doubt: because it does not seem necessary. For it is possible that something be accidental to a thing, and yet belong to every one: for nothing prevents color, or anything else, from being accidental to an animal, and yet being found in every animal.

X. To this it is briefly said that accidents (that is, accidental predicates) are of two orders. Some are accidental both to the superior and to the inferiors: others are accidental to the superior, yet essential and constitutive of the inferiors, or essentially consequent upon what constitutes the inferiors; as rational or risible with respect to animal is an accident, but with respect to man is essential. When it is said, therefore, that an accident of some nature does not belong to it universally, the proposition is true and necessary of an accident in the second way: it is also true for the most part of an accident in the first way. And because St Thomas was speaking of an accident in the second way, for that reason he proceeded not only from true but from necessary premises.

XI. Concerning the proof of the consequence as to the second part¹², a doubt could be raised, in that only one mode is excluded in which an intellectual substance can have a body naturally united, namely that which belongs to the human soul. For someone could say that natural separation from a body is insufficiently concluded from this, unless it is proved that no other mode is possible. Since St Thomas did not do this, he seems to have concluded insufficiently.

XII. To this it is said that, speaking formally of intellectual substance and of its whole breadth per se, that is, of all intellectual substances and inasmuch as they are intellectual, and inasmuch as they are intellectual in this way or that, the procedure of St Thomas was sufficient. For it is only in this way that intellectual operation happens to need a body, namely for the acquisition of knowledge and the service of phantasms, as happens in man. And because St Thomas was speaking formally of intellectual substance, for that reason, this one mode having been excluded, he passed on. And truly he proceeded wisely. For, granted that to some intellectual substance, say the soul of a heaven or of some aerial body, a natural union to a body could belong from another source, nevertheless this argument persists in its strength. For if in the breadth of intellectual things, running through all the differences of intellectuality as such, union to a body is not found except on account of imperfection of intellectual power; it follows that a perfect intellectual power without need of a body is found beforehand. And thus the procedure of St Thomas is to be interpreted.

XIII. But against this reply, though subtle, an objection can be raised. For from the force of this procedure it cannot be inferred that there are such substances separated from bodies simply, but only inasmuch as they are intellectual. Someone, however, would say that it is compatible with this that they be conjoined to bodies from another source, say because they are motive or operative toward the exterior.

XIV. To this it is said that to suppose such a cause of union with a body is not reasonable regarding all intellectual substances; although regarding some it is perhaps doubtful, on account of their imperfection. For such must be of so limited and imperfect a motive power that they can be applied immediately only to an organ conjoined according to being (esse), and to the rest by means of that organ. Hence if intellectual substance is found according to this imperfect degree, it is necessary that it be found beforehand according to the perfect degree, in which the operative power toward the exterior is proportionate to the intellective power; namely that both are so elevated that neither needs the aid of a body conjoined according to being. Since, therefore, the intention of St Thomas was to conclude the particular, namely that some intellectual substances are separated from bodies; not to discuss the universal, namely whether all intellectual substances perfect according to knowledge are separated from bodies (indeed this will be brought into doubt below, qu. LXX¹³); and since by the very argument he used this objection was excluded, insofar as it would stand in the way of that particular; and since this instance is taken from a condition outside the breadth of intellectuality as such: therefore it could be passed over in silence by one intending a procedure from the force of intellectuality.

Second, it can be said that this instance, although it can make for ambiguity simply, nevertheless cannot produce it given what was said above¹⁴ about the number of angels, that the number of such substances is so great, and that they are not for the sake of moving. For it is necessary that their breadth be reckoned not by moving, but by understanding.

Third, it can be said that the intention of St Thomas is indeed to conclude this specifying proposition, namely that angels, so far as the merits of their intellectuality are concerned, are separated from bodies; but to affirm this one simply, namely, angels are separated from bodies. Nor is this faulty. First on the part of the middle term he used, concerning the perfect and the imperfect, which by the same reasoning infers that prejacent proposition, as was said in the first reply. – Second on the part of the conclusion inferred. For intellective being is principal and essential, whereas motive being is as it were accidental and secondary, as fitting by reason of the first: and hence, if the principal essential does not require a body, and being unitable to a body is among the essentials, it follows that some such are not in need of bodies, according to the second reply. – Third on the part of what is to be said below¹⁵, where the discussion will be of them inasmuch as they are movers. For now, since the discussion is about their substance, and the substantial features of things must be weighed from their principal operation, and the rest are to be discussed in their proper places; it suffices to show that their proper and essential operation leads to positing that their substance can be so elevated that they do not need a body. And hence, here it can be said simply that they are separated from bodies: for in substantial matters the possible and the necessary do not differ.

The title, as to the meaning of the name, demands nothing other than that two things be noted. First, the term assume, which signifies to take to oneself, that is, for the manifestation of oneself; and not for the carrying out of one's works. – Second, the custom of Scripture is to be attended to, in which angels are introduced appearing in bodies.

In the body he does three things: first, he reports a certain opinion of Rabbi Moses¹; second, he refutes it²; third, he answers the question with a single conclusion³.

II. As to the first, that opinion says two things: namely both that angels do not assume bodies; and that what is said in the Scriptures about the corporeal appearance of angels is to be understood of an imaginary appearance only.

III. As to the second, an argument is made against the last statement, thus. What is commonly seen by all is seen by corporeal vision, by which that is seen which is placed outside the one seeing: but angels appearing corporeally were commonly seen by all: therefore the conclusion.

The major is evident from the difference between exterior corporeal vision and imaginary vision, on the part of the object: because purely imaginary vision terminates in an interior object, whereas the vision of the eyes terminates in an extrinsic object. And from this follows another difference: because what is seen imaginarily, as such, is only in the one imagining, and consequently appears to him alone; but what is seen by the eyes, because it exists outside the one seeing, can be seen by all in common. – The minor is proved from Scripture concerning the angels who appeared to Abraham, Lot and Tobias.

IV. As to the third, the responsive conclusion is this: Angels sometimes assume bodies. – It is proved thus. What is a substance which is not a body, nor has a body naturally united, and is at times seen by corporeal vision, sometimes assumes a body: angels are of this kind: therefore the conclusion. – The minor is known from this article and the preceding ones. And likewise the major.

The title is clear in the body of the article. – In the body of the article there is one responsive conclusion, namely: Angels through assumed bodies can perform certain works of life, as to that in which they share with non-living bodies, but not as to that which is proper to living things. – This conclusion is both declared and proved: declared, on the one hand, as to the distinctions it supposes; proved, on the other, as to the last particle.

The distinctions are these. Of operations, one kind is vital, namely that which is from the soul inasmuch as soul; and another is non-vital, namely that which is from nature only, such as motion upward or downward. – Again, of vital operations, some have something in common with non-vital ones, and something proper inasmuch as they are vital; but some have nothing in common with non-vital ones. An example of each is had in the text.

The proof of the last particle is that the action belongs to that to which the power belongs, as is said in the book de Somn. et Vig.; but angels, in assumed bodies, have no power proper to the soul: therefore neither do they have the action.

II. Concerning the second distinction, and the first part of the conclusion, a doubt occurs at the same time. For when such a distinction is assigned, either it intends that in certain operations two really distinct things are found, one common to living and non-living things, and the other proper to living things: or that those two are distinct only according to reason, as the superior and the inferior. If in the first way, it appears false: since all operations of the soul are simple, and not composed of two really distinct things. – If in the second way, it also seems false. Because in this the operations of the soul do not differ from one another: since all operations of the soul share with the operations of inanimate things in some common predicate. And so the distinction is null.

III. To this it must be said that the intention of St Thomas, as is evident from Qu. VI de Pot. Dei, art. VIII, is to speak of two really distinct things; not however composing the operation, but concurring in it. So that the sense of the distinction is that, of vital operations, some share with non-vital ones in effect or term, although they differ in principle; but some do not share with non-vital ones either in principle or in term or effect. The first are speech and processive motion and generation, whose terms or effects are the division of air, local motion and alteration, which can also be caused by non-vital actions. The second are sensing, being nourished, and the rest, which are not only from the soul, but are terminated in an animate body, as such.

IV. Concerning the proof of the conclusion¹, note carefully that from this argument it is sufficiently concluded that angels exercise no work of life, speaking absolutely, in assumed bodies, because they have no vital power in the assumed body. And so neither speech nor progressive motion truly belongs to angels. But because the term of certain vital actions can come about without the action of the soul, and hence without the powers of the soul, such as striking the air, and being moved locally; therefore such works of life are attributed to angels through assumed bodies, not according as they are works of life, nor according as they are such works of life, but according to likeness of effect; that is, there are attributed to them works similar to these vital ones as to effect. I say similar, however, not metaphorically, but properly, as white is similar to white: for by metaphorical likeness all works of life can be attributed to them.

V. Concerning what St Thomas says in this matter here and in the Qq. de Pot., in the place cited², a doubt occurs, from the fact that he places generation in the genus of vital works sharing with non-vital ones; but separates it from the assumed bodies of angels, because corporeal matter does not obey angels for formal transmutation. For this does not seem true. Because vital generation terminates in the animate, inasmuch as it is animate: and consequently, granted that formal transmutation did not concur, it would be unfitting for an angel; and it is under the other genus of vital operations.

VI. To this it is said that the distinction made there by St Thomas, although it could have been made more ample, is nevertheless restricted by him to works which are from the same soul in the same numerical identity, as against those which are not of this kind. And so generation, which terminates in a soul not the same in number but in species, is placed in the second member, and excluded for another cause. A more ample distinction, however, does not contradict these, by which the works of the soul are distinguished into those which begin from the soul and terminate in the soul, whether the same in number or not; and those which only begin from the soul. And so generation and nutrition are excluded on two counts: namely both because they terminate in the animate as such; and because they are formal transmutations.