Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. – In the body there are two things. First, three opinions are reported, those of Plato, of Aristotle, and of Rabbi Moses; and they are refuted one by one.

Second, the question is answered with this conclusion: Angels exist in a certain very great multitude, exceeding every material number. – And it is proved in two ways: namely by the authority of Dionysius; and by this argument. The more perfect certain things are among beings, the greater the excess in which they have been created: angels are most perfect: therefore. – The major is proved in two ways. First, because the perfection of the universe is principally intended. Second, because we see the heavenly bodies created in the greatest excess according to magnitude.

II. Concerning this argument, note that the proof of the major is given rather obscurely in the text, because it had been set down more clearly in II Cont. Gent., ch. XCII; where it is plainly proved from this, that the perfection of the universe, which consists in order, requires that its principal parts, which exist for their own sake, be multiplied as far as possible. For this is the difference between things sought for the sake of another and things sought for their own sake, that things sought for the sake of another are required in just so great a number as suffices for that end; whereas of things sought for their own sake, the more there are, the better the universe is. And because the more perfect among beings are among the parts that exist for their own sake, and the more imperfect exist for their sake, therefore, by one who principally intends the perfection of the universe, the more perfect certain things are, the greater the excess in multitude or magnitude in which they were to be created.

III. Concerning the major of this same argument¹, a doubt occurs: because it does not seem true that the more perfect certain things are, the more they exceed others in magnitude or multitude. For gold exceeds iron in neither way; and gems too are incomparably exceeded by stones: and yet it is evident that these are more precious.

IV. To this it seems one should say that, as is discussed in De Caelo et Mundo I², the parts of the universe are twofold. Some are as integrating its substance: and these belong to the first integrity of the universe. Others are as perfecting it to the secondary perfection of the universe; and they are effects of the first. The first parts are only the elements, the heavenly bodies, and intellectual creatures: the second are any mixed bodies. The major of St Thomas is to be understood of the first parts: and in those it is most true, and suffices well enough for his purpose. Because from this it is concluded not only that the number of angels, that is, of intellectual substances, exceeds the number of the heavens and of the elements; but, just as we observe an incomparable excess of magnitude between the higher bodies and the lower, a fortiori, since immobile and spiritual substances are far more distant from corporeal ones than any bodies are from one another, it follows that they incomparably exceed both the multitude of the aforesaid and that of the other material things.

V. Concerning the principal conclusion³ a doubt occurs, whether it is understood of every material multitude, namely according to species and according to number; or of the specific multitude of material things only; or of the multitude of the first material parts of the universe. If it is understood in this third or second way, the number of angels does not seem as great and excessive as is usually said. And yet that it must be understood in the third way, the preceding solution⁴ shows: otherwise an equivocation would occur in the premises and the conclusion. But if in the first way, no small absurdity seems to follow, namely that there would be more angels than grains of millet, of wheat, etc.: for the number of these, and of pebbles, and of sand, and of other such things, does not seem wisely compared with intellectual things.

VI. To this it is said that this discourse, speaking per se, concerns the specific multitude. Both because no other multitude is found in angels. And because the force of the middle term on which the argument is founded does not go beyond the limits of such a multitude: because the first parts of the universe, namely the elements and the heavenly bodies, are each contained in single individuals. – Nor does it follow from this that the number of angels is not excessive. Because a multitude incomparably exceeding the material specific multitude is very great; just as the magnitude of the first sphere, incomparably exceeding the elemental quantity, is also very great. – And this is without doubt the mind of St Thomas. Hence below, q. CXII, art. 4, to 2, speaking of this, he added the word nature, saying that they exceed all corporeal natures. And in the Quaestiones de Potentia Dei, q. VI, art. 6, in the body, he added the word species, saying that they exceed all species of material things.

But what is objected to the contrary about the first parts of the universe is no obstacle. Because the first corporeal parts of the universe contain the other species, if not formally, at least virtually. And therefore to speak of the multitude of the first parts of the universe and to speak of the specific multitude of all material things differ only as implicit and explicit. And thereby, what disproportionately exceeds the multitude of the first material parts of the universe is understood also to exceed disproportionately the multitude implicitly and virtually contained in them. – And if it be objected, therefore it is understood also of material distinction, because that too is virtually contained in those first parts: the response is clear, that the account is not similar. Since the argument draws its strength from the relation of the parts of the universe and its perfection, as is clear from what has been said⁵, and for that reason the discourse must be only of that multitude which pertains to the perfection of the universe; such as is not numerical multitude, but specific multitude, of the first parts formally, of the second virtually.