Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. In it, however, note that, once corporeity had been removed from angels, that is, a substance underlying quantity, there still remained the doubt whether such a substance, indivisible quantitatively, would be divisible essentially, that is, composed of matter and form.

II. In the body he does two things principally: first, he reports the opinion of Avicebron; second, he refutes it¹.

As to the first, since he reports in order the foundation, the position, and the mode; namely that the matter which he posited in angels was posited in such a way that it was one for all things; there is no need to labor otherwise.

III. As to the second, these three are attacked in reverse order. The unity of matter, first: because it would follow that an angel would be quantified. – The position of matter, next: because to understand is an altogether immaterial operation; therefore an intellectual substance is altogether immaterial. The consequence holds: because the mode of operating bears witness to the mode of the operator. The antecedent is proved from the nature of the object: because the thing understood must be immaterial; therefore the act of understanding too, because an operation is specified by its object. – The foundation he removes, both in general: because the mode in which a thing is understood by us is not the mode in which the thing is in itself; a sign of which is that material things are in the intellect in a simpler mode than in themselves. And in the special case at hand: because we understand higher things by way of composite things, in which what they agree in is one thing and what they are distinguished in is another; and from this that foundation arose. And in the divine nature.

IV. Concerning the refutation of the unity of matter, a small doubt occurs. For it could be said that the consequence is not valid: because this matter common to all is so divided that, by the reception of quantity, one part of it was made the matter of corporeal things; but the remainder of the matter remained without quantity, and so is spiritual matter, distinguished from corporeal matter by the fact that it is not affected by quantity.

V. To this one can reply in three ways. First, that, because St Thomas foresaw this escape, he therefore adds the rejection of matter simply, which was chiefly intended. – Second, and better, it can be said that this response does not avoid that spiritual matter would be divisible quantitatively, although it maintains that it is not divided in act: since, because it is one before the reception of quantity, there is no greater reason why it should be affected by quantity according to this portion rather than that. But to posit that spiritual substances are quantified in act or in potency, or divisible quantitatively in act or in potency, is of the same account. – Third, and better still, it can be said that this response cannot be given by anyone who holds that there are at least two angels: because by an equal, indeed the same, argument it would be asked how matter common to two or more angels, since it is of the same account, was partitioned and distributed among several angels, if matter without quantity lacks parts, etc. Hence, because Avicebron agreed to a plurality of spiritual beings, St Thomas's argument was effective.

VI. Concerning the efficacy of the argument made in the text against the position of Avicebron², a doubt occurs from Durandus³. Because it does not seem to be valid except against those who hold that angels are intellectual substances according to their whole selves. For it is possible that there be a substance intellectual according to a part, that is, the form, and yet composed of matter and form; as is clear of man, and of the heavens, if they are animate, etc. And if this is so, then the argument is worth nothing against Avicebron: since he does not seem to hold that way.

VII. To this it is briefly said that, whatever the mind of Avicebron may be, the argument of the text manifestly concludes that an intellectual substance, as such, is immaterial, that is, independent in being (esse) from matter: for this is proved from the operation and the object. And thereby, if it is a substance complete in species, it is altogether immaterial, as is clear. And since by the name of angels we understand all substances complete in species (a sign of which is that the question about the souls of the heavens and of other animate things is one thing, and about angels another), it therefore evidently follows that one cannot escape from this argument by that response brought forward by way of objection. For in denying that we suppose angels to be intellectual according to their whole selves, we say that we suppose the quid nominis of the terms, namely that angel signifies an intellectual substance complete in species. And so the argument proceeds formally.

VIII. In the reply to the first, note that, because the force of the argument consists in that proposition of the Philosopher, St Thomas therefore does three things. First, he shows what is formally required for the notion of a difference, namely to determine to some grade among beings. – Second, from this he declares in which things the Philosopher's proposition has place, namely in material things. – Third, from the same foundation he shows that difference and genus are posited otherwise in angels.

IX. In the same reply, note carefully that St Thomas does not differ from the Peripatetics in placing angels in a genus. Because, as is clear here, he imitates even the words of Aristotle from Metaphys. VIII⁴, last text; and says that genus is distinguished from difference in them not on the side of the thing, but of our consideration. And understand this as said of their intrinsic constituents.

X. In the reply to the second, there is a doubt about the difference assigned between the reception of matter and of the intellect, because matter, by receiving, is constituted in the specific and natural being (esse) of the received form, whereas the intellect receives the form according to the very notion of form. What is it to receive according to the very notion of form? Either this is to receive the what-it-was-to-be of the form: and this it is not, because matter too receives this. Or it is to receive the form alone: and this it is not, because matter too has this. Or it is to receive intentionally: and this it is not, because air too receives intentionally. Or to receive universally: and this cannot be said according to St Thomas, because according to him whatever is received in the intellect is an individual or singular thing, say, this intelligible species.

And the difficulty is increased: because here the reception of the form according to the very notion of form is distinguished against the reception by which things are constituted in being (esse). For it is evident that the reception distinguished against this one is intentional reception. And yet this is also material reception, as is clear from St Thomas, II Contra Gent., ch. LI, third argument.

XI. To this it is said that to receive according to the very notion of form is to receive the form in the mode of form: and the mode of form is what the form has of itself: and this is indetermination to this or to that. And therefore, from first to last, it is to receive the form while preserving its commonness and breadth toward whatever things. And this is to receive universally.

To the objection in opposition it is said that to receive universally is not opposed to every singularity, but to material singularity, which is to the here and now. Because one immaterial individual is equivalent to infinitely many of the material order: and the species of a stone in the soul is a universal stone, although it is one thing⁵, one in number, of another order, namely the immaterial.

To the second objection it is said that intentional reception has a great latitude. For it is divided into universal and particular, the latter belonging to sense, and to the medium, etc. Hence it is not St Thomas's intention to suggest that reception according to the very notion of form and intentional reception are convertible. But since reception is threefold, namely purely material, which constitutes in being (esse); and purely formal, namely that which abstracts from all material things; and a middle one, which is partly material and partly formal (and this is intentional reception of the particular kind, belonging to the senses): St Thomas distinguished the other extreme, namely universal intentional reception, against the one extreme, namely the reception of matter simply; also suggesting by this, to the wise, the distinction of the intellect's receiving from the whole latitude of the reception of matter, whether totally or partially.