Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title note two things: the term incorporeus, and the term omnino. "Corporeal" is said of what is quantified, that is, extended, whether per se, as quantity, or per accidens, as whiteness. Incorporeal, therefore, is said of what is extended in neither way. – Omnino can be understood in two ways. First, as a contrast with our soul, which, although in itself unextended, is nevertheless the form of a body. It is not taken in this sense here, as is clear from the first article of the following question, where it is asked whether an angel is the form of a body: so this is not excluded here. Second, as a contrast with the souls of perfect animals, which, although incorporeal, that is, unextended, according to St Thomas, q. LXXVI, art. 8, are nevertheless not wholly incorporeal, because they have no operation except a corporeal one. – By omnino incorporeum, therefore, he means a substance so elevated above body that neither it nor its operation is corporeal, that is, exercised through a bodily organ.

II. In the body, three things: first, he answers the question with a single conclusion; second, he argues against the ancients and the Sadducees, at: But the ancients; third, he confirms the conclusion from the reproof of these, at: But this very thing.

The conclusion is: It is necessary to posit some incorporeal creature. – It is proved. It is necessary that the universe be perfect: therefore perfectly like God: therefore like God according to an intellective nature: therefore it is necessary to posit some incorporeal creature.

The antecedent is clear. – The first consequence is proved: because the perfection of the universe consists in likeness to God. This is proved: because it is chiefly intended among all things in the things themselves created by God. – The second consequence is proved: because God acts according to intellect and will. – The third consequence is proved: because intellect is the act of no body. This is proved: because every body is determined to the here and now.

III. But here there are several doubts. For it is doubted, first, about the sense of the consequent of the first consequence: for this seems false. Because either he means perfect likeness absolutely, which is univocal likeness: and then it is clearly false. Or perfect likeness in a given genus, say, of creatures. And since this can happen in two ways, namely either in the genus of creatures that can be made, or of those that have been made: if of those that can be made, it is false, because God can make a creature more perfect and more like himself than any that has been made. If of those that have been made, although it is true, it does not infer what he proposes: since from the fact that an effect is most perfectly likened to its analogous or equivocal cause among all the effects made by it, it does not follow, therefore it is likened to it in the nature by which it acts; as is clear of the lower effects with respect to the heavenly bodies and the Intelligences.

IV. The second doubt concerns the middle term assigned to prove the second consequence¹, namely: God acts according to intellect and will; therefore the universe, which is his perfectly similar effect, has in itself an intellectual nature. For this does not seem valid. Because according to him himself, and all commonly, for perfect likeness between effect and cause it is required and sufficient that the effect be like not the nature or power of the agent, but the principle of acting, not as it is a thing, but as it is a principle of acting; as is clear of art and the artifact. But intellect and will and intellectual nature, whether in God or in any other agent by art, do not stand as the principle of acting, as is evident of itself. Therefore the inference is badly drawn: therefore there had to be intellectual natures.

V. Third, it is doubted about the third consequence²: for it does not seem to conclude what is intended. Because from the fact that some intellectual creature is posited, it does not follow, therefore wholly incorporeal. For someone will say that this is an intellective soul, which is a part of a corporeal substance, say, of the heavens, or of an airy one, or of a human creature.

VI. To the first³ of these it is said that the discourse concerns perfect likeness in the genus of creatures that can be made. Here it must be known that to compare the universe with the grades of things is one thing, and to compare it with the special modes of having those grades is another. For the grades of things are finite in act and in potency (unless perhaps some grade lies hidden in the treasuries of being by essence); and the highest among them, and most like God, according to Augustine, De Trin. XIV⁴, is the intellectual. But the modes of being, although they too are absolutely finite in act, are nevertheless infinite, speaking of logical potency and of God's: because no highest creature that God can make is given. Hence the perfection of the universe requires indeed the containment of all creatable grades, but not all creatable creatures. And therefore from the perfection of the universe the intellectual grade is best inferred: and thereby the most perfect likeness of the universe to God, as attaining even the most perfect grade that can be made. That the universe is perfectly like God in the genus of makeable things can therefore be understood in two ways, namely of grades, or of creatures: in the first way it is true, in the second it is not. And since, as is clear from what has been said, a universe perfectly like in the second way is not to be had, nor does the perfection of the universe require such likeness; it follows that, speaking simply and absolutely, the universe is rightly said to be perfectly like God, when it is like him according to all grades of being.

VII. To the second doubt⁵ it is said, by first premising that to compare any single effect with its cause is one thing, and to compare the universe itself, which is the effect first intended, for the sake of which the other effects exist, is another. For to the latter is required likeness to the cause according to all the grades possible to be participated from that cause: but to the former this is not required. It is said, therefore, that by intellect and will St Thomas means the intelligible form, or the art of God, by which he made the world through the action of intellect and will.

And to the objection to the contrary it is said that, since the principle of acting includes two things, namely the very principle of acting and its mode of being; effects that are likened to causes in the principle of acting only are less perfectly likened to them than those that are likened also in the modes of being. For a house produced in matter by the craftsman would be more like the art of the builder if it were immaterial. And therefore, since God acts through a form having intelligible being (esse), it follows that the universe, in which the likeness of that form is to be preserved according to all possible modes, is likened to it both in form and in mode of being: and thereby both is such as is described there, and is such as that form is, and thus contains in itself intellectual being (esse).

VIII. To the third doubt⁶ it is said in three ways. First, that the instance is not to the point: because our discourse is about creatures; but the soul, which is a part of any substance, is evidently not a creature, properly speaking, but an essential part of a creature. – Second it is said, in keeping with the end of the body of this article, that the proposal is the more confirmed by this instance: because, if an intellectual created nature is posited as a part of a corporeal substance, it is reasonable that a higher intellectual substance, freed from body, be posited in the genus of creatures. – Third, it can be said, according to the explanation of the title⁷, that the term omnino incorporeum is not taken here so strictly. – The rest is plain.

The title is clear. In it, however, note that, once corporeity had been removed from angels, that is, a substance underlying quantity, there still remained the doubt whether such a substance, indivisible quantitatively, would be divisible essentially, that is, composed of matter and form.

II. In the body he does two things principally: first, he reports the opinion of Avicebron; second, he refutes it¹.

As to the first, since he reports in order the foundation, the position, and the mode; namely that the matter which he posited in angels was posited in such a way that it was one for all things; there is no need to labor otherwise.

III. As to the second, these three are attacked in reverse order. The unity of matter, first: because it would follow that an angel would be quantified. – The position of matter, next: because to understand is an altogether immaterial operation; therefore an intellectual substance is altogether immaterial. The consequence holds: because the mode of operating bears witness to the mode of the operator. The antecedent is proved from the nature of the object: because the thing understood must be immaterial; therefore the act of understanding too, because an operation is specified by its object. – The foundation he removes, both in general: because the mode in which a thing is understood by us is not the mode in which the thing is in itself; a sign of which is that material things are in the intellect in a simpler mode than in themselves. And in the special case at hand: because we understand higher things by way of composite things, in which what they agree in is one thing and what they are distinguished in is another; and from this that foundation arose. And in the divine nature.

IV. Concerning the refutation of the unity of matter, a small doubt occurs. For it could be said that the consequence is not valid: because this matter common to all is so divided that, by the reception of quantity, one part of it was made the matter of corporeal things; but the remainder of the matter remained without quantity, and so is spiritual matter, distinguished from corporeal matter by the fact that it is not affected by quantity.

V. To this one can reply in three ways. First, that, because St Thomas foresaw this escape, he therefore adds the rejection of matter simply, which was chiefly intended. – Second, and better, it can be said that this response does not avoid that spiritual matter would be divisible quantitatively, although it maintains that it is not divided in act: since, because it is one before the reception of quantity, there is no greater reason why it should be affected by quantity according to this portion rather than that. But to posit that spiritual substances are quantified in act or in potency, or divisible quantitatively in act or in potency, is of the same account. – Third, and better still, it can be said that this response cannot be given by anyone who holds that there are at least two angels: because by an equal, indeed the same, argument it would be asked how matter common to two or more angels, since it is of the same account, was partitioned and distributed among several angels, if matter without quantity lacks parts, etc. Hence, because Avicebron agreed to a plurality of spiritual beings, St Thomas's argument was effective.

VI. Concerning the efficacy of the argument made in the text against the position of Avicebron², a doubt occurs from Durandus³. Because it does not seem to be valid except against those who hold that angels are intellectual substances according to their whole selves. For it is possible that there be a substance intellectual according to a part, that is, the form, and yet composed of matter and form; as is clear of man, and of the heavens, if they are animate, etc. And if this is so, then the argument is worth nothing against Avicebron: since he does not seem to hold that way.

VII. To this it is briefly said that, whatever the mind of Avicebron may be, the argument of the text manifestly concludes that an intellectual substance, as such, is immaterial, that is, independent in being (esse) from matter: for this is proved from the operation and the object. And thereby, if it is a substance complete in species, it is altogether immaterial, as is clear. And since by the name of angels we understand all substances complete in species (a sign of which is that the question about the souls of the heavens and of other animate things is one thing, and about angels another), it therefore evidently follows that one cannot escape from this argument by that response brought forward by way of objection. For in denying that we suppose angels to be intellectual according to their whole selves, we say that we suppose the quid nominis of the terms, namely that angel signifies an intellectual substance complete in species. And so the argument proceeds formally.

VIII. In the reply to the first, note that, because the force of the argument consists in that proposition of the Philosopher, St Thomas therefore does three things. First, he shows what is formally required for the notion of a difference, namely to determine to some grade among beings. – Second, from this he declares in which things the Philosopher's proposition has place, namely in material things. – Third, from the same foundation he shows that difference and genus are posited otherwise in angels.

IX. In the same reply, note carefully that St Thomas does not differ from the Peripatetics in placing angels in a genus. Because, as is clear here, he imitates even the words of Aristotle from Metaphys. VIII⁴, last text; and says that genus is distinguished from difference in them not on the side of the thing, but of our consideration. And understand this as said of their intrinsic constituents.

X. In the reply to the second, there is a doubt about the difference assigned between the reception of matter and of the intellect, because matter, by receiving, is constituted in the specific and natural being (esse) of the received form, whereas the intellect receives the form according to the very notion of form. What is it to receive according to the very notion of form? Either this is to receive the what-it-was-to-be of the form: and this it is not, because matter too receives this. Or it is to receive the form alone: and this it is not, because matter too has this. Or it is to receive intentionally: and this it is not, because air too receives intentionally. Or to receive universally: and this cannot be said according to St Thomas, because according to him whatever is received in the intellect is an individual or singular thing, say, this intelligible species.

And the difficulty is increased: because here the reception of the form according to the very notion of form is distinguished against the reception by which things are constituted in being (esse). For it is evident that the reception distinguished against this one is intentional reception. And yet this is also material reception, as is clear from St Thomas, II Contra Gent., ch. LI, third argument.

XI. To this it is said that to receive according to the very notion of form is to receive the form in the mode of form: and the mode of form is what the form has of itself: and this is indetermination to this or to that. And therefore, from first to last, it is to receive the form while preserving its commonness and breadth toward whatever things. And this is to receive universally.

To the objection in opposition it is said that to receive universally is not opposed to every singularity, but to material singularity, which is to the here and now. Because one immaterial individual is equivalent to infinitely many of the material order: and the species of a stone in the soul is a universal stone, although it is one thing⁵, one in number, of another order, namely the immaterial.

To the second objection it is said that intentional reception has a great latitude. For it is divided into universal and particular, the latter belonging to sense, and to the medium, etc. Hence it is not St Thomas's intention to suggest that reception according to the very notion of form and intentional reception are convertible. But since reception is threefold, namely purely material, which constitutes in being (esse); and purely formal, namely that which abstracts from all material things; and a middle one, which is partly material and partly formal (and this is intentional reception of the particular kind, belonging to the senses): St Thomas distinguished the other extreme, namely universal intentional reception, against the one extreme, namely the reception of matter simply; also suggesting by this, to the wise, the distinction of the intellect's receiving from the whole latitude of the reception of matter, whether totally or partially.

The title is clear. – In the body there are two things. First, three opinions are reported, those of Plato, of Aristotle, and of Rabbi Moses; and they are refuted one by one.

Second, the question is answered with this conclusion: Angels exist in a certain very great multitude, exceeding every material number. – And it is proved in two ways: namely by the authority of Dionysius; and by this argument. The more perfect certain things are among beings, the greater the excess in which they have been created: angels are most perfect: therefore. – The major is proved in two ways. First, because the perfection of the universe is principally intended. Second, because we see the heavenly bodies created in the greatest excess according to magnitude.

II. Concerning this argument, note that the proof of the major is given rather obscurely in the text, because it had been set down more clearly in II Cont. Gent., ch. XCII; where it is plainly proved from this, that the perfection of the universe, which consists in order, requires that its principal parts, which exist for their own sake, be multiplied as far as possible. For this is the difference between things sought for the sake of another and things sought for their own sake, that things sought for the sake of another are required in just so great a number as suffices for that end; whereas of things sought for their own sake, the more there are, the better the universe is. And because the more perfect among beings are among the parts that exist for their own sake, and the more imperfect exist for their sake, therefore, by one who principally intends the perfection of the universe, the more perfect certain things are, the greater the excess in multitude or magnitude in which they were to be created.

III. Concerning the major of this same argument¹, a doubt occurs: because it does not seem true that the more perfect certain things are, the more they exceed others in magnitude or multitude. For gold exceeds iron in neither way; and gems too are incomparably exceeded by stones: and yet it is evident that these are more precious.

IV. To this it seems one should say that, as is discussed in De Caelo et Mundo I², the parts of the universe are twofold. Some are as integrating its substance: and these belong to the first integrity of the universe. Others are as perfecting it to the secondary perfection of the universe; and they are effects of the first. The first parts are only the elements, the heavenly bodies, and intellectual creatures: the second are any mixed bodies. The major of St Thomas is to be understood of the first parts: and in those it is most true, and suffices well enough for his purpose. Because from this it is concluded not only that the number of angels, that is, of intellectual substances, exceeds the number of the heavens and of the elements; but, just as we observe an incomparable excess of magnitude between the higher bodies and the lower, a fortiori, since immobile and spiritual substances are far more distant from corporeal ones than any bodies are from one another, it follows that they incomparably exceed both the multitude of the aforesaid and that of the other material things.

V. Concerning the principal conclusion³ a doubt occurs, whether it is understood of every material multitude, namely according to species and according to number; or of the specific multitude of material things only; or of the multitude of the first material parts of the universe. If it is understood in this third or second way, the number of angels does not seem as great and excessive as is usually said. And yet that it must be understood in the third way, the preceding solution⁴ shows: otherwise an equivocation would occur in the premises and the conclusion. But if in the first way, no small absurdity seems to follow, namely that there would be more angels than grains of millet, of wheat, etc.: for the number of these, and of pebbles, and of sand, and of other such things, does not seem wisely compared with intellectual things.

VI. To this it is said that this discourse, speaking per se, concerns the specific multitude. Both because no other multitude is found in angels. And because the force of the middle term on which the argument is founded does not go beyond the limits of such a multitude: because the first parts of the universe, namely the elements and the heavenly bodies, are each contained in single individuals. – Nor does it follow from this that the number of angels is not excessive. Because a multitude incomparably exceeding the material specific multitude is very great; just as the magnitude of the first sphere, incomparably exceeding the elemental quantity, is also very great. – And this is without doubt the mind of St Thomas. Hence below, q. CXII, art. 4, to 2, speaking of this, he added the word nature, saying that they exceed all corporeal natures. And in the Quaestiones de Potentia Dei, q. VI, art. 6, in the body, he added the word species, saying that they exceed all species of material things.

But what is objected to the contrary about the first parts of the universe is no obstacle. Because the first corporeal parts of the universe contain the other species, if not formally, at least virtually. And therefore to speak of the multitude of the first parts of the universe and to speak of the specific multitude of all material things differ only as implicit and explicit. And thereby, what disproportionately exceeds the multitude of the first material parts of the universe is understood also to exceed disproportionately the multitude implicitly and virtually contained in them. – And if it be objected, therefore it is understood also of material distinction, because that too is virtually contained in those first parts: the response is clear, that the account is not similar. Since the argument draws its strength from the relation of the parts of the universe and its perfection, as is clear from what has been said⁵, and for that reason the discourse must be only of that multitude which pertains to the perfection of the universe; such as is not numerical multitude, but specific multitude, of the first parts formally, of the second virtually.

The title is clear. – In the body, two things. First, he recites three opinions clearly: the third is the one Scotus follows¹. – Second, he attacks all of them together, as to the matter proposed, in two ways, as is clear.

The first argument. Angels are not composed of matter and form: therefore neither are there several in one species. – The consequence is proved: because whatever agree in species and differ in number agree in form, and differ materially.

Second, he attacks them, supposing that they were material, proving the same conclusion thus. A distinction caused by matter is either according to a diversity of quantity or according to a diversity of potency: the first is not there, because they are incorporeal: therefore it would be the second. But this excludes not only specific identity but generic. Therefore.

II. Concerning the proof of the consequence in the first argument, a doubt occurs: because he either assumes something false or proves nothing. For if the term differ materially signifies to differ by matter properly so called, which would be one of the two parts of the differing thing, something false is assumed. Because two souls differ materially, and yet do not differ in matter, because they lack it; and similarly two lines taken mathematically; and similarly two accidents of the same species in angels. – But if the term differ materially signifies a difference in matter properly so called, though not matter that is a part of the differing thing, then too something false is assumed, as is clear in the two instances last mentioned: and against this there are many arguments of Scotus, which you have in the questions on the De Ente et Essentia²: and it does not prove what is intended, because to differ materially in this mode is superior both to differing materially by being composed of matter and form and to differing materially by differing in some way according to matter; and thereby, from the negation of composition the negation of material difference cannot be inferred, but it is the fallacy of the Consequent, from the inferior to the superior negatively. – But if the term differ materially signifies a difference in matter commonly taken, that is, in that which stands as the material element with respect to the species, in this way it is accepted by all. But then nothing at all is proved to the purpose, for the same reason: namely because the minor that is understood, namely, angels do not differ materially, is not proved from this, that they are not composed of matter and form; but it is the sophism of the Consequent.

III. To this it is said that, since the proposition of St Thomas is universal, it is to be understood in the third way. As a sign of which, he adds the example of the plurification of whiteness, which, it is evident, is individuated not by matter, but by what is quantified.

To the instance in opposition, however, it is said that St Thomas, intent on brevity, found it enough to bring an effective proof in the matter he was speaking of. For the evidence of which know that, since according to him³ every purely material difference arises either from quantity, as happens in material things, or from the subject, as happens in spiritual accidents; and a difference arising from quantity has no place in substances except by reason of matter; and matter is in a complete substance in no other way than as a part of it: it follows that, speaking of complete substances, such as angels are, material difference is sufficiently excluded from them by the fact that composition of matter and form is excluded from them.

IV. Concerning the first argument, note that St Thomas does not, from a lack of proper arguments, as he is accustomed, argue from common ones: rather this argument examines what is proper to angels.

For the evidence of which, two propositions as if known per se are to be noted. The first is that in substances which exist among us, the notion of genus is found existing apart in the nature of things, without the nobility of a superadded nature. For corporeity is found without the perfection of mixture, as is clear in the elements; and the mixed without life, as is clear in inanimate mixed bodies; and the living without sense, as is clear in plants; and sense without motion, as is clear in oysters; and this without intellect, as is clear in brutes. – The second is that intellectuality is the last and highest nature in the universe.

For from these two propositions the argument is produced: the major holds from the first and the minor from the second proposition. For if a genus is found apart from the highest nature, because it is a more imperfect nature, it follows that not all angels agree in the highest nature: and if they agree in the highest nature, that this is not a genus, because it cannot be found outside itself. But angels agree in intellectuality, which is the noblest of all. Therefore.

V. Concerning the reply to the first, note two things. First, that there the discourse is not about just any otherness between the nature of genus and of difference, but about the otherness of real separation; not of the generic notion from the notion of a more perfect difference, but of the generic notion from a whole single latitude of differences of a more perfect order; for example, of the living from the notions of sensing, and of the sensitive from the notions of two-footed and four-footed, etc. So that the Author intends to destroy the first proposition⁴, wishing that it not be necessary universally, although it is sometimes verified. – And he proves this in two ways. First, ostensively: because it is enough that genus and difference differ as the undetermined and the determined. Second, by leading to an inconvenience, namely that in irrational animals there would be, besides the sensitive nature, which is the genus, another more perfect form, or they would be of one species: for each is inconvenient, as will be clear below⁵.

Second, that the reply consists formally in this, that to agree in the noblest thing of oneself happens in two ways: first, in the noblest nature; second, in the noblest grade of its common nature. In the first way the major is false: in the second way it is true, but then the minor is false.

The title is clear. – In the body, one conclusion: Angels are incorruptible according to their nature. – It is proved in two ways¹. First thus. Everything that is corrupted is corrupted by the fact that its form is separated from matter: therefore angels are incorruptible.

The consequence holds: because angels are subsistent forms and altogether immaterial, and thereby in them the separation of form from matter cannot have place. – The antecedent is proved thus. Being (esse) belongs per se to form: therefore it is inseparable from form: therefore in every corruption a separation from matter occurs.

The first antecedent, now assumed, is proved from the fact that to whatever being (esse) belongs, it belongs by reason of form; as is clear in matter, which is at the greatest distance from form. – The first consequence is clear from I Poster.²; and is explained by the example of the roundness of the circle and of bronze, or of the bronze circle. – The second consequence is founded on two things. The first is: Corruption is a change from being (esse) to non-being. The second is: In every corruption matter must remain. For from these it manifestly follows that there is a separation of form from matter. Because, since in every corruption some being (esse) is destroyed, and being (esse) cannot be separated from form, being (esse) and form must go together: and since, on the other hand, in every corruption the subject must remain, it is necessary that, if corruption occurs, being (esse) be separated from the remaining subject, and thereby form too be separated from it: otherwise corruption cannot be understood.

II. Concerning the first argument, a doubt arises about the truth of that assumed proposition, namely, being (esse) belongs per se to form. For this is either false or infers nothing to the purpose. For it can be interpreted in two ways. First, as the term per se is distinguished against through another, and signifies the same as without a medium, or immediately. And in this way, although it is true, it does not prove the proposal: because from this it does not follow that being itself is inseparable from form. For it is not valid, A belongs to B immediately, therefore inseparably; as is clear of form with respect to matter, and of whiteness with respect to surface. – St Thomas's explanation from roundness and the circle, etc., also stands against this interpretation.

In the second way the term per se can be taken, as it is distinguished against per accidens. And thus the proposition is false, both in the doctrine of St Thomas and simply. According to St Thomas³, indeed, being (esse) is predicated per accidens of any form other than God; so that it is neither of the essence of any form nor flows from it as a property, as he said above in q. III, art. 4; because no thing is a sufficient cause for itself that it be. – And simply, because no thing can be understood under the opposite of what belongs to it per se: but it is evident that without contradiction it can be said of any form, the divine excepted, that it is not: therefore being (esse) does not belong per se to form.

III. To this it is said that the term per se can be interpreted in either way. And as to the first way, a distinction must be made about the medium, namely about a medium action and a medium form. For from the conjunction of certain things immediately, that is, without a medium form, inseparability cannot be concluded, as was proved by way of objection. – But whenever any two things are so related that they are conjoined universally without a medium conjoining action, then those two must be inseparable from each other: because whatever are generated by the same generation are also corrupted by the same corruption. But such immediacy of action is not found between matter and form, and other such things: since it is evident that, the subjects pre-existing, the agent conjoins them by its action. But between any form whatever and the existence of the thing no conjoining action intervenes joining this to that: since the form is not first made, and then joined to existing by another action; but the very making of the form terminates in that conjunction. And therefore they are related inseparably.

IV. For the evidence of the second way⁴, it must be known that for something to belong to something per se, that is, not per accidens, happens in two ways: in one way simply, in another physically. Perseity simply is called that which is founded on the relation of terms taken absolutely: physical perseity, that which is founded on the relation of terms posited in natural being. An example of the first: five is odd; an example of the second: Socrates will sometime be corrupted. These two perseities agree in this, that, just as what belongs to something per se simply adheres to it necessarily and inseparably when taken absolutely; so proportionally what belongs to something per se physically necessarily and inseparably accompanies it posited in natural being. But they differ, because predicates per se simply presuppose nothing non-necessary, since they regard subjects taken absolutely: but predicates per se physically presuppose something non-necessary, namely that the subjects have been produced in the nature of things (but the production of things is not always necessary); and this is because such predicates regard subjects in physical being. And from this they differ in a second way, because the first perseity is so necessary that its opposite implies a contradiction: the second perseity is not necessary except by the necessity of the natural course; and therefore its opposite does not imply a contradiction. – All these things said about physical perseity are clear by comparing actual corruption, not now but sometime, to any corruptible thing. For it is not accidental to any mixed body that it be corrupted sometime, but it belongs to it per se from its essential principles: and yet it does not imply a contradiction that it never be corrupted; but that, left to its own nature, it never be corrupted does imply one.

And by this the response to the objections is clear⁵. Because to exist is an accidental predicate with respect to any nature other than the divine, that is, not per se simply: and therefore its opposite does not imply a contradiction. But it is called a per se predicate with respect to form, because it is conjoined to it by physical perseity: since to exist necessarily accompanies a produced form, and not per accidens. And this is true, and effectively infers the proposal.

V. This distinction is to be noted, however, and kept before the eyes: because it is useful and necessary both for theological and for physical matters in many subjects. – The objection about the separation of proper existence from the soul of Christ, produced in the nature of things, is also solved from what has been said (since that soul, according to St Thomas⁶, does not have a proper being (esse) of existence). For it is already clear from what has been said that being per se and inseparably accompanies a produced form, so far as it is from itself, or left to itself: but the soul of Christ, once produced, was not left to itself, but was anticipated by the divine Word, and assumed to his being.

VI. The second argument⁷, from a sign, is this. The object of the intellect is everlasting: therefore an intellectual substance is incorruptible. – The antecedent is proved: because it is above time. – The consequence: because the species and notion of intellection is grasped from the object; and the mode of the operation shows the mode of being of the operator, because each thing operates according as it is in act.

VII. Two things are to be noted here about the antecedent. First, that the subject of the antecedent, namely the term object of the intellect, can be taken in two ways: namely materially, for the thing that is the object of the intellect; in another way formally, that is, for the intelligible in act as such. It is not taken in the first way here, but in the second.

Second, that the predicate of the antecedent, namely the term everlasting, can be taken in two ways: namely positively, and negatively. And although, expounded in the second way, it is indubitably true, and in the first way somewhat ambiguous, in both senses it nevertheless serves the proposal, and more so in the first. For it is doubtful to no one that the intelligible in act as such, since it abstracts from motion and change, is immutable and necessary, and thereby perpetual negatively. If anyone also examines more deeply, he will find that, because the intelligible, as such, is above time and motion, it follows both that the intelligible, speaking per se, claims for itself everlastingness, just as motion claims velocibility to infinity (and thereby it is incidental to the intelligible to be corrupted, because it is intelligible thus, for instance in phantasms): and that the intelligible in act, if it existed outside the soul as such, would be posited as everlasting positively according to its being (esse); since the intelligible would be posited as having existence above time and motion. Therefore the intelligible in act as such, if it exists, is everlasting positively: and if not, it is everlasting per se negatively.

VIII. Concerning the consequence⁸, note that the force of the consequence consists in this. The intelligible in act, as such, is above time: therefore intellection is of those things that are above time: therefore so is an intellectual substance. – The first consequence is proved: because the notion of an operation is taken from its proper object formally taken. For if the intelligible, as such, is raised above motion and time, it demands immobility and everlastingness, and it must follow that the condition of intellection is taken from immobility and everlastingness: and thereby it belongs to the same order. – The second consequence is proved: because if to understand is to operate in this mode, namely above time etc., then the mode of being of an intellectual substance will also be above time and motion. Therefore it will be an everlasting being.

Note well here that from the everlastingness of the object we did not infer the everlastingness of the operation: but that it is of the order of everlasting things, that is, raised above time and motion. And this speaking per se, of intellection as such: since it happens per accidens that intellection in such a mode, namely through phantasms, is with the continuum and time. – But from the fact that intellection is thus raised above time, we have a great sign that the intellect, as such, is more elevated; and thereby subsists incorruptibly.