Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title of this first article, note three terms. First, the word necessary. For it is taken in two ways in V Metaphysics¹: simply, and for an end. Here it is taken in the second way. - Second, the word physical² disciplines. For science can be called physical or natural—which is the same thing—in two ways: objectively, and thus it is one part of science, distinct, VI Metaphysics³, as opposed to mathematics and metaphysics; and effectively, because of itself it is naturally born from the natural principle of the sciences, that is, the light of the agent intellect. And in this way it is distinguished as natural as opposed to supernatural. And it is taken in this way in the matter at hand, where all knowledge acquirable by the light of the intellect is called physical discipline. - Third, the words another doctrine. It does not say science, opinion, or faith: that this must be well noted will appear when we come to raise the doubt⁴.

II. In the body there are two conclusions responsive to the question, in the affirmative. The first is: It is necessary for human salvation that there be a doctrine received through revelation concerning many things that exceed human reason. - The second is⁵: It is necessary for human salvation that there be a doctrine through revelation concerning those things about God which can also be investigated by natural reason.

III. Before the conclusions are proved, so that the distinction and sufficiency of the conclusions may be evident, note two distinctions. The first is from I Contra Gentiles, chapter III. There are two principal genera of things knowable about God: some are demonstrable; others are knowable only through revelation. These latter are the Trinity of Persons, the beatitude promised to us, the mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption: but those that are demonstrable are that God is one, immortal, etc. On account of the things that are revelable only, the first conclusion was posited; on account of the demonstrable ones, however, the second was posited. - The other distinction is from V Metaphysics⁶ What is necessary for an end is twofold: necessary for being (esse), and necessary for well-being (bene esse). In the first conclusion, what is necessary is taken in the first way; in the second, in the second way.

IV. These things having been premised, the first conclusion is proved from the text. Ordered to God as an end unknown by natural reason, yet to be attained by one's own intention and action, man needs supernatural instruction, by which he may know that end and direct his operations toward it: man is of this sort: therefore. — The minor is proved from chapter 64 of Isaiah.

V. Concerning this conclusion a doubt immediately arises: what is meant here by the name sacred doctrine or discipline. For it is understood either as faith, or as theology. If faith, two inconveniences follow. The first is that the same thing would be asked twice over: for in IIa IIae, question 2, article 3, it is asked whether believing something supernatural is necessary for salvation. The second is that sacred doctrine would be taken equivocally in this and in the following articles: for it is clear that in them it is not taken for faith. — If theology, it would follow that faith without theology would not suffice for man's salvation: which is false. The inference is evident: because the text says that that doctrine is necessary for human salvation. But the falsity of the consequent is evident in itself, and is convicted by the reason assigned in the text: namely, that man can direct his intentions and actions to a supernatural end through the knowledge of faith.

VI. To this it must be said that sacred doctrine is taken neither for faith, as distinguished against theology, nor for theology, as distinguished against faith; but it is taken for knowledge revealed by God, whether formally or virtually, insofar as it has the character of a discipline and of teaching, abstracting from the character of what is believed and what is known. For the knowledge by which we have need unto salvation, insofar as it is received in man from God teaching, is teaching and discipline, according to that saying of John VI⁷: Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me. And of this knowledge it is said in this conclusion that it is necessary for salvation. And since knowledge of this kind, insofar as it is a revealed discipline, abstracts both from the character of believing and of knowing, and from the character of the revealed thing formally—that is, in itself—and virtually—that is, in its principles—therefore in this place, where the question concerns revealed doctrine apart from the physical disciplines, it is not permissible to descend determinately to any of these.

And so something else is asked here formally, and something else will be asked below in IIa IIae: because here the question concerns doctrine, there concerning believing. And sacred doctrine is taken univocally here and in the following article. Nor does it follow that theology, as distinguished against faith, is necessary; but that theology, as it abstracts from faith and science, is necessary for salvation; which is evidently true, on account of the reason assigned in the text. Nor does this avail: faith suffices: therefore theology is not required: both because theology, as taken here, is contained within faith, as animal within man; and because this science, according to Augustine, XIV On the Trinity⁸, not only nourishes, defends, and strengthens faith, but begets it. And truly it is so on the side of the things to be believed. For faith, although it is from God infusing an inclination to believe, is nevertheless from hearing through the word of Christ with respect to the things to be believed, as is had in Romans X, in the text⁹ and in St. Thomas¹⁰. And thus theology is contained within faith, as begetting it. And if it is inferred: therefore every adult believer believing explicitly etc. is a theologian: it must be said that not simply; but he is a participant in theology in a qualified sense etc., namely according to its principles etc.

VII. Concerning this part, it must be noted that Scotus, in I, question 1 of the Prologue to the First Book of the Sentences, disagrees neither with the conclusion nor with the argument: but with the cause why that end is naturally hidden from us. For we say that that end is naturally hidden from us because it is a supernatural end of our soul: and therefore, however perfectly the nature of our soul might be known to us as regards its natural aspects, it would never be known under the aspect by which it is ordered to such an end; because both the end and that aspect of the soul lie beyond the range of natural things. He, however, holds that this end is natural to our soul, though to be attained supernaturally. And yet he holds it to be naturally unknown: because our soul is not naturally known to us, at least in this present state, under that proper and special aspect by which it is ordered to that end.

VIII. That this end is natural, he proves in three ways. First, by the authority of Augustine (in the book On the Predestination of the Saints¹¹): Therefore, to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of human beings; but to have it belongs to the grace of the faithful. – Second, from appetite. Man naturally desires that end which you call supernatural; therefore it is natural to him. – Third, from the notion of naturalness. A potency, when compared to an act, is either natural, or violent, or neutral; and there is no supernaturalness there: therefore the intellect, or the soul, is naturally ordered to the vision of God, or to fruition. The antecedent, as to its affirmative part, is explained: because a potency either inclines toward such an act, or resists such an act, or is neutrally disposed: if in the first way, it is natural; if in the second, violent; if in the third, neutral. As to the negative part, it is explained thus. The difference between naturalness and supernaturalness is considered in the comparison of the potency to an agent impressing itself naturally or supernaturally upon such a potency: therefore, when the potency is compared to the act, there is no supernaturalness. The consequence, moreover, is proved from the fact that the soul inclines toward every perfection of its own, and especially toward its highest perfection, which is the act of fruition of God, etc.

IX. To make the difficulty of this matter evident, know that among us power is either natural, or violent, or obediential: and this both in relation to act and to agent: nor is there any neutral power in the nature of things, artificial powers being set aside, as will be said in the question on Neutral Power¹² in accordance with this article. Now obediential power is called the aptitude of a thing for whatever God may ordain to be done in it. And in accordance with such a power, our soul is said to be in potency toward the promised beatitude, and the supernatural end, and other things of this kind.

X. Hence, to the first argument of Scotus¹³ it is said that Augustine did not say that the ability to have faith is natural to man, but that it belongs to the nature of men. For it is one thing for a power to be of the nature, and another for it to be natural: the first signifies the subject of the power, the second the mode of the power. And therefore the first is true in the matter at hand; the second, however, false. Indeed, that obediential power for faith and charity is in the nature of men, because they possess an intellective nature; but not in the nature of a lion, since it is repugnant to it. And this was Augustine's meaning. – To the second, the antecedent is denied. – To the third, however, the assumption is denied, both as regards the third member of the affirmative part and as regards the negative part. For supernaturalness is also considered by comparing the power with its act: since there are certain acts which are simply supernatural by their genus, such as grace, glory, and other things of this kind, as will be made clear in another question¹⁴.

XI. But the second conclusion¹⁵ is proved. The discipline by which men more commonly¹⁶, more quickly, and more safely arrive at the knowledge of divine things that are demonstrable is necessary for man: revealed doctrine is of this kind: therefore. – All this is evident in the text; and more fully in Book I Contra Gentiles, chapter IV.

XII. In response to the second objection, note that the argument was this: Every being is knowable through the physical disciplines; therefore nothing remains knowable through revealed doctrine; and consequently it is not necessary. – The first consequence is proved: because nothing is known except what is true, which is convertible with being. But the antecedent is evident from Book VI Metaphysics¹⁷, and inductively.

To this, however, a twofold reply can be given, according as the antecedent can be distinguished in two ways. First thus: Every being, with respect to all that is knowable in it; or not with respect to all, but only to what is abstractible from sensible things, is knowable through the physical disciplines. In the first sense it is false; in the second, true. – Second thus: Every being in every respect; or not in every respect, but insofar as it can be illumined by the light of the agent intellect, is knowable through the physical disciplines. In the first sense it is false; in the second, true. – And although the argument admits both replies, it nevertheless pleased the Author to employ the second reply, not the first explicitly: partly so that he might resolve the opposing difficulties from what is proper to this article itself, namely by the light of divine revelation; and partly because the first reply had already been given in the body of the article, in the first conclusion.

XIII. Nevertheless, Scotus, in the First Book, question 1 of the Prologue, in his solution to the second argument on behalf of the philosophers, censured this response: because according to it the necessity of theology, which that argument intended to undermine, is not preserved. – He proves this as follows. From this response nothing else is obtained except that the same thing is known through theology and through the other sciences, though in a different way; just as through astrology and through physics it is known that the earth is round. Therefore necessity is not preserved, but only the distinction of theology from the others. The consequence holds, by the proportionality you assigned: since once that conclusion, "the earth is round," is known through one of those sciences, the other is not necessary with respect to knowing that conclusion, although it remains distinct from it.

XIV. To this it is answered that a diversity in the mode of knowing is accompanied by a diversity of the object formally taken, that is, of the formal ratio of the object (though at times there is also some identity, in a certain respect, of a conclusion), if the ratio is adequate to the mode. Or at least it is accompanied by a diversity of many knowable truths, if the ratio is inadequate, as is clear below, art. 3¹⁸ Hence the same things, taken under diverse ratios of knowing, induce a diversity among things knowable. And therefore, by saying that there is a diverse ratio of what is knowable, he implicitly intimated also an otherness of the things knowable, which he had already expressed in the first conclusion. And for this reason the antecedent is denied: for from this answer, although explicitly only a diversity of the mode of knowing is contained, implicitly there is contained also a diversity of the things knowable.

But by way of the example from astrology, although it could be said that assimilation in all respects is not required of examples, nevertheless, following the example, it is said that, just as astrology coincides with physics in some conclusion by a different light than physics, and not in all conclusions, so theology, by a different light, considers the same truths as the other sciences, and other truths about the same things. And thus, just as astrology, although it coincides as to subject matter with some conclusion of physics, yet because it considers them by a different light, and consequently other truths, is not only distinct but a necessary science, so too theology is distinct from the others, and necessary.

In the title of this second article, note two terms: first, the term scientia; second, the term sacra doctrina. For scientia is taken here properly, as it is an intellectual virtue (VI Ethic.¹), and a habit of conclusions acquirable by demonstration from principles. And since subjects are such as are permitted by their predicates, it follows that sacra doctrina is taken here for revealed doctrine insofar as it consists of conclusions. Nor is it taken for the whole (for it would seem foolish to ask whether the whole of knowledge, embracing within itself both principles and conclusions, is science, since it is evident that the principles are not science): but for that doctrine absolutely, as in the first article², with respect added to its conclusions. So that the sense of the question is: Whether sacred doctrine, which we have shown to be necessary, has in regard to its conclusions the character of science; or not, but rather of opinion, etc. And thus the subject of the question and of the answering conclusion is entirely one and the same: and questions are equalized to true knowings, according to the teaching of II Poster.³

II. In the body, once the responsive conclusion has been set forth, he does three things: first, a single distinction is laid down; second, the responsive conclusion is qualified⁴; third, a corollary is drawn⁵.

The distinction is: Science is twofold, subalternating and subalternated, from I Poster.⁶ The difference between them is that the subalternating science proceeds from propositions known in themselves (per se nota), whereas the subalternated science proceeds from principles that are known not in themselves but through the light of the higher science: as is evident in arithmetic and music, geometry and perspective.

III. Concerning this distinction and difference, note that from the proper notion of science absolutely considered there arises this difference assigned in the text; and therefore it must be taken as the first and essential difference between the subalternating and the subalternated science; and from these all difficulties must be resolved, if the doctrine is true. Know, then, that it belongs to the notion of science absolutely, as distinguished from other habits or intellectual virtues, to have conclusions visible in another, that is, in principles; for all science necessarily arises from principles. And from this it follows that neither the subalternating nor the subalternated science has the evidence of its conclusions in itself, but aided by the habit of principles. Yet they differ in this: the conclusions of the subalternating science are visible from and in principles immediately, that is, without any other mediating habit; whereas the conclusions of the subalternated science are visible from and in principles that are known in themselves, but mediately, namely through the mediating scientific habit of the subalternating science. And this is the essential and per se difference between subalternating and subalternated science. The other conditions, however, are consequent ones; or they belong to such a subalternated science, not to the subalternated as such: for instance, that one says quia and the other propter quid; or that the object adds an extrinsic accidental difference. For this is the condition of subalternation with respect to the object, whereas that is the condition of subalternation with respect to principles, on account of the matter, as will be made clear below.

What is essential to every science properly so called, that is, discursive, is to have conclusions visible not in and from themselves, but in and from another. And five things are deduced from this. First, that every science is a science by its continuation to a higher habit. For only from that continuation does it have the evidentness of its conclusions; and as it is said in I Poster.⁷, one who does not have demonstration will not know the demonstrables. For demonstration is what continues, whether actually or in potency being of no concern here. – Second, that subalternated science is a science by continuation, or continuability, to the higher science, for the same reason. – Third, that the per se habit of the proximate principles of the subalternated science is the scientific habit of the subalternating science. – Fourth, that the subalternating and the subalternated sciences are not opposed necessarily on the part of the object, nor on the part of the subject, but rather on the part of the conditions of the middle term: namely, because the middle term in the subalternating science is joined immediately to principles known per se, but in the subalternated science mediately, through the mediation, namely, of a habit of another species. – Fifth, that the subalternated and the subalternating sciences are compossible in the same subject: because they are not opposed on the part of the subject. – And from these is deduced a sixth, that the proximate principles of the subalternated science can be known by two habits, namely, by the higher science, and by faith; as is expressly said in the text, when faith concerning the principles is posited in the corollary, and the light of the higher science concerning the same is posited in the distinction. But the higher science is their habit per se, because of the essential relation from which the subalternated science has that it is a science: whereas faith is their habit per accidens, because of the subject in which it resides, say, a perspectivist who is not a geometer.

One thing must be noted here: in the first and essential condition of a subalternated science, two things concur. The first is inevidence in itself, together with evidence from and in another; the second is the mediation of the proximate principles, which is the cause of that inevidence in itself. But the first of these is formal, and consequently is always and entirely required; the second, however, is material. For if that inevidence could be preserved with visibility in another without mediation, it would nonetheless be subalternated to it: because, as is already clear from what has been said, upon that mode of evidence rests the essential and per se difference between the subalternating and the subalternated. And hence it follows that the principles of the subalternated science need not possess propter quid by reason of the formal aspect of subalternation: but it suffices that they be propositions of that kind, inevident yet visible.

IV. The modified conclusion⁸ is: Sacred doctrine is a science, subalternated to the science of God and the blessed. – It is proved. A habit acquired from principles known in the light of the science of God and the blessed is a science subalternated to it: sacred doctrine is of this kind: therefore.

V. Corollary⁹ is: Sacred doctrine believes the principles revealed to it by God. – It is proved from the condition of the subalternating craftsman: music believes the principles handed down to it by arithmetic; therefore, etc.

VI. Concerning this article, note that the responsive conclusion has two parts: namely, that theology is a science; and that it is subalternated to the science of God. Against the first part, indeed, arguments are brought forward in many ways by Durandus, Aureolus, and Gregory of Rimini, as you have here from Capreolus¹⁰, from the conditions of knowing itself and of demonstration assigned in I Posterior Analytics¹¹ and VI Nicomachean Ethics¹² – From the side of the object. Because science is of necessary things: this one is of contingent things, for instance the Incarnation, predestination, glorification, etc. – From the side of the principles. Both because science proceeds from what is known through itself, and because the habit of the principles of a science is superior to the habit of the conclusion. – From the side of certitude. Both because one who knows knows that he knows, and because science is an intellectual virtue. And if it is said that the theologian knows that he knows by supposition, namely, if the articles of faith are true: therefore, says Aureolus, this is a science of consequences, and not of things consequent; of the necessity of the consequence, and not of the thing consequent; and, in short, of inferences, not of things. – From the side of the mode. Sacred doctrine, says Scotus, in III Sentences, dist. XXIV, qu. unica, is not handed down by a syllogistic discourse; but we give assent to all things equally, in such a way that we do not assent to one on account of another: therefore. The antecedent is made clear. Because although it is argued from I Corinthians chapter XV, and by the doctors, nevertheless no greater certitude is had of what is proved than of the one proving, or of what is proved and not proved but simply proposed: which does not happen in science. – Finally, from the side of the subject. Faith and science, according to you, do not stand together, says Scotus in the same place, and qu. III of the Prologue of the First Book: therefore.

VII. Against the second part, or the minor, of the argument brought forward¹³, it is argued in several ways¹⁴, by attacking two points: first, the diversity of our theology from the theology of God and the blessed; second, that that distinction which exists between them, whatever kind it may be, is not a distinction with the requisite conditions for a subalternating and subalternated science.

Scotus, therefore, in Book I of the Sentences, question III of the Prologue, attacks the first position in two ways. The knowledge of God cannot be other than one formally; therefore nothing is subalternated to it. The antecedent is evident: because the deity is not other than one formal ratio. — Moreover, concerning the same truths it is impossible that there be first a subalternating and a subalternated science, because where the latter ends, the former begins: these are about the same truths: therefore. — These two arguments are together insinuated by Aureol¹⁵ under another form, thus. The subject of the subalternated science adds something to the subject of the subalternating science; but the subject of our theology does not add anything: therefore.

Against the second, however, Scotus argues in two ways in the same place, and in Book III where cited above¹⁶. Subalternated science depends on the subalternating science as on a cause; but it does not depend thus on the science of the blessed; therefore it is not subalternated to it. The minor is proved: the cause of science is only the object, the power, the subject, or the light, none of which is that science of the blessed. — Furthermore, the subalternated and the subalternating sciences are compossible in the same subject; these are not compossible; therefore they are not so related. The minor is proved: because it would follow that one and the same person would be at once comprehensor and viator.

Finally, Durandus argues against the same point¹⁷. The subalternating science says propter quid, and the subalternated science says quia: these do not stand in that relation: therefore. The minor is proved. Because the articles of theology do not have a propter quid: and if they do, we say the same as the blessed; for instance, the propter quid of why Christ became incarnate, namely on account of human salvation, etc.

VIII. For the clarification of this difficulty, know two things. The first is that our theology can be considered in two ways: in one way in itself; in another way as it is in us wayfarers. If it is considered in itself, then without doubt it is a science subalternated to the science of the blessed with respect to evidence, since by its continuity with that science it takes on the character of a science, while it proceeds from principles known in themselves by the light of glory. And against this few or no arguments are effective: for the first arguments undermine only the claim that our theology as it is in us is not a science; the second, indeed, that it is not subalternated totally, not with respect to something. – But if it is considered as it is in us wayfarers, then the difficulties raised emerge. And it is thought that even according to St. Thomas, so taken, it would be a science only equivocally, as he himself seems to say elsewhere¹⁸; nor would it be subalternated except in a certain respect, namely with respect to evidence. And if these considerations are attended to, the solution of the question would be easy.

IX. It seems to me that holy Thomas must be interpreted differently, especially with regard to the second point¹⁹ For with regard to the first point, namely whether our theology, as it exists in us wayfarers, is or is not a science, either position can be maintained when properly understood: that it is not a science (that is, it does not possess the perfect character of science, because he does not truly know who cannot resolve things into evident principles; and this is what he intends wherever he hints at this); and that it is an imperfect science, by reason of our present state; for an imperfect science is not outside the scope of science. And this he affirmed here in so many words. And lest occasion be given for misunderstanding, since only this had been asked—whether it was a science—the answer was given affirmatively but with an adversative clause added, so that the complete answer would be conditional in a specifying way, and not absolute. For he did not prove that it is a science, but that it is a subalternated science, so that from the qualifying addition you might understand the imperfection it has in this state.

X. As to the second point, concerning subalternation, it seems to me that the text intends subalternation simpliciter. First, because it had made a distinction about such before the conclusion; second, because, as is clear from what has been said²⁰, subalternation with respect to evidence arises from the reason of the science. And therefore I judge that it must be held that our theology, in itself, is truly a science simply subalternate; but as it is in us wayfarers, it is a science imperfectly, yet simply subalternate.

But you, novice, when you dispute, take care lest you be deceived by taking theology in itself and our theology in itself to be the same. For these differ greatly. Since theology in itself is the science which the deity in itself is naturally born to bring forth: and this is the theology which God has of himself. But our theology is distinguished—if the term our signifies human nature simply—into the theology of the blessed and that of wayfarers. It need not, however, be distinguished if the term our signifies wayfarers: and it is so taken in the proposition at hand. Yet this can be taken both in itself and as existing in us wayfarers. You have this last distinction from the text itself, since in the corollary it speaks manifestly of our theology as existing in us wayfarers, whose it is to believe the principles; and in the responsive conclusion it spoke of the same in itself: for it belongs to it in itself to arise from principles known in themselves by the light of a higher science, etc.

XI. According to²¹ this, since all our terms, when transferred to God, are understood to be transferred with the imperfections removed, it follows both that the science of the blessed is such by reason of its evidence and certitude, not as regards the imperfection of its discursive reasoning; and that subalternation is transferred to the science of God not as regards demonstratively proving the principles of the subalternated science by discursive demonstration, but as regards their evidence, and the causality of the knowledge of them in others. Hence it is not required, on account of subalternation, that the principles of our theology be conclusions of the theology of the blessed: but it is enough that they be evident propositions of the theology of the blessed. Just as if geometry existed without discursive reasoning, it would have the same evidence concerning the principles of perspective that it now has, but not in the same way: and it would be subalternating no less. Therefore, since theological conclusions proceed from the articles of faith as from principles that are not evident in themselves, but are so in the science of God and of the blessed, it follows that it has the essential constitutive condition of a subalternated science²²; and that it is a science by its continuation to the science of God and of the blessed; and that the habit whereby its principles are known per se is the divine science, while the habit whereby they are known per accidens is faith; and that it is not opposed to the science of the blessed on the part of the object or of the subject, but negatively according to evidence and inevidence; and that they can coexist simultaneously in the same subject. Nor is the judgment the same concerning subalternated science and faith. For the divine light absolutely speaking is the per se formal ratio of this knowledge, insofar as it is scientific: but the veiled divine light is the per se ratio of the assent of faith, which is per accidens, as was said²³, the habit of the principles of these. And therefore the habit of the principles will not remain in the fatherland: but the science acquired from them will remain, according to that saying of Jerome²⁴: Let us learn on earth, etc.

XII. Whence, in reply to the arguments brought in opposition against the first part²⁵, we answer each one individually, for the sake of beginners.

And to the first it is said that the Incarnation and other things of this kind, which are contingent in themselves, insofar as they fall under this science are necessary; just as they are necessary as known by God, as will be made clear in question XIV²⁶

To the second, it is already clear that this science is from things known per se, that is, from evident things, mediately: and this suffices, according to that passage of the first book of the Topics²⁷: demonstration is from things known per se, or from those which have taken their certainty through them. – The habit of the per se principles of this science is also higher than the science itself; whatever may be said of the habit per accidens, that is, of faith; which can be called a higher science with respect to adhesion, though not with respect to evidence.

To the third, it is said that the theologian knows that he knows, not conditionally, but subalternately: this is not merely to know the inferences, but the things inferred from principles made evident in the higher science. Nor can more be drawn from such inevidence than that such knowing is not perfect unless it is continued with the higher science—which we not only concede but teach. – And likewise we say that subalternate science, so long as it is not continued with the science subalternating it, is not an intellectual virtue, but an incipient intellectual virtue: and therefore it pertains to the same species of virtue, namely science.

To the fourth, which is Scotus's, the antecedent is denied. For in Sacred Scripture demonstrations are handed down virtually; and another habit is generated from faith, from the deduction of conclusions from the articles of faith. Nor is it true that we assent to all equally, or in the same manner. For we assent to the articles not on account of anything else; but to conclusions, concerning which alone this science is, we assent on account of the articles. And when it is said that we assent equally to what is proved and what is proposed simply, it is answered: If all things to be believed were proposed simply, our theology would indeed be a science in itself, because its conclusions are by their nature apt to be deduced from the articles of faith; but with respect to us it would not be a science but faith; and we would assent to all not only equally, but in the same manner. But since in fact the articles are proposed to us as simply to be believed, while the rest are to be deduced from the articles, therefore we do not assent in the same manner to principles and conclusions. Nor do we assent equally to conclusions proved and unproved: on account of which such diversity of opinions is tolerated in sacred doctrine concerning those not proved. And therefore it is a science not only in itself, but also with respect to us; imperfect, however.

Finally, it is already clear that we do not posit faith and science about the same thing at once: because faith is about the articles, while science is about conclusions.

XIII. To the arguments against the second part²⁸, it is answered that a science of God, if adequate, cannot be other than one; if inadequate, however, it can be multiplied. Such is theology. – Or one may say—and better, though it comes to the same thing—that the antecedent is simply false. For the unity of a science requires both the unity of the formal ratio of the object as a thing and the unity of the formal ratio of the object as an object, as will be clear in the following article²⁹. In the case at hand, although the deity is one formal ratio of the object of both theologies as a thing, yet in each theology the formal ratio of the same object as an object is different and distinct. For God as clearly seen is set before the blessed; but God as revealed, abstracting from clarity and obscurity, is set before our theology taken absolutely.

To the second it is said that our theology and that of the blessed are not about the same truths: as is manifestly evident in the truths of the articles of faith, which are the concern of the theology of the blessed, not of ours.

And by these things the response to the form of Aureol's argument is clear. It may indeed be granted that the subject of our theology adds in some way to the subject of the theology of the blessed, if the subject of our theology is taken as the whole aggregate of the subject both as a thing and as an object: for thus the subject is God as revealed; and it is evident that revelation adds an accidental difference. But if one stubbornly insists, on the side of the object as a thing, that such an addition be required in the subject of the subalternated science, the assumption is denied universally; though in certain cases it holds true. Nor is the opposite stated in I Poster.³⁰: rather, it is taught there that one science does not descend into another unless its subject falls under the other's subject simply or in this way; which we grant when we say that the science of the blessed descends into ours, because the formal subject as a thing is entirely the same in both, and the object of this science falls under the object of that one.

As for the remaining objections against the second point, it is said that this science depends on the theology of the blessed as on a light, and that they are compossible together in the same subject. Nor does it follow that the same person is at once wayfarer and comprehensor; rather, he is at once comprehensor, and one possessing the science he acquired on the way, but in another manner—not only because of the exclusion of discursive reasoning, but also because of the perfection he obtains from its continuation into the science of the blessed.

At the very end, Durandus's claim is denied that theological conclusions do not have a propter quid, whatever may be said of their principles. And if we say that we and the blessed know the same propter quid, still not in the same way: because they know it evidently, whereas we without evidence. But if it be said that the principles must have a propter quid, the answer given at ³¹ is that it suffices that they are not evident in the subalternated science, but in the subalternating one. And this is said of the propter quid taken properly: for there is no purely theological proposition which does not in some way have a propter quid.

And thus the answer to all objections is clear.

In the title, note the two terms, namely subject and predicate: sacra doctrina sacred doctrine is here taken for the whole of theological science; and una one stands for a specific unity, indeed that of the most special species. And note carefully that what is asked here is not whether it is one simple quality, but whether it is one science according to species; whatever may be said of the mode of unity of this science in general—whether it is one by a unity of simplicity, or by a unity of order, etc.—is not to the point. For nothing depends on the matter at hand as to what anyone may think about this. It suffices here to inquire whether theology is one science according to the most special species; or whether it is not, but is divisible into many species; and, just as mathematics is divided into geometry, arithmetic, etc., so this might be divided into several sciences, say concerning God, concerning Christ, concerning morals.

II. In the body there is one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: Sacred doctrine is one science. – It is proved. The unity of a power and of a habit is according to the unity of the formal aspect of its object: therefore sacred doctrine is one science.

The antecedent is declared in the power of sight and the formal reason of its object. – The consequence, however, is proved. All things considered in sacred doctrine share in one formal reason of the object of this science, namely, the light of divine revelation: therefore.

III. To make this argument evident, note that there is a twofold formal ratio of the object in science: one of the object as a thing, the other of the object as an object; or one as what, the other as under which. The formal ratio of the object as a thing, or what, is the ratio of the thing known which first terminates the act of that habit, from which the passions of that subject flow, and which is the medium in the first demonstration; as entity in metaphysics, quantity in mathematics, and mobility in natural philosophy. The formal ratio of the object as object, or under which, however, is such immateriality, or such a mode of abstracting and defining: for instance, without all matter in metaphysics, with matter intelligible only in mathematics, and with sensible matter, though not this matter, in natural philosophy.

IV. The necessity, quality, and distinction of these formal reasons must be drawn from the distinction of the two genera in which the object of a science must be located. For it is necessary that it be formally such a thing, in such a way knowable. And therefore it must have the formal reason constituting it formally in such a real being, and the formal reason constituting it formally in such an being of the knowable; and so it is placed both in the genus of things and in the genus of knowables, just as the object of sense is in two genera, namely under passible quality and under the sensible. For the differences and species of passible quality are one thing, and those of the sensible another. Of the former, the species are color, sound, odor, etc.; of the latter, the species are visible, audible, odorous. The differences of the former are constitutive of the objects themselves; the differences of the latter add nothing to those objects. The former again constitute subjects, the latter passions, according to II De Anima¹, where visible is posited as a predicate of the second mode of per se, that is, a passion, of color. And just as the distinction and multiplication of sense is not attended to according to any division whatever of sensible quality, but only according to that division into those five from which flows the division of the per se sensible as sensible (namely by the proper differences of the sensible itself, for instance, as altering sense in such a way, etc.), since sense is said to be divided according to the division of the sensible insofar as it is sensible: so the object of science is in the genus of being and in the genus of the speculable, such that these two genera are divided by other and other proper differences into their proper species. For the proper differences of being are constitutive of beings in their real genera, just as being through itself constitutes substance, and being in another constitutes accident, etc.; but the proper differences of the speculable add nothing to beings. Hence the former intrinsically constitute subjects, while the latter constitute their quasi-passions, since indeed the speculability of a being is a passion. And therefore only that division of being diversifies speculative habits which entails the proper division of the speculable as speculable, by the proper differences of the speculable itself: which are taken according to the diversity of the mode of abstracting from matter VI Metaphys.² So that first the reason of being is divided into entity simply, quantity, mobility, and deity. And from this flows another division of the knowable: into the knowable by metaphysical light, that is, a medium illumined by abstraction from all matter; and by mathematical light, that is, a medium illumined by immateriality from sensible matter, yet shadowed by intelligible matter; and by physical light shadowed, that is, a medium shadowed by sensible matter but illumined by the separation of individual conditions; and by divine light, that is, a medium shining with divine light, which constitutes theological knowable.

V. Therefore the object of a science has a twofold formal ratio: one quidditative in respect of itself as it is a thing; the other denominative of itself simply, but quidditative in respect of itself as it stands under the genus of the knowable—which is to be under the genus of object, since the knowable is a species of object. And therefore it was said that one of these belongs to the object as the object is an object. And since, just as sense is distinguished according to the distinction of the sensible as such, so science is divided according to the division of the knowable as such, it follows that where there is one most special species of the knowable, there there must be only one species of science, as also happens in sense and the sensible; and where several differences of the knowable as such are found, diverse species of science must be posited. And if you add to this that the differences of the knowable as such are themselves the formal ratios of the knowable object as it is an object, it follows of necessity that the specific unity and diversity of sciences is attended to according to the unity and diversity of the formal ratios of objects as they are objects; or, which is the same, of the formal ratios under which things are known. — And this is what is said in the text, when the reason why theology is one science is assigned from the unity of the formal ratio under which, or of the object as object, namely the light of divine revelation: for all things are said to be considered in theology insofar as they are divinely revelable. And thus the force and meaning of the argument brought forward in the text is clear.

VI. Concerning this argument as thus expounded, a threefold doubt arises: the first concerning the argument itself; the second concerning the antecedent³; the third concerning the proposition assumed in the proof of the consequence⁴. And each is to be resolved in turn, in the order proposed.

Concerning the reason of the letter, then,⁵ a doubt arises, because it has fallen into equivocation. For in the antecedent it speaks of the formal reason of the object as it is a thing (as is clear from its proof in the case of sight: for the reason of color is assumed to be the formal reason of the visible; but the reason of color is the formal reason of the visible insofar as it is a thing, as is evident): but the proof of the consequence speaks of the formal reason of the object as it is an object; for it assumes revelability to be the formal reason of the object of theology. Therefore an equivocation is manifestly committed, by assuming the formal reason of the object as object under the formal reason of the object as thing.

VII. To this it is said, by denying the assumption. For the antecedent supposes indistinctly for the formal ratio of the object, whether as a thing or as an object: although it has been made manifest with respect to the formal ratio of the object as a thing; then because that is better known; and then because those two formal ratios convertibly follow upon one another, as subject and passion, as was said⁶. And therefore without equivocation the inference could be drawn concerning the formal ratio of the object as object, namely, revelability.

And rightly the formal aspect of the object as object was subsumed, rather than the formal aspect of the object as thing. First, because the formal aspect of the theological object as thing had not yet been assigned, but was to be discussed in article 7; whereas another was assigned in articles 1 and 2. Second, because that formal aspect as thing does not imply a most special species of the object as such, and consequently neither a most special species of science, as will now be shown at ⁷; and thus it would not have achieved its intended purpose.

VIII. But against this reply a greater difficulty arises. For if it is true that the formal ratio of the object as thing, and its formal ratio as object, are related to each other as subject and passion convertibly, as the aforementioned reply maintains, and as was said above⁸; it follows that the theology of the blessed and ours agree in one formal ratio of the object as object, and consequently are one science according to the most special species. And consequently the whole subalternation argued in the preceding article collapses, as Scotus argued there⁹: because the same thing is not subalternated to itself. — The consequence is proved thus. These theologies agree in the formal ratio of the object as thing, because deity is the formal ratio in both cases: therefore also in the formal ratio of the object as object. The consequence is evident. For those two formal ratios infer each other convertibly, as subject and passion, according to what has been said: for agreement in the unity of the subject requires that they agree in the unity of that subject's passion, since the passion is inseparable from the subject.

IX. To this it is said that that proposition, namely: the formal ratio of the object as a thing, and its ratio as an object, are convertible, etc., is most true, rightly understood, namely concerning the formal ratio of the object as such adequately proportioned to the formal ratio of the thing. But otherwise it stands with the formal ratio of the object as object inadequately proportioned to the formal ratio of the object as thing (if it happens that some object has an inadequate ratio): for the inadequate ratio need not be converted with the ratio of the thing; rather it indeed entails that one, but is not necessarily entailed by it. So it is in the case at hand. For to the deity there corresponds only one formal ratio adequate to the object as object, and this is the divine light: but that formal ratio is not one in species, but in genus; and it is divided into the evident divine light, and the revealing divine light (abstracting from evidence and inevidence), and the inevident divine light. And the first is the ratio under which the theology of the blessed proceeds, the second ours, the third faith. And therefore, with the unity of the formal ratio of the object as thing, there stands a specific diversity of the formal ratios of that object as object; and consequently a specific diversity of habits. And therefore, although the deity is converted with that adequate ratio, and they mutually entail each other, nevertheless it is not converted with any species of it. And consequently it does not determinately entail any of them, but is entailed by each. For this holds: God under the ratio of deity is the object of such a science, therefore under the divine light, and conversely: but it does not hold, therefore under the evident light; or, therefore under the light of revelation, etc.

X. And so that you may know the root of this reply, note that, although the two formal rationes so often named are related convertibly as subject and passion, they are nevertheless not related convertibly in degree of unity; so that, if one of them is one with a most specific specific unity, the other is not therefore one in that way; and if one is one in genus, the other is not therefore one generically. Indeed, the complete opposite appears in several cases. For in the object of metaphysics, the ratio of being is one degree less than a genus: and yet the ratio of its speculability, namely abstraction from sensible and intelligible matter, is one according to the most specific species. And the same appears in geometry and arithmetic, whose subjects have generic unity as things, and atomic specific unity as objects. And conversely, sometimes the ratio of a thing is one according to an atomic species, and the ratio of the object as such is one according to genus; as in the case at hand with the deity and the divine light. And in the opposite manner, and deservedly so, the object of theology is related to the objects of the aforementioned sciences: because the formal object as a thing is infinite. For it accords with reason that, as a thing, an infinite species exceeds the finite species of the object, even though it is equal to its genus.

XI. It could also be said that the formal ratio of the object is assigned in two ways: namely, on the side of the object, and this is convertible with the ratio of the thing; or on the side of a defective power, and this is not convertible, but infers the formal ratio of the thing, and is not inferred from it. So it is in the case at hand. For deity and the divine light are convertible: but deity and this divine light so understood are not convertible; rather, such a light infers and encloses within itself the deity, but not conversely. And therefore it would have been licit even to subsume the light of revelation under the formal ratio of the thing, since that is enclosed within it.

XII. Concerning the antecedent¹⁰ there is a doubt, having a very wide field, about the unity and diversity of habit and power on account of the object: and therefore one ought rather to make a special question of this. Let it suffice here that that antecedent is found in II On the Soul¹¹, where it is said that powers are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects: for the same judgment holds of act and habit in this respect.

XIII. Concerning the proposition assumed in the proof of the consequence¹², namely: all things considered in sacred doctrine agree in one formal ratio, that is, divine revelability, a twofold doubt arises: first, against the proposition in itself; second, against it as applied to inferring the specific unity of theology.

Against this very position in itself, Albert the Great argues in Book I of his Summa Theologiae¹³: Revealedness adds nothing to the thing revealed; therefore it is not a formal ratio. He holds that the consequence follows, because a formal ratio adds something to the object whose ratio it is. — Next, Aureol argues ¹⁴: The divine light is related to theology as the agent intellect is related to the acquired sciences; therefore it is not a formal ratio. — Moreover, God is related as teacher; therefore his revelation is not a formal ratio.

Against this same argument, by which he infers the unity of science, Aureol argues¹⁵. If God were to reveal philosophy and geometry at once, they would not for that reason be one science; therefore from the unity of revelation there does not follow the unity of science, etc.

XIV. For the clarification of the answers to these objections, beyond what has been said, know that the light of divine revelation can be related to some science in two ways. First, as that which infuses to that which is infused, or as an efficient cause to its effect. And in this way it does not give unity to a science, since it could infuse all sciences, however diverse they may be. In another way, it is related to a science as the reason or mode of knowing the object, under which, or by means of which, the revealed thing is attained by the knower. And in this way it gives unity to a science. And although this twofold relation concurs here simultaneously, it is not necessary for them always to concur together. For if God were to reveal geometry to me, revelation would not for that reason be the formal reason under which I know the object of geometry, since I would know geometrical things under that very same formal reason under which other geometers know them. But in theology both relations concur: because this science is had only through infusion; and all the things known in it are attained, and assent is given to them, as they stand under the divine light as their mode of intelligibility. And therefore the unity of theology is inferred in the text from the unity of the divine light—not as it is that which infuses, but as it is the formal reason under which, in the manner explained above.

XV. And from these the answer to the objections is easily clear¹⁶. For Albert's argument equivocates on the notion of object, taking the formal notion of the object as a thing, while excluding the formal notion of the object as object, etc. - But the first argument of Aureol fails: because the divine light functions as the agent intellect, but not only so; it also functions as the formal notion of the object insofar as it is an object. - The second likewise fails in the same way: because the teacher's illumination here is not only an infusion, but also the formal notion of the thing infused, under which it is infused. And again, it is false that from one teacher as such many sciences could proceed.

Finally, as for Aureol, it is already clear that the inference is worthless: because the divine light, by infusing physics and mathematics at the same time, does not concur as the ratio of the object qua object, but only as infusing, etc.

In the title, it must be noted what is meant by the name of speculative and practical science. Speculative science is called that whose proper end is nothing other than to know; practical science, however, is that whose proper end is to act, whether by the appetite of operation or by the executive power, Aristotle saying in Book II Ethic.¹: we undertake discourse of this kind not in order that we may know, but in order that we may act, etc.

II. In the body, two conclusions². The first is: Theology is neither purely practical nor purely speculative; but higher, comprehending in itself in a more eminent way both the character of the practical and of the speculative.

III. Before the conclusion is proved, so that the meaning of the conclusion may be evident, know that the practical and the speculative are neither essential differences, nor quasi-passions consequent upon essential differences, first dividing science in general: just as neither sight nor hearing are differences first dividing sense in general. But as sense is first divided into common and proper sense, and then proper sense is divided into sight, hearing, etc.; so science is first divided into infinite and finite science, and then finite science is divided into speculative and practical. And the reason for this is that one finite formal ratio of an object cannot have both conditions—that it be that from which a rule of operating is taken, and that it be in itself knowable—even if no rule of action could be taken from it: but these two conditions must be founded upon two finite formal rationes, as appears inductively. But if the formal ratio of some knowable object is infinite, it already comprehends both conditions in itself by its infinity, in a higher manner than they exist in finite things: because what is dispersed among lower things is anticipated unitedly in the higher. And therefore, as beyond the proper senses there is given a sense of a higher order, which is neither sight nor hearing, etc.; so beyond the speculative and practical sciences there is given a science of a higher order, neither speculative nor practical, but eminently containing both. And according to this sense the conclusion is understood. Hence in the text it is said that, although in the physical sciences one thing is speculative and another practical (that is, the practical and the speculative make otherness, which is a substantial difference); sacred doctrine nevertheless, being one, comprehends both, as being a science of a higher order.

IV. The conclusion is therefore proved in the text as follows. Sacred doctrine, being one, extends itself to those things that pertain to the speculative and the practical sciences: therefore it is itself higher, comprehending both under itself. – The antecedent is proved from the preceding article. Sacred doctrine attends to one common reason³ of things speculable and operable, namely insofar as they are divinely revelable: therefore. – The consequence is proved: because this science is like the science of God, who by one and the same science knows himself and his works: therefore.

V. Note here, for the clarity of the text, three things. First, concerning the proof of the consequence from the antecedent already proved: that this proof is excellent, and a priori, and not by way of an argument from analogy. For since our theology is nothing other than the impression and proper seal of the divine science (because both are about God insofar as God: and this one is derived from that one under its own, though small, participation of its light), it follows that the unity of the former entails the unity of the latter, and the height of the former, whereby it extends to both genera, entails the height of the latter. And therefore the as placed in the text for the proof does not signify pure likeness; but rather the assimilation of the proper exemplatum to its proper exemplar, etc.

Second, that the things placed in the middle of the text are so disposed that this doctrine comprehends under itself both, namely the speculative and the practical, because being one it extends itself to all. And this because it considers all things under one formal ratio. And this because it is a proper imitation of the science by which God knows Himself and other things, etc.

The third is concerning the phrase Whence, although in the sciences. For another argument can be drawn to prove the same consequence. For he intends that, because if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation will be the cause of negation, and conversely, as is said in I Poster.⁴; since from the antecedent there is had the unity of formal being (ens) in theology, with a diversity of physical formal beings of the sciences; and it is established that the diversity of formal beings diversifies the physical sciences into speculative and practical: it follows that from the non-diversity, or unity, of the formal being of theology, it itself will be one, at once containing the speculative and the practical.

VI. The second conclusion is⁵: Theology is more speculative than practical. – It is proved in two ways. First, it deals more principally with divine things than with human acts: therefore it is more speculative. – Second, thus: It deals with human acts on account of the contemplation of God: therefore it is more speculative. The antecedent is proved: because eternal beatitude consists in contemplation.

VII. Concerning the foregoing, two things must be noted⁶. The first is that this interpretation⁷ of the first conclusion is not fabricated or novel, but intimated in the body of the article; as is clear to one who diligently weighs what it means to say that a single existing being extends itself etc., and who considers that it speaks of specific unity, which it is established constitutes being one in itself. For by this it manifestly excludes the crude interpretation of those who understand theology to comprise within itself the practical and the speculative by way of aggregation. For then it would not be one except by aggregation: and not under one formal ratio, but under two: and properly speaking it would not comprehend both under itself, as the text says, but would be composed out of both. And to what purpose would the argument from the identity of God's knowledge, adduced in the text, have been brought forward?

And so that every such fantasy may be refuted, let them look at St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 45, art. 3, ad 1, where he expressly places infused wisdom in a higher order than the speculative and the practical, for the same reason he assumes here: namely, that the higher a reason is, the more things it extends to while remaining one. And another reason is adduced: namely, that this pertains to dignity. Since, therefore, this science is most worthy of dignity, as will be shown⁸; and has one common reason embracing all the practical and speculative sciences; and is of divine order: it is necessary that whoever interprets it otherwise than as a science of a higher order be wrapped in darkness as to both. – The same is also evident from the end of the preceding article: where it is expressly said that this doctrine has a proportion to the other sciences as the common sense has to the proper senses; and therefore it is not diversified by the differences of their objects, being of a higher order. And both reasons assigned here are touched upon: on the side of its higher formal reason, and on the side of its imitation of the divine science: since it is the proper impression and sealing of that science which is one and simple, not by aggregation, of all things.

VIII. Nor does the comparison adduced in the second conclusion stand in the way⁹. For together with being eminently both, it can be that something is formally both: just as the sun is eminently heating and drying, and yet also formally so; and God is eminently understanding, willing, and executing, and yet also formally so. Nor does that comparison intend anything else than that speculative science approaches more closely to the nature of theology than practical science does: just as if we were to say that common sense has more of the nature of sight than of hearing, the sense would be that the conditions of sight and of common sense agree more than do the conditions of hearing and of common sense. Nor is it otherwise in the matter at hand. – Nor, moreover, is it an obstacle that somewhere¹⁰ St. Thomas says that it is simply speculative, and practical in a certain respect. For the reason for what he says is this: because "speculative" signifies a more perfect difference of science, while "practical" signifies a less perfect one; and the conditions of the speculative suit so excellent a science more than do the conditions of the practical. It is therefore called speculative simply, that is, without any addition, because it is formally speculative, though eminently so. But it is called practical in a certain respect, and not absolutely, lest it be understood that it is an imperfect science, such as those are which are called practical absolutely.

Nor does it matter for our purpose whether the habit of theology, and universally of science, is held to be one on account of the simplicity of the quality, or one on account of the unity of the order of intelligible species. For in either way it must be that the order or quality of a higher grade than the order or quality constituting speculative science as distinct from practical science, and conversely.

IX. From¹¹ this position it is clearly evident that neither from the fact that the conditions of speculative science, nor from the fact that the conditions of practical science, belong to this science can it be inferred, therefore theology is speculative, or, therefore it is practical, as one is distinguished against the other; but rather, therefore it is speculative, or eminently contains the character of the speculative; and likewise, therefore it is practical, or eminently contains the character of the practical; and likewise, therefore it is affective, or eminently contains the character of the affective. Hence Scotus's arguments in the Prologue, question IV, from the definition of practical science and from the object of this science (namely, because from it are taken the principles that regulate practice, and the like), do not conclude that it is practical; but if they have any force, they conclude, as has been said, that it is practical, or that it eminently contains the character of the practical. – And therefore, you who devote yourselves to disputation, make use both of this reply and of that distinction concerning precisely and not precisely such, for example, the rule of the work or of contemplation, etc. For what is precisely such is either practical or speculative; but what is such, yet not precisely, is something higher, as is clear from what has been said.

Following this, there remains the special question concerning practice and the practical, which is to be treated separately.

A clear title. - In the body, a single conclusion of two members, answering the question affirmatively: Sacred doctrine is more worthy, insofar as it is speculative, than all speculative sciences; and insofar as it is practical, than all practical sciences.

II. Before the conclusion is proved, note why those specifications are placed in the conclusion, namely, insofar as speculative and insofar as practical. For this was not done in vain. But, as is clear from the preceding article¹, this doctrine contains within itself two things: first, that it is a science of a higher order than the physical sciences; second, that it contains the conditions of the speculative and of the practical formally. On account of the first, there is no doubt that it is more worthy than the others, since it is posited as of a higher order. But with respect to the second there could be doubt; and therefore, although in the title the question was asked absolutely, in the response we came to what could fall under doubt; and it was answered that it, insofar as speculative, is more worthy than the speculative sciences, and insofar as practical, than the practical ones—leaving aside that which is evident, that absolutely it is the most worthy of all, because of a higher order.

III. It is therefore proved first with respect to the first part². Among the speculative sciences, one is more worthy than another on account of certitude and the dignity of its matter, from I de Anima³: this science excels in both respects; therefore. — The minor is proved with respect to its first part. This science is certain by an infallible divine light, while the others are certain only by a fallible human light; therefore it is more certain. Understand this as holding of itself, not of us, as is clear from the reply to the first objection. — With respect to the second part, however: this science concerns things exceeding human reason, whereas the others concern things subject to human reason; therefore it is concerned with what is more worthy. This argument is founded upon II Metaphys.⁴, just as the eye of the owl is toward the light of the sun, etc.: for there it is stated that things which exceed the power of our intellect are most manifest and most luminous in themselves. And hence, the proper natures of intellectual substances, which remain hidden because of their excellence, are more worthy than those conditions of the same substances which we can abstract from sensible things in metaphysics, etc. And therefore, since this science is about things of this surpassing kind, it follows that it is concerned with what is more worthy — not with more worthy beings, since no being is more worthy than God, but with the worthier conditions of beings.

The second part of the conclusion⁵ is proved. That practical science is the more excellent which is not ordered to a further end: but the end of this one is the ultimate end of all the ends of the other sciences: therefore. — The major is proved in the civil and military sciences. The minor, however, because the end of this science is eternal beatitude.

V. Note here that the major premise is understood not absolutely as it stands, but of subordinate practical sciences. For it is not true, among practical sciences that are disparate, that the more worthy is the one not ordered to a further end: for it is more worthy to minister to an art of a higher order, say that of the goldsmith, than to preside over an art of a lower order, say that of the potter. But among practical sciences of which one is subordinate to another, the major premise is without doubt true. And therefore in the text it was not subsumed absolutely that the end of theology is not subordinated to another: but two things were subsumed: that all other practical sciences are subordinated to this one, by saying that the ends of the other practical sciences are ordered to the end of this one; and that the end of this one is the last, etc. For thus the argument is complete, with every calumny excluded.

VI. But remember that here, first, there is that distinction of ends: namely, into the end of the reason for acting, or of the thing acted upon, and into the end of the one acting. For eternal beatitude is not the ultimate end of all who act, since many act against it by departing from virtue, and yet act rightly according to their arts; but it is the end of all reasons for acting, and of all things acted upon, because all things are ordered to the good of reason, which is in turn finally ordered to eternal beatitude. And therefore in the text it is carefully said that the ends of the other sciences are ordered to eternal beatitude—and it does not say the ends of those who know.

Remember the second division of the other distinction: namely, the intrinsic end and the extrinsic end. And understand that the extrinsic end of theology insofar as it is practical is beatitude, which is the ultimate end, that is, the vision of God; although its intrinsic end as such is to act. Nor does this stand in the way of the force of the argument made in the text, which speaks of the intrinsic end of the practical sciences: for the text speaks of the proximate end, whether outside or within. For with respect to the dignity of the practical, it makes no difference whether the end ennobling it is brought in from within or from without, provided it be proximate. Such is the case here: since, as the Author said in the preceding article, we are treating of our works insofar as by them we are ordered to the contemplation of God. The other sciences, however, teach one to act on account of this end only remotely. — Now this, namely, that this science insofar as it is practical has the same proximate end which it has insofar as speculative (though in another way, because extrinsically), belongs to this science because it is practical secundum quid: for if it were purely practical, to speculate would be remote from its end.

VII. The response to the second uses two distinctions. To receive is twofold: from a superior, or from an inferior. And this again in two ways: either on account of a defect or insufficiency in the receiver; or as supplying the defect of another, namely of our intellect in the case at hand.

In the title, the word wisdom, that is, ordering and judging knowledge concerning other things, as in the chapter heading: for this name "wisdom" signifies this, as is clear in Book VI of the Ethics¹, speaking generally.

II. In the body there is one conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: Sacred doctrine is wisdom in the highest degree among all human wisdoms, not only in a genus, but simply.

And note that simply determines human wisdom, just as in a genus does as well: so that it is the case that sacred doctrine, both in relation to wisdoms in a genus and to human wisdom simply, is wisdom in the highest degree.

III. It is proved. Sacred doctrine treats most properly of God insofar as He is the highest cause: therefore sacred doctrine is wisdom in the highest degree, etc. — The antecedent is proved. It treats of God, not only as knowable through creatures, but insofar as He is known naturally to Himself alone: therefore most properly, etc.

IV. Concerning the antecedent and its proof, note that those things which are naturally hidden from us concerning God, just as they are more proper to God in knowing, so also in being. And therefore the science that determines about God according to those things which are known to God alone is a science about God from God's own proper attributes: and hence it is rightly said that it determines about God most properly. And since by means of such proper attributes are had the first and supreme foundations of divine causality, therefore it is said that it determines most properly about God inasmuch as He is the highest cause.

Yet here be careful: for the phrase as the highest cause can be expounded in two ways. In one way, so that as determines the formal ratio of God as He is the subject of sacred doctrine. And thus the assumption is false: since, as is clear in the following article, God inasmuch as He is God is the subject of it, and not inasmuch as He is the highest cause. – In the other way, so that as determines a certain special ratio of God, enclosed within the breadth of the conditions pertaining to the consideration of sacred doctrine, because it follows upon the deity. And thus it is true: for the text intends that sacred doctrine considers God most properly, and consequently also as the highest cause: which pertains to wisdom.

V. The consequence² is now proved. Judgment concerning lower things is had through a higher cause: therefore one who considers the highest cause of some genus is wise in that genus. Therefore, one who considers the cause that is simply the highest of the whole universe, namely God, is most wise. Therefore, if anyone considers God most properly as He is the highest cause, that person has the greatest wisdom among all, both in a genus and simply: which was the consequence to be proved.

The assumption is clear. – And the first consequence is indeed proved, because it belongs to the wise to judge and to order: this is made manifest in the genus of building, and in the genus of the whole of human life, with the authorities of Scripture joined to it, as is evident in the text. – The second, however, proved from the same source, is left in the middle ground, with understood the proportionality of the highest cause in a genus to wisdom in a genus, and of the highest cause simply to wisdom simply: and it is confirmed by the testimony of Augustine. In this deduction, moreover, wisdom simply is called wisdom most of all, so as to denote its excess over the wisdoms in a genus. – The third consequence, however, is left as self-evident. For if one who considers the highest cause simply, that is, God, is simply and most of all wise with respect to those who are wise in this or that genus; it must be that one who considers that same highest cause from its proper attributes is not only simply, but most of all wise, both with respect to those who are wise in a genus, and with respect to one who is wise simply; inasmuch as he transcends him in this, that he searches out the proper attributes of the highest cause, while the latter stops at what is common, and at those things which can be known through what is common. For all the reasons which metaphysics has concerning God are either common, if they are simple, such as being (ens), true, good; or composed out of what is common, if they are proper to God, such as pure act, first being (primum ens), etc.

VI. In response to the third, the praise of Hierotheus, the teacher of Dionysius, is adduced, namely that he was not only learning divine things according to the intellect, but undergoing them according to the affections: since the gift of wisdom is in the intellect formally, but in the will causally. And he is said to be undergoing from passion, in the way in which those vehemently moved with regard to something are said to be impassioned: in which is signified the greatest inclination of the will, now become habitual and connatural toward divine things, etc.

In the title, note both terms. Ly subiectum stands for the formal subject, and ly Deus is taken formally, that is, inasmuch as God: so that the meaning is: Whether God, inasmuch as he is God, is the formal subject of this science.

And for the goodness of the doctrine, penetrate what it signifies insofar as God is concerned, from Scotus's exposition in this question¹. Just as man can be taken in four ways: first, as rational animal; and thus he is understood quidditatively, insofar as he is man: second, as substance; and thus he is conceived in common: third, as naturally gentle; and thus he is conceived per accidens, because to be gentle is an accident or passion of man: fourth, as the noblest of animals; and thus he is conceived relatively with respect to another — so, in our case, proceeding in reverse order, God can be considered as the highest cause, and universally according to whatever predicate relative to what is outside him; and thus he is considered relatively to what is outside him: he can also be considered as wise, good, just, and universally according to the attributive notions; and thus he is considered quasi per accidens: he can also be considered as a being (ens), as act, etc.; and thus he is considered in common. And to these three modes, which are quasi simple, the composite considerations are reduced, e.g., as pure act, as first being (ens primum), etc.: for God is considered in such cases as standing under a common concept, one that is relative or negative, as is evident. But before all these modes, God can be considered according to his own proper quiddity: for this is the first knowledge of all things by nature, and the foundation of the others: and we designate this quiddity by the name deity. And so, to ask whether God under the notion of deity, as distinguished against the notion of goodness etc., is the subject of this science, is to ask whether God under the notion of his own proper quiddity is the formal subject of this science; such that the quiddity of God would be the formal ratio of this subject as it is a thing, etc.

II. In the body there are two parts: first, the responsive conclusion is set down, answering the question affirmatively; second, the sayings of others are reported². As to the first, the conclusion is: God is the subject of this science.

It is proved in two ways³. First. The object of any power or habit is that under whose aspect all things are referred to the power or habit; therefore the subject of a science is that under whose aspect all things are considered in that science. Therefore the subject of this science is God. The antecedent is made clear by the object of sight. — The first consequence, however, is proved as follows. The subject stands to a science just as the object stands to a power or habit; therefore, if the object, etc. — But the second consequence is proved as follows. All things are considered in sacred doctrine under the aspect of God; therefore, if the subject, etc. The assumption is proved: because all things either are God or are ordered to God, as to their principle or their end, etc.

III. Concerning the proof of the first consequence, note that the proposition assumed, as the object is to the power, so the subject is to the science, need not hold for all things: but it is enough for the purpose at hand that it hold with respect to the proportion of the formal ratio; so that, just as the formal ratio of the object of a power is that by which all things are referred to that power, so the formal ratio of the subject of a science is that by reason of which all things are considered in that science. Whether, however, the likeness holds with respect to other things, for instance with respect to commonness (so that just as the formal object of a power is something common to all the per se objects of that power, so the subject of a science ought to be something common to all its per se subjects), is not the present concern: although it is plainly evident from this that one need not preserve this likeness, since the subject posited for this science is not something common, but God as God, who, as such, is admittedly a certain singular being.

Nor is there any obstacle in the fact that in I Sent., article 4 of the Prologue, St. Thomas said that the subject of a science has this condition, namely, that it is common by predication: for that is true only according to what commonly happens, and not necessarily. For we see that condition commonly found in the subjects commonly assigned to the sciences by the doctors; yet it need not be so, as is clear from IV Metaphys.⁴ in the science of the healthy. - The community of predication could also be saved in every subject, not directly, but directly or obliquely: for thus God too is predicated of all theological things, because they are either God, or of God, or ordered to God, or from God, etc. The first answer, however, is literal.

IV. Concerning the proposition assumed in the proof of the second inference⁵, namely, that all things are considered in this science under the aspect of God, there is doubt, both simply and ad hominem. Simply, indeed, Gregory of Rimini argues⁶: If God under the aspect of deity were the subject of theology, both that of the blessed and ours, then all things knowable through the aspect of deity would fall under theology. But this is impossible: both because all things, simply speaking, would fall under theology; and because infinite truths would fall under the same science. For through the deity all things are knowable, and infinitely so, etc., as is evident in the science which God has of Himself through His essence.

But against the man himself: because St. Thomas himself, in the Prologue to Book I of the Sentences, article 4, expressly says that the subject of this science is divine being (ens divinum), knowable by inspiration; and not God, except as its principal subject. Therefore, etc.

V. To the first of these, the consequence must be denied, for a twofold reason. The first is that theology, whether ours or the blessed, is a science inadequate to its subject, whereas that conditional is true of a science adequate to its subject. For God alone has a theology adequate to its formal subject. — But this reason seems to count for nothing. For the formal ratio of the subject and the science must correspond to each other adequately; otherwise the sciences would not be distinguished by their formal subjects, nor could a reason be assigned why one science considers such a subject rather than another.

Hence another account of the negation is assigned. And it is this: because in the antecedent of that conditional there is no mention of the formal ratio under which; yet upon that depends the adequation or limitation of what is knowable concerning the subject, through the formal ratio of that subject as a thing is. For God, although by reason of the deity He is infinitely knowable, nevertheless God as God, under the participated light of glory, is knowable below a certain limit with respect to individual things. And similarly, under the participation of the light of grace, He is knowable according to certain limits, etc. And therefore, in order to verify that conditional, one must add: if God inasmuch as He is God, under a light adequate to Himself, were the subject of some science, that science would know all things, etc. But then the falsity of the proposition to be subsumed is evident: because only the divine light in itself is such a light; but for our theology and for blessed theology, God, indeed inasmuch as He is God, yet under a diminished light, is the subject. And therefore, according to the capacity of the light is the extension of the science. Science, then, is not to be measured according to the extension of the formal ratio as a thing is absolutely, but as standing under the formal ratio of the object as an object is.

VI. To the second ⁷ it is said that St. Thomas, not asserting but opining, following the conditions of the subject commonly stated by others, said this; as is clear from his manner of speaking, when, in beginning that position, he says: if we wish to posit some subject in which all these conditions are preserved. But here he determined assertively what he had even then begun: for there too he says that all things are considered in this science under the aspect of God. Therefore this is to be held simply; the former, however, is to be heard as a matter of opinion.

VII. The second argument leading to the conclusion⁸ is this. The subject of the principles and of the whole science is the same: God is the subject of the principles of this science; therefore God is the subject of the whole science. — The major premise is proved: because the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. The minor, however, because God is the subject of the articles of faith.

VIII. Concerning the proposition assumed to prove the major premise, namely, the whole of science is contained virtually in the principles, a doubt arises: for it seems contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas. For it follows: The whole of science is contained virtually in the principles: therefore in the subject of the principles: therefore in the subject of the science. Therefore there cannot be one science according to its most special species of two disparate species, indeed even of genus and species, according to what is proper to each. This is false according to St. Thomas: since the science of the triangle and the square and figure, etc., not only according to their common features but also according to what is proper to each, is of one species; as is clear in Ia IIae⁹, and in I Poster.¹⁰ Therefore.

The first consequence is evident: because principles are formed from the account of the subject. The second is also evident: because the subject of the principles and of the science is the same. The third, however, is evident because the science of one wholly disparate species, with respect to its proper attributes, is not contained virtually in another species, nor in the account of the genus as such: just as neither are the passions of one species contained virtually in another, nor in the account of the genus, as is clear.

IX. To this objection one must respond, not only ad hominem, but simply: since this virtual containment introduces doubt, not only because it is posited here in the text, but simply. Hence Scotus, in the Prologue, question III, holding that the virtual containment of all truths pertaining to some science is the condition constituting the formal notion of the subject in that science, agrees with the aforesaid objection, conceding as true that to which the argument leads, which we consider false.

It must be known, therefore, that there are two opinions concerning this kind of containment. For Scotus holds that the subject of a science must contain, first and virtually, as a sufficient cause, all the truths pertaining to such a science. And he proves this in two ways. First, because it contains the immediate propositions, which are the principles virtually containing the whole science. This is evident, because the predicate of an immediate proposition is contained in its subject; but the subject is the subject of the science; therefore. Second, because the subject is the adequate cause of the habit: therefore it contains the whole of that habit virtually, first; therefore all of its truths. — And according to this opinion, there are as many sciences specifically distinct as there are not only species of things wholly disparate (which I say on account of subordinate species, for instance a subject and a passion), but also as many as there are formal rationes of things, one of which is not contained virtually in another. And thus one science is of animal as such, to which it belongs to consider only the proper passions of animal (since those alone are enclosed virtually within animal); and another is of ox insofar as it is ox, and another of lion insofar as it is lion, etc.

X. But St. Thomas, holding that the sciences are divided not as things are divided absolutely, but as they are knowable, holds that the formal subject of a science requires two conditions, as is gathered from the text. The first is that by reason of it all things are attained by that science. The second, that it contain the whole science virtually: not as a cause sufficient in itself, as Scotus wished; but taken in itself indeed, sufficient as a first cause, that is, in its own order, and not simply. But when it is taken both in itself and in the things participating in it, or in any way attributed to it, it becomes sufficient simply. Now that cause is called simply sufficient which is first, that is, adequate, cause of something; as the subject of its proper passion, whether immediately or through some prior passion: but that cause is sufficient in its own order which, although alone it does not suffice for the effect, is nevertheless in its own order the complete and total cause, as the sun is the cause of Socrates. And in this way the first principles of any science contain virtually all the truths of that science, namely, as first propositions. For not from the first propositions alone immediately, as is evident, nor through only those things which depend totally upon them, are all truths known: but from them as first, and from others as second and proximate causes, many conclusions are known.

And this is clearer still in the very passions that are demonstrated. For in the science of number, it is not necessary that all the passions knowable by that science be contained virtually in number, first—that is, adequately and sufficiently—when speaking of number in itself: for thus neither the passions of two nor those of three would be known there, as is evident. But it is indeed necessary that number in itself contain virtually all passions of this kind, as their first root. As distinct and participated, however, in two and three and so on, the subject of all these passions must be first—that is, adequate. And hence the principles of such a science, which have number for their subject, contain virtually all truths as first causes. Nor is it necessary that they suffice for inferring all conclusions, unless joined with propositions whose subject is two or three and so on, as proximate causes: just as neither is number in itself a sufficient cause of the passions of two, but only their first root—and this insofar as they are knowable, that is, inasmuch as they are in such a species of the knowable; whatever may be the case in esse naturae.

And according to this way, it is manifest that the same science, specifically considered, can be about a genus and about many species, in accordance with the proper characteristics of each.

XI. And if it be asked: What, then, will be the limit of the knowables within a single science? The answer is already clear from what has been said: for sciences are delimited according to the species of knowables as such, and not according to the species of things. And therefore as many species and genera of things can be comprehended under one science as can happen to be comprehended under one species of the knowable. And therefore that formal ratio of things which first grounds that species of the knowable—that is, to which there first belongs that mode of abstraction, or definition, or cognition, which constitutes that species of the knowable—is the formal ratio of the subject in that science; and it is the first root of all that pertains to that science as such.

That, however, such virtual containment as has been explained¹¹ suffices for the subject and principles of a science is evident from the procedures of the sciences, both in mathematics and in natural philosophy. For in both cases the proper attributes of many species are handed down—for instance, of the triangle and the quadrangle—which, as is clear, cannot be contained adequately in the subject of geometry.

XII. To the first Scotist argument, it has already been said¹² that what was stated above¹³ holds. – But to the second, from the same foundation it is said that the subject of a habit containing the whole habit virtually can be understood in two ways: in one way, taking the subject in itself; in another way, as found in others participating in it per se in any manner whatsoever. And likewise containing virtually is twofold: namely, adequately, and as a first cause. The subject in itself contains the whole habit virtually, and not a part; just as the sun contains the whole man virtually, and not a part, yet as first or superior cause. But the subject both in itself and in its participants contains the whole habit virtually and adequately, as total cause. – And thus the doubt is resolved both simply and ad hominem¹⁴.

XIII. As to the second¹⁵, three other assignments are referred to it. The first is that of the Master of the Sentences; the second, that of Hugh of Saint Victor; the third is that of the Lincolnian. But note the modesty of the Author. For first, excusing them, he says that they attended to the matter: as if to say that they did not intend to assign the formal subject. Second, he reduces all the aforementioned to the formal subject assigned by himself, saying that all these things are treated in relation to God.

In the title: argumentative, that is, demonstrative of what it teaches: whether it does not, but perhaps simply proposes, as Scotus said against article 2¹.

II. In the body, three conclusions. The first is: Sacred doctrine does not argue to principles, but to conclusions from principles. The second is: Sacred doctrine disputes by arguing against those who deny its principles, if they concede something of it. The third: Sacred doctrine disputes only by resolving, against those who deny its principles and concede nothing of it at all. – And the discussion here is always about complex principles of cognition in this science, that is, the articles of faith: whatever may be said of incomplex principles concerns either their being alone or their esse itself.

III. The first conclusion is proved. No science proves its own principles, but draws conclusions from them: therefore. – And the second part of the conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, I Corinthians XV.

The second and third, however, are proved together at once. The supreme science among the physical sciences disputes against those who deny the principles; and it defends them by resolving—at least, if they concede nothing. Therefore this doctrine also has both. – The antecedent is explained from the difference between the inferior sciences and the supreme one. The consequence, however, is proved: because this is the supreme science.

Then they are made manifest one by one. The second, indeed, when against the heretics we prove one article from another, etc. The third, however, because no demonstrative argument can exist against infallible truth: therefore all arguments against those things that belong to this science are solvable arguments. The inference holds: because this doctrine rests upon infallible truth.

IV. Concerning the third conclusion, note that the theologian's ability to resolve the philosophers' arguments against the truths of faith occurs in two ways. In one way, from the things believed: for instance, if someone says that everything which is one in number is one hypostatically, he responds: "I deny it, because God is three." And thus the theological solution resolves only by believing. – In another way, from propositions known, either simply or in this respect: for instance, if he were to respond: "I deny it in the case of an infinite being": not because he knows its contradictory, namely that an infinite being exists in several hypostases; but because he knows negatively that no effective middle term can be had for proving it (and one is said to know negatively when the intellect is compelled by no middle term). And thus the theologian resolves from what is known in this respect. Sometimes, however, from what is known simply: as if he should resolve the argument against the accidents in the Sacrament of the Altar, on the grounds that the esse of an accident is not to exist actually, but aptitudinally.

In the matter at hand, I understand this text as referring to theological solution in the second way. And if it is insisted that such a solution is not that of the theologian qua theologian, because it does not proceed from the principles of theology: let the assumption be denied. For theology not only rejoices in what is its own, but also makes what belongs to others its own, when for our sake it employs the propositions of other sciences in its own defense, as was touched upon in article 5, ad 2. And although purely theological matters must flow from theological principles, yet ministerially theological matters need not do so; rather, it is enough that they serve them. Now solutions of this kind are theological in this way.

Hence those seem to think less well who assign to theology the power of solving objections only from some proposition believed. And they are deceived because they have not distinguished between the natures of solution and proof. For proof proceeds from what is evident; but solution also proceeds from things that do not appear to be false, even granted that they are not known to be true. And therefore the theologian can always solve an objection, without his intellect ever being compelled by any proposition contrary to the things that belong to faith, even though he does not see their falsity.

V. Concerning the proof of the third conclusion ², know that it is one thing to know that all the arguments against the faith are solvable, and another to know how to solve them. The first is proved in the text: and the proof assumes one proposition held on faith, namely, that this doctrine rests upon infallible truth: and therefore this conclusion is not evident to us here. The second, however, consists in actual exercise: and the book Contra Gentiles is full of it. And since the solution, as was said ³ and as we experience, does not require evidence, but only that the intellect not be compelled; and this is demonstrated in the very exercise of the solution, so long as no compelling reason is present: therefore, to know how to solve, or to solve the objections against this doctrine, is not to believe, or to believe from belief, except occasionally; for from the fact that we believe, we apply the intellect to discovering the defects of the opposing arguments and propositions. And mark this distinction well: because inattention to it has perhaps allowed some to err in this passage.

VI. In response to the second, note the four enumerated items, namely: the authorities of sacred Scripture, the authorities of the holy Doctors, human reasonings, and the authorities of the philosophers. From the first, indeed, this doctrine is said to proceed as from proper and necessary sources; from the second, however, as from proper but probable ones; from the fourth, truly, as probable but extraneous. And thus no place is assigned to the third. And therefore it must be known that human reasoning, of which we are speaking here, is nothing other than some argumentation having its force from the natural light alone. And it is twofold: one kind concludes necessarily, which is called demonstration; and another kind probabilistically, which has great breadth. But each is contained within some certain physical science, and consequently is extraneous to the genus of theological knowability: and by this very fact, theology proceeds from human reasoning as such as from something extraneous. And since no physical demonstration can be brought forward concerning theological matters as such (since theological matters, as such, must be resolved into principles evident not by natural light, but divine), therefore, speaking absolutely, theology proceeds from natural reason as from something extraneous and probable; just as from the authorities of the philosophers. And therefore the place assigned to the authorities of the philosophers must be understood as assigned also to the natural reason which they knew: a sign of this is that he was treating both at once. And thus all the enumerated items have been given their place.

VII. But a doubt arises here that must not be passed over in silence. If theology proceeds from natural reasons as from extrinsic and merely probable ones, why have speculative doctors undertaken such great labor? What is the purpose of the book Contra Gentiles, so full of natural reasons? etc. For either these authors do not hand down theology, or they have dwelt too long on extrinsic matters.

VIII. To this it is briefly answered that the metaphysical and natural demonstrations brought forward in sacred doctrine are, in themselves, extraneous; but as handmaids of theology—whether for destroying positions opposed to conclusions or principles that are theological, or for resolving arguments made against theological matters, or for establishing those things about which theology is secondarily concerned, such as that God is, and is one, and immortal, etc.—they are not extraneous. Rather, theology proceeds from them as from its own principles, and at times necessary ones; yet ministerially, and not by reason of themselves, but on account of the weakness of our intellect, as was said in article 5, reply to objection 2. And therefore the holy Doctors, who were endowed with a speculative genius and desiring to come to the aid of the defect of human understanding, attempted to bring forward very many philosophical reasons toward some one of these three ends: so that learned men, finding that the things which are of faith are not contrary to reason, might more easily adhere to the things that are of faith, or at least not despise or ridicule them.

It is further suggested that such reasons, as handmaids, become proper to this science for our sake, from the text in the third conclusion, and from its exposition. For objections opposed with a sufficient solution cannot otherwise be resolved except by philosophical reasons: for if the objections of the philosophers were to be resolved from matters of faith, the theologians would be ridiculous to the philosophers, etc.

IX. Concerning these matters, note carefully that it is one thing to speak of human reason, and another to speak of propositions known by human reason. In the text, as we explained ⁴, it is intimated that this doctrine proceeds from human reason, speaking absolutely, as from things extraneous: since propositions known by natural light, not by divine light as such, are extraneous. Yet nevertheless many propositions known by natural light and demonstration, taken in themselves, are truly and properly theological, though under a different light, as is clear in article 1, in the reply to objection 2; as is evident of these: God exists, God is one, God is good, etc. Hence, when the theologian argues from these, he argues from what is proper to him; although not known in a manner proper only to him, insofar as they are not only revealed but also known by natural reason.

In the title, to use metaphors is to use expressions that are not verified of the things of which they are said according to their proper signification, but rather according to some likeness to what is properly signified: as when it is said that our God is a consuming fire¹, we use a metaphor; because God is not truly fire, but is related in the manner of a consuming fire. And so with other cases. This question takes its occasion from II Posterior Analytics², where metaphors are forbidden in the sciences.

II. In the body, one conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: Sacred doctrine fittingly uses metaphors drawn from bodily things for divine and spiritual realities.

It is proved in two ways. First. God provides for all things according to what befits their nature. Therefore it is fitting that in sacred doctrine spiritual things are handed on to man under the similitudes of bodily things. — The antecedent is evident. The consequence, however, is proved: because it is natural for man to be led to intelligible things through sensible things. This is proved: because all our knowledge arises from the senses. And this argument is confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, etc.

Second. Sacred doctrine is set before all human beings in common. Therefore it is fitting that spiritual things be handed down under the likenesses of bodily things. The antecedent is proved at Romans 1. But the consequence is proved: because many are not suited to grasp intelligibles in themselves, who can nevertheless apprehend them in this way.

III. In response to the first, a doubt arises as to how it is verified that this doctrine uses metaphors out of necessity and utility, as was said. For there is no necessity, nor is any shown in the body of the text. The second reason indeed infers only utility, as is clear; the first, however, infers fittingness, as the text itself attests, and this can be proven from the fact that our connaturality with sensible things does not infer a necessity for such sensible things, namely metaphors. — And the doubt is increased: because nothing is handed down metaphorically in Scripture that cannot be taught properly. Therefore there is no necessity of using metaphors in this doctrine, although they are used fittingly and usefully.

IV. To this it seems to me that I must answer that the use of metaphors in this doctrine is in a certain way necessary, and in a certain way not: and this with respect not to these or those, say the less capable, but with respect to man as a wayfarer. For it is indeed necessary on account of better attaining the end, namely the knowledge of God. And this necessity is shown by the first argument of the text. For from the fact that it is connatural to man to know intelligibles only through sensibles, it follows that, if he ought to know spiritual things easily and in their own manner, he must know them through metaphors: since metaphors supply the place of the spiritual species, which would have to be had of spiritual things in themselves. — It is not, however, simply necessary: because although not without phantasms, yet without metaphors man could grasp even in this state what is said, though not so easily.

And by this the solution to the objections is clear³ For the first argument shows not only fittingness, but, in showing fittingness, by that very fact shows necessity—not simply, but on account of the better. — And if one presses against this the authority of Dionysius in the text cited, that it is impossible: it may be said that "impossible" is distinguished just as "necessary" is: since the impossible and the necessary are not equivalent; and it is as if it were said, it is necessary that it not shine otherwise for us, etc.