Eudemian Ethics

The question whether one is one’s own friend or not involves much consideration. Some think that every man is his own best friend, and they use this friendship as a standard by which to judge his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical grounds, and in view of the accepted attributes of friends, self-love and love of others are in some respects opposed but in others manifestly similar.

For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve two separate factors; owing to which a man is his own friend rather in the way in which, in the case of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we have said how one has those qualities voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one’s spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such matters are a similar thing,whether a man can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly.For all these relations involve two separate factors;

in so far then as the spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not separate, they do not.

From the state of friendship for oneself are determined the remaining modes of friendship under which we usually study it in our discourses. For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on his own account but for the other’s sake;

and in another way when a man wishes another’s existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone existence—for that other’s sake and not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high degree the friend of that other;

and in another way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires merely for the sake of his company and not for something else, as fathers desire their children’s existence, though they associate with other people. All these cases conflict with one another;

some men do not think they are loved unless the friend wishes them this or that particular good, others unless their existence is desired, others unless their society.

Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with one who grieves not for some ulterior motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters share their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and not for their masters’ own sake, as mothers grieve with their children, and birds that share each other’s pain.

For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel actually the same pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same as may be.

The same principle applies also in the case of joy; it is characteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason than because the other is rejoicing. Again there are sayings about friendship such as Amity is equality and True friends have one spirit.

All these sayings refer back to the single individual; for that is the way in which the individual wishes good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some ulterior motive, nor speaks well of himself for such and such a consideration, because he acted as an individual; for one who displays his affection wishes not to be but to be thought affectionate.

And wishing for the other to exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and being one spirit and being unable even to live without one another but dying together—for this is the case with the single individual, and he associates with himself in this way,—all these characteristics then belong to the man in relation to himself.

In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is discord, and because of this it is thought to be possible for a man actually to be his own enemy; but as being one and indivisible he is desirable to himself.

This is the case with a good man and one whose friendship is based on goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but many, and a different person in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man’s affection for himself carries back to love of the good;for because in a way a man is like himself and a single person and good to himself, in this way he is dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature.

But a good man does not rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his former, like the liar—

(and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as John Styles is related to good John Styles; for it is clear that the same amount of John Styles is good as of good John Styles )—because when men blame themselves they are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to himself good. And he who is absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, as has been said, because he has two factors within him which by nature desire to be friendly and which it is impossible to draw asunder.

Therefore in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself... so it is not dear to itself. But neither are children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is reached the mind is at variance with the appetite.

And affection for oneself resembles the affection of relationship: neither connection is in people’s own power to dissolve, but even if the parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still relatives and the individual is still one as long as he lives.

From what has been said, then, it is clear how many meanings there are of the term affection, and that all the forms of friendship carry back to the first one.