Eudemian Ethics
Aristotle (384–322 BC)
Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics in the Greek text edited by Franz Susemihl, with H. Rackham's English translation.
Book 1
Section 1.1
Section 1.2
Section 1.3
Section 1.4
Section 1.5
Section 1.6
Section 1.7
Section 1.8
Book 2
Section 2.1
Section 2.2
Section 2.3
Section 2.4
Section 2.5
Section 2.6
Section 2.7
Section 2.8
Section 2.9
Section 2.10
Section 2.11
Book 3
Section 3.1
Section 3.2
Section 3.3
Section 3.4
Section 3.5
Section 3.6
Section 3.7
Book 7
Section 7.1
Section 7.2
Section 7.3
These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all of these the term friendship in a manner indicates equality, for even with those who are friends on the ground of goodness the friendship is in a manner based on equality of goodness.
But another variety of these kinds is friendship on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a man,for that is a different kind of friendship, and generally of a ruler and subject; just as the principle of justice between them is also different, being one of equality proportionally but not of equality numerically. The friendship of father for son is in this class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary.
And of these sorts of friendship themselves there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of affection or it is not returned in a similar way.
For it would be ludicrous if one were to accuse God because he does not return love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject to make this accusation against a ruler; for it is the part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to love in another way.
And the pleasure differs; the pleasure that a man of established position has in his own property or son and that which one who lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the same.
And in the same way also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar manner; and also in the case of pleasure.
This is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is often a cause of combat between the lover and his beloved: the lover does not see that they have not the same reason for their affection. Hence Aenicus has said: A loved one so would speak, but not a lover. But they think that the reason is the same.