De Anima

It comes to this, then, as we have said, first, that this view coincides with that which makes of the soul a body composed of fine particles; next, that its agreement with Democritus as to the manner in which he makes the body to be moved by the soul gives it an especial absurdity of its own. If the soul resides in the whole sentient body, on the assumption that the soul is a sort of body it necessarily follows that two bodies occupy the same space. Those who call the soul a number have to assume many points in the one point, or else that everything corporeal has a soul; unless the number that comes to exist in the body is a different number, quite distinct from the sum of the points already present in the body. Hence it follows that the animal is moved by the number in the same way precisely as we said Democritus moved it. For what difference does it make whether we speak of small round atoms or large units, or indeed of units in spatial motion at all? Either way it is necessary to make the motion of the animal depend on the motion of these atoms or units. Such, then, are some of the difficulties confronting those who join motion and number: and there are many others, since it is impossible that the conjunction of motion with number should form even an attribute, much less the definition, of soul. This will be evident if we try to deduce from this definition the affections and functions of the soul; its reasonings, perceptions, pleasures, pains, and so forth. For, as we said above, from the account given it is difficult even to divine what these functions are.

Three modes of defining the soul have come down to us: some defined it as that which, in virtue of its self-motion, is most capable of causing motion; others as the body which consists of the finest particles, or which is more nearly incorporeal than anything else. And we have pretty fully explained what difficulties and inconsistencies these views present. It remains to consider what is meant by saying that the soul is composed of the

elements. Soul, we are told, is composed of the elements in order that it may perceive and know each several thing. But this theory necessarily involves many impossibilities. For it is assumed that like is known by like; which implies that soul is identical with the things that it knows. These elements, however, are not all that exists: there are a great, or perhaps we should say rather, an infinite number of other things as well, namely, those which are compounded of the elements. Granted, then, that it is possible for the soul to know and to perceive the constituent elements of all these composite things, with what will it know or perceive the compound itself? I mean, what God or man is; what flesh or bone is: and so likewise with regard to any other composite thing. For it is not elements taken anyhow which constitute this or that thing, but only those which are united in a given proportion or combination, as Empedocles says of bone:—

"Then did the bounteous earth in broad-bosomed crucibles win out of eight parts two from the sheen of moisture and four from the fire-god; and the bones came into being all white."

It is therefore of no use for the elements to be in the soul, unless it also contains their proportions and the mode of combining them. For each element will know its like, but there will be nothing to know bone or man, unless these also are to be present in the soul: which, I need hardly say, is impossible. Who would ask if stone or man resides in the soul? And similarly with that which is good and that which is not good: and so for all the rest.

Being, again, is a term which has various meanings, signifying sometimes the particular thing, sometimes quantity or quality or any other of the categories which have been already determined. Is the soul to be derived from all of these, or not? It cannot be: the general opinion is that there are no elements common to all the categories. Does the soul, then, consist of those elements alone which are the elements of substances? How then does it know each of the other categories? Or will they say that each summum genus has special elements and principles of its own, and that the soul is composed of these? Then soul will be at once quantity, quality and substance. But it is impossible from the elements of

quantity to derive substance or anything but quantity. These, then, and others like them are the difficulties which confront those who derive soul from all the elements. There is a further inconsistency in maintaining that like is unaffected by like and yet at the same time that like perceives like and knows like by like. But they assume that perceiving is a sort of being acted upon or moved. And the same holds of thinking and knowing.

Of the many problems and difficulties involved in holding with Empedocles that each thing is known through corporeal elements and by reference to its like [what has just been said ts evidence].— For, it would seem, whatever within the bodies of animals consists entirely of earth, such as bones, sinews, hair, perceives nothing at all, and consequently cannot perceive its like; as in consistency it should. Moreover, each one of the elemental principles will have a far larger share of ignorance than of intelligence; there being many things of which it will be ignorant and only one which it will know: in fact, it will be ignorant of all besides that one. It follows, for Empedocles at any rate, that God is quite the most unintelligent of beings. There is one of the elements, viz. Strife, which he, and he alone, will not know, while mortal things, being composed of all the elements, will know them all. And in general, seeing that everything is either an element or derived from one or more or all elements, why should not all things that exist have soul? For they must certainly know one thing or some things or all. It might further be asked what it is that gives them unity. For the elements, at all events, correspond to matter. That other principle, whatever it be, which holds them together, is supreme. Yet it is impossible that anything should be superior to the soul and overrule it; and still more impossible that anything should overrule intelligence. This, it may reasonably be held, has a natural priority and authority. Yet we are told that the elements are prior to all other things that exist.

And it is characteristic, alike of those who derive the soul from the elements on the ground of perception and knowledge, and of those who define it as the thing most capable of causing motion,

that their assertions do not apply to soul in every form. For not all sentient beings can cause motion; some animals are seen to be stationary in one place. And yet it is at all events a received view that this, namely, change of place, is the one form of motion which the soul imparts to the animal. Similarly with those who derive intelligence and the faculty of sense from the elements. For plants are found to live without any share in locomotion or sensation, and many animals to be destitute of thought. If we waive this point and assume intellect to be a part of the soul, and the faculty of sense likewise, even then their statements would not apply generally to all soul, nor to the whole of any one soul. The account given in the so-called Orphic poems is open to the same strictures. For the soul, it is there asserted, enters from the universe in the process of respiration, being borne upon the winds. Now it is impossible that this should be so with plants or even with some animals, seeing that they do not all respire: a point which the upholders of this theory have overlooked. And if the soul is to be constructed out of the elements, there is no need to employ them all, the one of a pair of contraries being sufficient to discern both itself and its opposite. For by that which is straight we discern both the straight and the crooked, the carpenter's rule being the test of both. On the other hand that which is crooked is not a test of itself or of that which is straight.

There are some, too, who say that soul is interfused throughout the universe: which is perhaps why Thales supposed all things to be full of gods. But this view presents some difficulties. For why should the soul not produce an animal, when present in air or fire, and yet do so when present in the compounds of these elements: and that, too, though in the former case it is believed to be purer? One might also enquire why the soul present in air is purer and more immortal than soul in animals. Whichever of the two suppositions open to us we adopt is absurd and irrational. To speak of fire or air as an animal is very irrational; and on the other hand

not to call them animals, if they contain soul, is absurd. But it would seem that the reason why they suppose soul to be in these elements is that the whole is homogeneous with its parts. So that they cannot help regarding universal soul as also homogeneous with the parts of it in animals, since it is through something of the surrounding element being cut off and enclosed in animals that the animals become endowed with soul. But if the air when split up remains homogeneous, and yet soul is divisible into non-homogeneous parts, it is clear that, although one part of soul may be present in the air, there is another part which is not. Either, then, soul must be homogeneous, or else it cannot be present in every part of the universe.

From what has been said it is evident that it is not because the soul is compounded of the elements that knowledge belongs to it, nor is it correct or true to say that the soul is moved. Knowledge, however, is an attribute of the soul, and so are perception, opinion, desire, wish and appetency generally; animal locomotion also is produced by the soul; and likewise growth, maturity and decay. Shall we then say that each of these belongs to the whole soul, that we think, that is, and perceive and are moved and in each of the other operations act and are acted upon with the whole soul, or that the different operations are to be assigned to different parts? And what of life itself? Does it reside in any single one or more or all of these parts? Or has it a cause entirely distinct? Now some say that the soul is divisible and that one part of it thinks, another desires. What is it then which holds the soul together, if naturally divisible? Assuredly it is not the body: on the contrary, the soul seems rather to hold the body together; at all events, when it has departed, the body disperses in air and rots away. If, then, the unity of soul is due to some other thing, that other thing would be, properly speaking, soul. We shall need, then, to repeat the enquiry respecting it also, whether it is one or manifold. For, if it has unity, why not attribute unity to the soul itself at the outset? If, however, it be divisible, then again reason will go on to ask what it is that holds together, and so the enquiry will go on to infinity. It might also be asked what power each of the parts of the soul

exercises in the body. For, if the entire soul holds together the whole body, then each of its parts ought properly to hold together some part of the body. But this seems impossible. For it is difficult even to conjecture what part the intellect will hold together or how it can hold any part together. It is found that plants, and among animals certain insects or annelida, live when divided, which implies that the soul in their segments is specifically, though not numerically, the same. At any rate, each of the two segments retains sentience and the power of locomotion for some time: that they do not continue to do so is not surprising, as they lack the organs requisite to maintain their nature. But none the less all the parts of the soul are contained in each of the two segments, and the two halves of the soul are homogeneous alike with one another and with the whole; a fact which implies that, while the parts of the soul are inseparable from one another, the soul as a Whole is divisible. It would seem that the vital principle in plants. jin plants also is a sort of soul. For this principle is the only one common to plants and animals; and, while it can be separated from the sensitive principle, no being which has sensation is without it.