De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

Introduction

Disputatio CXV: What the legitimate definition and proper nature of free choice are.

Disputatio CXVI: Whether indifference belongs to the essence of a free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.

Disputatio CXVII: Whether created free choice truly and properly has mastery over its act, and what such mastery is.

Disputatio CXVIII: Whether the harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.

Disputatio CXIX: Whether at least by God’s absolute power a creature, without the beatific vision, can have evident knowledge of the mysteries that belong in themselves to faith.

Disputatio CXX: In which various ways of reconciling free choice with grace proposed by different doctors are presented and refuted.

Disputatio CXXI: In which the legitimate harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine predestination and the efficacy of the helps of grace is established and defended.

Epilogue of almost everything said in the preceding disputations, containing twenty propositions.

I. In order that all things which have been said in this whole work may be more easily understood, it has seemed good to comprehend and touch upon them in brief in the following propositions. For I judged that this would be welcome to pious readers: for, as August. says, The same thing said in one way often moves; said in another way it does not move. Nor yet have I wished to recall all things that were said above, but only those which seem to look to a brief resolution.

Free choice was wounded and weakened by sin.— But for the full understanding of these things, two foundations, in which all agree, must be supposed. The one is that man's free choice was by original sin not only turned away from God, and stripped of original justice and of supernatural gifts, but was also wounded, weakened, and injured in natural goods. Caelestinus I. teaches this, epist. 1. ad quosdam Galliarum Episcopos cap. 4, and Innocentius I. in the epistle to the Council of Carthage, and the Council of Orange can. 1, condemning as Pelagian the man who says that by the offense of Adam's transgression man was not wholly, that is, in body and soul, changed for the worse, but that, with the freedom of the soul remaining unharmed, he holds only the body to be subject to corruption. The holy Council of Trent confirmed the same decree under anathema, sess. 5. decreto de pecc. origin. can. 2. and sess. 6. decr. de iustificat. cap. 1. in fine, where it says that free choice was by Adam's transgression weakened and inclined, though not extinguished. St. Thom. teaches the same 1. 2. q. 85. ar. 1, which he also proves from Luc. c. 10, where the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, that is, into the downfall of sin, is stripped of gratuitous goods and wounded in natural goods, as Beda expounds.

Secondly, it must be supposed, from the doctrine of the same St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 85. ar. 3, that the free choice of man incurred, through the sin of the first parent, four wounds, according to the number of the powers of the soul which can be subject to virtues and vices: namely ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, infirmity in the irascible, and concupiscence in the concupiscible. But because the will is the inclination of the whole man, human nature, as St. Thom. teaches 1. 2. q. 109. ar. 2. ad 3, is more corrupted by sin as regards the appetite for good than as regards the knowledge of truth; whence a man can know more things by himself, without the help of grace, than he can accomplish by the powers of nature. Hence St. August. says: I sighed, bound not by another's iron, but by my own iron will. The enemy held my will, and from it had made a chain for me, and had bound me fast. For from a perverse will lust was made; and while lust is served, custom is made; and while custom is not resisted, necessity is made; and by these, as by certain rings linked one to another (whence I called it a chain), a hard slavery held me bound.

Hence arose the inclination, or facility, to evil, of which it is written: The sense and thought of men are prone to evil from their youth, and the difficulty of embracing, and even of knowing, the good of reason. For it is said, Sapien. 9: We hardly guess the things that are on earth; and the things that are at hand we find with labour. In order, then, that free choice may be able to work works perfect and proportioned to its nature, it is necessary that it be healed and strengthened by grace; and further, it needs divine help in order to be raised to working supernatural works, which exceed the whole order and capacity of nature, as will become manifest in the following propositions, the contrary positions having been refuted in their place above.

On the powers of free choice, especially in fallen nature.

FIRST proposition. Man's free choice in fallen nature cannot, without the help of grace, produce a moral work which, in comparison with a natural end, is truly good and a work of true virtue: so that it is referred by the one working to God as to the last natural end, loved above all things simply.

True virtue cannot exist without grace.— St. August. teaches this lib. 1. retract. c. 3, where he retracts what he had said lib. 1. de ordine, namely that the philosophers, though not endowed with true piety, shone with the light of virtue; and lib. 4. contra Iulianum cap. 3, where by many testimonies of Scripture he manifestly shows that true virtue, even moral virtue, is not in anyone unless he is just; but it is impossible for anyone truly to be, or to become, just without the help of grace: for otherwise, as the Apostle argues, If justice is through the law, and through nature, then Christ died in vain; therefore without the help of grace there can be no true virtue, nor act of true virtue, even in comparison with a natural end.

St. Thom. teaches the same 2. 2. q. 23. artic. 7, where he shows that without charity there can be no true virtue; but charity, even the natural charity by which God is loved above all things simply, cannot be had in fallen nature without the help of grace, as will appear below. And 1. 2. q. 65. ar. 2 he teaches that the moral virtues do not have the perfect and true character of virtue unless they are productive of good in order to a supernatural end; and in the solution to 1 he adds that, if moral virtue be taken according to the perfect nature of virtue, it makes the one who has it good, and consequently cannot exist together with mortal sin. Moreover it is proved. True virtue is that which makes the one who has it good, and his act good; but moral virtue without charity does not make the one who has it truly good, even in comparison with a natural end, nor his act truly good: for it is said, 1. Cor. 13: If I distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I deliver my body so that I burn, and have not charity, it profits me nothing. Since, then, charity cannot be had without the help of grace, it remains that by the powers of nature alone a fallen man cannot perform any work of true virtue, in the sense explained, even in comparison with a natural end. It is confirmed. It is impossible that a man be turned away and disordered from a supernatural end, and that he be converted to God as to the last natural end, and rectified in his will in respect of that same end; but without the help of grace he cannot elicit any work that is truly good and a work of true virtue in comparison with the last supernatural end: therefore neither in comparison with the last natural end.

II. Second proposition. Man by the powers of nature alone cannot assent to all the supernatural mysteries proposed and explained to him, as revealed by God, or because they have been revealed by God: namely, so that the formal reason of believing be the divine revelation.

To assent to supernatural mysteries as revealed by God, man cannot without the help of grace.— This proposition is proved from sacred Scripture, ad Philip. 1: To you it is given not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him. And ad Eph. 2: By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God. And 1. Cor. 4: What have you that you have not received? By which testimony especially, together with the explanation of Cyprian, Aug. confesses lib. de praedest. Sanctor. cap. 3 that he was convinced to retract the opinion by which, before his episcopate, he asserted that faith is not a gift of God, but is in us from ourselves. For the Apostle, in order to comprehend even faith itself, says absolutely: What have you that you have not received? etc. But what faith is, and what is conducive to salvation.

Secondly it is proved from the Council of Orange, 2. can. 7, where it is defined that man, by the vigour of nature, cannot consent to the Gospel preaching without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. And in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. can. 3. de iustificat., he is anathematized who has said that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and his help, man can believe as is fitting, etc. But he who assents to all supernatural mysteries as revealed by God undoubtedly believes as is fitting: for he believes on account of the divine revelation as on account of the formal reason, as the Christian faith believes. For the heretic or the unbeliever does not assent to the mysteries of faith on account of the divine revelation as on account of the formal reason, but on account of other motives, or human reasons, and therefore he does not believe with a divine faith, certain and infallible on the part of the formal reason of believing, but with a human and fallible one, and so he does not believe as is fitting for salvation. And to exclude this human faith the Councils added that particle, as is fitting. It is confirmed: for, as is gathered from St. Thom. 2. 2. q. 1. ar. 1, and q. 5. ar. 3. in corp. and ad 1, in this Christian and human faith are distinguished, that the divine or Christian faith rests upon the first truth revealing as upon the formal reason; but human faith rests upon human testimony as upon the formal reason of believing, or upon another human motive. From which again follows another difference, that the Christian faith is certain and infallible on the part of the formal reason of believing, because namely it rests upon an infallible and indefectible formal reason, namely the first truth revealing, which can neither be deceived nor deceive; but human faith is fallible and defective, because it rests upon a fallible foundation, namely human testimony: therefore the assent by which someone assents to all supernatural mysteries as revealed by God, and because they have been revealed by God, is an assent of Christian faith, and such as is fitting for salvation; it cannot therefore be had from the powers of nature alone.

Thirdly it is proved from August. lib. de dono perseverantiae cap. 17, where he proves that faith is a gift of God, from that passage of Eph. 6: Peace to the brethren, and charity from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ: for he says: From whom, then, are peace and charity, from him also is faith; on which account we ask from him that it be increased in those who have it, and that it be given to those who have it not. And cap. 9, for the same opinion he cites St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, and Gregory Nazianzen; and cap. 20: What, he says, does God first and chiefly command us, but that we believe in him? And this therefore he himself gives, if it was well said to him: Give what you command. The same he teaches in the whole book de praedestin. Sanctor., especially c. 2. 3. 6. and 9, and epist. 105, and the two following, and tom. 3. lib. de Spiritu et littera cap. 31, where he says: For what is it to believe, but to consent that what is said is true? and a little after he adds: For even that we may believe, God has given. Which he proves by the authority of the Apostle, 1. Corinth. 4: What have you that you have not received? And in chapters 32 and 33 he confirms the same thing.

Fourthly it is proved from St. Thom. 2. 2. q. 6. ar. 1, where he says: For man's assent to the things which are of faith, besides those things which outwardly lead to faith, it is necessary to posit another interior cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to the things which are of faith. And at the end of the body he thus concludes: And therefore faith, as regards the assent, which is the principal act of faith, is from God moving inwardly through grace.

Fifthly. For the act of faith is the beginning of our justification, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 6. cap. 8. de iustificat., from the Apostle, ad Rom. 5: Being justified therefore by faith. Therefore if the act of faith is had from the powers of nature alone, the beginning of our salvation would be from nature, or from ourselves, which is not to be admitted.

III. The beginning of faith is from God.— Third proposition. Not only faith itself, but also the first beginning of faith, proceeds from the help of grace, and not from the powers of nature alone. It is had as defined in the Council of Orange, can. 5, where, from the authority of the Apostle, ad Philip. 1, He who began in you a good work will perfect it, etc., it concludes that the beginning of faith is from the gift of grace. And St. August. lib. de praedestin. Sanctor. c. 2 says: And so the very beginning of our faith, from whom is it, if not from him? For it is not with this one exception that the rest are from him; but from him, and through him, and in him are all things; which he proves there by many testimonies of Scripture, especially from that of 2. Cor. 3: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. But to think is prior to believing; therefore, according to the Apostle, the first beginning of faith is not from ourselves, but from God. The same he teaches cap. 20.

Secondly it is proved by the reasoning of St. August. cap. 2. de praedest. Sanctor. For if man from the powers of nature begins to believe, so that God by his gift may increase and perfect faith itself, it follows that the grace by which faith is perfected is given according to our merits: For who would say that he who has begun to believe merits nothing from him in whom he has believed? Whence the same August. lib. contra duas epist. Pelag. c. 8 says: Perhaps, then, they themselves in that way at least preserve a place for grace, so that they think that without it man can have the desire of good, but of imperfect good; but that he cannot more easily have that of perfect good through it, but that without it he cannot at all; yet even so they say that the grace of God is given according to our merits.

Thirdly it is proved by the reasoning of the same St. Augustine, lib. de praedestin. Sanctor. cap. 2, near the end: for if the beginning of faith is not from grace but from nature, it follows that faith itself, increased and perfected, is not from grace but from nature. The words of August. are: But why is it not wholly attributed to man, that he who could establish for himself what he did not have, may himself increase what he has established? I do not see at all, unless because no resistance can be offered to the most manifest testimonies, by which faith also, from which piety takes its beginning, is shown to be a gift of God.

IV. Man in fallen nature cannot love God above all things without the help of grace.— Fourth proposition. Man's free choice in fallen nature cannot, without the help of grace, love God above all things simply, even as he is the author of nature. It is proved from the Council of Milevis, can. 4, where it is defined that both are a gift of God: both to know what we ought to do, and to love, that we may do it. And in the Council of Orange, 2. can. 25 it is said: It is altogether a gift of God to love God. And in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustif. can. 3 he is anathematized who has said that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and his help, man can love as is fitting, etc. But the love of God above all things simply is as is fitting for salvation, since mortal sin, or aversion from God, is not compatible with it, as was said in proposition 2. For that particle, as is fitting, was added in the Council to distinguish it from imperfect love, by which the sinner loves God insofar as he preserves him, or on account of some other human motive, but not on account of his goodness, nor above all things simply.

Secondly it is proved from sacred Scripture, ad Rom. 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. And 1. Ioan. 4: Charity is of God.

St. August. teaches the same, epist. 107. ad Vitalem: We have lost, he says, free choice for loving God, by the greatness of the first sin: that is, we have lost the power of loving God above all things simply from the mere capacity of nature. And lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 18: If the love of God and of neighbour is not from God but from men, the Pelagians have conquered; but if it is from God, we have conquered the Pelagians. And St. Prosp. lib. cont. collatorem, cap. 30: So great, he says, according to this man is the soundness, or the capacity, of free choice, that charity, which stands in the citadel of all the virtues, he holds not from the gift of God but from the will alone. Which he attacks there by many testimonies of Scripture.

Secondly it is proved from St. Thomas 1. 2. q. 100. ar. 10. ad 3, where he says that the precept of charity is not fulfilled without grace. And he speaks also of the precept of charity, to which man is obliged by the law of nature; and q. 109. art. 3. in corp. he says thus: Man in the state of integral nature did not need the gift of grace superadded to natural goods in order to love God naturally above all things, although he needed the help of God moving him to this; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs even for this the help of grace healing nature.

If it be said that sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers speak of supernatural love, but not of the merely natural love by which God is loved above all things simply; on the contrary: for Pelagius, whom the Councils and sacred Scripture condemn, never taught that the love which he himself established as from the powers of nature alone was supernatural, but he said absolutely that the love of God above all things, and the absolute purpose of never sinning, can be had simply from the powers of nature; and yet the Councils and the holy Fathers, especially Aug. and Prosper, condemn this assertion of his: therefore.

It is confirmed: for Pelagius asserted that the love of God above all things can be had from the powers of nature alone: therefore he was speaking of merely natural love. The consequence is plain: for love proceeding from the powers of nature alone is merely natural: therefore the Councils, which determine against Pelagius that man cannot from the powers of nature alone love God above all things, speak also of the natural love by which God is absolutely loved above all things. To this is added that St. Thom., in the place cited above, speaks expressly of natural love.

V. Fifth proposition. Man in fallen nature cannot, without the help of grace, fulfill all the precepts, even of the natural law, or overcome any great difficulty and temptation, for any period even a short one, which it is necessary to overcome in order to observe that same law. It is proved from the Councils and Fathers adduced in the preceding proposition: for the precept even of the natural law, of loving God above all things simply, man cannot keep in fallen nature without the help of grace, as was shown in that same proposition.

Greater temptations cannot be overcome without the help of grace.— It is proved secondly: for St. Augustin. epist. 106. ad Paulinum reports that it was a condemned assertion of Pelagius, that our victory is not from the help of God but from free choice; and in the same place he teaches: that every faithful man is bound to confess that when we fight against temptations and illicit desires, although we have free will there also, yet our victory comes not from it, but from the help of God: therefore, etc.

Thirdly it is proved: for Innocentius I. in the epistle to the Council of Carthage says: With us, to resist, it is not free choice but the help of God alone that can effect it. And Caelestinus I. epist. 1. cap. 6 defines that no one, even one renewed by the water of baptism, is fit to overcome the snares of the devil and to conquer the desires of the flesh, unless through the daily help of God he has received perseverance in good conduct: and this is understood of the graver temptations that occur, for any period, however short, which, on account of the infirmity of nature, man cannot overcome unless he is helped by grace. Whence St. Prosp. lib. cont. collat. capit. 33 and 35 sharply reproves Cassian because he said that not from the grace of God but by his own powers Job overcame the temptations of the devil: But grace only prevented the most violent enemy from making his soul demented and deprived of sense, and from making it unequal to himself, and from weighing it down with the iniquitous weight of the contest.

On man doing what is in him from the powers of nature alone.

VI. Sixth proposition: There is no law, nor was one ever established by God, of giving the actual helps of prevenient grace to those who do all that is in them from the mere capacity of nature, nor did Christ the Lord merit, or will, that there be such a law.

No law has been established by God of giving the helps of grace to those who use well the goods of nature.— This is St. August. lib. 1. quaest. ad Simplicianum, near the end, at the verse For you have not, etc., where he teaches that God often leaves men in unbelief who apply themselves to good moral works from the capacity of nature, and calls to the faith others who are corrupt in morals, most wicked, and the greatest of sinners. Aug. holds, then, that there is no law established by God concerning the giving of the helps of grace to those who do what is in them from the capacity of nature. Likewise also lib. 1. contr. duas epist. Pelag. cap. 8 he says: For if without the grace of God the desire of good begins through us, that very beginning will be a merit, to which, as by debt, the help of grace comes; and so the grace of God will not be given freely, but our merit will be given. By which words he teaches that the operations preceding grace, proceeding from the capacity of nature alone, on which being posited grace is given, are some beginning of that same grace, and some merit of it: which he also teaches more at length lib. de praedest. Sanctor. cap. 2. Therefore St. Aug. understood that there is no such law; otherwise the same act, begun from the powers of nature, would be infallibly elevated by God through grace inserting itself, and would become supernatural and such as is fitting for salvation; and so the beginning of grace would be from us, which nevertheless St. Augustine always condemned in the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians.

This is St. Prosper's lib. contra collatorem cap. 4. 5. and 6, where he attacks that assertion of Cassian: He who, when he has looked upon a certain beginning of good will in us, straightway enlightens it, and strengthens it, and stirs it to salvation, giving increase to that which either he himself planted, or saw to have emerged from our effort. St. Prosper holds, then, that no law has been established by God of conferring on those who do what is in them from the powers of nature alone the helps of prevenient grace, by which acts begun through nature may become such as is fitting for salvation. And cap. 6 St. Prosper adds: But how do you not notice that you fall into that condemned position which, whether you will or not, you are convicted of asserting, that the grace of God is given according to our merits, when you affirm that something of good work precedes from the men themselves, on account of which they obtain grace? For the faith of the one asking, the piety of the one seeking, the insistence of the one knocking, cannot be held to be of no merit, especially since all such are said both to receive, and to come, and to enter. He holds, then, that grace is given according to our merits, if it be asserted that God confers it by law infallibly on those who do all that is in them from the powers of nature alone, by asking, seeking, knocking, etc. Whence lib. de vocat. gent. c. 9 he says: It remains altogether, and is daily fulfilled, that the Lord promised to Abraham without condition, and gave without law. The same is the opinion of St. Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. ar. 3. in corp., where he teaches that preparation, if it be considered as it is from free choice, has no necessity with respect to the obtaining of grace. And the same he teaches q. 109. ar. 6. ad 2, where he explains that text, To the one doing what is in him God does not deny grace, as concerning the one doing what is in him when moved by divine help; and he delivers the same explanation super caput undecimum ad Roman. Lect. 3. circa medium, which passage is notable, and must necessarily be seen. And 3. cont. gen. c. 149 throughout, especially rat. 1 and 3, he proves that man cannot merit divine help, nor even obtain it by his own power; for thus he says in the first reason: Man does not move himself to this, that he may obtain the divine help which is above him, but rather he is moved by God to obtain it. But the motion of the mover precedes the motion of the moved in reason and in causality: therefore the divine help is not given to us on this account, that we are advanced to it by good works, but rather we therefore profit by good works, because we are preceded by divine help. But if the aforesaid law had been established by God, man by his own power would obtain the help of prevenient grace, by doing all that is in him from the powers of nature alone.

Moreover: for, as St. Thomas says 2. 2. quaest. 80. in corp., a legal debt is that to whose payment someone is bound by law: therefore if God bound himself by his law to give the helps of prevenient grace to those who do what is in them from the capacity of nature, such helps would be owed to them according to law, and so grace would not be grace, because it would be given not freely but by debt. For it is said ad Roman. 4: To him who works the reward is not imputed according to grace, but according to debt. And cap. 11: But if by grace, it is now not of works; otherwise grace would not be grace.

Nor is it enough to answer that prevenient grace is given by law to those who do what is in them, not indeed on account of their merits, which are nothing without grace, but on account of the merits of Christ the Lord: for this does not commend, but rather obscures, the infinite merits of Christ, since it is nothing else than to merit that his grace should not be grace but a wage.

From this it follows that man cannot from the powers of nature alone ask for or desire the help of grace, but it must necessarily be said that such a desire proceeds from the help of prevenient grace, otherwise the beginning of grace would be from us. For Augustine says, in the book de corrept. et gratia, chapter 1: But who flees to grace, unless when the steps of man are directed by the Lord, and he wills his way? And by this, even to desire the help of grace is the beginning of grace: And I said, now I have begun: this is the change of the right hand of the Most High. And in the Council of Orange, canon 6, it is defined: If anyone says that the mercy of God is conferred from on high upon us who believe, will, desire, strive, labour, watch, study, ask, seek, knock, without the grace of God; but does not confess that it is brought about in us, that we may believe, will, or be able to do all these things as is fitting, by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, etc., he resists the Apostle saying: What have you that you have not received? and by the grace of God I am what I am.

On the comparison of grace and free choice with one another.

VII. Helping grace is prevenient.— Seventh proposition. God by his helping grace flows into free choice, premoving it that it may cooperate, and likewise truly and efficiently causes, together with that same free choice, its pious operation. And so the divine operation does two things. The first is to move free choice efficaciously, that it may work. The other is to cooperate together with that same choice, and to produce truly efficiently the free act. And indeed that God by a simultaneous concurrence produces efficiently, together with free choice, its pious operation in itself, all Catholic Doctors confess against Durandus, and it is established from what was said in disputation 18, especially number 11, and disputation 24, number one. But that he also precedes free choice by moving it, that it may consent, is proved by the authority of Pope Gelasius, epistola 5. ad universos Episcopos per Picenum, where he speaks thus: The Teacher of the Gentiles cries out, briefly summing up all gifts in himself: By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me was not in vain: that he might show that he himself did not precede the gift of grace, but followed after it, and might declare that he was a cooperator with grace, by following after it. If, then, free choice cooperates with grace by following after it, then helping grace cooperates with that same choice by preceding it and moving it.

Secondly it is proved from the Council of Trent, sessione 6. de iustificatione cap. 5, at the verse through his arousing and helping grace, etc., where it divides prevenient grace into arousing and helping. It holds, then, that helping grace, as it is helping, is prevenient.

Thirdly it is proved from St. Augustine, epistola 107. ad Vitalem, where he says that this was his chief question with Pelagius concerning the grace of God: Whether this grace precedes or follows the will of man; that is, whether it is given to us because we will, or whether through it God also brings it about that we will. For Pelagius asserted that it is given because we will; but St. Augustine contended that through it God brings it about that we will. Whence, book 3. Hypognost. after the middle, he says: In every holy work, therefore, the will of God is prior and the will of free choice posterior: that is, God works, man cooperates. But if you say, as you have been accustomed to say, that I willed first and then God willed, you make it a merit, so that grace is from works, and is now not grace but a wage. And St. Prosper, in the epistle to Augustine, at the verse whence because in these, says: The beginning of salvation is badly placed in man, if the human will is impiously preferred to the divine will, so that someone is helped because he willed, and not rather wills because he is helped. Since, then, St. Augustine and St. Prosper contend against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians that free choice wills because it is helped by God, it is evident that they hold that helping grace, as it is helping, precedes the free cooperation of the choice, not indeed in time, but only in the order of reason and of causality.

Finally it is proved from St. Thom. 1. 2. q. 111. ar. 2. in corp., where he divides the divine help, by which he moves us to will and to act well, into operating and cooperating grace. He holds, then, that God through cooperating, or helping, grace moves free choice to act, and consequently that he is prevenient insofar as he premoves that same choice to work.

VIII. God does not await man's consent.— Eighth proposition. After God by his arousing grace knocks at and touches the hearts of men, he does not await that the will itself, from its own innate freedom, begin its movement by consenting; but God through helping grace brings it about that it consents freely and infallibly. It is proved from the Council of Orange, 2. can. 4: If anyone contends that God awaits our will, that we may be cleansed from sin, etc. And the Council understands that he does not await man's free consent, even after he has aroused it: for it proves that he does not await it, because by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit he brings it about that we will to be cleansed.

It is proved secondly from St. Aug. epist. 107, near the end: How, he says, does God await the wills of men, that they may precede him, to whom he gives grace; when we not undeservedly give him thanks for those whom, not believing in him and with impious will persecuting his doctrine, he beforehand bestowed mercy, and converted to himself with most almighty ease, and made willing out of unwilling; to what purpose do we give him thanks for this, if he himself did not do it? Here Aug. speaks of efficacious grace, by which God makes the unwilling willing: for his controversy with Pelagius, at least his principal one, was about this grace; as was shown in disput. 99. nu. 2. Since, therefore, God through that grace truly and efficiently brings it about that we will to be cleansed, it remains that even after he has aroused us he does not await our will, that we may will to be cleansed; but that God himself works the very willing in us, and with us, that we may work, as is said in Conc. Araus. can. 9.

IX. Grace and free choice are not two partial causes of the pious operation.— Ninth proposition. Helping grace and free choice are not partial causes of the supernatural consent, as two men drawing a ship, such that neither is premoved by the other, or brings it about that the other cooperates with itself. It is proved from the passages of the Councils and Fathers cited in the two preceding propositions. Moreover St. Th. teaches this expressly, 4. con. Gen. c. 7. n. 16, where he says that when two agents partially draw a ship, because the power of each is imperfect and insufficient for that effect, from the different powers one power of them all is gathered together, which suffices to draw the ship. By which words he signifies that causes concurring partially are imperfect, and therefore that out of the two one integral and total cause is constituted: but it is impossible that the divine causality be imperfect: therefore. The same proposition is taught by St. Aug., St. Ans., St. Bernar., and the other Fathers, whose testimonies we adduced in disp. 85. n. 3. and disp. 62. n. 2.

On the foreknowledge and gratuitous predestination of God.

X. Middle knowledge is not to be posited.— Tenth proposition. Middle knowledge is not to be posited in God, by which, before the actual decree of his will, he should know what a created choice would do from its own innate freedom, if it were placed in such an order of things; or if by such and such a supernatural excitation it were invited and allured even interiorly: but all foreknowledge of the future cooperation of the choice, even on the hypothesis aforesaid, presupposes in the sign of reason the free decree of the divine will, by which he wills absolutely, or on that hypothesis given, to effect that operation in us, and with us, if it is good; or to permit it, if it is evil. It is proved from sacred Scripture, in which it is asserted that nothing will be future unless God wills it to be. Apoc. 4: You have created all things, and for your will they were, and were created. Sap. 11: But how could anything remain, unless you had willed it? ad Eph. 1: Who works all things according to the counsel of his will: therefore before the aforesaid decree nothing is, or can be understood as future, even on any hypothesis whatever.

Secondly it is proved from St. Aug. in Ench. ad Laur. c. 95, where he says: Nothing, therefore, is done unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it to be done, or by doing it himself, etc. And to whom beyond doubt it is as easy to do what he wills, as it is easy not to permit to be what he does not will: and more expressly lib. de praed. SS. c. 14, explaining that text of Sap. 4, He was taken away, lest malice should change his understanding, he says: This was said according to the perils of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God, who foreknew this, that it was to be, not that it was not to be, that is, that he was to bestow on him an untimely death, that he might be withdrawn from the uncertainty of temptations: not that he was to sin, who was not to remain in temptation. And lib. 1. de anim. et eius orig. c. 12, arguing against those who said that God permitted many infants to depart in original sin because he foreknew that they would be wicked if they lived, he says: Foreknowledge itself is wholly emptied, if what is foreknown shall not be. For how is it said to be foreknown as future, which is not future?

Moreover; for this middle, or conditioned, foreknowledge was impugned by St. Prosper and St. Hilary. For St. Prosper, epist. to Aug., says: But they subject the election of God to any feigned merits whatever to such an extent that, because they fashion past things which do not exist, and future things which are not to be future, and by a new kind of absurdity among them both things not to be done are foreknown, and things foreknown are not done. And St. Hilary, in his epistle to Aug., recalls the same thing, saying: But when it is said to them, why is it preached to others, or somewhere, or not preached, or now preached, which at some time was preached to almost all, as now it is not preached to some nations, they say that this belongs to the divine foreknowledge: that at that time, and there, and to those, the truth should be announced, or is announced, when, and where, it was foretold that it must be believed. And this they testify that they prove not only by the testimonies of other Catholics, but also by the older disputation of your holiness. For the Massilians attributed the aforesaid knowledge of conditioned things, preceding every free decree of the divine will, to Augustine. Answering them, St. Aug. in the book de praed. SS. teaches that the foreknowledge of the future cooperation of the choice follows upon the decree by which God predestined that men should consent to God calling. For c. 10 he says: By predestination indeed God foreknew the things which he himself was to do. Whence it is said: He made the things that are to be. And explaining that text of ad Rom. 4, Because whatever he has promised, he is able to do, he says: He did not say to foretell, he did not say to foreknow: for he can foretell and foreknow even the deeds of others, but he said: He is able to do, and by this they are his own deeds, not another's. And c. 19 he adds: When therefore he predestined us, he foreknew his own work, who makes us holy and immaculate. The same he says lib. de dono persev. c. 14, at the verse Or will anyone dare to say, and c. 18, at the verse: Of no one, therefore.

This is also the express opinion of St. Th., who establishes in God only a twofold knowledge, namely that of simple understanding, by which he knows all possible things, and the knowledge of vision, by which he knows the things that exist in some difference of time; as 1. p. quaest. 14. artic. 9. in corp., 3. p. q. 10. art. 2. ad 2, and in several other places adduced in disp. 6. num. 5. To this is added that the holy Doctor, 1. part. quaest. 14. artic. 13. in corp., teaches that concerning a future contingent, as it is in its contingent cause, no knowledge can be had except a conjectural one. And the same he teaches q. 57. a. 3, and q. 86. a. 3. in corp. and ar. 4. also in corp., and q. 16. de malo artic. 7. He holds, therefore, that before the decree of the divine will determining the future contingent to one of the two sides, it is not knowable with certainty, even by God.

XI. No cause of predestination is given on our part.— Eleventh proposition. No cause, reason, or condition is given on our part on account of which the divine providence, supernatural in comparison with this man or that, obtains the formal reason of predestination, or retains the common reason of providence: but predestination itself must be reduced to the sole gratuitous will of God. It is proved from sacred Scripture, ad Rom. 9: For when they were not yet born, or had done anything good or evil, (that the purpose of God according to election might remain) it was said to her, not by works, but by him who calls: the elder shall serve the younger, as it is written, Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. And again: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. And ad Roman. 11: The remnant, according to the election of grace, has been saved. And Ephes. 1: Who has predestined us unto the adoption of children, according to the purpose of his will, unto the praise of the glory of his grace. And a little after: In whom we also are called by lot, predestined according to the purpose, which must be understood of the gratuitous purpose of God's will, not of the purpose of man foreknown by God, as is most plainly established by the common consent of the ancient Fathers, especially Aug. lib. 2. contr. duas epist. Pelag. c. 9, and lib. de correp. et grat. c. 7. And Mat. 11: Yes, Father, for so it was pleasing before you. The same is the opinion of St. Aug. q. 2. ad Simplic. and lib. de praedestin. Sanct. c. 15. 16. and 17, at the verse He foreknew, therefore, says the Pelagian, and epist. 106, where in support of this doctrine he presses the passage adduced by the Apostle ad Rom. 9. The same he confirms in almost all his books written against the Pelagians. The same opinion is taught by St. Thomas, 1. par. quaest. 23. art. 5, and 3. contra Gentes cap. 163, and quaest. 6. de veritate artic. 2, and on cap. 15 of John, Lect. 5, and on Roman. 9, Lect. 2, and on Eph. 1, Lect. 1, in which places he affirms that the foreknowledge of merits is not the cause of predestination as regards its whole effect. And St. Thomas intends to exclude also the condition without which it does not happen, and merits proceeding not only from the powers of nature but also from the help of grace, as was seen in disp. 110. n. 12. and 13. And reasoning convinces this: for since all the merits by which the predestined attain to eternal life are effects of the divine predestination, they cannot be its cause as regards its whole effect.

XII. God has predetermined all things by an absolute decree.— Twelfth proposition. God, by the absolute and efficacious decree of his will, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future good use of free choice, has predetermined all the good acts which are done in time, and especially those through which the predestined attain to eternal life. It is proved from sacred Scripture, in the passages adduced in proposition 10. Moreover it is proved by other authorities of Scripture and of the holy Fathers, especially St. Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Anselm, St. Damasc., St. August., St. Thom., and other Doctors, whose testimonies I have adduced in disp. 22. n. 28. and following. Let St. Th. be consulted, quodlib. 12. q. 3. ar. 4, where he says that all things have been predetermined and ordered by the providence of God. And the same he says on cap. 5 of Dionys. de divin. nomin. Lect. 3, and 1. p. q. 19. ar. 3. ad 5, and q. 116. ar. 1. 3. and 4.

XIII. The cooperation of free choice with grace is an effect of predestination.— Thirteenth proposition. The cooperation of free choice with the gifts of grace is in the predestined an effect of predestination, and proceeds efficiently from God, who by the help of grace brings it about that we cooperate freely; and consequently it does not depend on the sole and innate freedom of the choice. It is proved from Caelest. Pap. epis. ad Episc. Gall. c. 7, where he teaches that no one, except through Christ, uses free choice well.

Secondly it is proved from St. Aug. lib. de dono persev. c. 14, saying: For if we are to glory in nothing, since nothing is ours; surely neither are we to glory in the most persevering obedience; nor is it so to be called ours as if it were not given to us from above. And lib. 1. retract. c. 9 he says: And because all good things, as has been said, both great and middling and least, are from God; it follows that from God also is the good use of free will, which is a virtue and is numbered among great goods. And in book 2. de peccat. merit. et remiss. cap. 18: But men labour to find in our will what good is ours, which is not ours from God; and how it can be found I do not know. And a little after, from those words of the Apostle, What have you that you have not received?, he proves that the good use of choice is not from us but from God. And St. Prosper, contra collatorem, definit. 11, says: Impious is the sense which thinks that man happier, to whom God has given nothing, than him to whom he has conferred all things.

Thirdly it is proved from St. Thomas, 1. par. q. 23. a. 5. in corp., where he shows that the good use of grace is from grace, because whatever is in a man ordering him to salvation is wholly comprehended under the effect of predestination. And in the solution to 1 he says that the foreknown use of grace is not the reason for the conferring of grace, but its end. And 1. 2. quaest. 111. ar. 2. ad 2 he says that God does not justify us without us, because by the movement of free choice, while we are justified, we consent to the justice of God; yet that movement is not the cause of grace but its effect; whence the whole operation belongs to grace.

Fourthly it is proved by the reasoning of St. Augustine, lib. 2. de pecc. merit. et remiss. cap. 18, cited above: for if to be able to will the good is from God, and the good use is from us, it follows that what is from us is better than what is from God: for actually to do good is better than to be able to do good: but the consequent is said most absurdly: therefore.

On the twofold help of grace: namely, sufficient and efficacious.

XIV. The help of grace is twofold, one sufficient, the other efficacious.— Fourteenth proposition. A twofold help of God, or help of grace, must necessarily be distinguished: one sufficient, by which man can be converted to God, or work piously; the other efficacious, which God effects, that he be actually converted and work piously.

It is proved from sacred Scripture: for of the sufficient help it is said, Apoc. 3: I stand at the door and knock, etc. Prov. 1: Because I called, and you refused. Matth. 20: Many are called, but few are chosen. Act. 7: You always resist the Holy Spirit; by which help they were called. Luc. 14: who would not come to the marriage. Of the efficacious help the Apostle speaks, 1. ad Cor. 1, when he said that he preached Christ Jews and Greeks themselves who are called. And ad Rom. 8: Whom he predestined, them he also called. And again: to those who according to the purpose are called saints. And again: Not by works, but by him who calls, it was said to her, the elder shall serve the younger. By him who calls, not by any calling whatever, but by that calling by which one is made a believer, as Aug. says q. 2. ad Simpl. Of the same help the Lord speaks through Ezech., saying: I will make you walk in my commandments. And Ioan. 6: Everyone who hears from the Father, and has learned, comes to me. For he did not say, as Augustine observes, Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned can come to me; but he said: comes to me; because everyone who has learned from the Father not only can come, but comes. For so he teaches: God, granting at once to those who are called according to the purpose both to know what they should do and to do what they know. This is the more powerful, high, and secret grace, by which God works in us, though not without us freely cooperating, the consent of the good will: by which grace he converts to himself the wills not only turned away but even opposed, making the unwilling willing; out of those not believing or not loving, making them believing and loving; out of the resisting, consenting; since the grace which is conferred on us through Jesus Christ (to use the words of Aug.) is the effector of the good will.

It is proved by the authority of St. Aug. lib. de corrept. et grat. c. 12, saying: The helps of grace are to be distinguished: one is a help without which something is not done, and another is a help by which something is done. And lib. de praed. SS. c. 16 he establishes the same distinction, and proves it by many testimonies of Scripture.

Likewise St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 109. art. 10. ad 2, and on that text of 1. Timothy 2, He gave himself a redemption for all, says: for all sufficiently, for some efficaciously. The same he says on Hebraeos 9, at the end, on those words: to exhaust the sins of many. And in 4. sentent. distinction. 8. quaestione 2. articulo 2. quaestiuncula 3. ad septimum he says: That the blood of Christ was shed for all as regards sufficiency, but for the elect only as regards efficacy. But the efficacious help is distinguished from the sufficient help not only in the extrinsic respect of a gratuitous gift or benefit, namely because it is given in those circumstances in which God foreknows that the man will consent if he is premoved by it: but because, as it comes from God and from his absolute decree of converting the man, it has in an intentional mode a certain real power for moving the free choice, which the help that is only sufficient does not have, as is established from what was said in disput. 72. num. 2.

XV. Efficacious help moves free choice to good action not only morally, but also efficiently.— Fifteenth proposition. The efficacious help of prevenient, or preoperating, grace moves man's free choice to good action, not only by persuading, alluring, inviting, or otherwise attracting even interiorly in a moral way; but also efficaciously, and by truly effecting, that the choice itself, moved and aroused by God, determine itself to good action, and act. It is proved from the Council of Orange, 2. can. 9, where it is said: As often as we do good, God works in us, and with us, that we may work. But to work only morally by persuading is to work metaphorically, and not properly, as St. Thomas teaches q. 3. de malo art. 3. in corp. And can. 6 it is defined that by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit it is brought about in us divinely that we believe, will, etc. And in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustif. can. 4, it is defined that man's free choice, moved and aroused by God, cooperates freely by assenting to God arousing and calling. It is proved moreover from St. Augustine, lib. de grat. et libero arb. c. 16, where he says: It is certain that we do, when we do; but he makes us do, by supplying most efficacious powers to the will, who said: I will make you walk in my justifications. And libr. 1. cont. duas Epist. Pelag. cap. 19: He is drawn, he says, in wondrous ways to will, by him who knows how to work within the very hearts of men, not that men, which cannot be, should believe unwilling, but that willing men should be made out of unwilling. Nor can St. Augustine be expounded as speaking of a merely moral efficacy, which is by persuasion and internal excitation; for this Pelagius admitted, though he denied that it is simply necessary for salvation, whom nevertheless St. Augustine in the book de gratia Christi cap. 7. and 10 vehemently impugns, because he posited only a prevenient grace that persuades morally, and not one that truly effects that man will, as is clear from the words of Pelagius related by Augustine in the same c. 10. For he said: Not by the help of God, but from ourselves the good will is effected in us. Where the word effected signifies true efficiency. The same conclusion St. Prosper teaches openly in the epistle on free choice to Rufinus, where he says: Who doubts that free choice then obeys the exhortation of the one calling, when the grace of God has generated in it the affection of believing and obeying? Otherwise it would suffice for a man to be admonished, and a new will would not also be made in him; as it is written: The will is prepared by the Lord: And as the Apostle says: For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish, for the good will. For which good will, unless that which God has worked in them? That what he had given them to will, he might give them also to do. Let those words be weighed, Otherwise it would suffice for a man to be admonished: by which he shows evidently that the efficacy of preoperating grace is not merely moral, or after the manner of one persuading, but also after the manner of a physical cause, or of one truly effecting, that free choice may cooperate. The same St. Th. teaches on c. 6 of John, Lect. 5, on those words: No one can come to me, unless the Father draws him: where he says: The Father draws many to the Son by the instinct of the divine operation moving the heart of man interiorly to believe. Philip. 2. It is God who works in you to will and to accomplish. And there he distinguishes this drawing from that which is done by persuasion, or internal revelation. And below, explaining that text, Everyone who hears from the Father, etc., he says: The drawing of the Father is most efficacious: which he proves because everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to Christ. And 2. 2. quaest. 6. artic. 1. in corp. he says that faith, as regards assent, is from God moving interiorly through grace. And 1. 2. q. 109. ar. 1. in corp. he says that as all bodily movements are reduced to the movement of the heavenly body as to the first bodily mover, so all movements, both bodily and spiritual, are reduced to the first mover, simply: which is God. And therefore however perfect any bodily or spiritual nature be posited, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God. And the same he says art. 9. in corp., and in almost all the articles of quaest. 111, and 1. p. q. 105. ar. 4. in corp., and q. 106. art. 2. in corp., and q. 111. art. 2. in corp.; in which places, and very many others, he teaches that God moves the will not only on the part of the object, and after the manner of one persuading, as an angel or a man can move another's will, but on the part of the power, and after the manner of one truly and properly acting and perfecting.

The same proposition is confirmed by all the passages adduced for assertion 13. For if the very cooperation and consent of free choice is from God as from a cause efficient of itself, it remains that God, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, works not only morally, but truly efficiently, that the choice itself freely consent.

XVI. The efficacy of the divine help is founded on the omnipotence of the divine will.— Sixteenth proposition. The efficacy of the help of prevenient grace, and its infallible connection with the free cooperation of the choice, is wholly founded upon and derived, as from its first root, from the omnipotence of God, and from the absolute and efficacious decree of his will, willing that the man whom he moves be converted and work piously: nor does efficacy of this kind depend in any way, even as on a condition without which it does not happen, on the future cooperation of the created choice: although the free act by which a man perseveres depends effectively on his choice as moved by God.

It is proved from the passages of Scripture, of St. Augustine, and of St. Thomas adduced in proposition 14. For St. Augustine calls efficacious grace a calling according to the purpose for this reason, because it depends on the purpose and will, not indeed of man, but of God who calls, as the same Augustine explains against the Pelagians, lib. de correptione et gratia, cap. 7, at the words: they are elect.

Moreover also St. Thom. 1. 2. quaest. 112. artic. 3. in corpore refers the infallibility of the cooperation of the choice to the intention of God moving, because from the decree of the Divine will, whose power is in an intentional mode in the efficacious help, that help itself has this, that it infallibly brings it about that the free choice work piously.

Evident reasoning persuades the same: for efficacious grace, insofar as it is efficacious, precedes the cooperation of the choice, as was shown in disput. 90. and 91: therefore it precedes it in the order of reason and of causality: therefore it does not depend on it: for the prior does not depend on the posterior.

In addition. The cooperation of the choice is an effect of efficacious help in the genus of a cause truly efficient: therefore the efficacy of the same help does not depend on the cooperation of the choice: for the efficacy of a cause does not depend on its effect, but on the contrary the effect itself depends on the efficacy of the cause.

XVII. Efficacious grace being placed in free choice, it will be converted infallibly and freely.— Seventeenth proposition. Efficacious grace being placed in free choice, it follows infallibly that the free choice itself consents and works piously: so that these two are at once incompatible, namely that efficacious grace be placed in a man, and that the man actually dissent. It is proved from that text of Ioan. 6: Everyone who hears from the Father, and has learned, comes to me; for he did not say, he can come to me, but he comes, as Augustine noted lib. de gratia Christi contra Pelagium, et Caelest. cap. 14. For grace is the effector of the good will, as the same St. Augustine teaches quaestione 2. ad Simplicianum. Likewise ad Rom. 8: And whom he called (namely with the calling according to the purpose, or efficacious) them he also justified. Threnorum 5: Convert us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be converted? Isai. 46: My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done. And Esther 13: Lord, Lord, almighty King, for in your dominion all things are placed, and there is no one who can resist your will, if you have decreed to save Israel. And Genes. 50: Can we resist the will of God? Psalm. 134: Whatever the Lord willed, he has done. Since therefore efficacious help is a calling according to the purpose of God willing to convert man to himself, and is founded in that same purpose; it follows that, as the efficacious will of God works infallibly whatever it wills, so also efficacious help infallibly works the same.

Secondly it is proved from St. Augustine, lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 14, where he says: To him who wills to save, no man's choice resists; for so to will or not to will is in the power of the one willing or not willing, that it neither impede the divine will nor overcome his power. And in Enchir. ad Laurent. cap. 95 he says: But our God is in heaven above; in heaven and in earth he has done all things, whatever he willed. Which assuredly is not true if he willed something and did not do it; and, what is more unworthy, therefore did not do it because the will of man prevented, lest what the Almighty willed should be done. Unless we believe this, the very beginning of our confession of faith is endangered, by which we confess that we believe in God the Father Almighty: for it is not for any other reason that he is truly called Almighty, but because whatever he wills, he can; nor is the effect of the Almighty's will impeded by the will of any creature. And cap. 103 he adds: No one is saved, unless he whom God has willed to be saved; and therefore he must be asked that he will it; because it is necessary that it be done, if he wills it. And lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 8, explaining that text of Lucae 22, I have prayed for you, Peter, he says: When he prayed that his faith should not fail, what else did he pray for, but that he should have in faith a most free, most strong, most invincible, and most persevering will? and cap. 12: Relief was given, he says, to the infirmity of the human will, that it might be acted upon by divine grace indeclinably and insuperably; and therefore, though infirm, it should not fail, nor be conquered by any adversity. And in the book de dono perseverant. cap. 14 he says that through the benefits of God they are most certainly freed, whoever are freed: therefore, etc.

Thirdly it is proved from St. Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. art. 3. in corpore, where he says that if the preparation for grace be considered as it is from God moving, then it has necessity to that to which it is ordained by God, not indeed of compulsion, but of infallibility. Whence if it is from the intention of God moving that the man, whose heart he moves, should obtain grace; he infallibly obtains it; according to that of Ioan. 6: Everyone who hears from the Father, and has learned, comes to me. And 2. 2. quaest. 24. art. 11. in corpore he says: The power of the Holy Spirit moving the soul infallibly works whatever it wills; whence it is impossible that these two be true at once, that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he lose charity by sinning. And quaest. 23. de veritate, art. 5. ad 3 he says the same. And quaest. 6. de malo, artic. unico ad 3 he says: God moves the will immutably on account of the efficacy of the moving power, which cannot fail.

XVIII. The gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, does not depend on the cooperation of free choice.— Eighteenth proposition. The gift of perseverance, in the character of the gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, does not depend, even as on a condition without which it does not happen, on the cooperation of our choice, but on the purpose and absolute decree of God effecting that man persevere in good even to the end.

It is St. Augustine's, lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 12, where he says: And by this, not even concerning perseverance in good did God will his saints to glory in their own powers, but in him who gives them not only such help as he gave to the first man, without which they cannot persevere if they will; but also works in them even to will; that, since they will not persevere unless they both can and will, the possibility and the will of persevering be given them by the largesse of divine grace. And lib. de dono perseverantiae, cap. 7 he says: Altogether in this matter let the Church not expect laborious disputations, but attend to her daily prayers. She prays that unbelievers may believe: God therefore converts them to the faith. She prays that believers may persevere: God therefore gives perseverance, even to the end. And lib. de dono persever. cap. 2, and lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 12 he says: Why is perseverance asked of God, if it is not given by God? Or is that also a mock petition, when that is asked of him which is known that he does not give, but that, while he does not give it, it is in man's power?

It is St. Thom. 1. 2. quaest. 109. art. 10. in corp., where he says: For the continuation of good even to the end of life, a man established in grace needs the divine help directing and protecting him. and quaest. 114. art. 9. in corpore he says: But the perseverance of the way does not fall under merit, because it depends solely on the divine motion, which is the principle of all merit: but God gratuitously bestows the gift of perseverance on whomsoever he bestows it. The same is proved by the passages adduced for the three preceding propositions. Finally the holy Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustificat. cap. 13, says that the gift of perseverance cannot be had from elsewhere, except from him who is able to establish him who stands, that he may stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls: If therefore the gift of perseverance cannot be had from elsewhere, except from God: therefore its efficacy does not depend on the cooperation of the choice, but on God alone.

XIX. Efficacious help and the power of dissenting are compatible together in free choice.— Nineteenth proposition. Efficacious help and the power of dissenting are compatible together, and are composed in the same choice. It is proved from the Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustific. can. 4, where it is defined that free choice, aroused and moved by God, can dissent if it wills: it holds therefore that the efficacious motion of God, and the faculty of dissenting if it wills, are together in the same choice.

Moreover it is proved from St. Prosper, lib. 2. de vocat. gent. cap. 27. and 28, where he says: What God willed them to will, they willed: who so bestows the very willing to obey him, that he does not take away even from those who will persevere that mutability which can will not to. And St. Thomas, quaest. 23. de veritate, art. 5. ad tertium, says that although the non-being of the effect of the divine will cannot stand together with the divine will; yet the power of failing the effect stands together with the divine will; for these are not incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man can be damned; but these are incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man is damned. The same he says quaest. 6. de veritate, art. 3. ad 7, whose words we have adduced in disput. 18. num. 23.

XX. Efficacious grace does not destroy, but perfects, the freedom of choice.— Twentieth proposition. By prevenient grace efficacious in the manner aforesaid, the freedom of choice is not destroyed, nor is its actual use impeded, but in a wondrous manner it is perfected and strengthened. It is proved from the Council of Trent, sessione 6. de iustificatione, cap. 5. and can. 4, where it is defined that free choice, aroused and moved by God, can dissent if it wills. Likewise also Caelestinus Pope, epist. ad Episcopos Galliae, cap. 12, says: By which help and gift of God free choice is not taken away, but is freed; so that from dark it becomes bright, from crooked straight, from sick sound, from foolish it becomes prudent.

Secondly it is proved from St. Augustine, lib. de spiritu et littera, cap. 29, saying: Do we empty free choice through grace? God forbid. But rather we establish free choice. For as the law is not emptied through faith, so free choice is not emptied through grace, but rather is established. And lib. 1. cont. duas epist. Pelagianorum, cap. 20 he says: Did the men of God who wrote this, or rather the very Spirit of God, under whose authorship they were written through them, fight against man's free choice? God forbid. But it commended the Almighty in all things, both his most just judgment and his most merciful help.

Thirdly it is proved from St. Thomas in the second of the Sentences, distinct. 25. quaestione prima, articulo secundo, ad primum, where he says that even if God changes the will of man to something else, nevertheless he does this by his omnipotence, that he willingly wills that into which he is changed. And prima secundae, quaestione 10. articulo 4. ad primum he says: That it would be more repugnant to the divine motion if the will were moved by necessity, which does not befit its nature; than if it were moved freely, as befits its nature. Likewise prima parte, quaest. 19. articulo octavo, and quaestione 83. articulo primo, ad tertium, he says: God therefore is the first cause moving both natural causes and voluntary causes. And as by moving natural causes he does not take away that their acts be natural; so by moving voluntary causes he does not take away that their actions be voluntary; but rather he does this in them. For he works in each one according to its property. And tertio contra Gentes, cap. 148, he shows by many arguments that by the help of divine grace no prejudice is done to the liberty of our choice. And it can be proved from what was said in proposition 19: for efficacious grace, by which God moves free choice to consent to the divine calling, in truth does not take away from that same choice the faculty by which it can dissent if it wills, as is established from the Council of Trent, and from what was said in disputation 18. num. 23: but it effects that, although it can dissent from its innate freedom, it nevertheless does not dissent, but infallibly consents: therefore it does not injure it in anything, but rather perfects and strengthens its freedom. For, as was said in disputation 115 and 116, freedom consists in the faculty of the will and of reason toward either side, namely toward acting and not acting, toward consenting and dissenting. Since therefore the will, even in that instant in which it is efficaciously moved to consent to the divine calling, retains the true and unimpeded faculty by which it can dissent if it wills; it remains that by efficacious grace of this kind the freedom of choice is not injured, nor impeded as regards its actual use, but rather perfected and healed. Which St. Prosper also confirms in his epistle to Rufinus on free choice, in these words: But too ineptly, and too inconsiderately, is it said by the adversaries, that by this grace of God nothing is left to free choice. And impugning the Collator, because he asserted that by efficacious grace, by which God makes willing men out of unwilling, the freedom of choice is destroyed, he says thus: Why do you strive to gather broken weapons from the petty reasonings of shattered argumentations? Why, by reviving the ashes of an extinct dogma, do you try to kindle the reek of failing smoke into a revived flame? There is no danger to free choice from the grace of God, nor is the will taken away, when good willing is generated in it. For if it is therefore not to be thought ours, because it is formed, ruled, ordered, imbued; the sons of God are stripped of liberty, who are led by the Spirit of God, they lose the vigour of the rational mind, and are deprived of every praise of voluntary devotion, to whom is given the spirit of wisdom and understanding, of counsel and fortitude, of knowledge and piety, and of the fear of the Lord. And cap. 38 of the same book he adds: The inept complaint of the proud does not disturb us, by which they allege that free choice is taken away, if both the beginnings, and the progress, and the perseverance in good even to the end, are said to be gifts of God: For the assistances of divine grace are the supports of the human will. Willing, we pray, and yet God has sent the Spirit into our hearts, crying Abba, Father. Willing, we speak, and yet, if what we speak is pious, it is not we who speak, but the Spirit of our Father, who speaks in us. Willing, we work out our salvation, and yet it is God who works in us both to will and to work. To whom be power, dominion, brightness, wisdom, thanksgiving, honour, and glory for everlasting ages. Amen.

The end of the twelfth and last book.

All things I humbly submit to the correction of the Holy Roman Church, which is the pillar and firmament of the truth.

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