De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Book Eleven
Book Twelve
Introduction
Disputatio CXV: What the legitimate definition and proper nature of free choice are.
Disputatio CXVI: Whether indifference belongs to the essence of a free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.
Disputatio CXVII: Whether created free choice truly and properly has mastery over its act, and what such mastery is.
Disputatio CXVIII: Whether the harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.
Disputatio CXIX: Whether at least by God’s absolute power a creature, without the beatific vision, can have evident knowledge of the mysteries that belong in themselves to faith.
Disputatio CXX: In which various ways of reconciling free choice with grace proposed by different doctors are presented and refuted.
Disputatio CXXI: In which the legitimate harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine predestination and the efficacy of the helps of grace is established and defended.
In which the legitimate concord of free choice with the infallibility of divine predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace, is established and defended.
I. Once the concord which various doctors assign has been excluded, it remains for us to set out the legitimate concord of free choice with divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and with the efficacy of the help of divine grace, which St Augustine, St Prosper and St Hilary, St Anselm and the other Fathers, and among the Scholastic Doctors St Thomas and the Thomists, handed down; and since it is contrary to the concord founded in middle knowledge, it must of necessity rest upon contrary foundations as well.
Let the first foundation, then, be this: that it is not knowable, even by God, before the actual decree of his will — absolute on the part of the act of willing, and at least conditioned on the part of the object willed — what in particular a created will,1 out of its own innate freedom, would do, on the hypothesis that it were constituted in such an order of things and with such helps — not efficaciously predetermining it to either side — and were aroused, allured and invited. Whence it comes about that much less is it knowable, before that same efficacious decree — absolute even on the part of the object willed — what in particular is absolutely future from the freedom of choice and from the other contingent secondary causes. This foundation was established and proved, by the testimonies of St Augustine and St Thomas and by the common consent of the ancient Doctors and of the Thomists, in disputation 7. Wherefore the infallibility of predestination, and of the future cooperation of the created will, cannot be traced back to the foreknowledge of God as to its first root,2 but to his absolute and efficacious decree, by which he mercifully determined to work our works in us and with us, if they are good, or to permit them, if they are evil. And the same must be said proportionably of future conditioned contingents: for their truth depends also upon the free decree of the divine will, absolute on the part of the act of willing, although on the part of the object willed it is conditioned, by which God determined, a condition being posited, that certain future contingents should come about, which are expressly set forth in the sacred Scriptures: as is clear in the decree by which God determined to convert the Tyrians and Sidonians, if Christ had worked among them those signs which he worked in Chorazin and Bethsaida.
II. The second foundation is that there is no law established by God of infallibly giving the helps of prevenient grace to those who do all that lies in them from the powers of nature alone,3 but that they are bestowed, upon whomsoever they are bestowed, out of the mere and gratuitous mercy and liberality of God, so that on our part no good operation or disposition is presupposed, not only as that on account of which they are conferred, but even as that without which they would not regularly be given by God, and according to the common manner of calling men: for otherwise it seems to follow that grace comes after the human will, and does not go before it; and consequently it would also follow that grace is given according to our merits, as has been shown expressly in disputation 56. Whence it comes about that the infallibility of predestination cannot be founded upon any one or several good works morally foreknown by God, nor depend upon them, nor presuppose them on our part even as a condition without which men would not be predestined by God; but of necessity such infallibility, as we said in disputations 30 and 41, must be traced back to the mere and gratuitous will and good pleasure of God, according to that word of Matth. 11: Yes, Father, for so it has seemed good in your sight.
III. The third foundation is: the general concurrence of God is an immediate influx of God into secondary causes, by which they are premoved, applied and determined to act, each one according to the condition of its nature — the natural cause, indeed, naturally, but the free cause freely; which has been shown expressly in disputations 18 and 23; and this holds most of all true when the secondary causes are free and contingent. Whence it comes about that the first and the second cause concur to the same effect not as partial causes, of which one does not determine the other nor make it concur partially with itself — as when two men drag a boat — but each is a total cause in its own order, of which one, namely free choice, is subordinated to the other, namely God, not only in being but also in acting. Hence God by his divine motion brings it about that free choice cooperates with him freely, which we left proved also in disputation 85.
IIII. The fourth foundation is: God, by his eternal, absolute and efficacious decree, antecedently to all foreknowledge of the future cooperation of our choice, predetermined all good acts in particular, according to all their circumstances, and those especially by which the predestined attain to eternal life, with the freedom of our choice preserved; and in time he moves that same choice by an efficacious motion, so that it elicits those acts which God determined in his eternal counsel should come about; which has been shown most copiously through three whole disputations above.4 And from a decree of this kind of the will of God, as from its first root and cause, and from the efficacy of his motion, as from the instrument of God, it has its origin that free choice, moved and aroused by God, freely and infallibly works in time those acts which God predefined as future, through the free cooperation of that same choice. Hence St Augustine traces back the certainty of predestination, as regards the attainment of the effect, to the efficacy of the means or of the effects of predestination, by which they are most certainly delivered, whoever are delivered,5 and he traces back the foreknowledge of this infallibility, as to its first root, to the efficacious decree by which he determined mercifully to deliver his own, as has been shown in disputation 7 by many testimonies of the same Augustine. For he teaches that God foreknew these things for the reason that he decreed to do them.
V. Created freedom must be traced back to the efficacy of the divine will as to its first cause.— The fifth foundation, and one especially to be observed in this matter and kept before the eyes, is that all actual freedom and contingency which is found in human acts and in any other actions whatever must be traced back, as to its first root, to the efficacy of the divine will and to the infinite power of his omnipotence. For since, as St Thomas says,6 when some cause has been efficacious to act, the effect follows the cause, not only according to that which is done, but also according to the manner of being done or of being. For it is from the weakness of the active power in the seed that the son is born unlike his father in the accidents which pertain to the manner of being. Since therefore the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that those things come about which God wills to come about, but that they come about in the manner in which God wills them to come about. But God wills some things to come about necessarily and some contingently, so that there may be order in things for the completion of the universe. And therefore to some effects he adapted necessary causes, which cannot fail, from which effects proceed of necessity; but to others he adapted contingent and defectible causes, from which effects come about contingently. The effects willed by God do not therefore come about contingently because the proximate causes are contingent, but because God willed them to come about contingently, and prepared contingent causes for them: and he teaches the same in the same 1 p. q. 22, art. 4. Hence from the fact that God predetermined and willed that Peter be converted at such a time and with such intensity, it follows necessarily, with the necessity of the consequence and of infallibility, that Peter be converted with that same intensity and be converted freely; because God predefined and willed both. Nor does that necessity of the consequence, or from the supposition of the decree of the divine will, conflict with freedom, as was explained in disputation 25. And the same must be said of all other good acts; for as St Thomas says, 1. 2. q. 10, ar. 4, ad 1: The divine will extends not only to this, that something be done through the thing which it moves, but also that it be done in the manner which is fitting to its nature; and therefore it would conflict more with the divine motion if the will were moved by necessity, which does not suit its nature, than if it were moved freely, as suits its nature. Hence that word of St Anselm:7 Since what God wills cannot not be, when he wills that the human will be forced or prevented by no necessity in willing or not willing, and wills that the effect follow the will, then the will must needs be free, and that which it wills must come to be. From which words it is evidently clear that by the decree of the divine will the freedom of our will, or its actual use, is not taken away or impeded, but rather is perfected and caused. Whence we must not infer: God wills Peter to speak, therefore he will speak of necessity; but we must infer: therefore he will speak freely, because God willed that Peter himself speak freely.
VI. Predestination is certain with the certainty of order.— From these foundations it is inferred first that predestination is certain and infallible as regards the attainment of the effect, with the certainty of order and of the causality of the means, by which, as Augustine says, they are most certainly delivered, whoever are delivered,8 and as the Apostle says: that the promise may be firm according to grace.9 For since such certainty and infallibility cannot be drawn from middle knowledge, as has been shown above, it must needs be drawn from the absolute decree of the divine will and from the efficacy of the helps by which God willed to send his elect to eternal life, as has been shown in disputations 30 and 41.
It is inferred secondly that the infallibility of the future consent or effect of predestination, drawn from the absolute decree of the divine will and from the very efficacy of the helps of prevenient grace, in no way prejudices the freedom of that same choice, whether as regards the free power itself or as regards its actual use; but in a wondrous manner perfects and strengthens it: because, as has been said, God not only decreed that man should act, but also willed that he should act freely, and by his efficacious help predetermines the will of that same man to act freely. And the reason is that which St Thomas assigns, q. 24 de veritate, art. 1, in the body, and in several other places: namely, that man, through the free judgment of reason, which is indifferent to either side, is moved by God and moves himself. For he, judging of things to be done through the power of reason, can judge by his own free decision, insofar as he knows the reason of the end, and of that which is for the end, and the relation and order of the one to the other; and therefore he is a cause of himself not only in moving but also in judging; and therefore he is of free choice, as if one said of free judgment concerning acting or not acting; whence he is moved by God not only to act but also to act freely.
VII. The concord of choice with grace which St Augustine and St Thomas handed down.— It is inferred thirdly that just as the authors of the opposite opinion have recourse to middle knowledge in order to reconcile the freedom of choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace, so too we have recourse to the omnipotence and supreme efficacy of the divine will, and to the dominion which his divine majesty has over the wills of men, so as to make them incline whither and when he wills. And in this way we judge that the ancient10 concord of the freedom of created choice with the infallibility of predestination and the efficacy of the helps of grace is to be defended and explained according to the mind of St Augustine and St Thomas: as is sufficiently clear from what has been said in the course of this work, and from the passages of Scripture which refer to the divine will and omnipotence all the good things that are done in time. Whence St Augustine says:11 Divine Scripture, if it be diligently inspected, shows that not only the good wills of men, which he himself makes out of evil ones, and having made them good directs to good acts and to eternal life, are so in the power of God that he makes them incline whither and when he wills, either to bestowing benefits on some or to inflicting punishments on others, as he himself judges, with a most hidden judgment indeed, but without any doubt most just. He teaches the same in other passages adduced above, in which he proves that human wills cannot resist the will of God: and that God has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own; not obscurely indicating that recourse must be had to the omnipotence of the will of God, who makes concord in the high places,12 in order to reconcile the freedom of created choice with the infallibility of predestination. To this St Thomas has recourse both in the passages alleged above and also in 2 Sent. dist. 25, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1, where he says that God works in the will, and in free choice, according to its exigency: whence even if he changes the will of man to something else, he nevertheless by his omnipotence brings it about that that to which it is changed it wills voluntarily, and so the character of compulsion13 is removed. Where St Thomas has recourse not to foreknowledge but to the omnipotence and supreme efficacy of the divine will, in order to reconcile the freedom of choice with divine providence and causality. The same is clear from what he says in 1 p. and 1. 2. in the passages alleged above.
Against this doctrine and account of the concord of free choice with divine predestination many arguments are brought forward, which have in part been touched upon and resolved in the preceding disputations; nevertheless in the present, for the greater clarity and explanation of the doctrine of St Augustine and St Thomas, a few must be set out and resolved.
VIII. The first argument is: for the concord which establishes the aforesaid predetermination in the created will, or the efficacious decree of the divine will antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future cooperation of our choice, does not seem able to be distinguished from the opinion of the heretics who deny free choice, except as to words. For the heretics do not deny that God acts freely when he determines our will, and that men have a full and perfect judgment of reason when they choose something, and choose spontaneously and voluntarily: but they say that all things are done by the decree and predetermination of God, nor can God decreeing and predetermining be resisted: and therefore that the free choice of man is a title without the thing, or a thing of title alone; that is, an empty and superfluous name. Therefore if we too admit that our will is so determined by God that it acts only that to which it is determined by God, and yet contend that, because God determines it freely and it acts voluntarily and with a full judgment of reason, man is of free choice, it follows that the whole controversy between us and the heretics is about a name: namely whether man is to be called of free choice or not. But this is not to be admitted, because the labors of so many most learned men, and of the Ecumenical Council itself, spent in asserting the freedom of choice, persuade us otherwise. For those most wise men were not ignorant of what St Augustine warned in ep. 28 to Jerome, and elsewhere: when the matter is settled, there must be no disputing about the name.
IX. Heretics depart from the Church not in all things, but in some.— So that the resolution of this argument may appear more evident, it must be carefully observed that heretics depart from the Church not in all things but in some, according to that word which the Psalmist speaks: For they were with me in many things:14 for heretics are with Catholics in many things indeed, but not in all; which St Augustine too, speaking against the Donatists, noted in these words:15 We both had baptism, they were with me in it: we both had the Gospel, they were with me in it: we celebrated the feasts of the martyrs, they were there with me: we frequented the solemnity of Easter, they were there with me. In schism not with me, in heresy not with me: in many things with me, in a few things not with me: but in these few things in which they are not with me, the many things in which they are with me do not profit them. Proportionably we say of Calvin that he withdrew not in all things, but in many, from the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Since therefore heretics teach false things mixed with true and true with false, one must cautiously discern, even in the very books of heretics, between leprosy and leprosy and sound skin, and the Catholic doctrine — not confounding both, but separating the true from the false: for it is written: If you separate the precious from the vile, you shall be as my mouth.16 Nor ought Catholics, nor can they, deny those things in which heretics do not depart from the Church, otherwise they could and should rightly condemn the Lord's Prayer; because Calvin asserted that it is to be recited and believed. X. Calvin therefore erred first,17 as one of the Doctors who wrote against him well noted, because he approved this most wicked consequence: The divine will is the first cause of all things; and it has already from eternity decreed what it wills or does not will to be done; therefore there can be no freedom of choice in man: for the first cause is most efficacious, and according to the Scriptures no one can resist the divine will. But we say on the contrary that the antecedent is indeed true, and taken from the sacred Scriptures, but that the consequence is bad and the consequent heretical: for, as St Thomas teaches,18 from the fact that the will of God is most efficacious, and no one can resist it, it rather follows that those things come about freely or contingently which he so willed to come about; because the divine will extends not only to this, that something be done through the thing which it moves, but also that it be done in the manner which is fitting to its nature.
Secondly Calvin erred: for he asserted19 that God so efficaciously moves and affects the will of man that it is afterwards not in our choice either to obey his motion or to resist it, as I said in disputation 3. But we say on the contrary that although God efficaciously moves free choice so that it is converted and acts piously infallibly and indeclinably, as Augustine and Thomas have very often taught, nevertheless our free choice can either obey the motion of God or resist it, and, as the sacred Council of Trent speaks, dissent from it, if it will.20 We add that although it cannot happen that these two things be true at once — namely that free choice be efficaciously moved by God to act piously, and that it not act — nevertheless these two are compossible at once: namely that free choice be efficaciously moved by God to pious acts, and that it be able not to perform those same acts, if it will; as has been said above: and therefore the will remains free in its operations.
Thirdly Calvin erred, because he said21 that God wills so to work in us by grace or efficacious motion, and to convert us to himself, that our choice does not freely obey prevenient grace with a following will. But we say with the sacred Council of Trent, St Thomas and all the holy Doctors that God indeed, by his efficacious prevenient grace, so converts us to himself, and works in us to will and to accomplish, according to his good will, that nevertheless our will, moved by God through efficacious prevenient grace, obeys and cooperates with God moving it, with a following will and with its own freedom. For just as God cooperates with man by going before him and moving him, so too our choice freely cooperates with the God who goes before it, by following after him, as Pope Gelasius taught, ep. 5 to all the bishops throughout Picenum, whose words have been several times adduced by us above.
Fourthly Calvin erred, because he posited grace to be efficacious of itself22 in such a way as to exclude moral motion, which is by counsels and persuasions, and to take away the free cooperation of the human will. But we say that efficacious grace includes, or presupposes, moral motion and persuasion, and that the same efficacious grace does not take away, but rather perfects, the freedom of choice.
Fifthly Calvin erred, and was impious and blasphemous against God, in that he said23 that men sin by the decree and will of God and by his providence, and that God is the cause and author of sin, and works evil works in us even as good works, not permissively only, but truly and properly. But we say on the contrary with the sacred Council of Orange and of Trent24 that God does not work evil works as he does good works, but only permits them; and that men sin by their own evil will alone, and not by any decree or providence of God. We distinguish nevertheless two things, with St Augustine and St Thomas, in evil works:25 one, that they are beings; the other, that they are evil; and the first we attribute to God, as to the first cause that acts per se:26 for every being by participation proceeds from the first being by essence, which is God. But the second we attribute only to the deficient secondary cause, namely the created will, which is defectible because it was produced from nothing.
Sixthly Calvin erred in that he said27 that our will, unless it be bent to good by the grace of God, is naturally inclined to evil. But we say with the holy Doctors Augustine and Thomas that our will is naturally inclined to good, as to its proper object, and has this inclination from the author of nature: but that it is bent to evil proceeds from the evil will itself, or from the suggestion of the devil.
These and other ravings against Catholic doctrine Calvin poured out, for which he was deservedly condemned with the other heretics by the Church in the Council of Trent, as is clear from the chapters and canons issued by that same Council; he did not, however, err in asserting that God, by the eternal decree of his will, which no creature can resist, predetermined all the good acts that are done in time, or efficaciously bends and moves the same will by his grace so that it infallibly performs such acts. For this word is not from Calvin but from Augustine, book on the gift of perseverance, chap. 6, saying: Nothing is done except what he either does himself or permits to be done. He is able therefore to bend wills from evil to good, and to convert those prone to fall, and to direct them into a step pleasing to himself. To whom it is not in vain said: You, God, being turned, will give us life.28
XI. These things being supposed, it is answered to the argument made that this our account of concord through the efficacious decree of the divine will is distinguished from the error of the heretics who deny free choice, not only as to words but also as to the thing itself, as heaven from earth. For although the heretics do not deny that God acts freely when he determines our will, and that men have a full and perfect judgment of reason when they choose something, and choose spontaneously, without compulsion; they nevertheless deny that man freely determines himself in the second act, as a true free cause of his act: they deny that he has a truly free judgment of reason when he chooses something: they deny, finally, that man chooses voluntarily, if voluntarily be taken as signifying the same as freely. And when the heretics themselves infer that therefore the free choice of man is a title without the thing, or a thing of title alone, from the fact that all things that are done in time are done by the decree of God, which cannot be resisted when it predetermines, they are most deceived in the drawing of the consequence and in the consequent itself, when from a Catholic antecedent they infer, by a most wicked consequence, a heretical consequent, as has been shown by us more at length above. I add that Catholics do not concede absolutely that created free choice cannot dissent from efficacious help, as the objector seems to suppose; but only with a diminishing addition, namely in the composite sense, because, as has been explained and proved above, these two cannot be true at once:29 God efficaciously moves free choice to consent; and free choice dissents.
The second argument is: for this account of reconciling the freedom of choice with grace is almost unintelligible, nor does it quiet our intellect; and on account of its difficulty the Pelagians denied the necessity of efficacious grace, while the Lutherans and Calvinists, admitting the efficacy of that same grace, took away freedom of choice from the midst. But the concord which rests upon middle knowledge lucidly and easily reconciles the freedom of choice with the infallibility of divine predestination and the efficacy of the helps of grace, and opens the way by which the Pelagians and Lutherans may return to the unity of the Church. Which concord, had it always been given and explained, perhaps neither would the Pelagian heresy have arisen, nor would the Lutherans have so impudently dared to deny the freedom of our choice, pretending that it cannot cohere with divine grace, foreknowledge and predestination, nor would so many of the faithful have been disturbed by the opinion of Augustine and by the contests with the Pelagians, and have defected to the Pelagians; and those relics of the Pelagians in Gaul, of whom mention is made in the letters of Prosper and Hilary, would easily have been extinguished; as is clear from those points in which those same letters testify that those men agreed with Catholics, and dissented from them; finally, the contests among Catholics would easily have been composed.
It is answered that, as has been said above,30 the account of the concord of free choice with grace cannot be perfectly known by man, for this state, or comprehended. Whence, although the concord assigned by us — indeed even by St Augustine and St Thomas — does not perfectly quiet the intellect, it is not therefore to be rejected, since it is clear from what has been said above that it is conformable to the testimonies of the sacred Scriptures and to the doctrine of the Councils.
But the clarity and facility which the concord founded in middle knowledge seems to display involve in reality many difficulties, which we have touched upon in disputation 7, indeed in almost the whole course of this work. Nor does a concord of this kind seem apt for resisting the Pelagians and Lutherans, as can be gathered from what has been said above. I add that the Pelagians did not deny the necessity of efficacious grace on account of the ancient concord handed down by Augustine, nor did the Lutherans take away freedom of choice from the midst on account of that same concord; but because they wished to be wise beyond what it is fitting to be wise, and to admit only a doctrine that quiets the intellect. Whence it was on account of their own obstinacy, and not on account of the contests of St Augustine with the Pelagians, that they fell away from the Catholic faith, and denied what is certain, because they could not comprehend what is hidden.
The third argument is: for men are led into a certain desperation, and lose heart, if it be said that it has already been established and determined by a divine decree altogether immovable, before every respect to the good or evil use of free choice foreknown by God through middle knowledge, who are to be brought into glory and who are not to be admitted. For by this doctrine an occasion is given to men to say: If it has already been settled concerning my salvation or damnation, whether I act badly or well, it cannot turn out otherwise; whatever I am now, such shall I finally be as God decreed that I should be; and so most men will be turned to torpor and sloth. Therefore the concord of free choice with the infallibility of predestination is not to be traced back to the efficacy of the decree of the divine will, but to middle knowledge: for in this way no occasion will be given to men to lose heart, but all will take care to conduct themselves strenuously in virtue, knowing that God has determined nothing by an immovable decree concerning their predestination or reprobation before he foreknew their good or evil use of free choice.
Predestination before foreseen merits does not lead men into desperation31.— To this argument, which was also formerly objected against St Augustine, answer has already been given several times above; and St Augustine expressly answers it in the book on the gift of perseverance, chap. 15, in these words: But they say, as you write, that no one can be aroused by the stings of correction, if it be said in the assembly of the Church, with many listening: Such is the definite sentence of the will of God concerning predestination, that some of you came to the faith from unbelief by receiving the will to obey, or remain in the faith by receiving perseverance; but the rest of you, who linger in the delight of sins, have not yet risen because the help of merciful grace has not yet raised you. Nevertheless, if there are any of you not yet called, whom his grace has predestined to be chosen, you will receive that same grace by which you may will, and be elect. And if any of you obey, if you are predestined to be cast out, the powers of obeying will be withdrawn, so that you cease to obey. When they say these things, they ought not so to deter us from confessing the grace of God, that is, the grace which is not given according to our merits, and from confessing the predestination of the Saints according to it: as we are not deterred from confessing the foreknowledge of God, if someone speaks of it to the people thus, saying: Whether you now live rightly or not rightly, you will afterwards be such as God foreknew you would be; good, if good; evil, if evil. For if, on hearing this, some are turned to torpor and sloth, and being prone from labor go after their concupiscences to lust, is it therefore to be thought that what has been said concerning the foreknowledge of God is false? Will they not, if God foreknew that they would be good, be good, in whatever malice they may now be engaged? But if he foreknew them evil, they will be evil, in whatever goodness they may now be seen? By these words Augustine confesses that it is indeed true that the predestined will infallibly be saved, and the reprobate will similarly infallibly be damned. But men ought not therefore to despair, or to relax their diligence in performing good works. Because, as we were saying above,32 the disposition of divine predestination does not have it that whatever the predestined man does, he attains eternal life, but that he is saved through good works, which are also predestined and preordained by God. On which account the Apostle Peter says: Brethren, be the more solicitous to make your calling and election certain through good works.33 Similarly the reprobate too will not be punished with eternal punishment except on account of the guilt which he has from himself, and not from the preordination of God. Whence to one of the reprobate it was said:34 Why is your countenance fallen? Will you not, if you do well, receive; but if you do evil, your sin will immediately be at the door?
Many other arguments are usually brought against our doctrine, which however need not be reported in the present, since they have been proposed and resolved in various disputations above. For some contend that by this concord the freedom of choice is destroyed, which we dissolved expressly in disputations 18, 22 and 23. Some strive to prove that the necessity of prayer and of correction is taken away by the same doctrine, of which we have treated abundantly in disputation 110. Others, finally, contend to show that our manner of concord makes God cruel, as we reported in disputations 37 and 38, in which places those things can be seen which, to avoid prolixity and the useless repetition of the same arguments, we deliberately omit.