De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Book Eleven
Book Twelve
Introduction
Disputatio CXV: What the legitimate definition and proper nature of free choice are.
Disputatio CXVI: Whether indifference belongs to the essence of a free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.
Disputatio CXVII: Whether created free choice truly and properly has mastery over its act, and what such mastery is.
Disputatio CXVIII: Whether the harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.
Disputatio CXIX: Whether at least by God’s absolute power a creature, without the beatific vision, can have evident knowledge of the mysteries that belong in themselves to faith.
Disputatio CXX: In which various ways of reconciling free choice with grace proposed by different doctors are presented and refuted.
In which the various ways of reconciling free choice with grace, which are assigned by different Doctors, are reported and refuted.
I. ALTHOUGH above the reconciliation which is assigned by some has been set out at sufficient length and refuted through very many disputations, nevertheless I judged it fitting to touch upon it briefly in the present place and to attack it, and to run through the reconciliations of the other theologians, so that the reconciliation of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, to be subjected in the following disputation, may appear the clearer.
A certain reconciliation of free choice with grace is proposed, and attacked.— The first ground, then, of reconciliation is founded on that middle, or conditioned, knowledge (for no force is done to the word), by which, as they say, God, before every free decree of his will predetermining future acts, on any hypothesis whatsoever that is given, certainly and infallibly knew what created free choice, out of its innate freedom, would do in the particular case, on the hypothesis that it were placed in such or such an order of things, and in such circumstances, and were allured and invited by such external and internal motion: although with that same freedom it could do the opposite, if it willed. But they posit this middle foreknowledge in God for this reason, as we observed above, namely that from it may be taken the infallibility of divine predestination and of the future consent of free choice, efficacious grace being posited. For since they think that God by his efficacious grace does not predetermine the created will1 truly and efficiently to consent to God calling and arousing it, because they suppose that with this predetermining grace the freedom of our choice cannot consist, they infer in consequence that the aforesaid infallibility cannot be founded either in some absolute decree of God efficaciously and efficiently predetermining that a man consent by his free choice, or in the real power of the efficacious help of prevenient grace, or of grace antecedent in the order of causality, to the free consent of the created will. Whence they are compelled to have recourse to the said middle knowledge, so that to it, as to the first root, the infallibility of divine predestination and of the future cooperation of created choice may be traced back.
II. Some hold that prevenient and exciting grace are formally indeliberate vital acts.— Secondly they suppose that prevenient and exciting grace are formally certain vital acts which God works in us without us: without us, I say, as freely cooperating, yet not without us as vitally and efficiently concurring; and that it consists in the illustration and illumination of the intellect, and in the excitation and persuasion of the will, which indeed proceed efficiently from the intellect and the will, not indeed as free, but as nature, although antecedently they depend on the will as it is free choice, namely inasmuch as it depended on its freedom that a man should acquire the knowledge of the mysteries of faith, or of the things that were to be done, by approaching preachers, or by acquiring them in another way by his own industry; into that knowledge God would insert himself, elevating it by his special influx, so that it be supernatural and such as is necessary for salvation, and so obtain the character of prevenient grace. The illumination, then, being supposed, by which God illuminates the intellect and proposes the good to the will as befitting it, they affirm that immediately, without any freedom, there arises purely naturally in the will a movement of affection toward the good proposed to it, by which movement indeed it is allured and as it were invited to love that good, and to command the executive powers to carry it out, as for example to command the intellect to assent to the things of faith proposed and explained. In these two movements, then, namely in the illustration of the intellect and the affection of the will, elevated by God by his special influx, they say that prevenient and exciting grace consists. But free choice, aided and aroused by these two movements of prevenient grace, has the free power of commanding or not commanding the assent of faith. But if the will wills to embrace the faith, and commands to the intellect the act of believing, the movement of prevenient grace which it has flowing in at the same time, it elicits in itself a supernatural act, by which it wills to embrace the faith, and by which it commands the assent to the intellect; and at the same time the intellect, moved by that supernatural command of the will and aided by the divine illustration, elicits a supernatural act of assenting to the things revealed; and exciting or prevenient grace, by a new influx, by which together with free choice it flows into the supernatural act of faith, obtains the character of helping, cooperating and efficacious grace. But if the will, in accordance with its innate freedom, is unwilling to embrace the faith, exciting and prevenient grace remains within the limits of sufficient grace and is not efficacious, because the will, as it is free, was unwilling to embrace the faith, although through exciting and prevenient grace it could truly have embraced it.
III. These foundations being established, together with many others which we have reported and attacked above, they think that they deliver a facile, clear, and for all accessible and intelligible reconciliation of free choice with divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace; through which they escape the most difficult arguments that are urged by the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, and afterwards by others, against the divine predestination delivered by the Apostle and explained by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and by the aid of that one middle knowledge they seem easily to dissolve them.
For if anyone asks whence it comes that the same help is efficacious in one man and not in another, or that, with the same helps on the part of God — of prevenient grace, inasmuch as they are helps of prevenient grace — one man is made predestined and is justified, perseveres in grace and is saved, while the other is not made predestined nor justified, but remains a reprobate for ever: they answer that the one, by the freedom innate to him, willed to use those same helps well and to persevere with them to the end, while the other did not, and that God foresaw this by that supereminent middle knowledge of his. If it is asked again whence it comes that the same prevenient grace is efficacious in one man and not in another, they answer that the one willed to use that same grace well and, by the freedom innate to him, to cooperate with it, whereas by that same freedom he could have not cooperated; but the other was unwilling to cooperate, and that God foreknew this by the same middle foreknowledge. And when they are pressed as to why God foreknew by that middle knowledge that one would cooperate and not the other, they answer that by the freedom of choice of each it was so to be in reality on the hypothesis that those men were placed by God in such an order of things and aroused and allured by such helps in such circumstances. And if the objection is put again, whence it comes that of two men prevented by equal helps of grace one is to consent, or to persevere to the end, and the other not, they answer that so it was to be according to the innate freedom of each, namely because one was going to will and the other was not going to will: and here they think that one must stop, and that no other reason is to be sought why this man was to consent with such helps and not the other. For they think that one must always answer, that so it pleased them, nor do they admit that the created will has another prior cause truly efficient of its cooperating, namely the efficacy of the divine will, to which, as to the first efficient cause, all things that are done in time must be traced back.
IIII. In what sense some understand that no cause of predestination is given.— And when it is objected against them, according to the sentence of St. Augustine, approved by many supreme Pontiffs and drawn from the most evident testimonies of the sacred Scriptures, that no cause, reason or condition without which it is not, of predestination is assigned on our part, but that it must be referred back to the mere and gratuitous will of God, who has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens; for which reason the Apostle says: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments, and unsearchable his ways: they answer that the admiration of the Apostle tends only to this, that he signifies that no cause, reason or condition can be assigned on our part why God willed to call one man at that time and in those circumstances in which he foreknew by middle knowledge that he would consent and persevere on the hypothesis that he were aroused and allured by such grace; and that in the same sense the sentence of St. Augustine concerning gratuitous predestination is verified. Yet they say that this must be conceded, that there is given on the part of the good use of future free choice on a hypothesis a condition without which the will to confer the means to salvation would not obtain the formal character of predestination in comparison with this particular man, but would retain the common character of providence.
THIS ground of reconciliation remains sufficiently refuted by what has been said above. For it has been shown that that middle knowledge truly is not given even in God, as is clear from what was said in disp. 7. Hence, since the foundation of that reconciliation does not stand, it is necessary that the things built upon it collapse. It has also been shown that that interpretation of the Apostle's admiration does not agree with the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as is plain from what was said in disp. 37, no. 10, and disp. 110, no. 13. Moreover, an argument is brought against the same reconciliation: for it is of faith that divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and the efficacious helps of prevenient grace, in no way prejudice the freedom of our choice, but cohere with it: therefore the ground of that reconciliation neither ought nor can be reduced to that middle foreknowledge, which all the ancient Doctors deny, and which, in our view, it is certain is not given. The consequence is proved: for a matter of faith ought not to rest, nor can it rest, on a doubtful or non-existent foundation; otherwise faith itself would be doubtful: therefore it is necessary to defend and explain the reconciliation of free choice with grace and divine predestination without middle foreknowledge.
V. Augustine did not reconcile the infallibility of predestination with the freedom of choice through middle knowledge2.— Moreover there is an a posteriori argument pressing enough, by which it is shown that that manner of reconciling free choice with grace is not conformable to the doctrine of St. Augustine: for the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians3, as St. Augustine acknowledges, objected against him that he was an assertor of fate and overthrew the freedom of created choice, and led men into a kind of despair through the predestination and grace which he constantly taught in his books and defended in his disputations. But they would not have objected this to that holy Doctor, had he traced the reconciliation of free choice with predestination and grace to that middle knowledge; for if, on the part of the good use of future free choice foreknown by God through middle knowledge, he had somewhere assigned the difference on account of which, with equal helps on the part of God, one man is converted and saved because he willed it, while another persists in sin and is damned because he was unwilling to be converted, with what feigned colour could even the heretics, acute as they were, though most wicked, have objected to Augustine that he established fate and led men into a kind of despair? For Augustine would have had an easy solution and could have answered: I do not in fact introduce fate; for men, by the freedom innate to them, use the helps of grace well because they will to; while others do not use those same helps, nor are saved, because they will not. And the Apostle could have answered the same to those who object: What is there still to question? for who resists his will? And yet they do not answer so, but say: O man, who are you, that you answer God? O the depth of the riches. And: There is no iniquity with God, as we observed in disp. 110, no. 13, with the same Augustine: therefore, etc.
It is confirmed: for St. Augustine, in order to solve the arguments of the Pelagians against the predestination which he preached, never had recourse to middle foreknowledge, but rather refuted it, as was shown in disput. 7: therefore he understood that by that same foreknowledge the freedom of our choice cannot be reconciled with the infallibility of predestination and grace.
But they say that, if this ground of reconciliation had been proposed and explained to St. Augustine and St. Thomas, or if they had been consulted on the matter, they would at once have answered that predestination and reprobation were not made without foreknowledge of the good use of free choice: which would have tempered the harshness of the sentence on gratuitous predestination which they taught; but that they did not advert how much the addition of that middle knowledge would contribute to this, which they neither denied nor would have denied had they been consulted about it; and consequently that through that same middle knowledge they would have reconciled the freedom of our choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and predestination. We however say that the holy Augustine and Thomas were not so slow of wit that that manner of reconciliation, which is founded on middle foreknowledge, never occurred to them, if by it the freedom of choice could be reconciled with the infallibility of divine predestination. Since, then, they nowhere had recourse to that middle foreknowledge, but to the omnipotence and efficacy of the divine will, which works all things in all according to the nature of each, it seems evident a posteriori that they judged that by that middle knowledge the freedom of choice cannot be reconciled with the efficacy of divine predestination and grace.
This reconciliation, and the foundations on which it rests, could be attacked by more arguments, which nevertheless we deliberately omit, since they have been abundantly attacked in the course of this whole work.
VI. The second ground of reconciliation is according to the sentence of Durandus, in 2 Sent., dist. 37, q. 1, asserting that no concurrence of the divine will is necessary for the actions of secondary causes, but that it is enough that God produced them into being, and afterwards conserves the natures themselves and their powers. Yet this sentence is false,4 and opposed to the sacred Scriptures and the holy Fathers, as the theologians commonly acknowledge: for it is said in Isai. 26: All our works you have wrought for us, O Lord. And 1 Co. 12: Who works all things in all. And Ephes. 1: Who works all things according to the counsel of his will. And Ioan. 5: My Father works even until now, and I work. And in Conc. Araus. 2, can. 9, it is said thus: As often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work. Which St. Thomas also proves by many arguments, 3 cont. gen., ch. 67. Necessarily, therefore, it must be said that God not only produced secondary causes and conferred on them the powers to act, and conserves them in their being, but also moves and applies them to act, and together with them likewise produces his effects: on which more has been said in the preceding disputations. Hence by this doctrine the freedom of choice cannot be reconciled with the infallibility5 of divine predestination.
VII. A third ground of reconciliation is assigned by others. For they say that the divine cooperation holds on the side of the effect, not on the side of the cause, that is, that the concurrence of God does not determine our will, nor impresses or works anything in it, but flows immediately into the effect and produces it in that very moment in which it is produced by our will. From this they infer that God does not determine the will, nor the will God: for each freely applies its concurrence; and if one of them is unwilling to concur, the work will not be done; as when two men carry a huge stone which one man could not carry, for neither adds strength to the other, nor impels him, and it is free to each to let go of the burden: although God (unless he wills extraordinarily to work a miracle) will always concur when our will concurs, since he freely bound himself in a certain manner to this, when he created the free will. VIII. They infer secondly that, although at absolutely the same moment of time and of nature, God and the will begin to act, nevertheless God acts because the created will acts,6 and not conversely: and that this is what some say, that the will acts prior in nature to God, not by the priority of the instant in which, but of that by which. They attribute this manner of reconciliation to Gregory of Rimini, Scotus, and Gabriel, in 2 Sent., dist. 37.
Yet this manner of reconciliation also does not seem conformable to the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as is clear from what has been said above. For it was shown in disp. 18 that the general concurrence of God is an immediate influx into secondary causes, even free ones, and that it premoves and predetermines them to produce their effects naturally or freely or contingently, according to the manner of their own nature. It was shown also in disp. 22 and 23 that God, by his eternal, efficacious and absolute decree, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future cooperation of created choice, predetermined all the good acts which are done in time by the created will, and especially those by which the predestined attain to eternal life. It was shown moreover in disp. 85 that God and free choice are not partial causes of the supernatural consent, like two men dragging a ship, of whom one does not move the other to concur, nor by his influx causes the other to concur with him. It was shown finally in disp. 99 and 100 that that causal statement is false: Because the will acts, therefore God acts; but that this one is true: Because God acts, the will cooperates. Since, then, no foundation whatever of this reconciliation seems to stand, it is necessary that the same reconciliation which has been built upon it collapse.
There is the further point that this manner of reconciling the freedom of choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace, does not seem to preserve the predestination of God as altogether gratuitous and independent even, as it were, of a condition without which it is not, namely the future free cooperation of created choice, which is shown thus. For if God cooperates because man cooperates, then it is prior in the order of reason that God foreknow that free choice will cooperate, than that he will to concur with it by his grace to the pious operation, and to ordain him through such means to eternal life; and in consequence predestination, as regards all its effects, will be dependent, at least as on a condition without which it is not, on the good use of free choice foreknown by God. From which again it seems to follow that grace is the handmaid of free choice and obsequious to it, and in consequence that the same grace is given according to our merits, which no Catholic admits. Moreover it would also follow that efficacious grace, inasmuch as it is formally efficacious, or helping, is not prevenient, nor antecedent in the order of causality to the free cooperation of our choice, but is only simultaneous, or concomitant, and flows equally with that same choice into the pious operation; but this consequent, although it is admitted by the authors of this sentence, does not seem able to be conceded, as is clear from what has been said above on the efficacy of grace:7 therefore this manner of reconciliation is not to be admitted.