De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Book Eleven
Book Twelve
Introduction
Disputatio CXV: What the legitimate definition and proper nature of free choice are.
Disputatio CXVI: Whether indifference belongs to the essence of a free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.
Disputatio CXVII: Whether created free choice truly and properly has mastery over its act, and what such mastery is.
Disputatio CXVIII: Whether the harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.
Disputatio CXIX: Whether at least by God’s absolute power a creature, without the beatific vision, can have evident knowledge of the mysteries that belong in themselves to faith.
Whether, at least by God's absolute power, any creature, setting aside the beatific vision, can have evident cognition of the mysteries that pertain per se to faith.
I. For the explanation of this difficulty it must be noted that a cognition can be evident in two ways. First, extrinsically, namely because the object is not known evidently in itself but in another, that is, in the attester, who cannot lie; as if someone evidently knew that God says or attests something, he would deduce by evident consequence that it is true: for it is evident that God cannot lie or deceive anyone, since he is the first truth. Secondly, a cognition can be evident intrinsically and in itself, whether the evidence be a priori or a posteriori, and whether it concern the question whether the thing is, or the question what it is. And indeed in the first sense this difficulty is treated expressly in 2. 2. q. 5, a. 1, where Bañez and Cajetan dispute it, and q. 171, a. 5. Finally, in 3 p. q. 11, a. 1, it is disputed whether the soul of Christ by infused knowledge evidently knew the mystery of the Trinity and the other articles of our faith; and the most weighty theologians, with whom I agree, confess that it knew them evidently with evidence in the attester. And the reason is: for the soul of Christ by infused knowledge most certainly knew that it was supreme among all creatures in the supernatural being of grace, and consequently knew with certainty that God is, who immediately revealed these mysteries to it. Since therefore he evidently knew that God cannot lie, it follows that through infused knowledge he had evidence in the attester of the mysteries of faith. But whether faith is compossible with this same evidence in angels or in men is expressly disputed in 2. 2, q. 5, cited above. In the present place, therefore, we do not speak of evidence in the attester, but of the intrinsic evidence of the thing, a priori or a posteriori.
II. The first opinion, then, is that of certain more recent authors, who assert that short of the beatific vision and of evidence in the attester, evident cognition of the mystery of the Trinity, and of the other things that pertain per se to faith, can be given in other ways. They prove this opinion.
First: for whatever does not imply a contradiction God can do; but it does not imply a contradiction that evident cognition of the mystery of the Trinity be given in other ways distinct from the beatific vision and from evidence in the attester: therefore.
Secondly: for, as will appear below, many grave Doctors set out several other modes by which the mystery of the Trinity can be evidently known by a pure creature: therefore it must not be said that this is impossible.
An evident cognition of the Trinity can be had only through the beatific vision and in the attester.— Durandus teaches the contrary opinion, q. 3 of the prologue; the Thomists commonly follow it, and it seems to us to be according to the mind of St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 32, a. 1. It is proved first by a reason drawn from the same a. 1. For, setting aside evidence in the attester and that which is had through the beatific vision, in which the divine essence is united to the created intellect under the aspect of an intelligible species, no other evidence of the mystery of the Trinity can be had, even a posteriori: for, as St. Thomas shows, 1 p. q. 12, a. 2, no created species can represent God quidditatively as he is in himself: but it is impossible that evident cognition of the mystery of the Trinity be given a posteriori; because no effect represents, or can represent, the mystery of the Trinity evidently as regards the constitution and distinction of the divine persons, as was shown above: therefore.
It is proved secondly by destroying all the other modes by which the authors of the first opinion contend that the mystery of the Trinity can be evidently known. The first mode is through abstractive knowledge, by which one knows, not indeed that the Trinity actually exists in reality, but the connection of the three persons with the divinity; as when we say that man is a rational animal, capable of wonder and of laughter, etc.: for this knowledge is abstractive, because we affirm none of these things to exist, but only assert the connection of the predicate with the subject, so that, if man exists, it is necessary that a rational animal, capable of wonder and of laughter, exist. And in this way, they affirm, the Trinity of persons can be evidently known by a pure wayfarer through a created species. So think some of the more recent theologians.
III. An abstractive evident cognition of the Trinity cannot be given.— But this mode is impugned by the Thomists, who hold that the divine essence, as it is in itself, cannot be represented quidditatively through any created species. Furthermore, its impossibility is shown; for it implies that someone know the divine essence quidditatively without knowing its actual existence: for actual existence belongs to the quiddity of God;1 nay rather, to have being by essence, or to be that very being by essence, infinite and unlimited, having beforehand in itself whatever pertains to the perfection of being, is the proper quiddity and essence of God according to our manner of conceiving; according to that word: He who is, sent me to you: and: I am who am:2 which St. Thomas also teaches, 1 p. q. 4, a. 2, and reason persuades it: for to have being by essence is the proper perfection which, in our manner of understanding, is presupposed in God to all other perfections, and through which, as through the notion first conceived of God, the rest are demonstrated. Hence St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 3, a. 1, in the second reason demonstrates that God is not a body, because he is the first being by essence, including no potentiality; and q. 4, a. 2, shows that the perfections of all things are in God, because he is the first being subsisting through itself; and q. 9, a. 1, reason 1, concludes that God is immutable, because he is pure act. Finally, in the course of the first part, he reduces all the other perfections that are in God, as to the first simply, in our manner of conceiving, to being itself by essence; and there he stops, nor does he show from any other prior reason that God has being by essence. This is confirmed: for, since to be a rational animal is the quiddity of man, it is impossible to know man quidditatively unless it be known that he is a rational animal. Since therefore being of existence belongs to the quiddity of God, it will be impossible to know God quidditatively without knowing the actual existence which he has in three persons.
IV. Two solutions are brought to bear on this argument. The first is that although actual existence belongs to the quiddity of God, and therefore the mystery of the Trinity cannot be perfectly known quidditatively without its actual existence being known, nevertheless it can be known quidditatively imperfectly and confusedly without such existence.3 For they say that it is not necessary that one who knows a thing quidditatively know all its quidditative predicates, but that it suffices that he know the more important ones; otherwise whoever knew God or a creature quidditatively would also know comprehensively, which is false: for all the blessed know God quidditatively, yet they do not comprehend him. This solution, however, is easily impugned. First: for it implies a contradiction in terms that something be known imperfectly and confusedly and be known quidditatively; for quidditative cognition is distinct cognition of a thing as it is in itself.4 Hence one who knew of man only that he is a being would not know him quidditatively. Secondly: for to know a thing quidditatively it is necessary to know all its essential predicates. For one who were ignorant of some essential predicate of man, as that he is rational or that he is an animal, would not know him quidditatively. Thirdly: for this solution supposes one falsehood, namely that the cognition by which all the quidditative predicates of God are known is comprehensive cognition of him:5 for this is false, since for the comprehensive cognition of a thing it does not suffice to know all its quidditative predicates, or those things which are formally found in that thing, but beyond this it is required that all things be known which are eminently or virtually in it: and therefore the blessed, even if they see all things which are formally in God, because they nevertheless do not know all things which are virtually in his power, namely all possible creatures, for that reason do not properly comprehend God, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 12, a. 7.
V. The second solution is that actual existence is the chief predicate of God, by which he is most distinguished from creatures.6 Hence one who did not attain it would not be said simply to know God quidditatively; nevertheless he would be said to know him in himself and through his proper species abstractively: and by this abstractive knowledge, they assert, God can be known as triune without the beatific vision. But against this solution there is an argument: for evident cognition of a thing in itself, which is not had a posteriori through an effect, is quidditative cognition:7 therefore, since that cognition of God is not from an effect and is evident cognition of the thing in itself, it will be quidditative cognition; the contrary of which this solution teaches. Furthermore: for one who saw the divine essence clearly and evidently as it is in itself would necessarily love God, and consequently would have eternal life and be blessed, as is clear from that word of John 17: This is eternal life, that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent: therefore this evidence would not be short of the beatific vision. This is confirmed: for only the beatific vision, or God known through the beatific vision, can on the part of the object efficaciously move the will and necessitate it to love God, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 111, a. 2, and q. 106, a. 2.8 But God clearly and evidently known through such knowledge would efficaciously move the will on the part of the object9 and would necessitate it to love God: therefore such knowledge would be beatific, and consequently, short of the beatific vision, evident cognition of God cannot be had.
VI. The second mode by which the mystery of the Trinity can be evidently known short of the beatific vision is assigned by other theologians; namely through a vision of the Trinity as to whether it is, and not as to what it is. For this vision, if God by his absolute power communicated it to someone, would not be a quidditative and perfect vision of God, but a very imperfect and confused one. And indeed that such a cognition is possible is proved: for in fact Christ the Lord by infused knowledge evidently knew the mystery of the Trinity as to whether it is, but not as to what it is; and likewise the prophets knew evidently, by the prophetic light, that there are three persons in God: therefore it is not repugnant that a vision of the Trinity be given, by which it be evidently known that the Trinity is, without that which is the what-is of the Trinity itself being known; but such a cognition would not be beatific: therefore.
This mode is impugned by nearly the same arguments as the preceding one: for this evident cognition of the Trinity, as to whether it is, would either be evident cognition a posteriori through effects, and this cannot be said, because, as has been shown, no effect of God shows clearly and evidently that there is in God a Trinity of persons; or it would be evident cognition a priori, or quasi a priori, namely because through it the whether-it-is of the Trinity would be known as it is in itself; and this too cannot be said: for that cognition would be beatific. For it is impossible that the existence of the Trinity be evidently known as it is in itself without the divine essence being evidently known, and all its attributes and the other predicates which are formally in God; on account of which all the Thomists, with St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 12, a. 7, teach against Scotus that it implies a contradiction for anyone to see clearly and evidently one divine person without another, or the essence without the persons, or one attribute, or any other predicate existing formally in God, without all the other attributes or predicates of God being known. Since therefore the existence of the three persons of the Trinity is a quidditative predicate of God, it follows that it is impossible that it be evidently known as it is in itself without the divine essence and all the attributes being evidently known. But these cannot be evidently known except through the beatific vision, through which God is known quidditatively as he is in himself: therefore. Hence to the argument made it is answered that it is false that Christ the Lord by infused knowledge evidently knew the mystery of the Trinity, even as to whether it is, as the Thomists commonly teach, 3 p. q. 11, a. 1; and a fortiori the same must be thought of the prophets: for otherwise it would follow that those same prophets did not have faith in the mystery of the Trinity as to whether it is. This is proved: for obscurity and inevidence belong to the nature of faith, and these cannot stand together with evidence in respect of the same object: therefore, if the prophets had evidence of the mystery of the Trinity as to whether it is, it follows that they did not have faith in the same mystery.
VII. The third mode is if God infused into someone a light by which his intellect would be determined to assent to this proposition: The Trinity exists; namely in such a way that through the species of creatures the Trinity of persons would be apprehended, as it is now apprehended by us, and through that infused light they would be elevated and determined so as to concur together with the intellect to the assent of the same proposition: The Trinity exists. For such cognition would not be beatific, nor evident in the attester, but would be evident from the terms, not according to itself, but as it lies under the experience of the intellect seeing and determined to the assent of that proposition. Some more recent theologians set out this mode as possible, but in our judgment it seems much less intelligible than the two preceding. First indeed: for this cognition of the mystery of the Trinity would not be clear and evident from the fact that that infused light determined the intellect, as regards the exercise, to the assent of the mystery of the Trinity. For the efficacious help of divine grace physically predetermines, as regards the exercise, the intellect itself to the free assent of the same mystery, and yet that assent is not evident but obscure, since it is an assent of faith, for which obscurity is intrinsically required. Nor would that cognition be evident because it would proceed from an infused light higher and more eminent than the light of faith: for the infused light by which the soul of Christ the Lord knows the mystery of the Trinity through infused knowledge is superior to the light of faith and more excellent than it; and yet through infused knowledge Christ the Lord did not evidently know the mystery of the Trinity in himself,10 even as to whether it is, but only in the attester, as was said above: therefore in no way would that cognition of the mystery of the Trinity be evident or clear, even as to whether it is. Secondly, because no infused light superior to the light of faith is given, nor can be given, by which the mystery of the Trinity may be clearly and evidently known in itself, except the light of glory, which is the beatific light; for if it were giveable, it would have been granted to the soul of Christ: but it is established from what has been said that Christ through infused knowledge did not evidently know the mystery of the Trinity, even as to whether it is, except by evidence in the attester only: therefore no evident cognition of the mystery of the Trinity can be given except a beatific one. But that which the authors of this opinion assert in the explanation of their opinion, that that cognition is evident from the terms, does not seem intelligible: for evident cognition from the terms cannot be had11 except concerning the first, most universal principles, which are known per se by the light of nature, as: Anything is or is not; Every whole is greater than its part. But the mystery of the Trinity is above all principles, even the most universal principles of nature, and transcends its whole order: therefore it cannot be evidently known from the terms.
Nor does it suffice to answer that that cognition is evident from the terms, not according to itself, but as they lie under experience: for either by experience they understand the experience of the terms, and this is not so, otherwise we too would evidently know that the Trinity is: for we experience the very terms signifying that the Trinity is. Or they understand the experience of the thing itself signified by the term, namely of the three persons of the Trinity; and this is a begging of the question: for we contend that the Trinity itself, even as to whether it is, cannot be known through experience except through the beatific vision, by which each of the blessed beholds the divine persons in themselves. Nay, properly speaking, experience cannot be had through the beatific vision, because experience properly pertains to sense; but through the intellect experience is not had except in a broad sense, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 54, a. 5, ad 2. We have, therefore, that that third mode of evidence is impossible.
VIII. The fourth mode is through discursive knowledge, from many essential predicates known through the beatific vision and having a connection with the mystery of the Trinity. From these, some say, the same mystery can be evidently known or deduced, a priori or a posteriori.
Against this mode, however, it is argued: for the evidence of the Trinity as it is in itself is not had through discursive knowledge unless it be reduced to the beatific knowledge,12 through which alone those predicates of God are known from which the Trinity of persons is inferred, just as the evidence of our theology is reduced to the knowledge of the blessed, because we do not evidently know the principles of faith from which theological conclusions are deduced. Furthermore, this mode of evidence seems altogether impossible: for the essential predicates are common to all the divine persons: therefore from them the Trinity of persons cannot be evidently known or deduced, otherwise in fact we would by the natural light evidently know that there is a Trinity of persons in God: for we evidently know a posteriori the essential predicates of God, as that he is a being, infinite, omnipotent, supremely good: therefore if from evidently known essential predicates it can be deduced, by evident consequence, that there is in God a Trinity of persons, it follows that the mystery of the Trinity can be evidently known or demonstrated by us by the light of nature alone.
IX. Whether Paul, the vision being past, evidently remembered that he had seen God.— The fifth mode is through the memory of a beatific vision already had: for one who sees God triune and one, if he be deprived of that vision, will afterwards evidently remember that he saw God triune and one, as in fact St. Paul remembered after the rapture, as is clear from those words of the same Apostle: That such a man was caught up even to the third heaven, and there heard secret words which it is not lawful for a man to speak.13
Against this mode fight the arguments by which, in the first part, q. 12, a. 11, the Thomists commonly show that through the species left in the intellect of St. Paul after the rapture he did not clearly and evidently know the beatific vision which he had, or that he had seen God through his essence; and much less could he through those same species evidently know the Trinity of persons: otherwise faith in the mystery of the Trinity would not have remained in the Apostle after the rapture.
It remains, therefore, that short of the beatific vision and of evidence in the attester, the mystery of the Trinity, or the other things that pertain per se to faith, cannot be evidently known by any creature.