De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

Introduction

Disputatio CXV: What the legitimate definition and proper nature of free choice are.

Disputatio CXVI: Whether indifference belongs to the essence of a free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.

Disputatio CXVII: Whether created free choice truly and properly has mastery over its act, and what such mastery is.

Disputatio CXVIII: Whether the harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.

Whether the concord of free choice with the infallibility of foreknowledge, providence, and divine predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.

I. The difficulty of the concord of free choice with grace.— This difficulty is usually discussed in connection with the various mysteries of the faith in various places of St. Thomas's Summa of Theology. For in 1 p. q. 32 ar. 1 the holy Doctor asks whether the Trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. And in 3 p. q. 1 ar. 1 the Thomists dispute whether the possibility of the mystery of the incarnation, or its actual execution, can be evidently known or demonstrated, at least a posteriori, by the light of nature alone. And in 2. 2. q. 1 art. 4 the matter is turned into a general controversy: whether the mysteries of our faith are evidently possible. In the present place, however, we must touch upon those of these questions which will seem to conduce to our purpose. And although all Catholics agree that it is certain that man has free choice, yet by what light this is certain, and how the freedom of that same choice coheres with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace, is not so known through itself that all agree that it can be evidently demonstrated by natural light. Hence St. Augustine, sensing the difficulty of this question: There are some, he says, who so defend the grace of God as to deny man's free choice, or who think that, when grace is defended, free choice is denied. And again he says: That question, in which the choice of the will and the grace of God are disputed, is so difficult to discern that, when free choice is defended, the grace of God seems to be denied; but when the grace of God is asserted, free choice is thought to be taken away. And in book 2 On the merit and remission of sins, ch. 18: The very reasoning, he says, which can be entered upon concerning these matters by such men as we are, straitens any one of us who seeks earnestly, lest we so defend grace as to seem to take away free choice; and again, lest we so assert free choice as to be judged, in proud impiety, ungrateful to the grace of God.

II. That man has free choice is known both from faith and from natural light.— There is, then, a first opinion of certain Catholics, who affirm that it is certain from the doctrine of faith that man has free choice, yet that this cannot be established by natural reason. This opinion, however, need not be impugned ex professo in the present place: for in 1 p. q. 83 art. 1, and On Truth q. 24, and 1. and 2., and q. 6 On Evil art. unique, St. Thomas demonstrates not only by testimonies of Scripture but also by evident natural reasons that man has free choice. Hence in the cited q. 24 On Truth ar. 1 he says that not only does faith teach, but evident reason also shows, that there is free choice in men. Master Bañez demonstrates this opinion by several reasons, 1 p. q. 83 ar. 1 dub. 1 conc. 3. But the strongest is the one St. Thomas assigns in the same article: because it is established by the light of nature that man is a rational animal; therefore it is evident that he acts by the free judgment of reason, by which he can be borne to different things, indeed even to opposites. But everything that acts from the free judgment of reason, being able to be borne to opposites, has free choice; because, as St. Thomas noted in 1. 2., the Philosophers define free choice as being a free judgment arising from reason: therefore.

III. That the concord of free choice with grace can be demonstrated, some hold.— The second opinion is that of others, who affirm by the opposite extreme that it is not only evidently known by natural light that man is endowed with the freedom of choice, but that the concord of that same choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and providence can also be clearly and easily harmonized through middle knowledge, of which we must treat in disp. 120. This opinion, however, is proved.

First: because what is natural can be demonstrated by natural light; but that man has free choice, and the actual use of it, is a natural truth; and the foreknowledge and providence that God has of human affairs which do not pertain to the order of grace is likewise natural: therefore the account of the concord of that same choice in such human affairs with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and providence can be demonstrated by the light of nature alone: but the concord of free choice with the gifts of grace has no greater difficulty: therefore that same concord can also be easily and clearly demonstrated.

Secondly it is argued. The heretics, especially of our time, when they have striven to introduce new and inexplicable doctrines repugnant to the Catholic truth, bid them be believed even if they can neither be understood nor accommodated to the principles of faith and the light of reason. Thus Calvin, when he had asserted that God works evil works in us as he does good, adds: If anyone object that this is above the grasp of his mind, I confess the same of myself. But what wonder if the incomprehensible and immense majesty of God exceeds our measure? Yet so far am I from undertaking to explain after the manner of the flesh that sublime and hidden secret, that I would have what I said at the outset continually come back to mind: that they are fools who desire to know more than God has revealed. Wherefore let learned ignorance rather delight us than an intemperate and drunken curiosity beyond what God permits: therefore it is not lawful for a Catholic man to establish such a concord of free choice with the gifts of grace as cannot be fully understood or grasped by the human intellect; but it must be, as it were, received with closed eyes, or believed as the mystery of the Trinity.

Thirdly, the same can be proved. Many supernatural mysteries, short of the beatific vision, can be evidently known or demonstrated by evident reasons: therefore a fortiori the account of the concord of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and providence can be demonstrated by natural light. The antecedent is proved: for the habit of faith can be evidently known by the light of nature. For the angel, while he was a wayfarer, evidently knew all things that were within himself; but the habit of faith was within the angel himself, for it inhered in his intellect: but a habit of this kind of itself inclines to assent to the mystery of the Trinity: therefore the inclination to such assent can be evidently known by the light of nature, and consequently the object of that inclination can also be evidently known, namely the Trinity of persons subsisting in the same numerically one divine nature.

It is confirmed, first. The angel evidently knew that he had assent to this proposition, God is three and one, since he experienced such assent in himself: therefore it was evident to the angel that that assent was supernatural. The consequence is clear: for between natural and supernatural assent no middle is given. But it was evident to the angel that that assent was not natural: for he evidently knew all natural things; yet among them he did not see such an assent and its object: therefore he evidently knew that that assent and its object were supernatural: therefore by natural light he evidently knew it to be true that God is three and one.

It is confirmed, secondly. By the light of nature it is evident that God has intellect and will: therefore it is evident that he knows and loves himself: therefore it is evident that he produces the Word and the love of the same substance and nature as God himself: for by the action of the intellect and the will there is necessarily produced some term remaining in the agent. But it is evident that such a term cannot be an accident in God, since it is known by the light of nature that no accident is given in God: therefore it is evident that it is a substance; and consequently it is evident that in God there is one person producing and two produced, one through the intellect and the other through the will: for it is impossible that anyone produce himself: therefore the Trinity of persons is evidently knowable by nature.

IIII. Fourthly it is argued. The mystery of the Trinity is evidently credible, as the theologians commonly confess: therefore evidently possible: therefore evidently true. The first consequence is proved: for what is evidently impossible is evidently incredible: therefore, arguing from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, what is evidently credible will be evidently possible. But the second consequence is known: for, as Aristotle teaches, in eternal things to be and to be able are the same.

V. The concord of free choice with the efficacy of divine grace cannot be evidently known by the light of nature alone.— The third opinion confesses that the freedom of our choice can indeed be evidently known and demonstrated by the light of nature alone: but how its actual use stands together with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of divine grace, cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by the light of nature alone: and therefore the account of this concord must be believed, and the intellect brought into captivity unto the obedience of faith. To this opinion Cajetan inclines, 1 p. q. 22 art. 4 §. To this doubt; where, resolving the present difficulty, after he has reported the opinion of those asserting that the same future contingent act is avoidable and unavoidable — avoidable indeed in itself, but unavoidable as it is foreseen — he thus concludes: Our intellect will rest, not in the evidence of the truth inspected, but in the inaccessible height of the hidden truth. And this seems to my little wit reasonable enough, both on account of the reason already given, and because, as Gregory says, he thinks too little of God who believes of him only what he can measure by his own wit. Nor therefore, I suspect, is anything to be denied of those things which we know or hold by faith to pertain to the divine immutability, actuality, certainty, and universality, and the like: but I think that something hidden lies concealed, either on the part of the order that is between God and the foreseen event, or in the very glue, as it were, between the event itself and its being foreseen; and so, considering the intellect of our soul to be the eye of a night-owl, I find its rest only in ignorance. For it is better, both for the Catholic faith and for philosophy, to confess our blindness than to assert as evident things that do not quiet the intellect: for evidence is that which quiets. Nor for this reason do I accuse all the Doctors of presumption: since by stammering, as they could, they intended to insinuate the immobility and the supreme and eternal efficacy of the divine intellect, will, and power, all of them through the infallibility of the order of divine election to all events, none of which is an obstacle to the aforesaid suspicion, which believes that something higher lies hidden in them. And truly, if it were so preached, perhaps no Christian would err concerning predestination, as he does not err in the matter of the Trinity: because it is said and written, and so it is, that it is hidden from the human intellect, and faith alone suffices. I have transcribed these things from Cajetan because he speaks most piously, and his words breathe Christian modesty and humility. Imitating him, Master Bañez says: If anyone does not understand how the use of free choice is free and nevertheless is an effect already predefined by divine providence, he must believe it. And elsewhere: First of all they ought to have believed what they say they cannot understand: for we Catholics believe the mystery of the Trinity even if we do not understand it.

VI. I judge this opinion to be true, and consonant with the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. For its evidence it must be considered that it often happens that two extremes, considered in themselves, are evidently known by the light of nature alone, and yet the connection they have with each other, and the mode of that connection, cannot be certainly known or demonstrated without a higher light. For example, that God exists is known through itself; and that man exists is also known by the light of nature: but that God is man, and man is God, is known only through divine revelation. Similarly too, when one extreme is naturally knowable, but the other is known only through supernatural light, the connection of both, and the mode in which they cohere with each other, cannot be evidently demonstrated, although the one extreme is comprehended by the light of nature alone. And the reason of this is: for the connection between two extremes, and the mode of that connection, cannot be evidently known unless both extremes are evidently known: therefore, whenever one extreme is supernatural, it is impossible that the connection it has with the other extreme be evidently known by the light of nature alone, even if that other extreme does not transcend the order of nature.

Our opinion is therefore proved by the testimonies of St. Augustine adduced, and by others that will be brought forward below, in which he expressly confesses that the concord of free choice with predestination and grace cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by human reason.

VII. Clarity in matters of faith ought to be suspect.— Secondly it is proved by reason: for in matters of faith, since it deals with things not seen, every evidence or clarity ought to be suspect, nor is anything therefore to be reckoned true because it can easily be comprehended or understood by us: for it happens that on one side some doctrine seems to carry ease with it, and on the other is repugnant to the principles of faith. For example, our intellect, led by the light of nature alone, more easily conceives that the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the Eucharist as in a sign, and not according to real presence, as the Lutheran heretics assert: for by their position all the natural reasons that are objected by unbelievers against this venerable sacrament are easily solved. Similarly the same intellect more easily perceives that God is one in essence, but not three in persons, as the ancient Philosophers held; yet a Catholic man ought not therefore to judge that true because our intellect can easily grasp it, or because it appears to us clearer: otherwise the Catholic faith would certainly have to be cast away, in whose mysteries, to be explained and defended, very many difficulties occur, and only those things would have to be accepted which our intellect easily grasps: which nevertheless is repugnant both to the doctrine of the Church and to the authority of Scripture, which says: Neither has the eye seen, nor the ear heard, nor have they ascended into the heart of man, the things which God has prepared for those who love him. Hence St. Augustine says: Is that therefore to be denied which is open, because that which is hidden cannot be comprehended? Are we, I say, therefore to say that what we clearly see to be so is not so, because we cannot find why it is so? And in another place he says: But I, even if I cannot solve their arguments, yet see that we must adhere to those things which are most open in the Scriptures; that from them the obscure may be revealed, or if the mind is not yet fit to discern them when demonstrated, or to investigate hidden things, they may be believed without any hesitation. And in sermon 20 on the words of the Apostle: Better, he says, is a faithful ignorance than a rash knowledge. And Jerome: It is better to be ignorant of something than to learn it with danger. And Irenaeus, book 2 Against Heresies, ch. 45: Better therefore and more useful is it to be simple and to know little, and through charity to become near to God, than to think oneself to know much, and to be found blasphemous against one's God through much experience. Therefore the account of the concord of free choice with the gifts of grace which is assigned by St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and their disciples is not therefore to be rejected because our intellect cannot fully see or comprehend it.

VIII. Thirdly it is proved. Because, although our free choice is contained within the limits of nature, yet divine grace and its efficacy exceed the whole order of nature: therefore the connection and concord of both cannot be perfectly or evidently known or comprehended by our intellect in this state. The consequence is clear: for, as has been shown, the connection and concord of two extremes, of which one is supernatural, cannot be perfectly known or demonstrated by the light of nature alone.

Many natural things cannot be perfectly understood by man.— Fourthly. Because even in natural things there are many whose reasons man cannot perfectly know or demonstrate; namely the mode by which the rational soul is whole in the whole and whole in each part; and the mode by which God is in all things by essence, presence, and power; and in the ant, the bees, and other tiny living things many things are found, in the knowledge of which men labour greatly; for which reason the Wise Man says: And we hardly estimate the things that are on earth: and the things that are in sight we find with labour. But who shall search out the things that are in heaven? And who shall know thy thought, unless thou give wisdom, and send thy Holy Spirit from the highest? Hence St. Augustine, after he had diligently treated in the second book On the Trinity that question — whether spiritual creatures can work miracles by their own natural power — concludes at the end: It is altogether useful for me that I remember my own powers, and warn my brethren to remember theirs, lest human weakness advance beyond what is safe. For in what way the angels do this, or rather in what way God does this through his angels, I am unable to penetrate with the keenness of the eyes, nor to unravel with confidence in reason, nor to comprehend with the advance of the mind, so as to speak as certainly to all the things that can be required concerning these matters as if I were an angel, or a prophet, or an apostle. Wherefore, with this moderation also applied, one must proceed without assertion and without prejudice to a better opinion, as far as reason and authority can help.

The omnipotence of God cannot be perfectly known by man.— Fifthly. The omnipotence of God, since it is infinite, cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by the human intellect; but God by his omnipotence brings it about that the man whose heart he moves wills, and wills freely. For St. Thomas says that even if God changes the will of man to something else, nevertheless he does this by his omnipotence, that he willingly wills that into which he is changed: therefore it cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by man how the freedom of choice stands with the efficacious motion of God, or with the infallibility of divine providence and predestination.

IX. To the first argument it is answered that, although it is a natural truth, and is established by experience itself, that man has free choice, yet its connection with efficacious grace, and the mode of that connection, cannot be demonstrated or evidently known in this state.

The mysteries of faith are to be believed in order that they may be understood.— To the second it is answered that the heretics therefore bid what they teach be believed, lest the falsity, impiety, and repugnance to Catholic truth be detected in their sects, which they strive to introduce according to their own brain, against the Apostolic See, against the sacred Councils, indeed even against the divine letters and the light of nature. But Catholics wish what faith teaches to be believed in order that it may be understood, because it cannot be investigated or comprehended by human reason. Hence the Lord, about to speak of the great and from the ages hidden mystery of the incarnation, says: If you will not believe, you shall not understand: to signify that the mysteries of faith are to be believed in order that they may be understood. Hence St. Peter the Apostle: We, he says, have believed and have known that thou art the Christ, the Son of God. Where, as Augustine noted, he said we have believed before we have known; to teach that the hidden mysteries of God are to be believed in order that they may be known, and that faith is to be put before knowledge. But the unbelieving Jews wished first to see the things that were to be believed by faith. For they said: What sign therefore dost thou do, that we may see and believe? They wished to see before believing. Thomas the Apostle also: Unless I see, he says, the print of the nails in his hands, and put my finger into the place of the nails, and put my hand into his side, I will not believe. For which Christ the Lord charged him with unbelief: Be not, he says, unbelieving, but faithful. And again: Because thou hast seen me, Thomas, thou hast believed: blessed are they who have not seen, and have believed.

X. To the third it is answered that the mysteries which of themselves pertain to faith cannot be known quidditatively, or evidently demonstrated, except through the beatific vision. And to the impugnation Cajetan seems to insinuate that any angel whatever, through implanted and connatural species, evidently knew the supernatural habits infused in him: for he says that through those species the angels knew faith, hope, and charity by natural cognition, not absolutely and in themselves, but as they pertain to the angel himself, who perfectly knows himself. But whatever be the case with Cajetan's opinion, it is answered that, as St. Thomas teaches, the object of the theological virtues, and consequently the theological virtues themselves, cannot be comprehended or evidently demonstrated by natural reason. Hence even the highest angel did not evidently know by the light of nature the supernatural habits or the supernatural acts which he produced; just as neither did he know habitual grace, because, as St. Thomas teaches in prima secundae, q. 112, article 5, no one, setting aside divine revelation, can know with infallible certainty that he or another has habitual grace. And the reason he assigns persuades this: because no one can know that he has knowledge of some conclusion if he were ignorant of the principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God himself, who, on account of his excellence, is unknown to us, according to that of Job 36: Behold, God is great, overcoming our knowledge. And therefore his presence in us and his absence cannot be known with certainty, according to that of Job 9: If he come to me, I shall not see him: and if he depart, I shall not understand.

XI. To the first confirmation it is answered that the angel did not evidently know that the assent to the mystery of the Trinity which he elicited was supernatural and not natural: because, although an angel left to his own nature evidently knows all natural objects and all acts of the natural order, even those freely elicited by himself, yet God by his absolute power could hide some natural object from him; and because the angel himself could not evidently know by the light of nature alone whether God in this respect was using his absolute power, since that depends on the mere will of God: therefore he could not evidently know that the assent which he elicited concerning the mystery of the Trinity, or concerning its object, was not natural but supernatural.

But against this: for at least the highest angel evidently knew that that revelation of the mystery of the Trinity was not made by another, inferior angel: for he evidently knew that he was higher than all; and that no inferior angel could illuminate a superior, as St. Thomas shows 1 p. q. 107 art. 3. Therefore he evidently knew that that revelation had been made to him immediately by God; and consequently that the revealed mystery was true: for it was evident to him that God cannot lie or deceive anyone.

Some answer that the argument at most concludes that the highest angel had evidence in the one attesting the mystery of the Trinity, and the other things which he knew from the beginning by faith. But we say that, although it was evident to the highest angel that he was higher than all according to natural being, yet it was not evident to him that he had grace, as is clear from the premises: nor did he evidently know that a higher angel in natural being was also higher in the order of grace. By this doctrine a similar argument is solved, which is customarily made in the third part to prove that the angels by natural power evidently knew that the humanity of Christ the Lord subsists through an uncreated subsistence, and so knew through their natural powers the mystery of the incarnation, after it had in fact been carried into execution. For it must be said that he did not evidently know by the light of nature alone that that subsistence by which the humanity of Christ subsisted was not created; because, although among created subsistences he did not see the subsistence of Christ's humanity, yet, standing in the light of nature alone, he did not know whether in truth the humanity of Christ had a proper subsistence, and whether it was hidden from him on account of some mystery. But the blessed angels knew the mystery of the incarnation through divine revelation, and consequently they also knew with certain knowledge that the humanity of Christ subsists immediately and formally through the uncreated subsistence of the Word.

XII. The mystery of the Trinity is not demonstrated by natural reason.— To the second confirmation it is answered that, although it is certain that by created natural cognition a word is produced, yet it is not evident or certain, indeed not even true, that a word is produced by every cognition. For it is a most probable opinion that the blessed do not produce a word by the beatific vision, as very many Thomists teach in 1 p. q. 12; and it is of faith that the Holy Spirit, and likewise the Son of God, by knowing his essence, do not produce the Word; whence it is not evident by the light of nature that God, by knowing himself, produces the Word. But the reason by which St. Thomas deduces from the things that occur in created cognition that in God there is a substantial generation of the Word is not demonstrative, but a probable conjecture for persuading and explaining the things that the Catholic faith teaches concerning the eternal generation of the divine Word.

But against this there is an argument: for, as St. Thomas teaches 1 p. q. 93 art. 5 in the body of the article, in man there is the image of God, not only according to the imitation of the divine nature, but also according to the representation of the three persons; because just as in God there are three persons in one essence, so proportionally in man there are three powers in the same soul: therefore, just as by natural light man can evidently demonstrate a posteriori that God exists, so also he will be able, through effects representing the Trinity of persons — namely through the knowledge of himself — evidently to know the mystery of the Trinity.

What sort of image of the Trinity is in man.— It is answered that God is one is evidently demonstrated a posteriori through creatures, since this consequence is evident: There are created things: therefore there is given one first efficient principle, independent in its being from another; otherwise in efficient causes there would be a process to infinity, as St. Thomas shows 1 p. q. 2 art. 3 in the body: and as regards the question whether he is, the creatures themselves perfectly demonstrate God a posteriori. But the image of God that is in man does not perfectly represent God as he is three and one, even as regards the question whether he is, but only in an imperfect mode, as St. Thomas teaches in the same art. 5, q. 93, solution to 3. And the reason of this is: for the divine relations constitutive of the persons import only a respect within; whence God himself, as he is three, produces no effect outside, but through something common to the three persons, namely through his omnipotence: whence no effect of God can evidently demonstrate, even a posteriori, the Trinity of persons, but only the unity of the divine essence.

XIV. The mystery of the Trinity is not evidently possible for us.— To the fourth it is answered that the mystery of the Trinity is indeed evidently credible, as are the other mysteries of our faith, yet it does not follow that it is evidently possible or true for us: for many false things, indeed even impossible things, are more probable than true ones. And the reason is: for the evidence of credibility, and credibility itself, is taken from the authority of those who speak and from other extrinsic signs; but possibility is founded in the very nature of the thing. Whence, although it is more probable, and consequently evidently credible, that quantity is distinguished from the quantified thing, yet it can be that in reality it is impossible. To the impugnation it is said that the consequence made does not proceed from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent; because both the antecedent and the consequent of each consequence are affirmative, and so they are not opposed to each other. But in order that, from the opposite of the consequent of this consequence — this is evidently impossible: therefore it is evidently incredible — the argument be made to the opposite of the antecedent, we must argue thus: This is not evidently incredible: therefore it is not evidently impossible; and in each consequence the consequent is true, as is the antecedent, because we have evidence neither that the mystery of the Trinity is possible nor that it is impossible.

For although in reality it is not only possible but even necessary that God be three, yet this cannot be evident to any creature, as has been said, setting aside the beatific vision.

Disputatio CXIX: Whether at least by God’s absolute power a creature, without the beatific vision, can have evident knowledge of the mysteries that belong in themselves to faith.

Disputatio CXX: In which various ways of reconciling free choice with grace proposed by different doctors are presented and refuted.

Disputatio CXXI: In which the legitimate harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine predestination and the efficacy of the helps of grace is established and defended.

Epilogue of almost everything said in the preceding disputations, containing twenty propositions.

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