De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Book Eleven
Book Twelve
Introduction
Disputatio CXV: What the legitimate definition and proper nature of free choice are.
Disputatio CXVI: Whether indifference belongs to the essence of a free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.
Disputatio CXVII: Whether created free choice truly and properly has mastery over its act, and what such mastery is.
Whether created free choice truly and properly has dominion over its act, and what sort of dominion this is.
I. THIS difficulty can be treated under other terms: namely, whether the consent of free choice, especially with respect to supernatural acts, is first and immediately in its power, or in the power of God.
On which question those authors who think that the actual determination of the will, supposing exciting grace, must be begun first by that same created will, by reason of its innate freedom, so that the rights of its freedom be preserved unviolated, teach consequently that free choice so has dominion over its act that the determination of such an act, even when it is supernatural, is first and immediately in its power; and that the freedom of that choice cannot otherwise be defended as regards its actual use, indeed not even as regards its free power itself. This opinion can be proved.
First from St. Augustine, book 1 of On Free Choice, ch. 12, saying: You see, then, as I think, that it is established in our will that we either enjoy this good, so great and so true, or lack it; for what is so situated in the will, as the will itself is? And book 1, ch. 14, he says: What each one, I say, chooses to follow and embrace, consists in being placed in the will: And book 2, ch. 18: Man himself, insofar as he is a man, is some good, because he can live rightly when he wills. And book 3 of On Free Choice, ch. 3: For I cannot think otherwise than that it is in our power only what we do when we will. Wherefore nothing is so in our power as the will itself; for with no interval at all, it is at hand as soon as we will. And ch. 17: Who, he says, sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? But sin is committed; therefore it can be guarded against. By these words Augustine openly teaches that to will and to be unwilling are immediately in the power of the will, and that free choice truly and properly has immediate dominion over its act; otherwise it would not be free, nor would sin be imputed to it as guilt when it sins, nor would it be worthy of reward when it acts piously.
II. Secondly it is argued from the authority of St. Thomas, in the second book of the Sentences, d. 25. q. 1. art. 1. in the body, where he says that judgment about one's own action belongs only to those who have understanding, as though it were established in their power to choose this action or that; whence also they are said to have dominion over their act, and for this reason free choice is found in those alone who have understanding, and not in those whose actions are determined not by the agents themselves but by certain other prior causes. And in the reply to the first he speaks thus: In God free choice is saved as regards this, that the determination of his act is not from another but from himself: whence he is most truly the Lord of his work, and for this reason also it is said in the text that free choice is found otherwise in God than in others. And in the reply to the second he adds: It belongs to the freedom of choice that it be able to do some action or not to do it; and this belongs to God: for the good things which he does, he is able not to do. And in the reply to the third, speaking of man's free choice, he says: The determination of the action and of the end is established in the power of free choice: whence there remains to it dominion over its act, although not as to the first agent. By these words he openly teaches that for the freedom of choice, whether in God or in men, it is necessarily required that it have dominion over its act, and power to produce it or not to produce it.
Confirmation: for from this that St. Thomas, in the reply to the first just cited, proves that there is free choice in God, because he is most truly the Lord of his work: and from this he concludes that he is the Lord of his work, because the determination of his act is not from another but from himself: therefore, according to St. Thomas, in order that someone have free choice it is necessarily required that he have dominion over his act; and similarly, in order that he have dominion over his act, it will be necessary that the determination of that same act be in him not from another but from himself; otherwise that causal statement of St. Thomas would be false, namely: Because the determination of his act is not from another but from himself, therefore God is the Lord of his work.
III. Thirdly it is argued from the definition of free choice commonly received by the theologians: for free choice is that which, all things required for acting having been posited, can act and not act: therefore for the freedom of choice it is necessarily required that it have immediately a proximate and unimpeded power over either act, namely over willing and being unwilling: but this is to have absolute dominion over the very act of willing and being unwilling: therefore.
Fourthly. A man is not said properly to have dominion over that which depends on the will of another: therefore similarly a man will not be said to have free choice with respect to an act which is not immediately in his power, but in the power of God: therefore, in order that true freedom be defended in man, it is necessary to say that consent or dissent is immediately under the dominion and power of that same choice.
Confirmation. If the will of man has no dominion or power of acting except what God wills it to do: therefore freedom will exist only in God, who, as he wills, moves the created will to this act or that; and not in the created will itself: since it cannot determine itself to act as it likes, but as it pleases God.
Fifthly. If our choice is not under our dominion and power, it follows that men who do not act well are not to be reproved, nor those who live piously to be praised: but that all praise is to be attributed to God; because by his power he brought men to act well; and by the same reasoning it would have to be imputed to God that men sin or persist in sins, since indeed he does not grant them to be converted to God.
IIII. Created free choice has dominion over its act, but not the first dominion.— The second opinion affirms that created free choice indeed has dominion over its act, but not the first and absolute dominion: for the first and absolute dominion, wholly independent of another, resides with God alone, who is the universal Lord of all. And since this opinion is true and according to the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, for its explanation it must be noted that, as St. Thomas teaches:1 Free choice is the cause of its own motion; because man through free choice moves himself to act; yet it is not of the necessity of freedom that what is free be the first cause of itself, just as neither, for something to be the cause of another, is it required that it be the first cause of it. Whence a voluntary motion, although it has a proximate intrinsic principle, yet because this principle is a mover moved by another, therefore the first principle of that same voluntary motion is from without; just as the first principle of natural motion is also from without, namely that which moves nature:2 and therefore these two cohere well, namely that created free choice moves itself and is premoved by another: that it determines itself as the proximate cause of its own motion, and is predetermined by God as by the first cause: inasmuch as created free choice is not simply the first self-mover or the first self-determiner. Proportionably, in the present matter it must be said that these two cohere best with each other, namely that created free choice has dominion over its act and deliberates about it, and yet does not have the first and absolute dominion over it, nor is simply the first deliberator about such an act or the first determiner of it; but necessarily every deliberation and dominion of the created will must be reduced to God, as to the first deliberator and the first lord simply. And the reason for this is that created dominion does not exclude but rather presupposes uncreated dominion, and depends on it, just as the created causality of any particular cause does not exclude but rather presupposes the causality of God, and is reduced to him as to a prior cause per se efficient3.
V. Let the first conclusion, then, be: man's free choice has dominion over its act, as its proximate cause. In this conclusion the authors of both opinions agree; and the arguments made from the beginning prove it effectively.
Created free choice in the use of its dominion over its act depends on God as on the first predeliberator.— Second conclusion. Created free choice, in the actual use of the dominion and of the faculty which it has over its acts, depends on God as on the absolute Lord who predeliberates and predetermines, before the foreknowledge of future cooperation, what in particular that created choice itself is going to do. And so the deliberation and determination of the created choice to one side falls under the divine predeliberation and predetermination, and it depends on it in the genus of efficient cause that created free choice deliberate and will what is good. All theologians hold this conclusion who hold that God by his motion, or by efficacious grace, not only morally but also efficiently, or physically, makes us do, and works that we work. And it is proved by all the reasons by which it was shown above that God by his decree and efficacious motion physically predetermines all secondary causes, even free ones, to act, their freedom and nature being saved.4
Secondly it is proved: for, as was shown in disputation 28, all free acts in the individual, and according to all good circumstances, are subject to divine providence: therefore before the created will deliberates about any act, or uses its dominion and power of producing such an act, it is presupposed that God has first preordained that the created choice itself deliberate about such an act and use its faculty to produce that same act: otherwise created free choice would be simply the first free being and the first deliberator about such an action, whose contrary St. Thomas proves in the Prima Secundae, q. 9. art. 4.
VI. They answer this argument that man is not simply the first deliberator, nor the first lord of his act, but the proximate one: because although he can deliberate about his act without God effecting that man deliberate, yet he cannot deliberate without God conserving free choice, and equally inflowing with it into that same act. But this solution is impugned in disput. 18. no. 14, and disput. 24. no. 17.
Dominion over its act is not first in the power of the created choice, but in the power of God.— Third conclusion. Dominion over its act is not first in the power of the created choice, but in the power and dominion of God, especially with respect to supernatural acts. We mean to say that every dominion, and the actual use of the dominion, which the created will, as a proximate cause, has or exercises over the free acts which it elicits, proceeds from God as from the most powerful and first efficient cause, and must be reduced to him in the end as to the first author and the first absolute Lord: and we speak of all acts which in the individual are not sins. That this conclusion is according to the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas I show thus.
First: for St. Augustine, book 1 of the Retractations, ch. 9, explaining those words, To will is present with me, but to accomplish I find not, says that man does not have it in his power to be good. And book 2, ch. 1, he adds: Although it is in each one's power what he wills, yet it is not in anyone's power what he can do. Which was said for this reason, because we say that nothing is in our power except what is done when we will, where first and most of all is the willing itself. For with no interval of time at all the will itself is at hand when we will, but this power also for living well we receive from above, when the will is prepared by the Lord. And in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10, explaining those words, Therefore it is of faith, that the promise may be firm to all the seed according to grace:5 This, he says, he promised not from the power of our will, but from his predestination. For he promised what he himself was going to do, not what men were to do: because even if men do the good things which pertain to worshipping God, he makes them do what he commanded: they do not act so that he may do what he promised: otherwise, for God's promises to be fulfilled, it would be in the power not of God but of men; and what was promised by the Lord would be rendered to Abraham by them. By which words he openly teaches that the power which free choice has over pious operations is first in the power of God, and that men receive from him the power which they have to do those things which pertain to the worship of God. Which he teaches even more clearly in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 8, in these words: As the Apostle says, which I also recalled in the previous book: We are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.6 Following whom blessed Ambrose dares and says:7 For our heart and our thoughts are not in our power: which everyone who is humbly and truly pious perceives to be most true. And a little below, explaining that verse of Psalm 118, Incline my heart into your testimonies, and not into covetousness, he adds: For our heart and our thoughts are not in our power, which, poured out unexpectedly, confound the mind and the soul, and drag them elsewhere than you have proposed: they recall us to worldly things, insert mundane things, thrust in voluptuous things, weave in alluring things, and at the very time when we prepare to lift up the mind, inserted among empty thoughts, we are for the most part cast down to earthly things. It is therefore not in the power of men but of God that men have power to become sons of God. For they receive it from him who gives to the human heart pious thoughts, through which it may have the faith which works through love:8 to take up this good, and to hold it, and to advance in it perseveringly even to the end, we are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, in whose power are our heart and our thoughts. From ch. 13 he twice repeats the saying of Ambrose cited above: For our heart and our thoughts are not in our power. And in ch. 19 he answers the objection of those who from the fact that our heart and our thoughts are not in our power wrongly inferred that men are not to be exhorted to act well, or reproved if they have sinned. And in the book On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 20, he concludes thus: Divine Scripture, if it be diligently inspected, shows that not only the good wills of men, which he himself makes out of evil ones, and having made them good directs them to good acts and to eternal life; but even those which preserve the creature of the world are so in the power of God that, as he wills and when he wills, he makes them incline either to conferring benefits on some or to inflicting punishments on others, as he himself judges, by a most hidden judgment indeed, but without doubt most just. And in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 14, he says: to will or not to will is so in the power of the one willing or unwilling that it neither impedes nor overcomes the power of the divine will. For concerning those who do what he does not will, he himself does what he wills. And a little below: If therefore, when God wills to establish kings on earth, he has the wills of men more in his power than they have their own; who else brings it about that reproof be salutary, and that correction be made in the heart of the one reproved, so that he be established in the heavenly kingdom? He teaches the same in other passages to be adduced in the reply to the first and fifth arguments.
VII. The same opinion is held by St. Thomas, 3 Contra Gentiles, c. 149, where explaining these words of the Apostle: It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy,9 he says: Therefore by words of this kind the free choice of the will is not excluded, as some have badly understood, as though man were not the lord of his interior and exterior acts, but it is shown that he is subject to God. And ch. 160, explaining what he had said in the preceding chapter, namely that it is in the power of free choice to impede the reception of divine grace, or not to impede it, he adds: But what was said, that it is in the power of free choice to present no impediment to grace, applies to those in whom the natural power has been integral. But if through preceding disorder it has declined to evil, it will not be altogether in its power to present no impediment to grace. For although for some moment it can by its own power abstain from some particular act of sin; yet if it is left to itself for a long time, it will fall into sin, through which an impediment is presented to grace. And 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1. he says: that if something be said to be in the power of man, with the help of grace excluded; thus man is bound to many things which he cannot do without preparing grace; as to love God and neighbour, and similarly to believe the articles of faith. But yet this he can with the help of grace. From which passages it is evidently clear that, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, man's free choice has power and dominion over its act not from itself but from God, as from the first efficient and moving cause, and that it depends on him not only as regards the faculty of the power and the habitual dominion, but also as regards its actual use. He teaches the same in all the passages adduced above and to be adduced below, in which he asserts that created free choice, however perfect it be posited, can do nothing unless it be moved by God. But especially 1. 2. q. 109. ar. 2. ad 1., explaining how man has dominion over his act, he says: The mind of man, even when healthy, does not so have dominion over its act as not to need to be moved by God, and much more the free choice of man, weak after sin, by which it is impeded from good through the corruption of nature. By which words he quite openly teaches that created free choice does not have the first and absolute dominion over its act, but in the actual use of that dominion depends on the motion of God, who is the first and absolute lord of all, according to that word of Esther 13, You are Lord of all, nor is there anyone who can resist your majesty. And in book 1 Contra Gentiles, c. 68, after the fifth reason he confirms the same in these words: But the dominion which the will has over its acts, whereby it is in its power to will or not to will, excludes the determination of a power to one thing, and the violence of a cause acting from outside, but does not exclude the influence of a superior cause, from which it has its being and its acting: and so causality remains in the first cause, which is God, with respect to the motions of the will.
VIII. Secondly it is proved from that word of Prov. 21: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, that is, in the power of the Lord, like the divisions of waters, wherever he wills he turns it. By which words it is signified that the dominion of the heart, of the will, and of free choice, which the most powerful among temporal princes has, is subject and subjected, as regards all its motions, to the power and dominion of the divine free choice. Likewise also Rom. 9: It is not of him that wills, namely, to will, nor of him that runs, namely, to run, but of God that shows mercy: which words do not signify that man has no dominion and power over his willing and not willing, but declare that man does not have the first and absolute dominion over his willing and not willing; but that God alone is the first and absolute Lord of our actions, and that our willing and not willing is in his power, and depends on his nod and will. With which agrees that word of Jerem. 10: I know, Lord, that the way of man is not his, nor is it for a man to walk and direct his steps.
Thirdly it is proved by reason: for, as St. Thomas teaches, dominion is the faculty of using a thing, but no creature has the power of using its own choice from itself, but every actual use of free choice, with respect to any good act, is from God, as was shown above: therefore no creature has the first and absolute dominion over its act, but such dominion is only with God, and consequently, in the actual use of this dominion it depends on God as on a prior cause per se efficient. To all the arguments made from the beginning the answer is that they prove only the first conclusion: but insofar as they seem to impugn the second and the third, each must be satisfied.
IX. To the first the answer is that St. Augustine expressly teaches our opinion, as is clear from the passages adduced for the third conclusion. And to the testimonies adduced to the contrary Augustine himself replies, book 1 of the Retractations, ch. 9, where he reports that those same testimonies had earlier been objected to him by Pelagius, who contended that Augustine was being drawn over to his own opinion, as is clear from the words of the same Augustine adduced in disput. 22. no. 28.10 And in ch. 10 of the same book, answering the objected testimonies, he says: But what I said: That light, however, does not feed the eyes of irrational animals, but the pure hearts of those who believe in God, and turn themselves from the love of visible and temporal things to the fulfilling of his commandments, which all men can do if they will, let not the new Pelagian heretics think that it was said in accordance with them. For it is altogether true that all men can do this if they will; but the will is prepared by the Lord, and is so increased by the gift of charity that they can. Which was not said here for this reason, because it was not necessary for the present question. And ch. 22 of the same book: In another place I said: Unless each one, I say, has changed his will, he cannot do good, which the Lord teaches in another place to be placed in our power, where he says: Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree evil, and its fruit evil.11 Which is not against the grace of God which we preach. For it is in the power of man to change his will for the better: but that power is nothing unless it be given by God, of whom it was said: He gave them power to become sons of God.12 For since that is in our power which we do when we will, nothing is so in our power as the will itself; but the will is prepared by the Lord. In this way, then, he gives the power. Thus also is to be understood what I said afterwards, that it is in our power either to merit being grafted into the goodness of God or to merit being cut off by his severity; because nothing is in our power except what follows our will. And when the will is prepared by the Lord, strong and powerful, the work of piety is easily accomplished, even what was difficult and impossible. The opinion of St. Augustine, then, is that man's free choice has power and dominion over its act, but does not have this power and dominion from itself, but from God, as from the first and absolute Lord, from whom all good things proceed, whether great or very small or middling; lest anyone glory in himself but in the Lord; as the Apostle says: What do you have that you have not received? But if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?13
X. To the second the answer is similarly that St. Thomas indeed confesses that man through will and reason has dominion over his act: but not the first and absolute dominion, as is clear from what has been said above; and especially in the second book of the Sentences, which is the first passage adduced for the opposite opinion, he expressly insinuated this when he said: There remains to man dominion over his act, although not as to the first agent; as if he were saying that man does not have the first and absolute dominion over his act, but that this dominion resides only with God. And to what is objected from the reply to the first, the answer is that St. Thomas from this, that the determination of his act is not from another but from himself, rightly infers that God is most truly the Lord of his work; yet it is not necessarily required, in order that man be lord of his act, that the determination of that same act not be in him from another, namely from God; but it suffices that man himself through free choice be the proximate cause of the determination of his act. Nor is it unfitting that this determination be first in the power of God, as was shown above. And by these things the answer is clear to the other passages of St. Thomas brought forward in the first argument.
What is necessary for the freedom of the act.— Secondly the answer is that, in order that someone be most truly, or most perfectly, lord of his act, it is necessarily required that his determination be not from another but only from himself. Whence God alone is most perfectly Lord of his act; because his dominion is wholly independent of another. Whence St. Thomas with great care added that adverb, most truly; for he did not say, because the determination of his act is not from another but from himself, therefore God is lord of his work; but he added: Whence he himself is most truly the Lord of his work; that is, most perfectly. Whence St. Thomas can be explained so that his meaning is that for the freedom of choice it is required that its determination be not so totally from another as to exclude the free cooperation of the choice, by which, as a proximate cause, it concurs from itself, that is from an intrinsic principle, to the determination of that same act. And by these things the answer is given to the confirmation. And to what is objected in the same confirmation, namely that that causal statement of St. Thomas would be false, namely: Because the determination of his act is not from another but from himself, therefore God is the Lord of his work; the answer is, first, that St. Thomas added that word, therefore most truly, that is in the most perfect way, he is Lord of his work. Secondly the answer is that even if he had not added that particle, the causal statement would still be true: for, for its truth, it is not required that whoever is lord of his act be so the cause of it that such a determination be only from himself and not from another. Just as this causal statement is true: Because Peter is a man, Peter is an animal; yet it is not permitted from that same causal statement to infer that, in order that something be an animal, it must be a man; for it can be an animal even if it is not a man.
XI. A power unimpeded for acting is said in two ways.— To the third the answer is that a power can be called proximate and unimpeded for acting in two ways. First, because nothing else is required on the part of the power itself by which it be constituted in first act to act actually, or to will and not will; and in this way free choice, all things required for acting having been posited, can by a proximate and unimpeded power act and not act, will and not will. Whence St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 83. art. 2. ad 2., says that faculty sometimes names a power unimpeded for acting, and thus it is placed in the definition of free choice. In the second way a faculty or power can be called proximate and unimpeded for acting, because in its operation it does not depend on another prior cause efficiently granting it to cooperate or to concur actually; and in this sense no secondary cause, however perfect it be posited, is in itself, and with divine premotion excluded, unimpeded for acting; because, as was said above from St. Thomas, no secondary cause, however perfect, can go forth into its act except by the power of the divine motion.
XII. To the fourth the answer is that man is not said to have dominion, or free choice, with respect to that which is in no way in his power, nor depends on his will; but free acts, whether they be natural or supernatural, are in the power of created free choice; yet not with the power excluded which God, as the first and absolute lord, has over those same acts. But when the acts are proportionate to free choice, man has power over those same acts through the natural faculty of free choice which he received through creation; although, in order that this power go forth into act, the general prior concurrence of God is necessarily required, as was said above.14 But if they are supernatural, or exceeding the natural powers of free choice, it does not have the faculty, or power from the powers of nature, to produce those acts; but this power belongs to it through the help of grace; as St. Thomas says, 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1. But what we can do through friends, we are said to be able to do through ourselves, as Aristotle says, 3 Ethics, c. 3.
To the confirmation the answer is that it concludes only that freedom by essence, and independent of another prior cause, is found only in God, who is simply the first free being, on whom consequently, as on a prior cause per se efficient, depends every created freedom, and its actual use.
Predestination and the efficacy of grace do not take away the necessity of exhortations and of preaching.— To the fifth the answer is that the same argument was once objected against the doctrine of St. Augustine, to which nevertheless the holy Doctor replies in these words:15 I think that Cyprian and Ambrose, whose testimonies we have set down as so brilliant, ought to suffice and to be sufficient for both ends, that is, that believing in all things, they should preach in all things the gratuitous grace of God as it is to be believed and preached: and that they should not think that same preaching adverse to the preaching by which we exhort the sluggish, or reprove the wicked: because these men too, when they so preached the grace of God that one of them said that one should glory in nothing, since nothing is ours; and the other, that our heart and our thoughts are not in our power, yet did not cease to exhort and reprove, that the divine commandments might be done. Nor did they fear lest it be said to them: Why do you exhort us? Why do you reprove us, if we have no good thing that is ours, and if our heart is not in our power?