De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

Introduction

Disputatio CXV: What the legitimate definition and proper nature of free choice are.

Disputatio CXVI: Whether indifference belongs to the essence of a free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.

Whether indifference is of the essence of the free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.

It is proved, first, that the freedom of choice does not consist in any indifference: for all indifference is either passive or active; but the freedom of choice does not consist formally in passive indifference, nor in active indifference: therefore in none. The minor is proved, as to the first part: for otherwise man would not have a greater or other indifference than a staff; since a staff also has passive indifference, so as to be moved upward or downward, to the right or to the left, by another: and so free choice would behave like some inanimate thing, receiving a motion caused by another: and consequently formal freedom would be in God, moving free choice to one part or the other, and not in the free choice that is moved, which is repugnant to the definition of the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 5, and canon 4. As to the second part it is proved: for created free choice is predetermined efficiently to its act, prior in the order of nature to its performing any act, as has been shown in disputations 22 and 23; therefore in the instant in which it acts, or in what is prior in the order of nature, it does not have active indifference so as to determine itself, or to be able to determine itself, to either side; for what is determined by another is not actively indifferent to determining itself or not determining itself: for what determines itself is understood as undetermined before it determines itself: therefore active indifference is not intrinsic to free choice, at least to created free choice.

It is confirmed. Throughout the whole time in which the will produces a free act, it truly has freedom in respect of that act, and yet throughout that whole time it does not have indifference to either side, since it is already determined to one of the opposites: therefore active indifference is not of the essence of freedom.

Secondly. In God there is the most perfect free choice, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 19 art. 10, and book 1 contra Gentiles ch. 88, and yet in him there can be no indifference: for indifference denotes potentiality to having contrary or diverse acts successively, which cannot belong to God; otherwise he would be mutable, against that word of James 1: With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration: therefore indifference is not of the intrinsic notion of free choice as such, and according to its common notion.

Thirdly. Christ the Lord freely obeyed even unto death, and yet, the commandment being supposed, his free choice did not have indifference to obeying and not obeying: otherwise he could have sinned: therefore indifference to either side is not of the intrinsic notion of free choice.

Fourth: for the evil angel now in fact sins: therefore he acts freely; for sin cannot be without freedom: and yet he does not have indifference in his free choice to sinning or not sinning; or to doing evil or not doing it: for his choice is obstinate in evil: therefore indifference to either side is not necessarily required for freedom.

II. Fifth. And it is proved that at least the indifference of the object and of the judgment of reason does not suffice for freedom: for God, since he is the author and Lord of the created will, can, in whatever way he has willed, move the will, impel it, necessitate it, or prevent it from going forth into a free act and make it go forth into a necessary act; for it is said in Prov. 21: The heart of the king is in the hand of God; like the divisions of waters, he will turn it wherever he wills: therefore even if the object be indifferent and the judgment of reason indifferent, he will be able to necessitate the will to will that object.

Sixth. All the holy Doctors require for the free use of the will this condition on God's part, namely that he allow it to be moved in its own proper way. They suppose therefore that God can, according to the efficacy of his power, prevent that manner of acting if he wills: therefore the indifference of the object, or of the judgment of reason, is not enough for the use of free choice; but it is also necessary that force or necessity not be brought in by an extrinsic agent.

Seventh. The heretics, especially Calvin, do not deny that we act from a perfect judgment and with advertence of reason: for they experience that they are not coerced by the objects themselves, nor suffer necessity; yet they deny that we act freely, on the ground that God by his omnipotent will imposes necessity on us; and in this they are not reproved by Catholics for asserting something that even in the matter itself involves a contradiction or repugnance, or exceeds the omnipotence of God; but they are refuted because it is established from the divine Scriptures and other principles of faith that God does not ordinarily deal with us with that efficacy and omnipotence of his, nor is that consonant with his most wise and most sweet providence.

III. On the contrary is the definition of freedom handed down and explained in the preceding disputation.

On this difficulty certain doctors report two ways of explaining the intrinsic indifference of freedom. The first is that this indifference is to be understood as only passive, namely in such a way that the power of willing and not willing is found in the created will only insofar as it is not of itself determined to willing this or that object, nor to willing or not willing the same object: but can be determined to either by another. Yet I would believe that there is no Catholic doctor who holds that the essential indifference of freedom, even as it is found in an intellectual creature, is only passive indifference; for otherwise indifference of this kind would be only for receiving an act produced by God alone in the created will, the will itself behaving merely passively: which is a heresy condemned against Luther in the Council of Trent, session 6, can. 4, on justification. For Luther, as was shown in disputation 3, no. 8, asserted: that free choice has no activity in good works, when we speak of the inward work: but behaves merely passively.

III. The second opinion, or the second way of explaining the indifference essential to freedom, is that of those who constitute the freedom of the will radically in the indifference of the judgment of reason, by which the intellect judges that the good proposed to the will as to be pursued does not have a necessary connection with the good in common, to which the will is naturally determined. When, therefore, the intellect proposes to the will an object with this indifference, then the will has formal freedom in respect of that same object; and if through such a judgment of reason it desires that object, it is always carried into it with freedom. Hence the authors of this opinion regard it as impossible that the will be moved by such a judgment of reason to love that object, and love it of necessity and without the use of freedom, however efficaciously it be moved by God.

IIII. Indifference is one thing negative, another privative.— Certain theologians regard this opinion as false, and they are refuted by the last three arguments from the facts set out at the beginning: yet to us it appears most true, and we judge that it is the express mind of St. Thomas. Hence for its understanding it must be noted, first, that indifference is twofold, one negative, the other privative. That is called indifferent with negative indifference which according to itself is not more determined to this object than to that, or to acting or not acting: and in this way the divine will, before it had decreed to create the world, was in that prior sign of reason, according to itself, indifferent to this part or to that: or even to creating or not creating another universe; because it was not more determined, according to itself, to one than to the other. But this indifference does not import in God any privation of any perfection: for God is not perfected in himself by determining himself to produce something outside himself; but the whole perfection is placed in the creatures which are produced into being by the divine will; and therefore God loved them and produced them freely, because creatures do not have a necessary connection with the divine good; so that without them the divine good is not preserved; to love which the divine will is naturally determined. Hence St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 19 art. 3 ad 5, says that the divine will, which of itself has necessity, freely determined itself to an object to which it has a non-necessary relation. That is called privatively indifferent which is capable of being perfected and determined by some act, whether it be determined and perfected by itself, or by another, or be perfected at once by itself and by another; and indifference of this kind presupposes in the power itself some imperfection or potentiality: hence this indifference can belong only to a created power: which St. Thomas also explained in 1 contra Gentiles ch. 82 in these words: To be directed to either of two things can belong to a power in two ways. In one way on its own part; in another way on the part of that to which it is said to be directed. On its own part indeed, when it has not yet attained its perfection, by which it would be determined to one: hence this redounds to the imperfection of the power, and it is shown that there is potentiality in it, as is clear in the doubting intellect, which has not yet attained the principles from which it would be determined to the one or the other. But on the part of that to which it is said to be directed, a power is found to be directed to either of two things when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither, but yet either can be: as when someone can use different instruments equally for accomplishing the same work; but this does not pertain to the imperfection of the power, but rather to its eminence, insofar as it exceeds either of the opposites, and on that account is determined to neither, but is related to either. And so it is in the divine will in respect of things other than itself: for its end does not depend on any of the others, while nevertheless it is most perfectly united to its end: therefore it is not necessary to posit any potentiality in the divine will. Let the holy Doctor be consulted, q. 24 On Truth, art. 3, in the body, where he assigns the difference between divine, angelic and human free choice.

V. Indifference is one thing passive, another active.— It must be noted, secondly, that the indifference of a power is sometimes joined to a purely passive power, as is the indifference which prime matter has to this substantial form or to that, and the indifference of a subject in respect of the whiteness or blackness which it receives. For this indifference is only passive; because neither does prime matter concur effectively to the production of a substantial form, nor does the subject concur actively to the production of whiteness, but only in the genus of material cause. Sometimes, however, it is joined to an active power, as is the indifference which a craftsman has to making or not making some artifact; or even to making this or that artifact. Thirdly, indifference can be joined to a power which is partly active and partly passive; or is passive in order to one thing and active in order to another: as the intellect, in order to the species produced by the object, has the character of a passive power, because it receives that species into itself; but in order to the act of understanding it has active indifference. Similarly the will, in order to the production of a free act, has active indifference, and insofar as it receives into itself the immanent acts which it produces, it has some character of a passive power.

VI. Passive or privative indifference is not of the essence of free choice.— First conclusion. Passive or privative indifference is not of the intrinsic notion of free choice, if it be considered according to the common notion, which belongs analogically to God and to intellectual creatures. In this conclusion all theologians agree, and the second argument from the facts at the beginning proves it: for in God is found whatever pertains to the common notion of wisdom; since wisdom is a perfection simply, which is found formally in God; but freedom also is a perfection simply existing formally in God: therefore whatever pertains to the common, formal and essential notion of freedom must be found in the divine freedom; but no passive or privative indifference belongs to it, nor can it belong to it, as has been said, otherwise God would not be pure act, nor infinitely perfect: therefore.

Negative and active indifference is of the essence of free choice.— Second conclusion. Negative indifference, and active indifference, which imports being able to act and being able not to act; or being able to act this or that, is of the intrinsic notion of freedom. This conclusion is likewise commonly received among theologians, and it is established from the definition of freedom handed down in the preceding disputation, and will be clear from the fourth conclusion.

VII. Created choice has some passive indifference.— Third conclusion. In every created free choice, by the very fact that it is created, there is found some indifference, or passive power, according to some aspect. This conclusion is also certain, and it is proved. First: for every created free choice, since it is not pure act, nor free by essence as God is, but by participation, has some potentiality, which can be perfected by diverse acts; but every potentiality perfectible by diverse acts has some passive indifference in order to receiving those same acts: therefore.

Secondly. Every created free choice, as was said above from Augustine, is by its nature peccable and defectible, because it was made from nothing: therefore by its nature it is mutable from good into evil, from justice into sin: for sin cannot be except in free choice and from free choice; but every subject of change through diverse acts, insofar as it is a subject, has a power and some passive indifference in order to the reception of those acts: therefore.

Thirdly. Created free choice is not simply the first self-mover, but moves itself freely, yet moved by God prior in the order of reason, as we showed in disputations 18 and 23: therefore, although in order to the production of a free operation it has active indifference, yet in order to the divine motion by which it is moved by God to determine itself freely and to produce those acts, it has some indifference and passive power: therefore in every created free choice there is found some passive indifference conjoined to active indifference.

VIII. The indifference which is the essence of freedom.— Fourth conclusion. The formal freedom of created choice does not consist formally in objective indifference, nor in passive indifference, but in the active indifference of the free faculty itself, which is related indifferently to opposites; although it has joined to it, or presupposes, some passive indifference of the power itself, and the indifference of the object. The conclusion is proved. First: for free choice is essentially and per se an active power, as St. Thomas teaches, q. 24 On Truth, art. 4, especially in the reply to the eighteenth: therefore the essential indifference of freedom must be active: therefore the essence of freedom cannot consist in passive indifference. Secondly it is proved from the definition of free choice; for it is a faculty of the will and of reason toward either of two, or the faculty of willing and not willing; of choosing this means or that in order to the end: but to will and not to will, to choose this or that, are actions of an active power: therefore the indifference in which the freedom of choice formally consists must be formally active indifference.

IX. The indifference of the object and of the judgment of reason is the root of freedom.— Fifth conclusion. The indifference of the object, or objective indifference, and the indifference of the judgment of reason, by which the intellect proposes to the will the object itself as to be loved not of necessity but with the active indifference of the will itself toward either of two — namely because it judges that such a proposed object does not have a necessary connection with the end and with the good to love which the will is naturally determined — is the root of freedom, which formally resides in the will, in such a way that it is impossible for the will through that judgment to be carried into such an object and to will it without freedom. And so if the will wills that object so proposed, it is necessary that it will it freely and not of absolute necessity. This conclusion is against certain theologians who teach that God can by his absolute power necessitate the will, and bring it about that it is carried without freedom into an object indifferent in itself and proposed to the will as to be loved through an indifferent judgment of reason, in the manner explained above. Yet our conclusion is the mind of St. Thomas, 2 p. q. 17 art. 1 ad 2, where he says that the will can be carried to diverse things for this reason, that reason can have diverse conceptions of good; and 1 p. q. 83 art. 1 in the body he says that because the judgment of reason is related to diverse things and is not determined to one, for that very reason it is necessary that man be of free choice, from this very fact that he is rational. By which words St. Thomas openly teaches that it is impossible for the will to will something under a judgment of reason that is related indifferently to opposites, and to will it of absolute necessity and not freely.

Moreover it is proved by reason: for the object of the will is the good apprehended through the intellect: therefore it is impossible for the will of absolute necessity to love any good unless the intellect proposes that good to the same will as to be loved of absolute necessity: therefore if it proposes it as to be loved not of absolute necessity but with the indifference to opposites explained above, it will be impossible even by the absolute power of God that the will, through that judgment, tend into that good and yet love it of absolute necessity and not freely.

X. The indifference of free choice in respect of divine help is passive, but in respect of the free action it is active.— To the first argument from the facts at the beginning it is answered that created free choice, in order to the prior motion by which it is moved by God to determine itself freely, behaves passively, insofar as it receives that same motion into itself: hence the indifference which it has in respect of that same motion is passive; but in respect of the free operation which it produces as moved by God, it has active indifference, and in this indifference freedom essentially consists; not, however, in the first, although it presupposes it, as has been said. And to the passage of the Council adduced it is answered that it openly confirms what we have said. For when it says that free choice is moved by God, it does not obscurely indicate the power and passive indifference which it has in respect of the motion of prevenient grace which it receives; and when it adds that it cooperates freely with God moving it, so that it can dissent if it wills, it most clearly teaches that in free choice moved and stirred by God there is active indifference in respect of that same cooperation: which indifference consists in this, that it can perform and not perform that act, absolutely speaking. And, in order to show that the indifference of created choice is so active as to have some passive indifference joined to it, the Council does not define absolutely that free choice in no way behaves passively, but defines that it does not behave merely passively, as some inanimate thing, so as to do nothing at all freely in the same instant of time in which it receives the divine inspiration. To the other point touched in the same argument — for what is determined by another does not determine itself — it is answered that, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 83 art. 1 ad 3, and 2 p. q. 9 art. 2 in the body, although the will moves itself, nevertheless before it moves itself it is moved by God; because the created will is a mover that is moved, and is not simply the first self-mover, just as Peter's father is truly the cause of Peter, but not the first cause: for he has another, prior cause. Proportionably we say in the present case that the created will determines itself, freely producing the second act, by which it is formally determined in second act; but because it is not simply the first free thing, nor the first self-determining thing, it is predetermined by God in the ultimate complement of the first act to determine itself in the second act by producing a free operation. Hence St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 2, to certain objectors who said that freedom is destroyed if it be said that free choice is acted upon by God, answers: Let them understand, if they are sons of God, that they are acted upon by the Spirit of God; so that they may do what is to be done; and when they have done it, let them give thanks to him by whom they are acted upon: for they are acted upon so that they may act, not so that they themselves may do nothing. And he says the same in other places adduced in disputation 18, no. 16.

XI. The will, in the instant in which it wills, is free to will and not to will.— To the confirmation, Ockham in 1 Sent. d. 38 q. 1, and Gabriel in the same distinction, answer that the will, in that instant in which it elicits volition, is not free not to elicit it, or to elicit the contrary act. This opinion, however, is false, as will be clear at the end of this disputation: for, as we were saying above, the freedom of choice in second act is more perfect than freedom in first act. Moreover: for otherwise the first act of the will would never be free; and consequently would not be meritorious. It is proved: for that act is not free before it is elicited, since it does not exist; nor is it free after it has been produced, for there is no power over the past: therefore if it is not free in the instant in which it is produced by the will, it will never be free. It is answered therefore otherwise: that although the will is under one act, it nevertheless remains still with the power to elicit the opposite act, as has been said above; and therefore it remains free in respect of that same act even in the instant in which it produces it: although it cannot in the composite sense not bring it about.

In the will of God there is no passive or privative indifference.— To the second it is answered that in God there can be no passive or privative indifference; there is, however, active indifference together with the indifference of a secondary object, which does not have a necessary connection with the divine good: and this indifference suffices for God to will freely and not of necessity that creatures exist, as St. Thomas shows, 1 p. q. 19 art. 3.

XII. To the third it is answered that the death of Christ the Lord, in order to his will, was an indifferent object, because by its nature it did not have a necessary connection with the good to which the human will of Christ was naturally determined; hence, through an indifferent judgment of reason, his intellect proposed to his will that death itself was to be accepted; and therefore he died freely and obeyed freely; and consequently, simply speaking, he had the faculty for either side, namely for accepting and for refusing death, although, the commandment being supposed, it was incompossible with that same commandment that he should will not to die. But the argument still presses. Christ the Lord did not have the faculty to obey the commandment and not to obey it; otherwise he could have sinned: for disobedience and transgression of a commandment cannot be without sin: therefore in respect of obedience, formally speaking, he did not have an indifferent faculty for either side: therefore he did not obey freely. It is answered that Christ the Lord not only died freely, but also freely obeyed the commandment to die imposed on him; otherwise he would not have merited formally by the act of obedience, since for such merit it is necessarily required that the obedience be free. But the consequent is against that word of the Apostle, Phil. 2: He humbled himself, etc., for which cause God also hath exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above all names. XIII. To the attack made it is answered that 'not to obey' can be taken in two ways. In the first way contrarily, or privatively, as it signifies the same as to disobey, or to sin by the sin of disobedience; and in this way Christ the Lord could not not obey. In the second way it is taken negatively, as it signifies the mere negation of the act of obedience, which negation can be said of what is and of what is not, and can belong to someone without any sin, even when no commandment exists: as if Peter, for example, does not hear the sacred rite on the second or third ferial day, when there is no commandment to hear Mass, it is most truly asserted that Peter then did not obey the commandment to hear Mass, if 'not to obey' be taken merely negatively, because it is truly so that he did not perform the act of obedience of hearing Mass, since there was no commandment and he did not hear Mass. And in this way Christ the Lord was able not to obey in the negative sense, because he could have no commandment to die; just as this negative is in fact true: Christ did not obey unto the death of decapitation; nor did he obey by undergoing death in the fifteenth year of his age; because in truth he had no commandment to undergo the death of decapitation: and in this sense Christ had the faculty to obey and not to obey. And this faculty for contradictory opposites suffices for him to have obeyed freely: for we have already said above that the power to sin, or to disobey, does not pertain to the formal notion of freedom, but to its imperfection, according as it is found in a defectible creature. If it be said: for, the commandment being supposed, he could not not obey, even negatively: therefore even the decree and the commandment being supposed, he did not have an indifferent faculty to obey and not to obey, even negatively, and so he did not obey freely. It is answered that, the commandment being present and presupposed, he could not in the composite sense not obey negatively, because he would also consequently disobey contrarily: hence, just as he then could not disobey contrarily, so also he could not in the composite sense not obey negatively: yet it does not follow from this that he did not obey freely: for it suffices for freedom that he could obey and not obey negatively, absolutely speaking.

XIV. The demons are obstinate in evil, and nevertheless they sin freely.— To the fourth it is answered that although the evil angel is obstinate in sin, yet he is obstinate by an operation perfectly free, by which he determined himself to such an election with the highest knowledge of the indifference of the means to the end, and of all the circumstances. Yet because his free choice, after it has once determined itself to something with perfect freedom, is by its nature inflexible, therefore he cannot recover from the evil which he once chose with full freedom: this, however, does not diminish his freedom; rather it is a sign of greater freedom: for man, because he is rational by nature, can afterwards refuse what he once chose, while he is on the way; since after the first election new reasons can offer themselves to him, and new knowledge of some circumstances, on account of which he could reject that good which he once chose. Similarly we have an example of this also in God, who, after he has freely determined himself to do something, cannot change his counsel or choose the opposite, on account of the immutability of the divine will and the infinity of his knowledge, which knows all things in one most simple act: and yet he freely produces outside himself what he willed; on which see also St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 19 art. 3 and art. 7 ad 4. Proportionably we say of the angels that, before they adhere, they can adhere to this object and to the opposite; but after they have adhered to some object with perfect freedom, they now adhere to it immovably, as St. Thomas says, 1 p. q. 64 art. 1; and yet, absolutely speaking, they adhere freely to that same object: for from the beginning the act proceeds from the power not of necessity, but according to the mode of freedom. Other arguments which could be objected against the fifth conclusion have already been adduced by us and solved in disputations 18, 22 and 23.

XV. A doubt now offers itself as an appendix, which we touched on in passing above: whether the will, in the instant in which it elicits some act, is truly free in comparison with that same act, or in respect of eliciting the contrary act, if it wills.

The first opinion is that of those who assert that the will, in the instant in which it elicits volition, is not free not to elicit it, or to elicit the contrary act: and similarly, in the instant in which it elicits the nolition of some object, it is not free to will the same object: and they add that only before that instant is there freedom in it, so that it may elicit the volition of that object, or the nolition, as it has pleased it. So think Ockham in the first book of the Sentences, dist. 38, question 1, Gabriel in the same distinction and question, and certain others of the nominalists. This opinion is proved: for the will, in the instant in which it wills some object, cannot not will it; because it cannot at once will and not will the same object: therefore in that same instant there is not in it freedom to not will the same object. The consequence is proved: for, as has been said above, freedom is a faculty of the will and of reason toward opposites: therefore if in the instant in which it wills some object there is not in it the faculty to not will the same object, it follows that in that same instant there is not in it freedom to will and not will the same object.

Secondly it is proved: because, as Aristotle teaches in book 1 of the Perihermenias, ch. 6, Everything that is, while it is, is of necessity: therefore in the instant in which the volition of some object is in the nature of things, it cannot not be, and consequently there is not in the will the faculty or freedom for that same volition not to be, or for the opposite nolition of the same object to be.

Thirdly. Over a past action there is no power, and consequently no freedom, for it not to be; because it already has being outside its causes: therefore neither is there freedom in respect of a present operation for it not to be: for it too already has being outside its causes.

XVI. The second opinion is that of others who, rejecting Ockham's opinion, affirm on the one hand that the will, in the instant in which it elicits the volition of some object, is truly free in comparison with that same volition; but on the other hand, in order to defend such freedom, they have recourse to a priority of nature, in which the will is understood as indifferent to either part before it determines itself to one. For they say that the will, at whatever point of time it arrives, precedes its act by priority of nature, as any other cause precedes its effect: for it is prior in the order of nature that the will exist at any point of time, than that the act emanate from it in that same point. But this priority of nature has a true foundation in the thing. Since, therefore, the will is by its own nature a free cause, that is, one in whose power it is to will or not to will, or to hold back the act altogether and will nothing, then at whatever point of time it exists, in that prior of the same point in which it is conceived with a foundation in the thing as by order of nature antecedent to its act, it is in its power either to do nothing at all, or to elicit volition or nolition, as it has preferred. And by this reasoning they defend that the present operation is elicited freely by the will. They confess, however, that by this very fact — that the will later in the order of nature freely determines itself to one part of the contradiction — it can no longer determine itself to the other, or be subject to it.

XVII. This opinion, however, seems to differ little or not at all from Ockham's opinion, nor does it sufficiently explain the reason why the will is truly free in comparison with the present operation: for according to it the will would be free only in the prior of nature, in which it is considered before it elicits volition or nolition, but not in the instant of time in which it elicits it; and consequently the present operation would be free only in its cause, and not formally in itself, which would be to fall back into Ockham's opinion, which they attack.

Moreover: for the instant of nature is not an instant in which, but one from which: therefore, if the will is not free for either part of the contradiction or contrariety in the instant of time in which it determines itself to one part, but only in the prior of nature in which it is considered before it determines itself, it follows that in no instant of time does the will freely elicit its volition or nolition.

Nor does it satisfy if it be answered that the will can continue the present operation and desist from it, and for that reason is free: for besides that the authors of the first opinion do not deny this but expressly affirm it, by this alone freedom would be saved in the will, in comparison with the prosecution of the act, which pertains to future time; but not in comparison with the present operation as it takes place in this present instant.

XVIII. The will is free even in the very instant in which it acts.— It must be said, therefore, in accordance with what we premised in the preceding disputation, that our will is truly free in comparison with the volition or nolition which it elicits at any moment or instant of time; and that it is truly free not only for the reason that, prior in the order of nature to its determining itself to one part, it could refrain from determining itself to that same part and determine itself to the opposite; nor only because it can continue or desist from the operation which it produces in the instant of present time; but also because in the instant of time in which it elicits its operation it retains a true power and faculty by which it can not elicit it if it wills, or also elicit the contrary operation.

This opinion is proved by the authority of St. Anselm, in the book On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination, ch. 1, where he establishes the difference between the past on the one hand and the present and the future on the other: for in a past thing not only does the power or freedom no longer remain for the past not to be past at the same time, but it can no longer even come about that that thing which is past should not be past. But concerning the present and the future, power and freedom are otherwise: for although there is no power by which it could come about that the present should not be present at the same time, or the future should not be future, there is nevertheless power for the thing which is present not to be present, and for the thing which is future not to be future: therefore according to Anselm the present operation, elicited by the will, is subject to its power and freedom just as a future operation is: but in comparison with a future operation the will truly has the power and freedom by which it can elicit it or not elicit it, or also elicit the contrary operation: therefore it has the same power and freedom in comparison with the present operation. They answer by restricting the authority of Anselm to the present insofar as it has something in common with the future, namely that it can still be continued and remain, or cease to be. For they say that the present agrees in part with the past and in part with the future. For it has actual being outside its causes, in which respect it agrees with the past, and on this side it is now subject to no power for it not to be outside them: for we say that an effect remains in the power of someone, to be or not to be, for as long as it is not outside its causes but is still indifferent: therefore the thing which is present cannot now not be present, and this (they say) Anselm would not deny. But besides this the present has something in common with the future, which in no way belongs to a thing already past, namely that it can still be continued and remain, or cease: and on this side Anselm said that a present thing is subject to our freedom just as a future one. But the future, since it has nothing outside its causes while it is still future, remains altogether freely in our power. XIX. This explanation, however, does not seem to be the mind of Anselm: for according to it the present operation would be subject to the power and freedom of the will only according to what it has of the future, namely according to continuation or cessation, which in truth does not belong to the operation according to the first instant in which it begins to be, but according to future time; and consequently the difference of St. Anselm between a present and a past operation would be none, and he ought not to have assigned it between the past on the one hand and the future on the other; for according to the explanation given, a present thing, according to all that it has for the instant of present time, agrees with the past as regards this, that it is not subject to the power of the will for it not to be. This is confirmed, and the force of this argument is more fully opened: for the present operation elicited by the will, considered according to all that it has for the instant of present time, is more perfectly free than a future operation. For the present operation is free in second act; but the future, as future, is free only in first act, or in potency: but that which is actually such is more perfect than that which is such only in potency: but the future operation, while it is future, as the authors of the solution which we are attacking confess, remains altogether in our free power and freedom, according to the opinion of Anselm: therefore much more perfectly does the present operation of the will remain in our power and freedom, according to all that it has for the present instant.

Finally, against the authors of the second opinion the argument suggested above from the Council of Trent presses, which in my judgment seems most effective; for speaking of a man who actually consents and cooperates with God stirring and calling him, it defines that he can dissent, if he wills, and from this it proves that he consents freely: therefore according to the definition of the sacred Council not only in the prior of nature, in which the will is considered before it elicits consent, but also in that same instant of time in which it consents, it truly can dissent, if it wills: therefore in that same instant it consents freely. Moreover: for if the will, absolutely speaking, in the instant of time in which it consents, cannot dissent if it wills, it follows that, simply speaking, it consents necessarily and not freely; for that is called necessary which cannot be otherwise absolutely.

If it be said that, from the supposition that the will consents, it is necessary in the composite sense that it consent, since it is impossible for the will in respect of the same object at once to consent and not consent, or to dissent: against this is the fact that necessity on a supposition, or in the composite sense, is not to be called necessity absolutely, but in a certain respect, as was shown in disputation 25, and consequently the act which is said to be necessary only on a supposition is compatible with a true and real power, which could not produce that act but elicit the opposite, if it wills.

XX. By these things, however, the first argument from the facts at the beginning remains solved; for we say that, although in a man in the instant in which he elicits consent there is not freedom, or a free faculty, for eliciting dissent at the same time as consent, yet in that same instant there is in him a free power and faculty for eliciting, concerning the same object, dissent and consent divisively. For, as has been said above, in free choice there is a faculty for opposites; yet there is not a faculty for having or eliciting opposites at the same time: nor is such a faculty required for freedom; otherwise it would imply a contradiction that some act be free not only in its exercise, but also in the very faculty of the power.

To the second it is answered, with St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 14 art. 13, that that proposition of Aristotle, Everything that is, while it is, is of necessity, is to be understood not of the necessity of a thing existing considered absolutely in itself, but as it supposes the thing to exist, as if it were said: An existing thing is existing; but this necessity does not take away the freedom or contingency of the thing considered absolutely and in itself.

To the third it is answered that over a past action there is no power nor freedom, because that being of the past thing outside its causes has now totally ceased; and because there is no return from privation to habit by nature, therefore free choice has no freedom or faculty by which it could bring it about that a past volition was not in the nature of things. But the being outside its causes, which belongs to the operation of the will in any present instant, is truly in the making, and proceeds from the will itself as from an efficient cause according to the mode of freedom. Since, therefore, a free power has this from its own intrinsic notion, that it so elicits consent that it can truly not elicit it but the contrary dissent, if it wills, as is established from the Council of Trent, therefore in the will in that same instant in which it elicits consent there is true freedom and faculty by which it can not elicit it but the contrary dissent, if it wills; although, the consent standing, it will never in fact elicit the contrary dissent in that same instant, just as was said above of efficacious help to consent, which he who receives infallibly consents, and can truly dissent if he wills; but in fact will not dissent.

Secondly it is answered that the argument concludes only that there is not in free choice freedom or faculty for bringing it about that its present operation at once be and not be: for that is altogether infactible even by God; but it does not prove that in the instant of time in which free choice consents it cannot, absolutely speaking, or in the divided sense, dissent, if it wills.

Disputatio CXVII: Whether created free choice truly and properly has mastery over its act, and what such mastery is.

Disputatio CXVIII: Whether the harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.

Disputatio CXIX: Whether at least by God’s absolute power a creature, without the beatific vision, can have evident knowledge of the mysteries that belong in themselves to faith.

Disputatio CXX: In which various ways of reconciling free choice with grace proposed by different doctors are presented and refuted.

Disputatio CXXI: In which the legitimate harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine predestination and the efficacy of the helps of grace is established and defended.

Epilogue of almost everything said in the preceding disputations, containing twenty propositions.

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