De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Book Eleven
Book Twelve
Introduction
Disputatio CXV: What the legitimate definition and proper nature of free choice are.
What the legitimate definition of free choice is, and its proper nature.
I. Certain more recent Doctors have said that free choice is that which, all things required for acting having been posited, can act and not act, or can so do one thing that it can also do the contrary. This definition of free choice in this form is found neither in Aristotle, nor in the Master of the Sentences, nor in St. Thomas, but in some of the nominalists: which definition, although it can have a true and catholic sense, nevertheless in the sense in which it is explained by some does not seem able to stand. For they understand this definition thus: that, all things required antecedently to the free act having been posited, and also the actual influx by which the will flows into it, free choice can, even in the composite sense, perform that act and not perform it, but suspend it; or even elicit the contrary act. This opinion proceeds from a bad understanding of the composite and divided sense, which we treated ex professo in disputations 93 and 94. From this they infer that it is necessary for true freedom, and for the use of it, that the motion by which God moves the will to consent can at once stand in the same free choice, and be composed with the contrary dissent.
They prove this. First: for the inner force and intrinsic indifference of the free faculty demands it: for otherwise, if we interpret in the divided sense that word, can, as placed in the definition of free choice, the proper privilege of freedom will be destroyed. For the sense will be that with that power, and with all things required for acting, the act is so conjoined that, as far as lies in itself, the privation of the act could also be conjoined with it, if any one of the aforesaid requisites were removed. But this is not true freedom: for it can belong even to fire; for it so heats, when the wood is present, that it could cease if the wood were removed: therefore for true freedom it is necessarily required that, all things required for acting having been posited, it can act and not act even in the composite sense.
Second: for the blessed one, by absolute necessity and not freely — not with a will of contradiction or of contrariety — loves God clearly seen, and yet in the divided sense he can cease from the love of God, namely if he be deprived of the beatific vision, from which the act of love follows by necessity: therefore, for a free power with respect to some act, and for its free use, it does not suffice that, all things required for acting having been posited, it can in the divided sense not act, but it is necessary that it can do so also in the composite sense.
It is confirmed: for even if you include the very act of loving, he who actually loves can in the divided sense hate, just as a white thing can be black: therefore the power of acting and not acting, which is placed in the definition of free choice, is not to be understood in the divided sense, else man would not be more free and indifferent before he acts than while he acts.
II. Third: because if created free choice, all things required for acting having been posited, cannot in the composite sense not act — especially since one of the things required antecedently to our free act is God's efficacious motion, physically predetermining free choice to consent, which having been posited, such an act follows infallibly — but such a motion is not required antecedently to acting; otherwise he who did not have that motion could not act for lack of an active principle necessarily prerequired, and so the omission of the act would never be imputed to him as a fault, and he who has it could not not act, and so the freedom of our choice would perish altogether: therefore.
It is confirmed by all the arguments by which in disputation 23 we strove to prove that a physical predetermination of this kind is repugnant to created freedom, not only as regards its use, but also as regards the free faculty itself.
Fourth. In the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, on justification, it is said that, when God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, he freely receives that inspiration as one who can reject it. And canon 4 defines that free choice, moved and aroused by God, can dissent from that same motion, if it will. There the Council speaks of the man who is actually touched and actually moved by God: therefore it speaks in the composite sense. It holds, therefore, that for the freedom of choice it is necessary that, all things required for acting on God's part having been posited, free choice can still, by its innate freedom, act and not act, even in the composite sense.
It is confirmed from the fifteenth decree of faith of the Council of Sens, where, after teaching against the Pelagians that the created will needs the help of prevenient grace in order to turn itself to God, it adds against Luther: Nor does so great a necessity of grace prejudice free choice, since it is always at hand, nor does even a moment pass in which God does not stand at the door and knock; and if anyone opens the door to him, he will enter in to him and sup with her: nor, finally, is the help of the God who draws of such a kind that it cannot be resisted. And to prove that man can resist the help of the drawing God, the Council adduces the passage of Matthew 23: How often would I have gathered thy children, as the hen gathers her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldst not? And it also adduces what St. Stephen said to the Jews, Acts 7: You always resist the Holy Spirit. The Council holds, therefore, that man, even when moved by efficacious help, while that help stands, can conjoin actual resistance with the whole entity and intrinsic power of that same help, and consequently that he can resist it in the composite sense.
III. In a contingent and free cause there is at once a power to opposites, but not to opposites at once.— Now we, in order to assign the legitimate definition of free choice and explain its nature, must necessarily presuppose two foundations. It must be presupposed first that, as Aristotle teaches, and St. Thomas, 9 Metaph., lecture 10, in a contingent and free cause there is at once a power to either of two opposites; yet there is not a power to have opposites at once, just as in man there is at once a power to walk and to sit, yet there is no power to walk and sit at once; and the reason is: for the power to one act is not repugnant to the power to the contrary act, nor is it even repugnant to the contrary act; but contrary acts are repugnant to one another in the same subject. Hence created free choice, not only before it is determined to one act, but even in the very instant in which it is determined by God and determines itself to the same act, has at once the power by which it can freely produce the contrary act; yet it does not have the power to have the contrary act at once; for two contrary acts cannot be at once in the same power, but only successively. Hence arose that distinction commonly received by theologians and metaphysicians concerning the simultaneity of power and the power of simultaneity;1 for in free choice there is a simultaneity of power to act and not to act: for by the very fact that it performs one act, it does not destroy the free faculty and the power which it has to perform the contrary act, if it will, or not to act; and likewise by the fact that it does not perform such an act, it does not lose the power of performing that act; yet there is not in free choice, nor can there be, a power of simultaneity to contrary or contradictory acts: for these cannot be at once in the same thing. To explain this, then, that distinction of the composite and divided sense serves, which the Doctors commonly use, as was seen in disputation 25.
IV. In what sense free choice, all things required for operation having been posited, can act and not act.— It must be noted secondly that, when it is said that the free power is that which, all things required for acting having been posited, can act and not act even in the composite sense, this can be understood in two ways: first, so that the composition is made between the things prerequired for acting and the very power of acting and not acting: and then the sense is that the power to act and not to act stands at once in the same subject with the things antecedently prerequired for such an operation: and this sense is most true, as we shall explain afterwards. In the second way it can be understood so that the composition is made between the things antecedently prerequired for performing such an act and the privation of such act, or the contrary act itself: and then the sense is that all things prerequired, even on God's part, for performing such a particular act, and the privation of the same act, or the contrary act, can be, or sometimes are, at once in the same subject. In this sense, then, we intend to attack the aforesaid definition. Hence:
In free choice, together with all things prerequired for acting, the power of not acting stands at once.— FIRST CONCLUSION. For free choice it is necessarily required that, all things prerequired antecedently according to the order of reason or of time for the act having been posited, it can act or not act; namely so that with the same prerequired things there stands at once in free choice the faculty and power by which it can act if it will, or not act if it will. In this conclusion all Catholics agree: for it is held as defined in the Council of Trent, in the place cited above, against Luther and Calvin. For Luther asserted that free choice has itself merely passively, receiving into itself the free act produced by God alone: but Calvin said that man indeed concurs actively to the act which God produces in us, yet not with a free motion, but only a spontaneous one, and not under compulsion, as a horse runs when it is led by its rider.
Efficacious help does not take away from free choice the power of not acting.— It is proved further: for if any one of the things prerequired for performing such an act in particular took away from free choice the faculty, or power, of not acting, or of performing the opposite act, it would be the efficacious motion of God, by which we are predetermined to such an act, that did this; but a motion of this kind does not take away from free choice the faculty of not performing that act, or of performing the contrary act: it only brings it about that, although free choice can act and not act such an act, it nevertheless infallibly and freely performs it, as is clear from St. Prosper, who says:2 What God willed them to will, they willed; and to those who obey him he so gives the willing itself that he does not take away even from those who are to persevere that mutability by which one can will not. and St. Thomas, q. 23 de ver., a. 5 ad 3, says that although the non-being of the effect of the divine will cannot stand at once with the divine will, nevertheless the power of failing the effect stands at once with the divine will; for these are not incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man can be damned; but these are incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man is damned: and he says the same in q. 6 de ver., a. 3 ad 7. It is confirmed: since the power of dissenting and God's absolute decree, or the efficacious motion by which God moves free choice to consent, are not opposed to one another, as is clear from the foundations laid down: therefore the things prerequired on God's part for free choice to perform such an act do not take away from that same choice the faculty by which it can not act, if it will, or perform the contrary act. From these it follows that the will is free and has a true faculty by which it can absolutely act and not act, not only before it determines itself to act, but even in the very instant in which it acts: but of this we must treat in the following disputation.
V. It is not of the essence of free choice that, all things prerequired for acting having been posited, it can in the composite sense not act.— SECOND CONCLUSION. It is not of the reason or definition of free choice that, all things prerequired antecedently according to the order of causality for performing such an act having been posited, it can fail to perform the same act in the composite sense, if the composition be made between prerequired things of this kind and the privation of such act, or the contrary act. And so these two are at once incompatible, namely that in free choice, for some instant of time, there be all the things antecedently prerequired, according to the order of causality, for the production of such an act, and that it not produce it, but produce the contrary act: and nevertheless with this incompatibility the freedom of choice stands at once. This conclusion is according to the mind of St. Thomas, in the place cited above and in other places to be cited below, and it is proved: for among the things prerequired antecedently to the concurrence of free choice for man to produce an act (of love, for example) there is enumerated God's absolute and efficacious decree, by which he determined that free choice should produce such an act, and the efficacious help by which in time he premoves the will to the same act; but with the aforesaid decree and efficacious help it does not stand at once that free choice not produce that act of love, or elicit the contrary act of hatred, as is clear from St. Thomas, 2-2 q. 24, a. 11, in the body, where he says: That the power of the Holy Spirit works infallibly whatever it has willed. Hence it is impossible that these two be at once true, that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he lose charity by sinning. and p. 2 q. 112 a. 3 in the body he says that the preparation, according as it is from God moving, has necessity to that to which it is ordained by God; not indeed of compulsion, but of infallibility, because the intention of God cannot fail. Hence if it is from the intention of the moving God that the man whose heart he moves obtain grace, he infallibly obtains it, according to that of John 6. Everyone who has heard from the Father, and has learned, comes to me, etc. and St. Augustine, in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, ch. 95, says: Our God in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever he willed: which assuredly is not true if he willed some things and did them not, and (what is more unworthy) did them not because, that what the Almighty willed might not be done, the will of man hindered it: therefore, all things required for producing some act having been posited, it does not stand at once that free choice not produce that3 act, or elicit the contrary act.
VI. They answer that the absolute and efficacious decree by which God determined that Peter be converted is not altogether antecedent to Peter's future conversion, but presupposes it as future on the hypothesis that he will be placed in such circumstances, and foreknown by God through the knowledge which they call middle.4 Hence in the very decree of God there is already involved Peter's future consent on that hypothesis. Hence the argument proves nothing; for it does not proceed about the things which are antecedently prerequired for acting, but about the things which presuppose the future conversion. But this solution is attacked by the same arguments5 by which in disputation 7 we showed that that middle knowledge does not stand.
The efficacious decree does not presuppose middle knowledge.— Further: for if before the decree of the divine will it is supposed that the will will cooperate from its innate freedom, on the hypothesis that it be placed in such circumstances, it would follow that the concurrence and operation of the created will would not be reduced to God as to an efficient cause, but only to created free choice: and so created free choice would be the first cause of its own concurrence and cooperation, which nevertheless is impossible, as St. Thomas shows ex professo in 2 Sent., d. 37, q. 2, a. 2.
Secondly the conclusion is proved. One of the things prerequired for God to create the world at the beginning of time was the eternal decree of his will by which he determined to create it; and yet, this decree having been posited, it was not compossible that he should not in fact create the world, else God would be changed: therefore, if for a free act it is required that, all things antecedently prerequired having been posited, free choice can act and not act even in the composite sense, it follows that God did not produce the world freely, but from absolute necessity.
VII. The legitimate definition of free choice is explained.— THIRD CONCLUSION. The legitimate definition of free choice is as follows. Free choice is the faculty of the will and of reason for acting or not acting towards either of two, and for doing one thing or the other. For its explanation it must be observed that, although freedom is formally in the will as in its proximate and immediate subject, nevertheless radically and fundamentally it is in the intellect;6 for it is founded and rooted in the indifference of the judgment by which the intellect judges that the good proposed to the will as to be loved does not have a necessary, or natural, connection with the good in general, to which the will is naturally determined as regards specification. So St. Thomas teaches, p. 2 q. 17, art. 1 ad 2, where he says that the root of freedom is the will as its subject; but as its cause it is reason: for from this the will can be borne freely to different things, because reason can have different conceptions of the good: and therefore the philosophers define free choice as the free judgment concerning reason, as if reason were the cause of freedom. And since, in this state, whatever good reason proposes to the will, it proposes it with this indifference of judgment, therefore the will remains free with respect to such a good, to love it or not love it, as regards exercise, as St. Thomas excellently explains, q. 24 de ver., art. 1, and 3 contra Gent., ch. 83, reason 4, and 1 p. q. 83, art. 1. But all these things are comprehended and explained in the definition of free choice proposed: for since freedom is formally in the will as in its subject, which is not in itself determined to one thing, but determines itself through the deliberation of reason to this or that good, therefore it is said in the definition of free choice that it is the faculty of the will towards either of two; but that particle (and of reason) is added to explain the root and foundation of the will's indifference; which, as we have said, is the indifference of the judgment of reason: and by the name of reason is understood intellectual cognition, even if it takes place without the discourse of reason, so that the definition may extend also to the free choice of the angels and of God, as St. Thomas says, q. 24 de ver., art. 3 ad 1, where he establishes this definition, which the Master of the Sentences also handed down in 2 Sent., d. 24. The remaining particles, namely for acting or not acting, etc., are added for fuller explanation.
VIII. For freedom the faculty for contradictory opposites suffices.— It must be noted secondly that for freedom there is not necessarily required the faculty for contrary opposites, as for doing good or evil, but the faculty for contradictory opposites suffices, as for acting and not acting; so St. Thomas teaches, q. 24 de verit., art. 3 ad 3, and it is proved: for in God there is found most perfectly free choice, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 19, art. 10; but in God there is no faculty for doing good and evil, but only for doing good: for the works of God are perfect, as Scripture says: therefore, etc. From this it follows that to be able to sin does not pertain to the formal reason of free choice, but is rather a certain imperfection of created choice, belonging to it because it was made from nothing:7 and this reason St. Augustine assigns, lib. 2 de vitiis et concup., ch. 28, and lib. 12 de Civit., ch. 1; whence St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 62, art. 8 ad 3, says that free choice can choose different things, the order of the end being preserved, and this pertains to the perfection of its freedom; but that it choose something by turning away from the order of the end, which is to sin, this pertains to the defect of freedom: and he says the same in q. 24 de ver., art. 3 ad 2. But what kind of indifference is of the essence of freedom will be clear in the following disputation. To all the arguments made from the beginning the answer is given; they prove only the first conclusion; but insofar as they seem to proceed against the second, each one must be met.
IX. To the first, then, the answer is that the intrinsic indifference of the free faculty does not demand that, all things prerequired for performing such an act having been posited, the will's not performing the same act stand at once, but only demands that, all things prerequired antecedently to the operation, or concurrence, of the free cause having been posited, there stand at once in the same power the faculty by which it can, from an intrinsic active principle, not perform such an act if it will; but this can belong neither to fire nor to any non-free power: for, all things prerequired for heating having been posited, there is not in fire the faculty by which it could, from an intrinsic active principle, not heat if it willed; but by the necessity of nature it is determined to heat. And although, the wood being removed, it does not heat it, this nevertheless does not come about from an intrinsic active principle having the faculty for either of two, but from something extrinsic, namely from the removal of the wood.
The beatific love is an act simply necessary.— To the second the answer is that, as was said in disputation 22, n. 43, the beatific love which is in the blessed, as it is terminated at God, is an action simply necessary and not free; because, the beatific vision and the clear vision of God having been posited, and all things prerequired for loving God, there does not remain in the will of the blessed the faculty by which it could not love God if it willed. And the reason of this is that, as we said above from St. Thomas, the faculty for either of two which is in the free will is rooted in the intellect, or reason, according as the intellect can have different conceptions of the good: and because the intellect of one seeing God through his essence cannot conceive, as a good, ceasing from the act of the love of God, or hating God, therefore the will of the blessed is not free with respect to such love, as the will of the wayfarer is; but in the beatific love there is absolute necessity, and a happy necessity, as Augustine says. But in our free choice, in this state, with all things prerequired for loving, there stands at once the faculty by which it can not love if it wills, since the intellect can propose to the will, as a good, ceasing from such love, although in fact it does not propose it.
X. To the confirmation the answer is that, as will be clear below, even in the instant in which our will actually loves, it at once retains the power and faculty by which it can not love if it wills: for even while it loves, it loves freely, simply speaking; although in a certain respect, and on the supposition that it loves, it is necessary that it love, because everything that is, while it is, necessarily is: as the Philosopher says, lib. 1 Periherm., ch. 6. Nor is man more free before he acts than while he acts, but rather, on the contrary, while he acts he has a more perfect freedom: for he has freedom completed through second act, which freedom is indeed more perfect than the freedom which is only in first act: for it has less of potentiality. But as regards indifference, it must be said that, if we speak of the indifference which is intrinsic and essential to freedom itself, free choice has the same indifference before it acts and while it actually acts:8 for essential indifference consists in an indivisible; nor does it admit of more or less. But this is the indifference which is opposed to determination to one thing by necessity; and this indifference free choice always has, whether it actually acts or not. But if we speak of privative indifference, which imports the imperfection of created free choice, it is more indifferent before it acts, because then it has the privation of second act, which it does not have when it actually acts. But this indifference is not of the essence, but an imperfection of freedom, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 contra Gent., ch. 82.
XI. To the third the minor is denied. To the proof it must be said that he who receives into himself the efficacious motion of God, prerequired antecedently for the act of love, for example, can, simply speaking, not perform such an act if he wills: since, as has been said, the efficacious motion of God does not take away from free choice the power, or faculty, by which it can not act, or dissent, if it wills. But he who actually does not receive the efficacious motion to act can also act through the active power which he has, or through the sufficient help which God, as far as lies on his part, mercifully confers on all according to place and time; and therefore they sin if they do not act: for the efficacious motion is not necessary in order that man can act, but in order that he actually act, and the power be reduced to act. Nor is such a motion an active principle in the direct line, but the last complement of the active power, as St. Thomas teaches, 3 contra Gent., ch. 66, reason 4, and q. 3 de pot., art. 7 ad 7. Hence from the fact that someone is not premoved by efficacious motion it is only inferred that he will not perform such an act; but it is not inferred that he cannot perform it: for that consequence is manifestly open to objection. For indeed from the fact that someone does not have whiteness, which is necessarily required in order that he be white, it does not follow that he cannot be white, but only that he is not white;9 for he who does not actually have whiteness can nevertheless be white, because he can have whiteness, through which he is made white. Proportionably we say in the present case that he who is not efficaciously premoved by God to such an act will not produce that act; yet he can, through the active power which he has, natural or supernatural, namely through sufficient help, produce that act: because he can always, in this state, be moved by God with an efficacious motion, through which the active power is completed and applied; yet not without the cooperation of free choice concurring in the same instant of time to produce that same act freely: therefore man can always have this efficacious motion. And if anyone asks on what this power of having efficacious motion is founded, it must be said that, as is gathered from St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 8, art. 3 ad 1, it is founded on two things.10 First indeed, and principally, on the mercy of God, which can mercifully convert any wayfarer to himself, and efficaciously premove him to good. Secondarily, however, on the freedom of choice, which in this state is flexible towards good and towards evil: on which account Augustine said, To be able to have faith is of the nature of men;11 because namely he has a natural capacity for having faith from the mercy of God; yet Augustine immediately subjoins, But to have it is of the grace of the faithful. Let St. Thomas be consulted, 3 contra Gentes, ch. 156 and 159.
XII. The Council of Trent speaks in the divided sense when it says that free choice can dissent from efficacious motion.— To the fourth argument it is said that the Council of Trent speaks in the divided sense, not in the composite sense, as some even of the authors of the contrary opinion admit. And to the attack it must be said that the Council indeed speaks of the man who is actually touched and moved by God; yet it does not for that reason speak in the composite sense: for by that proposition of the Council, understood in the composite sense, it is not merely signified that the motion of God is composed and conjoined with free choice; but it is signified that efficacious motion and actual dissent are compossible in the same free choice: which sense nevertheless is false, and therefore that proposition in the composite sense is false: whence it could not have been intended and defined by the sacred Council in that sense, but only in the divided sense. This is also gathered from the very form of the proposition defined in the Council: for it has the form of a divided and not of a composite modal,12 since, as St. Thomas teaches, opusc. 4 de modalibus, and after him Ferrara, 1 con. Gent., ch. 67, M. Soto, lib. 3 Summularum, ch. de modalibus, and others: a composite modal, which makes the composite sense, is that in which the dictum is the subject and the mode is predicated, as: That the predestined be damned is possible; That a white thing be black is possible. But a divided modal, which makes the divided sense, is that in which the mode is interposed between the parts of the dictum, as: The predestined can be damned; A white thing can be black; or: A white thing is possible to be black; but in that proposition of the Council by which it is asserted that free choice, moved and aroused by God, can dissent if it will, the whole dictum is not the subject, but rather the verb, can, or the mode, possible, is interposed between the extremes of the dictum: therefore it is not a composite but a divided modal, and consequently it makes the divided sense, and in the divided sense it was intended by the Council.
XIII. What is required for the truth of a composite modal.— But in order to explain generally when a modal is true or false in the composite sense, a single general rule must be laid down, namely that for the truth of a composite modal de possibili, or accepted in the composite sense, it suffices and is required that the extremes imported by the dictum of that modal be compossible in the same subject; for by this reason it is called composite, because it composes, or places at once in the same subject, the aforesaid extremes, by means of the copula de possibili, as in this proposition: That a white thing be black is possible; the dictum of the modal is all of this, that a white thing be black, of which dictum one extreme is white, the other is black. In order, then, that this proposition be true in the composite sense, it is necessarily required that it be possible for the same subject to be at once white and black: and therefore that modal is false, because the proposition de inesse, by which it is immediately regulated and proved, namely a white thing is black, is an impossible proposition. Proportionably we say in the present case that, because these two are incompatible, namely that free choice be moved by God with efficacious motion, and that it resist or dissent, therefore that proposition in the composite sense is false, namely: Free choice, moved by God with efficacious motion, can dissent.
XIII.13 It can dissent from any help whatsoever.— To the last argument the answer is, from what has been said on the Council of Trent, that man can, absolutely speaking, dissent from both sufficient help and efficacious help: but from sufficient help man can resist even in the composite sense; and this alone the passages of Scripture adduced by the Council prove. But from efficacious help man cannot dissent in the composite sense, as has been proved; yet he well can dissent absolutely, and in the divided sense: for the power of dissenting stands at once in free choice with efficacious motion. But they object.14 A power which will never be reduced to act is in vain: therefore, if free choice can dissent from efficacious help, it will sometimes in fact dissent; or that power will be in vain; or at least it will be a remote and not a proximate power. The answer is that,15 in order that some power not be in vain, it is not required that it be at some time reducible to every act which it can produce; but it suffices that it be reduced to some act or acts;16 otherwise the power which God has to create another world, which will never be reduced to act, would be in vain. Hence the free choice of him who is efficaciously moved to the act of the love of God, and the power which he has for either of two, is not in vain; because although such power is never to be reduced to the act of hating God, it is nevertheless reduced to the act of love, and to other acts. Similarly too we say that the power of free choice to dissent is a proximate power, because on the part of the power nothing further is required in order that it can truly dissent if it will, although in fact it will not dissent.