De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Introduction

Disputatio CIX: Whether reprobation includes a positive act by which God, with absolute will before foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, wills not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom.

Disputatio CX: Whether there is a cause of reprobation on our part with respect to its entire effect.

Disputatio CXI: Whether a sufficient cause of reprobation can be assigned on God’s part.

Disputatio CXII: Whether God grants all people, however hardened and reprobate, sufficient supernatural helps through which they can attain eternal life and actually attain it if they will.

Disputatio CXIII: Whether God from eternity, with absolute and efficacious will, before foreknowledge of the future determination of the created will, decreed not to give sufficient or efficacious supernatural helps to those who in fact do not receive them in time.

Whether God from eternity, by an absolute and efficacious will, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future determination of the created will, determined not to give supernatural helps, sufficient or efficacious, to those who in fact in time do not receive them.

I. There have not been lacking those who think it cannot be granted that God, by the eternal, absolute and efficacious decree of his will, decreed in fact not to give the helps of grace to those who in time do not receive them: and they assert this opinion to be so certain that they reckon the opposite to be not only a danger and an offence to pious ears, but also a ground for despair and for the abandonment of good works. This can be proved.

First: for it would follow that God denies both to all those who in fact are not converted, and to the just who do not actually act well, the sufficient help by which they might be converted and act piously. The consequent is contrary to the holy Fathers and Doctors, who affirm, as a principle certain beyond controversy, that God denies the sufficient help to no one: therefore, etc. The consequence is proved. For if by an immutable will, and before the foresight of the determination of the human will, God determined not to confer the supernatural helps, whether sufficient or efficacious, which are necessary for conversion or for pious action, then he denies, as far as lies on his part, the help necessary for salvation.

It is confirmed, and the force of the preceding argument is explained. If God were unwilling to produce a species in the eye, or light in the air, which are altogether required for seeing, man in fact would not have what is necessary for seeing, and consequently in fact could not see: therefore in the same way, if God by an absolute and efficacious will, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, determined by an immutable decree not to confer on some men the helps necessary for salvation — especially that help which predetermines the will, which is asserted to be necessary for conversion and for every supernatural action — it follows that God denies them the sufficient help, since such a help is no less necessary for conversion and for supernatural operations than light and species are necessary for seeing.

It is confirmed secondly. As often as anyone lacks some principle necessary for producing some act, and it is not in his power to have it, by that very fact he lacks a principle sufficient for such an act. For if someone be in a dark place, from which he cannot go out, even if he has the vital power of seeing, nevertheless, because he lacks the light and the visible species, which are necessarily required for seeing, he cannot truly be said to have a sufficient principle of seeing, since he also lacks the power of going to the place where the light shines: therefore, if God by an absolute will determined this — and that independently of the foreknowledge of the created will — and the will of man cannot in any way be converted without these helps and that determination, it follows that men of this kind do not have a sufficient principle for conversion and for other supernatural operations, especially since it is not in their power to have these helps and the divine predetermination.

II. Secondly. The will, when it lacks understanding, does not have a sufficient principle of willing, since understanding is altogether necessary for willing: therefore, if those helps and God's predetermination are necessary for supernatural acts, when man lacks them because God from eternity by an absolute will determined not to confer them and not to determine the will, the will will not have a principle sufficient for acting well and supernaturally.

Thirdly. This help determining the will is no less necessary for man to be converted and to act supernaturally than God's physical concurrence is necessary for the local motion of a creature: but if God determined independently of the created will not to give physical concurrence for local motion, then man would truly lack the necessary help, namely God's concurrence, necessarily required for local motion: therefore by equal reason, if God independently of the human will denies the help necessary, and the cooperation required, for conversion and for supernatural actions, man truly lacks the help necessary for them and the principle sufficient for them.

Fourthly: for it would also follow from the opposite opinion that it is not to be imputed to man that, when the precept presses, he is not converted to God, and — what is greater — that the precept of conversion to God could not be imposed on that same man. This is proved: for if God has already decreed not to give some man the sufficient or efficacious help necessary for conversion, and it is not in his power to obtain it from God, then it will not be imputed to him that he is not converted, because in fact without that help he cannot be converted: for this reason also negative unbelievers, who on account of sins committed are deprived of the knowledge of the things of faith, do not sin against faith by not believing, because they do not have a principle sufficient and necessary for believing: For how shall they believe him whom they have not heard; and how shall they hear without a preacher? And consequently they could not be obliged by any precept to conversion; or else one would have to say that God's precepts are impossible to fulfil, against the express doctrine and definition of the Council of Trent.

III. Fifthly: for from the same doctrine it follows that man is forsaken by God before he himself forsakes God; which is opposed to those words of Hosea 13, Thy destruction is from thyself, O Israel, and of Ecclus. 15, Say not: It is through God that he is away: and to the definition of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 11, whose words are: For God does not desert those once justified by his grace, unless he be first deserted by them: in which passage it is clear that the Council treats not only of habitual grace but of any help of grace, from the end which the Council had in view in that chapter, inasmuch as it wished to exhort men to obey the divine law. And it is clear besides from the very title of the chapter, which is on the observance of the commandments, on its possibility and necessity: therefore God denies this grace, or help, to no one except to him who has first deserted God.

It is confirmed from those words of chapter 13 of the same session: God, unless they set themselves against his grace, will perfect the good work he has begun, even unto the day of Christ: but no greater dereliction can be imagined than that by which God, before the foreknowledge of any determination of the created will, decreed by a firm purpose not to confer on a man the help without which man cannot be converted, nor act well, nor resist a grave temptation: therefore it must necessarily be said that God, before the foreknowledge of the determination of the created will, did not determine by an absolute and efficacious will not to confer those helps on those who in time do not receive them.

Sixthly there is an argument from the authority of St Thomas, 2. 2. q. 2. art. 5. ad 1, where he says that if something be said to be in man's power, with the help of grace excluded, then man is bound to many things which he cannot do without preparing grace, such as to believe and to love God above all things: yet he can do this with the help of grace, which help indeed is given mercifully to whomever it is given by God; but to those to whom it is not given, it is not given from justice, in punishment of a preceding sin, at least original, as Augustine says in the book de correp. et gratia, chapters 5 and 6. From these words an argument is drawn. Whatever God himself does or does not do in time, he must have determined from eternity to do or not to do; but in time the matter stands thus according to the doctrine of St Thomas and St Augustine, that as often as God does not confer on someone the help of grace for believing, acting, or loving God, he does not confer such help except in punishment of a preceding sin, at least original: therefore from eternity he determined not to confer that same help except in punishment of a preceding sin, and not otherwise: therefore before the foreknowledge of that same sin he did not determine by an absolute or consequent will not to confer that same help on those who in time do not receive it. There is another passage of St Thomas for proving the same, 1. 2. q. 112. artic. 3. ad 2, where he says that the defect of grace has its first cause from us, but the conferring of grace has its first cause from God, according to that of Hosea 13: Thy destruction is from thyself, O Israel; only in me is thy help. By which words he teaches most clearly that the defect of grace and of divine help is not to be referred to God's simple will, but to man's preceding fault, on account of which God does not confer that same help: and consequently on account of that same fault, and not otherwise, he determined from eternity not to give that same help to those who in time do not receive it. Likewise 3 cont. Gent. cap. 159 he says that they alone are deprived of grace who present an impediment to grace in themselves. And 1. p. q. 94. art. 4. ad 5 he says that in the temptation help was not brought to the first parent lest he be deceived, although he then especially needed it, because sin had already preceded in his mind, and he did not have recourse to the divine help. He holds, therefore, that God never denies the help of grace except on account of a preceding sin, and consequently that before the foreknowledge of it he did not decree not to confer that same help on those who in time do not receive it.

Finally, the same can be proved by all the arguments adduced in disputation 101 to prove that the denial of efficacious help is not the cause why a man is not converted to God, even if the non-conversion be taken as it signifies a pure negation.

IIII. The opposite opinion is taught by the Thomists, among whom is M. Bañes, 1. p. q. 23. artic. 3. dub. 3. conc. 10, where he says: God from eternity determined by a will either absolute or consequent not to give supernatural helps to all, namely to those who in fact will not receive them: and M. Bañes speaks in that sense in which the word “to give” is correlative to the word “to receive”, as is clear from the 8th and 9th conclusions of the same doubt, and from what has been said by us in the preceding disputation. For if the word “to give” be taken absolutely and simply, he acknowledges that God, as far as lies on his part, is prepared to give to all men, as long as they are in this life, the help by which they are made able to be converted; nay rather, even a more special help by which they may be converted, if they will. And in this sense I reckon this second opinion to be true, and necessarily to be defended by those theologians who hold that no cause of reprobation is given on our part, as regards its entire effect.

The denial of supernatural help can be considered as it is a mere negation, and as it is a privation.— To make this clear, it must be observed that, just as non-conversion is taken as it is the pure negation of conversion and as it is its privation, and consequently as sin, as we explained more fully in disput. 101, so also the denial of supernatural help can be taken in two ways: First, as it is a simple negation, which can be said both of that which is and of that which is not: for we truly say that God does not confer the help of grace on men, or on possible angels who never were, nor are, nor will be, or even on stones, which are not capable of that help. Secondly, it can be taken as it signifies the privation of help, and as it formally has the character of punishment.

V. God, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, determined not to give some the supernatural helps for believing immediately.— The first conclusion, then, is: God, before the foreknowledge or foresight of the determination of the created will, determined from eternity by an absolute or consequent will not to give supernatural helps to those who in fact do not receive them, if the word “not to give” be taken as it signifies the mere negation of help, that is, an absolute and consequent will of not giving such help.

This conclusion is proved first: for, as was shown in disp. 110, on our part no cause of reprobation is given, as regards its entire effect: but just as predestination, as regards its first effect, is resolved into God's gratuitous will alone, so also reprobation, as regards its primary effect, which is the first permission of sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned, is attributed to God's simple will: nor could there be, or be foreknown, any other sin before that permission; otherwise that first sin would not be the first: therefore, before any sin is understood as preceding in the man who is reprobated, there is understood in God the absolute will of permitting that sin; but in the will of permitting sin there is necessarily included the absolute will of not giving the efficacious help for avoiding that sin: for, as St Thomas teaches 1. 2. q. 79. art. 2, if God gave man this help, man would not sin: therefore before all foreknowledge of future sin there precedes in God an absolute or consequent will of not giving efficacious help to those who in time do not receive it.

It is confirmed. For this reason no cause of predestination is given on our part, because in fact no cause of the first effect of predestination is given, as is clear from the premises of disp. 37: therefore, if no cause of reprobation is given on our part, neither will a cause of the first effect of reprobation be given. Since, then, in the first effect of reprobation there is included the absolute will of not giving the efficacious help by which man may avoid that first sin on account of which he is damned, it remains that God, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of created free choice, determined by an absolute will not to give that help to those who do not receive it.

Secondly. A negation, simply speaking, is something higher than a privation, which is on account of fault, since every privation is a negation, and not conversely: therefore wherever there has been a privation of divine help, there is understood prior its negation, by which God does not bestow that help, or wills not to bestow it: but for a negation of this kind no sin is presupposed of necessity on our part: for since that help is not owed to anyone, but is purely gratuitous, God can, by his own will alone, give the same help to whom he has wished, and not give it to whom he has not wished: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. If some preceding sin of man were presupposed of necessity, so that God should have determined by an absolute will not to give him efficacious help, it would follow that even before God had determined simply not to give the efficacious help for avoiding the first sin, and before the permission of that same sin, another sin would be foreknown; which is impossible: both because that sin which we suppose to be the first would in fact not be the first, but there would be another before it, and the same difficulty would proceed concerning that sin, and so there would be a process to infinity: and also because it would follow that some sin is committed while God does not permit it, which is against the express doctrine of St Augustine in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapters 95 and 96. For to the permission of any sin whatsoever it is necessarily required that there precede in God the absolute will, or the consequent will, of not giving the help by which that sin is avoided. Hence if before the first sin there did not precede in God the absolute or consequent will of not giving help of this kind, such a sin would be committed with God not permitting it; from which again it would follow that a positive act, to which the malice of sin is conjoined, is produced, inasmuch as it is an act, with God not willing it. For if any sin is committed without divine permission, then consequently also the entity of the act, without which the evil of sin cannot be, would be produced by man before God wills that act, since no supreme evil can be given — which, as was shown above, cannot be admitted.

VI. Thirdly. God, by a consequent and absolute will, before all foreknowledge of the evil use of the created will, willed not to admit the reprobate to his kingdom, as was shown in disputation 109: therefore in like manner he willed, before the foreknowledge of that same evil use, not to confer on them the helps of grace by which they would come to that same kingdom. The consequence is proved: for the absolute or consequent will of not conferring on someone efficacious helps for eternal salvation is intrinsically included in the absolute and consequent will of not admitting him to the kingdom of heaven.

Fourthly. As was shown in disput. 34, the consequent will of God is that by which God wills some good considered according to all its circumstances; whereas the antecedent will of God is that which is borne toward some good considered absolutely and according to itself; and therefore by his antecedent will God wills all men to be saved, and to confer on them helps for salvation, because this object is good according to itself; yet because this good has annexed the privation of another greater good, namely the splendour of divine justice in the reprobate, and of greater mercy in the elect, therefore by his consequent will God does not will all men to be saved, but only the predestined, as St Thomas teaches 1. p. q. 19. art. 6. ad 1. Therefore in like manner by his consequent will, which is the will simply, God does not will to confer on all efficacious helps for producing supernatural acts, but on some only, namely those who receive them in time. The consequence is proved: for although it be absolutely and according to itself good that all should have in themselves and receive helps of this kind, yet it is not reckoned good, all particular circumstances being considered, because it has annexed the lack of a greater good, namely of the greater splendour of divine mercy in the gratuitous conferring of these helps: therefore although God by his antecedent will wills that all have the helps of grace for eliciting supernatural acts, yet he does not will this by his consequent will.

If it be said that the consequent will in God is that which has its origin from our fault and presupposes it, and therefore that God by his consequent will did not, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of our free choice, decree not to give someone the helps of grace for producing supernatural acts, but only on the supposition of the evil use of that same free choice foreknown and foreseen by God; against this militate the arguments by which it was shown in disputation 34 that the consequent will of God does not presuppose of necessity the evil use of created free choice, nor take occasion from it, otherwise God would not have willed by his consequent will the eternal salvation of the predestined angels: for such a will does not presuppose any evil use of the free choice of those same angels, nor did it take from it the occasion of predestining them.

VII. Fifthly. The consequent will of God is always fulfilled, as St Thomas teaches 1. p. q. 19. art. 6: therefore, if God by his consequent will determined from eternity, and willed, that all should receive in themselves the helps of grace, sufficient or efficacious, for producing supernatural acts, it follows that all, according to place and time, do receive helps of this kind in themselves; and so no one would be a purely negative unbeliever: for indeed if anyone has sufficient help for believing, since he is bound to believe, he will sin mortally against faith if he does not believe, and consequently whoever does not believe will be a contrary unbeliever, which manifestly conflicts with the doctrine of St Thomas 2. 2. q. 10. art. 1; it must therefore be said that God by his consequent will, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, willed not to give some the helps of grace, sufficient or efficacious, for immediately producing supernatural acts, namely those who in time do not receive them.

This is confirmed specially concerning efficacious help: for if God by his consequent will wills that all men receive in themselves the efficacious help for believing and loving God, then all receive help of this kind according to place and time: for, as has been said, the consequent will of God is always fulfilled, and so all would believe and love God when the precept presses: which is false, and contrary to experience itself.

VIII. That men do not receive sufficient or efficacious help in execution is their own fault.— The second conclusion. In execution, as often as God, according to place and time, does not give someone the sufficient or efficacious help for believing, loving, and exercising other supernatural works, he always does not bestow it except in punishment of a preceding sin, and at least of original sin, whether such a sin have preceded in the order of time or only in the order of nature. In this conclusion the authors of both opinions agree, and it is expressly that of St Augustine and St Thomas in the passages cited above, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it efficaciously.

Moreover it is proved by a reason drawn from St Thomas, 3 cont. Gent. cap. 159: for God, as far as in him lies, is prepared to give grace to all. For he wills all men to be saved, as is said 1 Timoth. 2. But they alone are deprived of grace who present an impediment to grace in themselves; just as, when the sun illumines the world, it is imputed as a fault to him who closes his eyes, if some evil follow from this; although he cannot see unless he be preceded by the light of the sun: therefore as often as God does not bestow on someone the help of grace, sufficient or efficacious, for believing or for eliciting other supernatural acts, he denies it in punishment of a preceding sin.

Secondly. For although God, before the foreseen evil use of free choice, determined not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom, inasmuch as non-admission imports the mere negation of that which is not owed to anyone, nevertheless in execution he excludes no one from that same kingdom except on account of a preceding sin, at least original; because such exclusion has the character of punishment, which consequently is not inflicted on anyone except on account of fault: therefore in like manner, although God before the foreseen evil use of free choice determined not to give some the sufficient or efficacious help, inasmuch as this imports the simple negation of supernatural help, which is owed to no created substance, yet in execution he never deprives anyone, according to place and time, of help of this kind except on account of a preceding fault: for this privation too has the character of punishment, because it necessarily presupposes fault, at least preceding in the order of nature, as it is presupposed in him to whom God does not in fact give, but only offers, the efficacious help for avoiding the first sin, through which he loses justifying grace: for then no sin is presupposed as preceding in time the privation of grace or of efficacious help, but only in nature: for God gives to the justified man the exciting and sufficient help for avoiding any sin whatsoever, being prepared to confer the efficacious help, unless he himself by his own malice present an impediment to that same help. But if that man sin mortally, on account of a sin of this kind God does not confer on him efficacious help: for that sin is an impediment with which efficacious help for avoiding such a sin is not compatible.

IX. And if an argument be made: for with mortal sin there is compatible the sufficient help for believing and for eliciting other supernatural acts: therefore through that sin man does not present an impediment to that same help; it is answered that, although with mortal sin the sufficient help be compatible, nevertheless through that same sin, as also through original sin, man is made unworthy that such help be conferred on him: and on this side, as far as lies in himself, he presents an impediment to that same help. Nevertheless, even if, inasmuch as the order of things requires it, that sinner ought not to receive prevenient grace, because he is unworthy of it, yet because God can act beyond the order implanted in things, as when he enlightens a blind man or raises a dead man, sometimes out of the abundance of his goodness he also precedes with his help those who present an impediment to grace, turning them away from evil and converting them to good, as St Thomas says 3 cont. Gent. cap. 161. Much more, therefore, regularly will he give sufficient helps out of the abundance of that same goodness for eliciting supernatural acts, even to those who through sin are unworthy of helps of this kind, although sometimes he does not in fact confer them on some, in whom he wills the order of his justice to be manifested. Hence we see that of two unbelieving men who are held fast by the same sins, he precedes one, giving him sufficient help for believing, teaching him by the ministry of preachers, and inwardly arousing and moving him to faith; but the other he permits to proceed according to the order of things; nor is a reason to be sought why he precedes or converts these rather than those; for this depends on his simple will; just as it proceeds from the simple will of the craftsman that from the same matter similarly disposed he form some vessels for noble uses and some for ignoble, as St Thomas shows from the Apostle, Rom. 9, Hath not the potter power over the clay, etc., 1. p. q. 23. art. 5. ad 3.

The third conclusion. There is a cause on the part of the reprobate, on account of which God permits him to fall into the other sins which he commits after the first sin in which he is found, and the demeritorious cause is the preceding sin. Some of the arguments made at the beginning prove this conclusion. Moreover it is proved: for in order to save the claim that no cause of reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate as regards its entire effect, it suffices that no cause of the permission of the first sin be given, on account of which the reprobate is damned: therefore it is not unfitting that a cause of the permission of the subsequent sins be given: therefore just as in predestination an intermediate effect is the cause of the last effect, as is clear from what was said in disp. 37, so also in reprobation a sin committed after the first permission of God is the cause, not only in execution but also in the divine intention, of the permission of the subsequent sins.

X. To the first argument it is answered that God gives to all, as far as lies on his part, the sufficient help, nay even efficacious, for salvation and pious action, because it does not fail through him if men do not receive it; yet in fact he does not confer on some the help, even sufficient for believing immediately, so that they receive such help, as was shown in the preceding disputation concerning purely negative unbelievers. And although in his purpose by an absolute will, before the foreseen determination of the created free choice by which he wills to commit that sin which follows from man's fault after that permission, he determined not to give these helps to those who in time do not receive them, if the word “not to give” be taken as it signifies a simple negation; yet in execution he deprives man of helps of this kind on account of fault, as has been said: whence it does not follow that, as far as lies on his part, he denies anyone the sufficient or necessary help for salvation.

To the first confirmation it is answered that if God, as far as lies on his part, were prepared to produce a species in the eye and light in the air, and in execution man through his own fault did not have these, because namely he presents an impediment to both; then he would truly have them at least in another, namely in God, who is prepared to confer these aids for seeing, which on the part of the species and of the light are necessary for seeing; and so through the intrinsic visual power which he has he could see, although in fact through his own fault he does not see, because he has placed an impediment that a species should not be produced in the eyes and light in the air. Since, therefore, God, as long as the precept of believing obliges, so that a man sins by not believing, gives in fact to every man an intrinsic and supernatural sufficient help by which he can believe, being prepared to give him efficacious help unless he present an impediment to that same help: therefore it does not follow that God denies the sufficient help to all who are not converted to God when they are bound to be, and do not perform other supernatural acts, as was also said above. I add that, as was shown above from Cajetan and Ferrariensis, some principle is said in two ways to be sufficient for some operation. First it is said to be sufficient in the account of power, or of a principle bestowing the ability to act, and in this way the visual power is said to be sufficient for seeing even if it lack the intelligible species, or be situated in a dark place, because, as far as lies on the part of the power which bestows the ability to see, man has all things necessary for seeing. Secondly it is said to be sufficient in all ways and in every kind, because namely it contains virtually all things, both intrinsic and extrinsic, required for the operation: and in this way he who lacks the visible species, or is in a dark place from which he cannot go out, truly does not have a sufficient principle of seeing. Proportionally it must be said in the proposed matter that even if someone does not have efficacious help received in himself, yet if he be aroused by God and moved to supernatural acts, he is truly said to have a principle in its kind sufficient for producing those acts, namely in the kind of help bestowing the ability, although it is not sufficient in all ways. And through these things the solution to the second confirmation is clear.

XI. To the second argument it is answered in the same way, that the will, even if the intellect propose nothing to it, has in itself a power sufficient for willing in the account of power, although the power of that same will alone is not sufficient in all ways for actually willing.

To the third it is answered that just as one who lacks God's physical concurrence (if nevertheless he have an integral and sound power of walking) truly has a power sufficient for local motion, although he is not actually moved; so also he who lacks the efficacious predetermining help lacks indeed the principle necessary for being actually converted, yet nevertheless has the sufficient help by which he can be converted, as has been said, and through his own fault presents an impediment to the efficacious help offered to him by God.

To the fourth argument an answer has already been given sufficiently, as I think, in disput. 18. num. 20, and in disput. 22 and 23. And now we say with Ferrariensis that, if anyone by his own will falls into some evil from which he cannot be freed by himself, if he be not freed, it is not without imputation to him: for he ought to have taken care not to fall into that evil, from which he knew that he could not be freed by his own power: just as it is not without imputation that someone does not get out of a pit, out of which he cannot get out unless he be helped by another, when he has thrown himself into it by his own will. But man, when he sins, falls by his own will, through which he is deprived of grace, which he cannot acquire by himself; therefore it is deservedly imputed to him if he does not have grace, even when divine help, necessary for the preparation of grace, fails him. Hence, as is gathered from St Augustine, lib. de corrept. et grat. c. 11, the proposition assumed has truth only when he who is thus deprived was not, on account of some fault of his own, the cause of such a privation: but if he himself by his own fault was the cause of this kind of lack and privation, it is not universally true, as is gathered from St Thomas saying: that, although those who are in sin cannot by their own power avoid presenting or placing an impediment to grace, as has been shown, unless they be preceded by the help of grace; nevertheless this is imputed to them as fault, because this defect is left in them from a preceding fault, just as a drunkard is not excused from homicide, which he commits through drunkenness, which he incurred by his own fault. And when it is argued: for man would be obliged to the impossible; it is answered with the same Ferrariensis that it is not unfitting that man be obliged to something which has been made impossible for him by his own powers through his own fault, as happens in the proposed matter: but it is indeed unfitting that he be obliged to that which is absolutely impossible, on which St Thomas is to be consulted, 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1. Secondly it is answered better, that even he who lacks efficacious help is not obliged to the impossible: for through the sufficient help received in himself he can perform the supernatural act which is in the precept, and through his own fault he is unwilling to perform it. Nor does it follow from this that purely negative unbelievers sin by not believing. For although through their own fault they do not have faith, yet that fault was not committed against supernatural faith, because they have heard nothing of it, but against the law of nature: and therefore they will be damned on account of original sin, and on account of other things committed against the natural law, but not on account of the sin of unbelief, as has been said above.

XI. Man deserts God before he is deserted by God.— To the fifth it is answered that, if he who does not receive from God the sufficient or efficacious help for believing or for eliciting other supernatural acts be in original or mortal sin, he has already first deserted God before God deserts him by not actually giving him those helps. But if he be in grace, God never deserts him by taking away from him justifying grace, unless he himself first in the order of nature desert God, by converting himself to a changeable good through mortal sin, which is incompatible with habitual grace; nor does God even desert the just man by withdrawing from him the sufficient help by which he can do good and persevere unto the end. But if sometimes he does not give him the efficacious help by which he may actually do good and persevere unto the end, it is not to be imputed to God, but to man: for through the sufficient help he could have persevered, and through his own fault he was unwilling to persevere: whence in execution he himself first, in the kind of demeritorious cause, deserted God by sinning, before God deprived him of efficacious help, as has been said above.

XII. To the sixth it is answered that the passages of St Thomas adduced prove only the second conclusion, as is clear from what has been said about it. And to the reason founded on that passage of 3 cont. Gent. it is answered that, just as God in execution on account of a preceding sin often deprives men of the help of grace, so from eternity he determined in execution to deprive them of that same help on account of those same sins; and just as from eternity, before the foresight or foreknowledge of the evil use of the created will, he decreed not to give some that same help, inasmuch as “not to give” is a pure negation, so also in execution, from his simple will, he does not give it to those who do not receive such help: but because that negation in execution is not a mere negation, but also a privation and a punishment, because it finds a fault antecedent at least in the order of nature: therefore on this side in execution there is also presupposed fault on the part of man, on account of which God does not bestow on some, in punishment, the helps of grace which he was prepared to give to all. This solution can be explained and confirmed by an example: for, as we were saying in disput. 100, the negation of efficacious help is the adequate cause of non-conversion, if it be considered as it is a mere negation; but not as it is the privation of a conversion that ought to be present: for under this aspect it is attributed only to the malice of the created free choice. Proportionably, therefore, we can say that God's simple will alone is the cause of the non-conferring of efficacious help, as it is the mere negation of a help not owed, but not as it is a privation and punishment: for under this aspect it is referred to the free choice of man as to a demeritorious cause. And through these things an answer is given to the other passage of St Thomas adduced from p. 2 and 3 cont. Gent. Or it must be said that in 1. 2 St Thomas speaks of habitual grace, which God does not confer on those who are unwilling to prepare themselves for it: but actual help does not prerequire a preceding preparation, because that preparation would have to be made through another help, and for that again another help would be necessary, and so there would be a process to infinity. When, therefore, God deprives someone of the help of grace, he does not for this reason deprive him, that he has not prepared himself to receive that help; but because he places, or has placed, an impediment of sin, with which the efficacious help for avoiding that sin is incompatible, or through which he merits that God not confer such help on him.

XIII. To the other passage from the first part it is answered that, before Adam sinned by an exterior act, by eating of the forbidden tree, he had already sinned by an interior act of pride: and in punishment of this sin, and because he did not have recourse to the divine help, help was not brought to him lest he be deceived; but before that sin committed by an interior act, it is understood that God did not bestow on Adam the efficacious help by which he would avoid sin. For if he had received such help, he would not have sinned, as St Thomas says generally of all, prima secundae, quaest. 79. artic. 2. in corp. But because he received the sufficient help by which he could avoid that sin, and through his own fault was unwilling to persevere in the accepted justice, but placed an impediment to efficacious help, therefore that first sin was deservedly imputed to him as fault.

Disputatio CXIV: Whether infants dying with original sin will remain forever in limbo, condemned to death, or will lead a blessed life in this world after the day of judgment.

Book Twelve

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