De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Book Eleven
Introduction
Disputatio CIX: Whether reprobation includes a positive act by which God, with absolute will before foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, wills not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom.
Disputatio CX: Whether there is a cause of reprobation on our part with respect to its entire effect.
Disputatio CXI: Whether a sufficient cause of reprobation can be assigned on God’s part.
Disputatio CXII: Whether God grants all people, however hardened and reprobate, sufficient supernatural helps through which they can attain eternal life and actually attain it if they will.
Whether God grants to all men, however hardened, and to the reprobate, supernatural helps sufficient, through which they can attain eternal life, and in fact attain it, if they will.
I. The affirmative part is proved by many authorities of sacred Scripture: for it is said in Apoc. 3.1 Behold, I stand at the door, and knock; if any man shall open to me, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me: now to stand at the door is to confer sufficient helps; for to knock is to rouse and to move men to that supernatural good which is signified by the supper. Again, it is also said in Eccli. 15: God established man in the hand of his own counsel, and again: Say not: It is through God that he is away, etc. But if God did not give to all helps sufficient for salvation, the fault would lie with God that someone is not converted to him, nor would every man be placed in the hand of his own counsel, as long as he is on the way. Again, the Apostle also says in 1 Tim. 2: God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth: therefore he gives to all helps sufficient for salvation. Moreover, in 2 Cor. 5 he says: Christ died for all. And again he says that he is the Savior of all: but for this reason he is said to have died for all, and to be the Savior of all, inasmuch as he gives to all sufficient helps, by which, if they will, they can be saved. For on this account he did not die for the demons, nor is he called their Savior, because he gave them no help by which they could be saved: therefore.
Secondly, the argument is drawn from the Council of Sens, where it is said:2 Nor does so great a necessity of grace prejudice free choice, since it is always at hand, nor does even a moment pass in which God does not stand at the door and knock, etc. therefore a help sufficient for salvation is given to all.
Thirdly. Any sinner, as long as he is on the way, can be converted to God: otherwise some state of a sinner would be given, of whose salvation one must despair, and some sin of one existing on the way, which could not be blotted out by true penance, which nevertheless is erroneous, as St. Thomas proves 3. part. q. 86. art. 1. therefore any sinner, as long as he is on the way, has a supernatural help sufficient for salvation; otherwise he could not be converted to God, since without a help of this kind no one can be converted to God and be saved.
II. Fourthly. He who does not fulfill the precept of penance sins mortally, and the same holds of the precept of charity and of the others: therefore he has a help sufficient for fulfilling precepts of this kind: otherwise men would be bound to what is impossible, which is false, since no one sins in what he cannot avoid, as St. Aug. teaches lib. 3. de libero arbitrio cap. 18. and 19. and in the other places adduced in disp. 54. num. 7.
Fifthly. As St. Thomas teaches p. 2. q. 89.3 art. 6. anyone arriving at the use of reason is bound at that time to convert himself to God: which if he does, he will be justified; and from this principle he concludes that a venial sin cannot be given together with original sin alone: therefore anyone arriving at the use of reason receives from God a supernatural help, at least sufficient, by which he can convert himself to God, if he wills: otherwise to one doing what is in him by the powers of nature alone grace would sometimes be given infallibly; which nevertheless is against the teaching of St. Aug. as was shown disp. 56. nu. 6. and following.
A sufficient help for believing immediately is not given to all.— On the contrary: for St. Th. 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1., speaking of the help of grace without which man cannot love God and his neighbor and believe the articles of faith, says that this help, to whomsoever it is given by God, is given mercifully; but to whomsoever it is not given, it is not given from justice, in punishment of preceding sin, at least original, as St. Aug. says lib. de correp. et grat. c. 5. and 6. He therefore holds that to some the help of grace is not given by which they could believe and love God. And q. 10. ar. 1. he teaches that some are unbelievers only negatively, who are damned on account of sins committed against the natural law: but if all had sufficient help for believing, no adult would be an unbeliever only negatively; but all who do not believe would be unbelievers contrarily: for all are bound to believe: therefore if they can believe through the sufficient help which they have, and do not believe, they sin mortally against faith: for these three suffice for unbelief to be imputed to them as guilt. Moreover St. Aug. tract. 19. on John and epist. 105. to Sixtus says that in those who have not heard, nor could have heard, not to believe is the punishment of sin, but not sin: he therefore holds that sufficient help for believing is not given to all.
Concerning this difficulty, the first opinion is that of those asserting that there are some sins of a man on the way which cannot be blotted out by true penance: but this opinion theologians commonly reject as erroneous, with St. Th. 3. p. q. 86. cited, where it is expressly disputed whether there is any sin of one existing on the way which is truly irremissible.
III. The second opinion says that God sometimes, in punishment of preceding sin, does not give to some adults a help sufficient for salvation: which many follow, and it can be proved from the places of St. Aug. and St. Th. adduced by us in the counter-argument.
The third opinion absolutely concedes that a help sufficient for salvation is conferred by God on all men universally, with no distinction made between the faithful and infidels: which opinion all the arguments made from the beginning prove.
The fourth opinion distinguishes between faithful and infidel men, and teaches that to all the faithful helps sufficient for salvation are given: for faith very often rouses them to pursue and to love the supernatural good. But if the discourse is about infidels, and especially about those who never heard the Gospel, this opinion asserts that to many a help sufficient for obtaining eternal life is not given, but is denied in punishment of preceding sin, as has been said: which the places adduced from St. Aug. and St. Thomas seem to prove.
IIII. The fifth opinion is that of Master Bañes 1. p. q. 23. a. 3. dub. 3. especially concl. 8. and 9., where he teaches that the word give is taken in two ways. First, as it is correlative to receive; and in this sense God does not give to all men, even those arriving at the use of reason, the supernatural help of preparing grace, whether for believing or for repenting: which he proves by the authorities of St. Th. and St. Aug. adduced above. In the second way it is taken as it signifies the same as to be ready, as far as lies on his part, to confer a help of this kind on all; and in this sense he says that God gives, that is, is ready to give, to all men, as long as they are in this life, a help by which they can be converted, and are converted, if they will.
The extrinsic and intrinsic helps of God, and what they are called.— For the resolution of this difficulty it must first be noted that the helps of God are of two kinds: some are extrinsic to us, such as the passion of Christ the Lord, his example, the sacraments, the exterior preaching of the Gospel, miracles, and the law itself, of which it is said psalm. 118. And thy judgments shall help me. But other helps are intrinsic, and divine motions inhering in us, through which we can work those works which exceed the powers of nature. Secondly it must be noted that these intrinsic helps are sometimes given for acts which, from their formal object and as to substance, are supernatural, such as the acts of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity; sometimes they are given for acts which, according to their object and formal reason, do not exceed the capacity of nature, absolutely speaking; yet they exceed the powers of fallen nature. Of this kind are the act of natural love of God above all things, and the absolute and efficacious conversion to the good of reason proportionate to nature; to which conversion a child is bound by the natural precept as soon as he arrives at the use of reason. But in what ways and by what means God is wont to move men to good, St. Prosper explains excellently lib. contra collat. c. 14.
V. Extrinsic helps for salvation God gives to all.— First conclusion. If we speak of extrinsic helps, God gives to all helps sufficient for salvation, proposes and offers them to all, as far as lies on his part, although in fact some do not receive them. The places of Scripture adduced in the first argument prove this conclusion: for Christ died for all, for all he instituted the sacraments, and to every creature he commanded the Apostles to preach the Gospel, as is said Marc. ult.
A sufficient intrinsic help for fulfilling the natural precepts God confers on all.— Second conclusion. God gives to all, according to place and time, a supernatural intrinsic help, and sufficient for fulfilling the natural precepts, which, supposing sin, cannot be fulfilled from the powers of nature alone. For example, to a child, when he arrives at the use of reason, he gives a sufficient help by which he can be converted to the good proportionate to his nature, and propose to live according to reason; and the conclusion is understood to mean that in fact all receive a sufficient help of this kind, at least for the place and time in which a precept of this kind obliges. The fourth and fifth arguments from the points made at the beginning prove this conclusion efficaciously. It is proved moreover: he who does not fulfill a natural precept at the time in which it obliges sins mortally, nor is he excused by invincible ignorance, because precepts of this kind are known to all through the light of reason: therefore it is necessary that he have in himself a supernatural intrinsic help, and sufficient, by which he can fulfill that precept; for, as we suppose, by the powers of nature alone he cannot fulfill it. It is confirmed: for otherwise the transgression of that precept would not be imputed to men as guilt, since by natural means alone they cannot fulfill it; but no one sins in what he cannot avoid.
VI. Some respond to this argument that, when someone through his own fault lacks the sufficient help for fulfilling some precept, his transgression is nevertheless imputed as sin, although it would not be imputed if he were destitute of a help of this kind without any preceding fault: just as inculpable drunkenness, or invincible ignorance, excuses from the sin which one commits in that drunkenness or ignorance, for example the killing of a man; but it does not excuse when the ignorance or drunkenness was culpable.4 And this solution seems to have a foundation in St. Th. 3. con. Gent. c. 160. near the end, where he says: Although those who are in sin cannot by their own power avoid presenting or placing an impediment to grace, unless they are prevented by the help of grace, nevertheless this is imputed to them as guilt; because this defect is left in them from a preceding fault, just as a drunkard is not excused from homicide which he commits through drunkenness, which he incurred by his own fault: and from this he concludes that not undeservedly is it imputed to him as guilt. Which St. Aug. also teaches lib. de corrept. et grat. c. 11., where, speaking of the assistance of grace by which Adam could have persevered if he had willed, he says: But if this assistance had been lacking to the angel or to man as soon as they were made, since their nature was not made such that it could remain without divine assistance if it willed, they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault. For the assistance would have been lacking without which they could not remain. But now, to whom such assistance is lacking, it is already the punishment of sin. He therefore holds that even if a help is not given to a man by which he could act piously or persevere if he willed, the sin that follows is imputed to him, because in punishment of preceding sin the help of grace was not conferred on him by which he could avoid that sin.
But against this solution there is an argument: for St. Aug. lib. 3. de lib. arb. c. 18. and 19. and lib. de natur. et grat. cap. 67. teaches that a man does not always sin in what he cannot avoid, even if that impotence arises from a preceding sin. And reason persuades this: for otherwise he who by his own fault falls into madness would sin mortally by not fasting, or not hearing Mass at his time: for he has also been made impotent by his own fault to fulfill precepts of this kind. In like manner, too, the inordinate motions of the sensitive appetite, which can in no way be guarded against, would be imputed as guilt in infidels, because the impotence to guard against such motions took its rise from preceding original sin. And to the place adduced from St. Th. it is answered that he speaks openly of the privation of efficacious help, as is clear from what he says in the preceding words: for in c. 159. he openly teaches that God, as far as in him lies, is ready to give grace to all: and he explains this by the example of the sun, which on its part illuminates all. And to the place adduced from St. Aug. it is answered that he only teaches that in fallen nature it is a punishment of sin that no help is given it by which it could persevere: he does not, however, hold that it is a new sin if a man does not do what he cannot do from the corruption of original sin, unless a help is given him by which he can do it: as is clear in negative unbelief; and so Augustine explains himself in the c. 67. cited. The greater difficulty is about the sufficient help which is given immediately for the supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity. For some Thomists answer that helps of this kind are given to men for the time in which they would sin, if they did not fulfill these precepts, and are so given that all in themselves receive intrinsic helps of this kind, and sufficient: which doctrine, although it is true, nevertheless does not seem to explain exactly the state of the question. Hence it is that
VII. A sufficient help for believing immediately not all receive.— Third conclusion. It must absolutely be said that if the word give is taken as correlative to receive, God does not give to all, even those arriving at the use of reason, a supernatural and intrinsic help sufficient for producing immediately the supernatural acts of faith and hope. And so not all receive a physical and intrinsic help sufficient for them to be able to believe immediately: but this help is not given to many in punishment of preceding sin, at least original. The conclusion is Master Bañes's, in the place above, and sufficiently common among Thomists, and in my judgment is expressed in the places of St. Aug. and St. Th. adduced in the counter-argument; otherwise there would be no negative unbeliever, as we deduced in the same argument. It is proved moreover: for, as is said in Rom. 10. How then shall they believe him whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? But there are some who have never heard anything of supernatural faith, such as children brought up among barbarians in the woods: therefore. The consequence is clear: for without a preacher, interior or exterior, of supernatural faith, no one is said to have a sufficient help for believing immediately. I said in the conclusion, for believing immediately: for whether mediately or immediately, all receive, according to place and time, a sufficient help, if they arrive at the use of reason: for, as we said above, if an infidel child arriving at the use of reason should do what is in him from a special help, converting himself to God and to the good of reason proportionate to nature, God would enlighten him concerning the mysteries of faith, and he would be justified by grace. And according to this doctrine are to be understood the things St. Th. teaches q. 14.5 de verit. ar. 11. ad 1., where he says: But if anyone brought up in the woods follows the guidance of natural reason in the appetite of good and the flight from evil, it is most certainly to be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration the things necessary for believing, or direct some preacher to him.6 And in 2. sent. d. 28. q. 1. art. 4. ad 4. he says: That for having faith someone can prepare himself by what is in natural reason. Whence it is said that if anyone born among barbarous nations does what is in him, God will reveal to him what is necessary for salvation, either by inspiring or by sending a preacher. For the sense is not that to one doing what is in him from the powers of nature alone the help of grace is given infallibly; or that for having faith someone can prepare himself by what is in natural reason done from the faculty of nature alone, as some think; but by what is natural from its object, yet done from the special help of prevenient grace, as has been said; otherwise the first preparation for the help of grace would be in us from ourselves: which cannot be admitted, as was shown disp. 55. Let what Master Medina 1. 2. q. 89. ar. 6. and Master Bañes in the place above, and 2. 2. q. 10. ar. 1. dub. 2. ad. 4. teach concerning this doctrine of St. Th. be consulted. To all the arguments made from the beginning it is answered that, for the most part, they prove the first and second conclusions; but as far as they seem to proceed against the third, answer is made to each singly.
VIII. To the first, from c. 3. Apoc., it is answered that God, through the means of creatures and the light of reason, knocks at the door of all, according to place and time, that they may follow the good of reason proportionate to nature: and in like manner he knocks, according to place and time, at the door of all by a special help, that they may follow the same good, especially when they arrive at the use of reason, as has been said; yet he does not always knock by giving to all a supernatural help sufficient for believing immediately, so that all receive this help, as is clear from what has been said. And by these things answer is easily made to the other places of Scripture, and by what has been said in the first and second conclusions.
To the second argument, from the Council of Sens, answer is made from what has been said to the first. For the sense is not that at every moment any sinner receives in himself a help sufficient for salvation: for when he sleeps, certainly he is not moved by a sufficient help in act: but the sense is that, as far as lies on God's part, he always has it at hand, as St. Thomas teaches 3. cont. Gent. c. 159. and 160.
IX. That something can be comes about in two ways, namely through the power of another, or through a power which is in it.— To the third it is answered that, as St. Th. says q. 6. de verit. ar. 3. ad 7., Something can be said to be able in two ways: in one way by considering the power which is in it, as we say that a stone can be moved downwards; in another way by considering what is on the part of another, as if I were to say that a stone can be moved upwards, not by a power which is in it, but by the power of the thrower. Proportionably we say in the present matter that when it is asserted that any sinner, as long as he is on the way, can be converted to God and be saved at any time and moment, this can be understood in two ways. First, that he can be converted by a proximate and physical power which is in act in him, at any time and moment. Secondly, by a power, or special help, which God, as far as lies on his part, is ready to give to all at any moment, as has been explained above: and in this second sense that proposition is most true; but not in the first, since by the faculty of nature alone a man cannot be converted to God and be saved by a proximate power. In like manner, too, not all have in themselves received, at every moment, a supernatural sufficient help by which they could proximately be converted to God and be saved, since not at every moment is one roused in act by God to follow good, as is clear in those who sleep and in many others. Nevertheless at any moment any sinner, as long as he is on the way, can have a special help by which he can be saved,7 and this power is founded on two things, as St. Th. teaches excellently 3. p. q. 8. art. 3. ad 1. first indeed, and principally, on the power of Christ and on the mercy of God, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race: secondly, on the freedom of choice: for, as long as man is on the way, he has free choice flexible to good and to evil.8 And as to this there is a difference between men on the way and the damned: that the damned cannot, according to ordinary power, have a special help for salvation, even sufficient; and much less will they have it, nor is God ready to give them a help of this kind: and on the other hand their free choice, since it is at the term, is inflexible and obstinate in evil, which indeed does not belong to those on the way, however hardened and reprobate. Whence the account of both is not the same.
X. To the fourth argument it is answered that those who neither receive in themselves nor have a sufficient help for believing immediately do not sin against faith, as St. Aug. and St. Th. teach in the place above: which is manifestly gathered from that authority of John: If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin, namely of unbelief, which they committed by not receiving Christ the Lord, as St. Aug. often explains; and the same holds of the other supernatural precepts as to the substance of the act which is commanded, as is the precept of supernatural hope. This however is to be understood when he who transgresses the precept does not by a new act impede the help, even a sufficient one. As for example, if God imposed on someone the precept that he fly, and he should answer, I have no wings with which I can fly, and God should offer him wings for flying; certainly if he should answer, I neither wish to have wings nor to fly, the transgression of the precept would be imputed to him as guilt. So proportionably it must be said of the act of faith: for if he should impede the Gospel from being preached to him, he would now sin at least indirectly against faith, because he is bound by the precept of faith not to impede a sufficient proposal of the Gospel. But when the precepts are natural on the part of the object, man always has a sufficient help for fulfilling them, when the precept obliges, and so he who does not fulfill it is not excused from guilt. See, concerning this solution, St. Th. 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1. and 3. cont. Gent. c. 159.
To the fifth argument the solution is clear from what has been said concerning the third conclusion.