De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Introduction

Disputatio CIX: Whether reprobation includes a positive act by which God, with absolute will before foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, wills not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom.

Disputatio CX: Whether there is a cause of reprobation on our part with respect to its entire effect.

Disputatio CXI: Whether a sufficient cause of reprobation can be assigned on God’s part.

Whether a sufficient cause of reprobation can be assigned on the part of God.

I. Since, therefore, it is supposed that no cause of reprobation is given on our part, as regards all of its effects, it must be asked whether one is given on the part of God. And the difficulty is: whether the manifestation of divine justice in the reprobate, and the greater splendor of divine mercy in the elect, is the chief and of itself sufficient cause of reprobation, as regards its first effect, which is the permission of sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned. Some defend the negative part, for which

It is argued first: for to will, with such great loss and harm to a rational creature, to permit its sins for this sole or chief reason, namely that he may have something to punish, and in which his justice may shine, is altogether repugnant to divine clemency and mercy: therefore. The antecedent is proved: for a prince would be reckoned by all to be blameworthy and devoid of clemency and mercy, if, when he could prevent all the sins of his commonwealth, he willed nevertheless to permit some for this sole or chief reason, that he might have something to punish justly, and in which to exercise his vindictive justice: therefore.

Secondly. There are many other chief ends for the sake of which God permits sin: therefore. The antecedent is proved: for the first end is that he permit an intellectual creature to act freely according to its own nature, and permit defective causes sometimes to fail: which end St. Thomas seems to assign, 1 p. q. 23, art. 3. The second end is that on the occasion of sins other greater goods should follow in some, such as the incarnation of the Word and the crowns of the martyrs, which would not have come about if God had not permitted the sins of the first parent and of tyrants.

Thirdly. God did not create the reprobate for this end, that he might damn them for ever; rather he ordained them to eternal life as to the ultimate supernatural end of the intellectual creature: therefore he did not create them for this chief end, that he might show his justice in them: therefore in like manner he did not permit their sins for this chief end, that he might show in them his vindictive justice.

This is confirmed: for otherwise it would have to be conceded that God by his providence destined the reprobate to eternal punishment, just as he predestined the elect to glory; and consequently that God by his providence procures that the damnation and punishment of the reprobate should follow: which seems contrary to that word of Eccles. 15: Do not say, He has led me astray. The consequence is proved: for it pertains to the providence of God to procure that the chief end which he intends should infallibly follow: therefore if the showing of divine justice is the chief end intended by God through reprobation, it follows that it pertains to God to procure that such an end should follow.

Fourthly. The splendor of divine justice is manifested most abundantly in the punishment of the angels: therefore it is superfluous to permit so great a multitude of men to be damned, in order that divine justice may shine in them.

II. The contrary opinion is taught by St. Thomas in the solution to the third objection of the same article; for the explanation of which it must be noted that God in his works ad extra does not intend to acquire any perfection at all in himself, but rather to communicate and manifest his own to others. Hence in creation he showed his omnipotence, in the distinction of things he manifested his wisdom, and in their adornment his goodness; and since the perfections of God are infinite, it was necessary that his goodness be communicated and manifested in many ways in created things: as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 23, art. 3, on which Father Romeus Castilionus, formerly General of our order, treats excellently in his book On Freedom and the Necessity of Works, verit. 12; and so it was necessary that divine justice also, and mercy, be manifested. Let this, then, be laid down:

The splendor of divine justice and mercy is, on the part of God, a sufficient cause of reprobation.— First conclusion. The splendor of divine mercy in the elect, and likewise the showing of divine justice in the reprobate, is truly and properly the final cause for which God permits sins, both in men and in the reprobate angels. This conclusion, as it stands, is of faith, and the authors of the opposite opinion do not deny it: for it was handed down by St. Paul, Romans 9, when he says that if God, willing to show his wrath and to make known his power, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his mercy and glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for his glory: by which words the Apostle teaches that the manifestation of his justice and mercy was the cause for which he permitted sins. The same he shows in the same chapter from the authority of Exodus 9, where it was said of Pharaoh: For this very thing have I raised you up, that I might show in you my power.

It is proved by reason: for God works all things for himself, according to that word: The Lord has wrought all things for himself, even the wicked for the day of evil: therefore the end for which God permits sins is the showing of divine justice and mercy. The consequence is clear: for God cannot intend any perfection which he would acquire anew through works ad extra, as has been said: therefore he intends the manifestation of his own perfections; but through the permission of sin divine justice is most especially manifested in the reprobate: therefore. Let those words be noted: Even the wicked for the evil day; by which it is signified that God created man, who by his own fault would be wicked, and permitted sin, that on the evil day, the day of judgment, he might show his justice in his punishment. Thus Aymo on the same passage, and Lyranus, Rodulphus, and several other expositors explain that place. Moreover, to permit the evil of fault is absolutely good, as St. Augustine teaches in Enchir. ad Laur. c. 95; likewise the infliction of eternal punishment, guilt being supposed, is good: therefore it is reasonably ordered to the showing of divine justice, which is a greater and more universal good. The consequence is clear, because the lesser good is ordered to the greater good.

III. Second conclusion. The showing of divine justice is not so the cause of reprobation as to exclude other causes and particular proximate ends. We concede this conclusion to the arguments made for the first opinion, which the second argument especially proves. Moreover: for a universal end does not exclude other particular and proximate ends; but the showing of divine justice is the universal and ultimate end of the permission of sin in the reprobate: therefore.

Third conclusion. The showing of divine justice in the reprobate, and the splendor of divine mercy in the elect, is the chief end and of itself sufficient cause for which God permits the sins of the reprobate and punishes them. The conclusion is St. Thomas's, 1 p. q. 23, art. 3, where he says that this is the reason why he chose some and reprobated others, namely that the goodness of God might be represented in the elect by way of mercy, in sparing, and in the reprobate by way of justice, in punishing. And St. Thomas intends to assign the chief cause of predestination and reprobation, as is clear in the argument to which he responds; and Cajetan teaches the same in the same solution, in the response to a certain confirmation of Aureolus, where he says that reprobation, as regards the permission of demerit (even if there were no other cause but the refulgence of divine justice), would not be evil. And all the Thomists teach the same. It is proved first: for sacred Scripture, and especially the Apostle, assigns this cause for which God permits sins, namely that divine justice may be manifested in the reprobate: therefore this is the chief and of itself sufficient cause. The consequence is clear: for from this St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 1, art. 3, proves that the redemption of the human race is the chief and of itself sufficient cause of the incarnation of the Word, namely because sacred Scripture assigns this cause when it treats of the coming of Christ. It is proved secondly: for the showing of divine justice is the most universal end of the permission of sin, containing under itself the other particular ends: therefore it is the chief. The consequence is clear: for the universal end is the chief of all, as victory, because it is the universal end, is principally intended through war, and is of itself sufficient to set a just war in motion.

It is proved finally by an argument ad hominem: for the showing of divine justice is truly and properly the end for which God permits sins and punishes them: but it is not a less principal end, otherwise the glory of God would be ordered to us as to a chief end: therefore it is the chief end.

IIII. God does not permit sin in order to punish it.— To the first argument it is answered from Cajetan that God does not permit sin in order to punish it, but permits and punishes sin in order that divine justice may shine. And the reason for this is that the permission of sin and its punishment, in themselves, have not and cannot have the character of an end, because in themselves they have nothing on account of which they are desirable; but they have it through their relation to the glory of God and the showing of his justice, which is absolutely good; as a most bitter medicine is not desirable in itself, but only for the sake of the health to be obtained. And to the comparison introduced in the argument it is answered that there is not the same reason for a temporal prince and for God: for the commonwealth is not ordered in itself to the prince, nor to the manifesting of his glory as to an end; but rather the prince is ordered to the good of the commonwealth: whereas creatures are ordered in themselves to God himself as to their ultimate end, and to the manifesting of his glory. Moreover: for a prince is a particular governor, and therefore is bound, as far as he can, to prevent the sins of his commonwealth: but God is an agent and governor absolutely universal; and therefore it pertains to his providence to permit certain particular evils, in order to bring out of them greater goods.

It is answered secondly that even a particular prince justly permits lesser sins in order that greater ones be avoided: as he permits harlots, in order that sins against nature, which are graver, be avoided.

To the second it is answered that it proves only the second conclusion.

V. God did not create the reprobate for this end, that he might damn them.— To the third it must be said that God did not create the reprobate for this end, that he might damn them; since their damnation in itself has nothing on account of which it is desirable; but he created the reprobate, and permitted their sins, and damned them for ever for their sins, in order that divine justice and power might be shown in them. Nor does it follow from this that God procures that sins be committed for the obtaining of this end; but only that he permits them, since sin cannot stand on the part of God, but is supposed on the part of man, in order that the ultimate end of reprobation may follow, as St. Thomas teaches, art. 3 of the cited question, ad 2. And by these things the answer to the confirmation is clear.

To the fourth it is answered that even in men it was necessary that divine justice and mercy be manifested. But mercy shines the more in the elect if fewer are saved; since everything rare is precious, according to that which is said in 1 Reg. 3: The word of God was precious, namely rare, as the holy Doctors explain. And Isaias 13: A man shall be more precious than gold, and a man than refined gold: by which words it is signified that on account of future wars so many men would die that very few would be found, and therefore they would be more precious than gold.

Disputatio CXII: Whether God grants all people, however hardened and reprobate, sufficient supernatural helps through which they can attain eternal life and actually attain it if they will.

Disputatio CXIII: Whether God from eternity, with absolute and efficacious will, before foreknowledge of the future determination of the created will, decreed not to give sufficient or efficacious supernatural helps to those who in fact do not receive them in time.

Disputatio CXIV: Whether infants dying with original sin will remain forever in limbo, condemned to death, or will lead a blessed life in this world after the day of judgment.

Book Twelve

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