De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Introduction

Disputatio CIX: Whether reprobation includes a positive act by which God, with absolute will before foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, wills not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom.

Disputatio CX: Whether there is a cause of reprobation on our part with respect to its entire effect.

Whether there is on our part a cause of reprobation, as regards its entire effect.

I. The affirmative PART is proved from the Council of Valence under the Emperor Lothair, ch. 3, where it is said thus: We faithfully confess the predestination of the elect to life, and the predestination of the ungodly to death: yet in the election of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God precedes good merit; but in the damnation of sinners, the merit of evil precedes the just judgment of God. But by the just judgment of God some men are reprobated: therefore sin, or the foreknowledge of it, precedes reprobation, and consequently is its meritorious cause. The same thing the passages of Scripture seem to suggest in which it is held that God does not will the death of the sinner, and created man not that he should perish but that he should obtain salvation, and consequently always stands at the door and knocks.

It is argued secondly from the authority of St. Augustine, which in the matter of grace and predestination is of the greatest weight: for he teaches that original sin is the cause of reprobation in men. Thus he says in epistle 105 to Sixtus, when he says: We seek the merit of hardening, and we find it; but we seek the merit of mercy, and we do not find it, because there is none. II. Nor can this be explained of the last effect of reprobation, of which sin, at least original, is the cause; otherwise he would not have well assigned the difference between predestination and reprobation: for even predestination, as regards its last effect, has some cause on our part: namely the merits of grace, as St. Thomas teaches in 1 p. q. 23, a. 3. Likewise also in q. 2 ad Simplicianum, and in the Enchiridion to Laurentius from ch. 94 through 100, and in the book de praedestinatione et gratia, ch. 3 and 7, and de praedestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 8 and 9, and book 6 of the Hypognosticon, he very often repeats that the cause of reprobation is original sin. Whence St. Thomas, q. 6 de ver. a. 2, ad 9, expressly confesses that, according to Augustine: The reason of reprobation in men is original sin.

This is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas on ch. 9 of Romans, Lect. 2, at the end, where he says that the foreknowledge of merits cannot be any reason of predestination; because the merits foreknown fall under predestination, but the foreknowledge of sins can be some reason of reprobation on the part of the punishment: from these words the following argument is drawn. Therefore no cause of predestination is given on our part, because whatever is required for the predestined to attain the last end of predestination falls under predestination as its effect, and consequently can be neither a cause nor a condition on which predestination depends; but this reasoning does not proceed in the case of reprobation: for the sin which is required for the last effect of reprobation to follow does not fall under reprobation as its effect, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited article 3, but is presupposed on our part. The same St. Thomas seems to teach in the same article 3, and in the solution to the third, when he says that God willed to show his goodness in some by way of mercy, sparing them; and therefore he predestined them to glory; where he manifestly seems to teach that predestination presupposes original sin, and the whole mass of nature infected in the first parent, and consequently that reprobation also presupposes original sin: for out of the same mass he mercifully predestined some and justly reprobated others.

Third. To reprobate is to hold someone in hatred; for as to hold someone in hatred is to will evil to him, but God holds no one in hatred, nor wills to anyone the evil of punishment except on account of guilt: therefore reprobation presupposes the foreknowledge of guilt.

Fourth. The reprobation of men presupposes the foreknowledge of original sin, which is a sufficient cause of reprobation: therefore there is on our part a cause of reprobation. The antecedent is proved, because the predestination of Christ the Lord supposes in the sign of reason the foreknowledge of original sin, and so comes as a remedy for it, and otherwise would not have come, as St. Thomas teaches, 3 p. q. 1, a. 3, especially in the solution to the fourth: therefore our predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of original sin, otherwise it would precede the predestination of Christ, and so Christ the Lord would not be the first of the predestined, nor their head: therefore reprobation also is understood as after the foreknowledge of original sin. That consequence is clear: for predestination in the sign of reason precedes reprobation, as affirmation precedes negation: therefore if the foreknowledge of original sin precedes our predestination, much more must it precede reprobation.

Fifth. God, as far as lies on his part, wills to exclude no one from his kingdom, inasmuch as he wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth, as is said in 1 Tim. 2: therefore that he wills to exclude some from his kingdom presupposes a demeritorious cause on their part.

It is argued sixth. Reprobation is an act of punitive or vindictive justice: therefore it necessarily presupposes guilt foreknown, on account of which God decreed to punish men.

This is confirmed: for otherwise God would be cruel, and not a most clement prince, if of his mere will he had reprobated some, knowing and seeing that by that very fact they were to be damned.

III. Seventh. There is on our part a cause of the whole effect of reprobation: therefore there is a cause of reprobation. The consequence is clear: for on this ground St. Thomas, in 1 p., at the article cited, proves that no cause of predestination is given on our part, namely because no cause of the whole effect of predestination is given: therefore if a cause of the whole effect of reprobation is given, a cause of reprobation will be given on our part. But the antecedent is proved: for, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 23, a. 3, ad 2, and q. 6 de verit. a. 1, at the end of the body, and on Romans 9, Lect. 4, there are two effects of reprobation, namely the infliction of eternal punishment, which is the last effect, and the withdrawal of the help of divine grace, or the abandonment in sin; but of each effect a cause is given on our part; for the cause of the infliction of eternal punishment is guilt, as all acknowledge; and in like manner guilt, at least original, is the cause of the other effect, namely of the abandonment in sin, as is clear from St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1, where he says that the help of grace, to whomsoever it is given by God, is given mercifully: but to those to whom it is not given, it is not given save in punishment of a preceding sin, at least original, as St. Augustine says in the book de correptione et gratia; and in 3 contra Gentes, ch. 159, he says that men are not helped by God, the cause being in themselves, namely because by their own guilt they put an obstacle to grace, and so it is imputed to them as sin if they are not converted, even if they cannot do this without the help of grace. Finally, in 1.2, q. 112, a. 3, ad 2, he says that the defect of grace has its first cause from ourselves, but the conferring of grace has its first cause from God, according to that word of Osee 13: Thy perdition is from thyself, O Israel; only in me is thy help. And the same he teaches in 1 Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 2. Therefore there is on our part a cause of the whole effect of reprobation.

This is confirmed. God could have reprobated a man on account of original sin; for in itself it is a sufficient cause of reprobation, and it was fitting for divine mercy to do so, lest men under any color, even an apparent one, might be able to complain of him: therefore in fact he reprobated men on account of sin, at least original.

Eighth. The permission of the first sin, at least original, cannot be an effect of reprobation: therefore from the fact that no cause is given on our part of that permission, it does not follow that no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation. The antecedent is proved: since of the same sin there is not a twofold permission, but original sin is understood as permitted, and as future, before reprobation is understood: therefore the permission of the same sin cannot be understood as after reprobation, and so it will not be its effect; otherwise the same sin would be permitted twice by God, or the same thing would be both prior and posterior in respect of the same.

This is confirmed first. God in fact permitted that all men should sin originally, and in like manner he permits that many of the predestined should sin mortally, and yet the permission of original sin is not in all an effect of reprobation, and in like manner the permission of actual sin: therefore neither is it in any. The consequence is clear: for such permission stands equally towards all.

This is confirmed secondly. As is said in the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 11: God does not desert those once justified by his grace, unless he is first deserted by them: therefore before the divine permission by which he deserts a man and permits him to fall, something is always presupposed on the part of the man, by reason of which God deserts him; and consequently that first permission of sin supposes a cause on our part.

This is confirmed thirdly: for St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 94, a. 4, ad 5, says that in the temptation help was not given to Adam, because sin had already gone before in his mind, and he had not recourse to the divine help: therefore according to St. Thomas, before the permission of sin some negligence is presupposed on the part of man.

For the contrary, St. Thomas seems to be adduced, 1 p. q. 23, a. 3, in the solution to the second and third, where he speaks indifferently of predestination and reprobation, and teaches that it is not from foreknown merits.

IIII. First opinion.— In this difficult question a certain author, in order to establish in God a predestination and reprobation that quiets the human intellect, by which he may easily meet the arguments that seem to lead either to despair or to slackness and torpor, distinguishes a twofold reprobation, as was said above concerning predestination. The first he calls incomplete and conditional reprobation, which has a tacit condition understood along with it, and imports the act by which God conditionally wills not to admit some into his kingdom, but to punish them with eternal penalties for their sins, if they themselves have sinned and persevered in sin even to the end. The second they call complete and absolute reprobation, and this they hold to presuppose in God the foreknowledge of final impenitence, or of perseverance in sin even to death, and on the part of man to suppose sin itself and its continuation even to the last term of life: and thus such reprobation to be from foreknown demerits. From this he infers that no one is reprobated by the absolute will of God before the forevision of his end in the state of sin. He infers also that God has not determined by an absolute decree, before the forevision of works, who are to be saved and who to be damned. He is compelled to establish this opinion.

First from the sacred Scriptures: for in Matthew 25 it is said to the reprobate: Go, you cursed, into the everlasting fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels: and the reason is added: For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc. where that causal word for signifies the demeritorious cause foreknown by God, on account of which they were reprobated. Likewise Ezechiel 18: The death of the wicked is not of my will. Ezechiel 33. As I live, says the Lord, I do not will the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted and live. Sapient. 11: You love all things that are, and hate nothing of the things you have made, etc. And 1 Tim. 2: Who wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. But with this will an absolute reprobation of some, before their demerits are foreseen and their perseverance in them even to the end, does not in truth comport. For how does he truly and sincerely will all to be saved, if in that first decree concerning the men to be saved, which he conceived of himself, he chose so few for salvation and excluded so immense a number, and in the second instant prepared for them no grace except an incongruous one, at least for the term of life?

Secondly he proves it from the Fathers: for St. Jerome on ch. 1 of Malachias: The love, he says, and the hatred of God are born either from the foreknowledge of future things or from works: otherwise we know that God loves all things, and hates nothing of those things he created: but he properly claims for his own charity those who are the enemies and rebels of vices; and on the contrary he hates those who desire to build again what God has destroyed. Where he openly suggests that hatred is born from works. The same in the epistle to Hedibia, q. 10: The vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto his glory, he saves not irrationally; and not apart from truth, but from preceding causes: because some did not receive the Son of God, while others willed of their own accord to receive him. From which it is shown that it is not nations that are chosen, but the wills of men. But this would not be true if, before all forevision of wills, he chose these to glory and not those out of his mere good pleasure. Likewise also Ambrose, book 5 de fide, ch. 3, explaining that word of the Apostle: Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated, says: For he did not predestinate before he foreknew; but the merits of those whose merits he foreknew, he predestinated. Moreover Fulgentius, to Monimus, on the twofold predestination, ch. 24, says thus: God therefore, about to show what he foreknew was to be rendered and what was to be given, predestinated to punishment those whom he foreknew would depart from him by the vice of an evil will. St. Prosper, in reply to the objections of Vincent, resp. 12, says: Because they were foreknown as about to fall, they were not predestinated; but they would be predestinated if they were about to return. And in the reply to the chapters of the Gauls, respon. 7: Because he himself foreknew that they would fall by their own will, for this reason he distinguished them by no predestination from the sons of perdition. By which words the foreknowledge of works is openly presupposed to election and reprobation: therefore before foreseen merits or demerits there is not in God an absolute predestination and reprobation, but a conditional one.

Thirdly: for the divine promises and comminations, by which he promises eternal life to the elect and threatens eternal punishment to the reprobate, are conditional, and always contain a tacit or express hypothesis, namely, if they have kept the commandments and persevered even to the end, or if they have fallen and not done penance, as is clear from the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, canon 20: If anyone says that a man justified, and however perfect, is not bound to the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, but only to believe; as though the Gospel were a bare and absolute promise of eternal life, without the condition of observing the commandments: let him be anathema. And the same condition is expressed in ch. 13 of the same session: For God (unless they themselves fail his grace) as he has begun the good work, so will he also perfect it, working both to will and to perform: and in canon 32 it is defined that the justified man merits eternal life by good works, and the obtaining of that eternal life itself (provided however that he departs in grace). Which condition is expressed also in Matthew 19: If you will enter into life, keep the commandments: and in Luke 13: Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish: therefore absolute reprobation is not in God before demerits are foreseen.

Fourth. Absolute reprobation before foreseen demerits does not seem to agree with the divine goodness, to which it is not consonant that, in the goods which of himself, before all forevision of future things, he prepares for the rational creature, he should except some. Nor does it seem to agree sufficiently with justice either: for in the damnation of the wicked and the rewarding of the just, there does not seem to shine out in that manner of predestination and reprobation so much equity as there would be if it were from foreseen merits or demerits. Moreover, according to that manner it would be difficult to explain how the greatest part of men is not predestinated to evil by divine power, and created in order to perish: therefore.

Fifth: for experience teaches that some, from an absolute predestination and reprobation before foreseen merits or demerits, have fallen into the gravest fits of melancholy, others have cast aside the pursuit of piety and the perfection of religion, others pass almost their whole life in anxiety, always holding the predestination of God suspect. For if concerning all men, before all forevision of what we are going to do, it is already firmly and by absolute decrees determined; if the number of those to be saved, which can neither be increased nor diminished, is immutably defined with no regard had to our works or labors; if before the examination of works it is determined concerning all by an irrevocable prejudgment; it seems perspicuous that all solicitude for living rightly is taken away: because if you are comprehended in that number, no injury will bring it about that you fall out; if you are not comprehended, no solicitude will help you to enter: therefore that account of predestination and reprobation must be established which may bring solid consolation of mind, which may stir up the pursuit of good works, contempt of the world, and the love of Christian perfection. But these things we attain if we say that predestination and reprobation on the part of God are not absolute before foreseen merits or demerits, but conditional: therefore, etc. The other reasons which are brought forward for this opinion I omit: both because they are comprehended in those adduced above, and also because they tend to impugn the absolute predestinations or predeterminations of God, of which I have already treated professedly in disputation 22 and 23.

V. That the cause of reprobation was original sin; what they hold.— The second opinion is that of those who assert that the meritorious cause of reprobation in men was original sin foreknown by God, by which the whole human nature was infected in the first parent: and consequently that all who sinned in Adam merited for themselves in him wrath and eternal punishment, according to that word of Eph. 2: And we were all by nature children of wrath. This opinion many Thomists follow, convinced by the authorities of Augustine in the places alleged above, and they affirm two things. The first is that original sin is the general cause of reprobation in men: for God foresaw from eternity the whole mass of human nature infected on account of the sin of the first parent. Then out of this mass of perdition he chose, of his mere liberality, some in particular, and predestined them, in order to show in them the abundant riches of his mercy; but others he justly left in the same mass of perdition, and reprobated on account of the sin of nature, to which eternal punishment was due: according to that word of Gen. 3: In whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death: in which no injury was done to anyone: just as, if two men were in prison condemned to death for the same cause, and the King should enter and of his mercy wish to grant life to one and snatch him from death, but leave the other in prison to be hanged for the crime committed, in order to manifest in him the justice of the prince, no injury would be inflicted on anyone. On which account also St. Augustine says: O man, if you do not receive what is due, you have reason to rejoice; but if you do receive it, you have nothing to complain of. The second statement is that actual sins foreknown are not the cause of reprobation, which they prove from the authority of St. Augustine and from that word of Rom. 9: Before they were born, or had done anything good or evil, etc. from which testimony the following argument is drawn. The same is the reason of the reprobation of Esau, of which the Apostle speaks, and of the other reprobate; but Esau was not reprobated on account of his own actual demerits: therefore neither were the others.

This is confirmed: for the Apostle, although he speaks of Esau, of whom mention is made in the passage of Malachias which he adduces, nevertheless hands down a general doctrine concerning predestination and reprobation.

The third opinion is that of those who assert that a cause of reprobation is indeed given on our part, but that it is not the same in all. For they say that in some, namely in little children dying without a remedy against original sin, the cause of reprobation was original sin foreseen by God: but in some the cause of reprobation is only mortal sin, as in the reprobate angels and in baptized adults who are damned only on account of mortal sin: in others, finally, both together, as in infidels who die with original and actual sin. This opinion M. Soto held in his commentary on ch. 9 of Romans, although in the retractations which he added at the end of book 4 of the Sentences he did not obscurely change it. The strongest arguments of this opinion have been set out from the beginning.

VII. The fourth opinion is that of other Thomists, who assert that of reprobation, as regards the last effect, a cause is given on our part, namely guilt, whether original or actual, and likewise as regards hardening and perseverance in sin even to the last of life. But as regards the first effect of reprobation, which is the first permission of the sin on account of which the reprobate is damned, whether that be original or actual, no cause is given on our part, but the cause of that permission is the mere will of God: and consequently they teach that no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation. This opinion M. Bañes defends, 1 p. in the article cited, M. Zumel, disp. 4, and many other most learned Thomists.

VIII. The difference between predestination and reprobation.— For the resolution, however, of this difficulty it must be supposed first that, as St. Thomas teaches in the places cited above, divine predestination stands otherwise in order to the predestined, and reprobation otherwise in order to the reprobate: for predestination is not only the cause of the last effect, namely the conferring of glory, but is also the cause of all those things by which the predestined is disposed to the obtaining of that last effect, whether by way of merit or by way of material cause, even if no merit intervenes there; as happens in the dispositions antecedent in time to the infusion of grace. But reprobation, although it is a cause inferring the last effect of reprobation, which is eternal punishment, is not however the cause of the means by which the reprobate merits eternal punishment, because it is not the cause of the sin, or demerit, of the reprobate himself.

It must be supposed secondly that in the process of reprobation, as regards its effect, or as regards those things which are supposed for the obtaining of the last effect, this order is found. For first is the permission of sin: for it is not intelligible, and much less possible, that any sin should be future unless God permits, as St. Augustine teaches in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, ch. 95 and 96: Nothing, he says, is done unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by doing it himself, or by permitting it to be done. Secondly, after the permission of sin, the sin itself is understood as future. Thirdly, the perseverance of sin even to death, or even to the term of the way, as in the angels. Fourthly and lastly, eternal punishment, whether it be of sense or of loss.

It must be supposed thirdly that the chief difficulty of this controversy consists in this: namely, whether the permission of the guilt on account of which the reprobate is damned is to be numbered among the effects of reprobation. For, as Zumel noted in the place cited above, if the first permission of sin is an effect of reprobation, it is evident that no cause of reprobation is given on our part, as regards its entire effect, just as no cause of predestination is given; but if the permission of guilt is not an effect of reprobation, it must be conceded that a cause of the same reprobation is given on our part.

It must be supposed fourthly that the present question concerning the cause of reprobation can be understood in two ways. In the first way, absolutely, or in general: namely, whether the fact that some are reprobated has a cause on their part. In the second way, in particular and comparatively, and then the sense is: whether a cause is given on the part of the reprobate, on account of which these in particular were reprobated rather than others.

Let this be the first conclusion. Reprobation, by which God determined not to give eternal life to some and to permit their sin, is not conditional but absolute, nor does it presuppose in God the foreknowledge or forevision of the demerits of the reprobate himself, or of his perseverance in sin even to the last of life. This conclusion remains sufficiently proved from the things said in disputation 36 and 37 concerning predestination, and will be made plainer from the things to be said in the following conclusions and in the solutions of the arguments.

IX. In the angels no cause of reprobation was given.— The second conclusion. In the angels who fell, no cause of reprobation is given on their part as regards its entire effect, but before the foreknowledge of their future sin God, of his own will, reprobated some of them and permitted them to fall into sin: and by the name of cause we comprehend any reason whatever, or motive, or condition without which not, holding on the part of the angels. The conclusion is proved: for St. Augustine only concedes that original sin is the cause of hardening, but not actual sin: therefore since in the angels there was no original sin, but only actual, in them no cause of reprobation is given. Secondly it is proved from that word of Rom. 9: Not of works, but of him that calls, it was said: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. And after a little: Has not the potter power, of the same mass, to make one vessel indeed unto honor, but another unto dishonor? From which testimonies St. Thomas proves that actual sin is not the cause of reprobation, as regards its first effect. Thirdly it is proved from the things said in the preceding disputation, where we showed that God by a positive act, before the foreknowledge of future sin, even on a hypothesis, decreed not to admit some into his kingdom; and this conclusion will be made plainer from the reasons to be adduced for the fourth conclusion.

X. Of comparative reprobation no cause is given in little children.— The third conclusion. In little children departing with only original sin, no cause of reprobation is given on their part, if they be considered in particular and comparatively in order to others who are not reprobated: and the same must be said proportionably of adults. In this conclusion all the Thomists agree, and it is the express opinion of St. Thomas in the solution to the third, art. 3 cited, and in 3 cont. Gent. ch. 161, and Ferrara there. It is proved by the reason which St. Thomas touches in the third argument and in its solution: for as regards nature all little children are equal, and likewise as regards original sin: for on account of that sin all are equally by nature children of wrath, and equally merit eternal damnation: therefore on their part no reason or particular cause can be assigned on account of which one rather than another is reprobated. This argument proves the same thing concerning adults: for although one may have greater actual sins than another, yet in this all are equal, that on account of original sin they could be left in the mass of perdition.

This is confirmed by the examples adduced by St. Thomas in the same solution to the third, from natural and artificial things; for no reason can be assigned on the part of prime matter on account of which from the beginning this part of matter was produced under this substantial form and that part of matter under another: but this depended on the simple will of God; because any part of matter, in itself, stands indifferently towards any form. In like manner in artificial things no reason can be assigned on account of which, out of two equal stones, the craftsman places one in the foundation and the other on the top of the building, but this depends on the simple will of the craftsman: therefore proportionably, out of two men infected with the same original sin, no reason can be assigned on their part on account of which one rather than the other is left in the mass of perdition and the other is taken up into the kingdom.

XI. No cause of reprobation is given, absolutely speaking.— Fourth conclusion. Not only comparatively, but also absolutely speaking, no cause of reprobation is given. And so neither actual sin, nor original, nor both together foreseen by God, was in fact the meritorious or motive cause of the reprobation of anyone, as regards all its effects. This conclusion is held, and not obscurely, by Cajetan at the end of the same article 3, where he confesses that the permission of sin is an effect of reprobation. The same conclusion Durandus teaches, in the first book of the Sentences, d. 41, q. 2, especially no. 14; Master Bañes and Zumel in the place above; and Master Soto, at the end of the fourth book of the Sentences, seems rather to incline to the same view. Many most weighty Thomists also defend it, and I judge that St Thomas definitively taught the same view; for in the cited article 3, in the body of the article, he says that as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will to permit someone to fall into fault, and to bear the punishment of damnation for the fault: and he says the same in the reply to the second. From which place Cajetan, according to the view of St Thomas, deduces that reprobation is foreknowledge together with the will to permit fault and to damn for fault: therefore according to St Thomas the permission of the first sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned, is an effect of reprobation; but of that permission no cause is given on the part of the reprobate: for before the permission of the first sin, and before the first sin, no other preceding sin is given; otherwise that would not be simply first, or another sin, committed with God not permitting it, would precede it in the man, which is against St Augustine, Enchiridion to Laurentius, cc. 95 and 96. Therefore according to St Thomas no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation. Likewise also in the same article 3, in the reply to the first, he says that inasmuch as God does not will this good for certain ones, which is eternal life, he is said to hate them, or to reprobate them; but it proceeds from the simple will of God that he does not will this good of eternal life for some: for in gratuitous things one can, according to his own good pleasure, without any other cause, give something to this one and not give it to that one: as St Thomas says, in the reply to the third of the same article, and in q. 6 de veritate, a. 2, ad 8. Moreover, in the same reply to the third, inquiring into the cause of predestination and reprobation, he assigns no other than the divine will: for he says: Why he chooses these to glory and reprobates those has no reason except the divine will; which he also explains by examples. Nor is it enough to answer that St Thomas speaks comparatively of the reprobation of some in preference to others; for he speaks in the same way, as regards the cause, of reprobation and of predestination; but no cause of predestination is given, according to the mind of St Thomas, as regards the whole effect of predestination, not only comparatively, but not even absolutely: therefore neither of reprobation. It adds weight that, although the holy Doctor, in q. 6 de veritate, a. 2, ad 9, had assigned a twofold cause of reprobation in men, one according to St Augustine, namely original sin, the other the divine will, which can reasonably will to deny to someone something that is not owed to him, yet in the first part, in the third article cited, where he treats the same question ex professo, he passed over the first cause in silence and assigned the second: he holds therefore that original sin was not the cause of reprobation as regards its whole effect. But what the view of St Augustine was I will say afterwards. For I judge that in this part too St Thomas does not depart from him.

It is proved secondly by reason. The first permission of sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned, whether it be original or actual, is the first effect of reprobation; but of it no cause is given on our part, as has been said above: therefore no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation, and consequently neither of reprobation itself. The major is St Thomas's, in the place above; and it is proved; for that which is required beforehand in order that the last effect of reprobation may follow, if it does not have the character of fault, is an effect of reprobation itself: but the permission by which God permits the sin on account of which he inflicts on the reprobate the last effect of reprobation is necessary in order that that effect may follow; for if God does not permit the sin, there will be no sin, since nothing is done unless God wills or permits it, and consequently neither will there be eternal punishment for sin. And on the other hand the permission of sin does not have the character of fault, but is good: for St Augustine says, in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, ch. 95: Nor is it to be doubted that God does good even by suffering whatever things are done ill: therefore the permission of sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned, is an effect of reprobation.

It is confirmed: for in the angels the permission of sin was an effect of their reprobation: therefore also in men, when we speak of the sin on account of which someone is damned. Some Doctors regard this argument as so effective that they think it evidently demonstrates our conclusion. But the arguments by which it is proved that the first permission of sin, on account of which someone is damned, is not an effect of reprobation but is presupposed to it, at least when the sin is original, we shall bring forward and solve below.

It is proved thirdly. In those to whom original sin has been remitted through baptism, original sin itself is not a cause of reprobation: therefore at least in all reprobate men original sin will not be the cause of reprobation. The antecedent is proved: for through baptism original sin is truly remitted as regards all that which has the true and proper character of sin, as is defined in the Council of Trent, session 5, decree on original sin, last canon; which the Council proves by the authority of the Apostle, Romans 6, when it adds: For in those who are reborn God hates nothing, because there is nothing of condemnation in those who have been truly buried together with Christ through baptism into death: where the Council speaks indifferently of the baptized, whether they be elect or reprobate: therefore through baptism, according to the mind of the Council, the debt of fault and of eternal punishment is truly remitted: therefore an adult who has been baptized is not reprobated on account of original sin that has been dismissed; otherwise there would be something of condemnation for those who have been reborn through baptism, and consequently either original sin would afterwards return, or it would not have been truly remitted through baptism, but would only be said to be erased, or not to be imputed: which is against the Council.

It is confirmed. The sin on account of which someone is reprobated is the cause of the last effect of reprobation, but original sin, remitted through baptismal grace, is not the cause of the last effect of reprobation, namely of eternal punishment, otherwise it would not have been truly remitted through baptism as regards the debt of eternal punishment; and consequently neither as regards the fault: for the debt of eternal punishment cannot remain unless the fault remains: therefore.

To this argument many solutions are applied, but plainly difficult ones. The first is that through baptism original sin is truly remitted as regards the fault and the debt of eternal punishment: and accordingly afterwards, in execution, the original sin that has been dismissed is not in itself a cause of reprobation as regards its last effect: nevertheless the original sin itself, foreseen before its remission, was a true motive cause of the ordination to eternal punishment in the intention of God, and so it is called a cause of reprobation, because by baptismal grace that eternal decree of God was not changed, but only according to present justice is such a baptized reprobate made pleasing and acceptable to God unto eternal life. But this solution does not evacuate the force of the argument: for God by his eternal decree has not ordained anyone to eternal punishment on account of original or actual sin that is truly to be remitted in time, as regards the fault; but only on account of the sin in which he is to persevere until death: therefore it is impossible that on account of original sin truly to be remitted, as to fault, God should have had an eternal decree of ordaining someone to eternal punishment.

The second solution, that of others, is that original sin dismissed is not in itself a cause of reprobation, but only per accidens, inasmuch namely as it was the cause that all who are born children of wrath were reprobated on account of that sin committed in the first parent; which decree indeed remains in God in respect of those who depart this life in some mortal sin, whether original, or both together. Yet this solution seems to beg the question: for this is what we contend, that God from eternity did not have the decree of reprobating someone on account of a sin truly to be remitted as regards the fault. Moreover: for a sin perfectly remitted stands in the same way in relation to reprobation as if it had not been committed, as is clear from that text of Ezechiel: In whatever day the sinner shall groan, I will remember all his iniquities no more. But if it had not been committed, it would in no way be a cause of reprobation, even per accidens: therefore neither if it was committed or contracted, if afterwards it was really dismissed through grace. It is confirmed: for the cause being removed, the effect is removed: therefore, if original sin is in all the cause of reprobation, original sin being removed, reprobation is removed.

The third solution is that original sin, although it is remitted through baptism as regards the fault and eternal punishment, yet remains as regards a certain effect; namely as regards the fomes, as regards the hardships of the body, and as regards temporal death. Therefore just as God justly inflicts temporal death in punishment of original sin already remitted, so in punishment of the same sin he leaves some, in a certain common supernatural providence, with helps sufficient for salvation and without efficacious help, at least of the gift of perseverance, knowing that they will sin and be damned. Many learned men employ this solution: but against it the argument presses: because no one is punished with a spiritual punishment on account of a sin already dismissed, but the withdrawal of efficacious help is a great spiritual punishment: for, that being posited, the damnation of the man follows infallibly. Moreover: for, in order that something be called simply the cause of reprobation, it must be the cause of the whole effect of reprobation, as has been said of the cause of predestination; for on this account works proceeding from grace are not simply the cause of predestination, because they are not the cause of the whole effect of predestination; for they are not the cause of the first call: but original sin dismissed is not the cause of the whole effect of reprobation, because it is not the cause of the infliction of eternal punishment, as has been said: therefore it cannot be the cause of reprobation.

The fourth solution is that of others, who, to escape the difficulty of the argument, confess that the cause of reprobation in baptized men was not original sin but actual, and contend that this is the mind of St Augustine. For, although for the most part he seems to refer the cause of reprobation to original sin, by reason of which the whole human race has been made as it were a certain damned mass, he does this because thence begins the damnation of all the reprobate. And although some are rescued from this mass through baptism, as Augustine says, epistle 54 to Dardanus, q. 2, yet again through actual sin they return to the mass; and therefore they are so regarded by God as though they had never been separated from that mass; and they bring forward for this view St Augustine, in the book de correptione et gratia, cc. 7 and 13, and Prosper, at the second chapter of the Gauls. This solution does not seem to be according to the mind of St Augustine: for in the places cited above he expressly teaches, on account of the passages of the Apostle adduced, that actual sin is not the cause of reprobation: nor does he anywhere say the opposite: for in the book de correptione et gratia he only asserts that those who are justified and live piously, but are not going to persevere, are beyond doubt not to be counted in the number of the elect even at the time when they live well and piously; because they have not been separated from that mass of perdition by the foreknowledge and predestination of God: which in everyone's judgment is most true. Yet St Augustine, or St Prosper in the place above, does not there say that they were reprobated on account of actual sin, unless the discourse be of reprobation as regards the last effect, concerning which there is no controversy.

The last solution, that of others, is that original sin dismissed through baptism returns as regards ingratitude, on account of the actual sins that follow, just as sins dismissed through penance also afterwards return as regards ingratitude through a subsequent sin, as St Thomas teaches, 3 p. q. 88, a. 2; and by this reasoning all who are damned were reprobated on account of original sin, and not on account of actual sin alone. But against this: for it can happen that someone invincibly ignores that original sin was dismissed in him through baptism, as if a boy had been baptized before he came to the use of reason, and were carried off by infidels and brought up in the woods, where he would hear nothing of baptism; such a boy, if he afterwards sins mortally and is damned, that actual sin would not have the circumstance of ingratitude by reason of the original sin already dismissed through baptism. Moreover: for that ingratitude is not original sin, but actual, or a circumstance of it: therefore those once baptized are not reprobated on account of original sin.

XII. Fourthly the conclusion is proved from the words of the Apostle, Romans 9: For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might remain, not from works, but from him who calls, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger, as it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. And below: Has not the potter power, out of the same mass, to make one vessel indeed unto honour, but another unto dishonour? In which testimony, as we showed in disputation 37, no. 9, from the doctrine of St Augustine and St Thomas, it is openly signified that in the absolute election and reprobation of men God did not have regard to foreseen merits or demerits, but by his good pleasure chose this one and predestined him to glory, and did not predestine that one, but by an absolute will determined to permit his sin and hardening, or perseverance in the same sin up to the end of life, and to inflict eternal punishment on account of the same sin, whether that punishment be only of loss, as in little children dying with original sin alone, or also of sense, as in adult reprobates who have added actual sins: which those words of the Apostle also signify: That the purpose of God according to election might remain: for election is among several, out of whom one is taken up and another left: therefore according to the Apostle absolute predestination and reprobation precede in a sign of reason foreseen merits or demerits, at least actual ones: for what is to be thought of original sin according to the mind of St Augustine and St Thomas will be said below.

To this passage of the Apostle the author of the first view applies two explanations. The first is that by that word, not from works, only works already done are excluded; but not works foreseen: or if works foreseen are also excluded, as Augustine and many others following him hold, that passage is not to be interpreted of absolute election to glory, but of election to grace. This explanation there is no need to impugn again in the present place, since it has already been excluded as insufficient in disputation 37, no. 17.

The second explanation is of election to the benefits of this life, partly temporal and partly spiritual. For when God had chosen Jacob and his posterity, so that from them Christ should be born, he determined to pursue them with singular benefits and to dispose them for the advent of Christ, and that not with a view to works, but from his own good pleasure. But for Esau and his posterity he did not prepare such excellent benefits. And that the whole discourse of the Apostle in that chapter may be better understood, he notes that it is not the Apostle's scope there to show that God, in the call to faith or in the election to the grace of justification, has no regard for works good or evil, but does all things from a bare good pleasure conceived before all foresight of works: That is not his mind, he says, but his scope is to teach that God, in conferring salvation, the grace of justification, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, has no regard for external works, especially of the law, which the Jews made so much of, and on account of which they thought all things were owed to them, and that they were to be preferred to all others, but only for faith and the inward affection toward God and toward Christ. But those words which the Apostle took from Malachi: But Esau I have hated, he says are so to be taken that by the name of hatred is not signified a true hatred, whereby according to his good pleasure he wills evil to Esau or to his posterity, but a lesser love, which in comparison with the favour bestowed on the other can be called hatred. For the same explanation Bartholomew Camerarius is adduced, in the Catholic Dialogue, ch. 6, § 1, and John of Bologna, opuscule on predestination, part 1, § But that we may return to it.

But whatever be the case with this interpretation, it cannot be denied that the Apostle speaks in that chapter 9 of predestination and reprobation in comparison with the supernatural gifts of grace and glory, as is clear from what has been said in the disputation on predestination. Nor is the authority of Bartholomew Camerarius and John of Bologna so great that on account of it, to escape the difficulty of the argument, one should depart from the common explanation of the holy Fathers, who interpret the passage of the Apostle of predestination and reprobation in comparison with the supernatural end. It adds weight that from the context of the Apostle in the same chapter 9 and in the preceding chapter 8 it is gathered, and from it the holy Fathers, Latin and Greek, gather, that the Apostle speaks of the predestination and reprobation of which we now treat: for those words of chapter 8, Whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son; and those, Who shall accuse against the elect of God? God, who justifies: who is he that condemns? And what he adds in chapter 9, Therefore it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy; and those, Therefore he has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens; are not to be narrowed to some particular person, or to mercy or the denial of temporal benefits, but are to be understood universally of mercy, or of predestination and reprobation, in comparison with supernatural goods: which those following words in the same chapter confirm: But if God, willing to show his wrath and to make known his power, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared unto glory; whom he has also called, not only from the Jews, but also from the Gentiles, etc. Certainly vessels of wrath fitted for destruction are called nothing but reprobates, who fail from the supernatural end, and vessels of mercy are called those predestined to eternal life; which those words indicate, which he has prepared unto glory.

XIII. Fifthly our conclusion is proved: for if absolute predestination and reprobation is not in God before the foresight of merits or demerits, it would follow that the mystery of predestination and reprobation would not be so inscrutable and unsearchable; for to the objection which the Apostle proposes on the part of the reprobate, Why then does he still find fault? for who resists his will? it could easily be answered that it is no wonder that these were absolutely predestined and those reprobated: for by their own freedom these willed to cooperate with the helps of prevenient grace, but not those: and accordingly it seems to follow that that reproof of the Apostle, and the answer, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? are superfluous, and that there would have been no need to have recourse to that admiration: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments, and his ways unsearchable; and consequently that saying of St Augustine, so often repeated, would collapse: why he draws this one and does not draw that one; do not be willing to judge, if you do not wish to err. And that one: From two little ones, therefore, bound by original sin, why is this one taken up and that one left? and from two impious men already advanced in age, why is this one so called that he follows him who calls, while that one is either not called, or is not so called that he follows him who calls? The judgments of God are inscrutable. But from two pious men, why is perseverance unto the end given to this one and not given to that one? The judgments of God are more inscrutable. Whence the same Augustine, epistle 105 to Sixtus, weighing that same passage of Romans 9 and of Malachi 1, and excluding predestination and reprobation on the basis of foreseen merits, says: To which view the blessed Apostle also took up the testimony of a Prophet far later: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated, so that it might be understood that this, afterwards made open through the Prophet, was before they were born in the predestination of God through grace. For what did he love in Jacob, before he was born and had done anything good, except the gratuitous gift of his mercy? And what did he hate in Esau, before he had done anything evil, except original sin? For he would neither love justice in the one, which he had done none of, nor hate nature in the other, which he himself had made good. But it is a wonder, when they are hemmed in by these straits, into how great precipices they cast themselves, fearing the nets of truth. Therefore, they say, he hated one of those not yet born and loved the other: because he foresaw their future works. Who would not wonder that this most acute insight was lacking to the Apostle? For he did not see this, when, to the question set before him as it were by an opponent, he did not rather answer that which is so brief, so open, so (as these think) true and absolute. For when he had set out the astonishing matter, how it could rightly be said of those not yet born, and doing nothing good or evil, that God loved one and hated the other, he himself, expressing by the question set before him the movement of the hearer, says: What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? Far be it. Here, then, was the place for him to say what these hold. For God was foreseeing their future works, when he said that the greater would serve the less. But the Apostle does not say this; rather, lest anyone should dare to glory in the merits of his own works, he willed that what he said should avail to commend the grace and glory of God. For when he had said: Far be it that there be injustice with God, as if we were saying to him: Whence do you show this, when you assert that it was said, not from works, but from him who calls: The greater shall serve the less? For Moses, he says, saith: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show mercy to whom I will be merciful. Therefore it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. To these and similar words of St Augustine the author answers that he speaks against those who held that predestination is from foreseen merits proceeding from the powers of nature alone, as the Pelagians said: but not against those who say that predestination is from foreseen merits proceeding from grace, as the first view asserts. Nevertheless I judge that it cannot be affirmed that predestination is from foreseen merits of grace, as will be clear below. But someone will argue from the context of the same epistle. For immediately after the words adduced he adds: Where now are merits, where works, whether past or future, as it were of the powers of nature, whether fulfilled or to be fulfilled? Of the powers of nature, he says, not of the powers of grace. And in the book on the predestination of the Saints, ch. 17: He foreknew, therefore, says the Pelagian, who would be holy and immaculate through the choice of free will: and therefore before the foundation of the world he chose them in his own foreknowledge such as he foreknew they would be. He chose them, therefore, he says, before they were, predestining the sons whom he foreknew would be holy and immaculate: surely he did not himself make them, nor did he foresee that he would make them, but that they would be. Here he speaks only of predestination from foreseen merits of nature, which those words through the choice of free will indicate, and it is only this predestination, which the Pelagians established, that Augustine impugns in those places and in many others.

Yet this solution could somehow have a place, if it were said that predestination is from foreseen merits of grace, or of the divine call, not of any call whatever, but of that by which God not only grants the power, nor only grants to act piously and to persevere, if we will: nor only concurs with us to pious operation, or to other free acts, by a simultaneous concurrence, if we will to cooperate, but also by his grace truly and efficiently makes us will and persevere unto the end. For of this call St Augustine speaks, as is clear from the same Augustine, in the book on the predestination of the Saints, ch. 16, where he says: He said therefore, not from works, but from him who calls, not by any call whatever, but by that call by which one is made a believer. And ch. 17 he says: But they were chosen out of the world by that calling by which God fulfilled what he predestined. For whom he predestined, them he also called, namely by that calling according to purpose. And he says the same in ch. 16 and 19 of the same book: therefore he speaks of the call by which God not only makes it possible for us to believe, to act piously, and to persevere, if we will, or by which we persevere, if we will: but of that by which God effects that we will. For as the same Augustine says in the same Epistle: The help of the Holy Spirit is so expressed that he is said to do what he does in order that we may do. Which he confirms from that text of Romans 8: The Spirit helps our infirmity. On which we have said more in disputation 86. Which is also certain: for, as was shown in disputation 99, no. 2, the controversy, at least the most important one, of Augustine with the Pelagians was not about exciting grace, but about helping grace, through which God effects that we will. For if God through grace does not in this way effect that we will, but leaves it to the inborn freedom that, if it wills, it determine itself, and if it does not will, it work nothing, all the arguments against predestination from foreseen merits subsequent to exciting grace seem to proceed, which are usually brought against predestination from foreseen merits of nature. Nay, it must be added that even if all this be admitted, there would still have to be solved by the author of the first view that argument by which St Thomas, in the first part, q. 23, a. 5, and on Romans 9, lecture 2, at the end, excludes the view which asserts that predestination depends on foreseen merits of grace: for since merits of this kind are effects of predestination, they cannot be the reason, or a condition without which it is not, on which that same predestination depends under the aspect of absolute predestination, as has been said in disputation 37.

But to that which we objected concerning the depth and inscrutability of the divine predestination and reprobation, the author of the first view answers that it is not an inscrutable judgment of God that of two who are called one follows and the other does not follow; or that of two just men one perseveres and the other does not persevere; as some will, referring the cause of this distinction, as to its first origin, to that discretion by which God of himself chose this one to glory and did not choose that one. For it is certain that the cause why this one does not follow the divine call, or does not persevere, is not a defect of grace or of divine election, but the freedom of choice, according to that text of Osee 13: Thy destruction, O Israel, is from thyself; only in me is thy help. And that this one follows and perseveres, the true and proper cause is the freedom of choice, furnished with divine help; which, as in natural things, so in supernatural things, can bend itself in either direction. From which he infers that it is not inscrutable either why the call is efficacious in second act in the one and inefficacious in the other: for that depends on the freedom of choice, in whose hand it is to make it efficacious or inefficacious. He says the same of the helps which are given for persevering: for that these helps have the character of the gift of perseverance, or do not have it, depends similarly on the freedom, which through them can actually persevere or not persevere. And indeed, if it perseveres, those helps will have the character of the gift of perseverance; if it does not persevere, they will not. He adds that in these things St Augustine does not place that inscrutability of the judgments of God; but in this, that when God, before he determines to distribute his graces, foreknows concerning anyone which graces will be efficacious in him and which inefficacious, he nevertheless wills to give to this one the one which he knows will be efficacious, and to that one the one which will be inefficacious. For why does he not also give an efficacious one to the other? why does he give an efficacious one rather to this one than to the other? This cannot be known by us certainly and in particular.

This reply is very difficult, and it does not satisfy our argument. We indeed confess that the proper cause why this man does not assent to the divine call, or does not persevere in grace to the end, is that he himself wills not to consent nor to persevere, as is clear from what was premised in disputation 102: nor do we in any way refer to divine reprobation the fact that the reprobate contradicts grace, or persists in sin to the end, but that alone is referred to the created will as failing. For, as St. Thomas says, 1. p. q. 23, art. 3, ad 2: Reprobation stands otherwise in causing than predestination; for predestination is the cause both of that which is awaited in the future life by the predestined, namely glory, and of that which is received in the present, namely grace. But reprobation is not the cause of that which is in the present, namely guilt, but is of abandonment by God. It is nevertheless the cause of that which is rendered in the future, namely eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free choice of him who is reprobated, and he is deserted by grace. And according to this the saying of the Prophet is verified, namely: Thy perdition, O Israel, is from thee. We contend, however, that the first root and the cause of the first effect of reprobation, namely of the permission of the first sin, on account of which sin the reprobate is damned, is to be reduced to the absolute decree of the divine will, and does not presuppose on man's part any foreseen demerits (otherwise that permission would not be of the first sin, but another sin would be supposed before it), and consequently that no cause of reprobation is given on our part as regards all its effects, although a cause is given as regards some, namely as regards hardening in sin and perseverance in it to the end. For the demeritorious cause of this effect is man's sin itself: nor do they impugn this, but rather the arguments made for the opposite opinion confirm it. We contend secondly that, although the proximate cause why the predestined man consents to God exciting and admonishing him is that he wills to consent (for in truth he consents freely, and can dissent if he wills), nevertheless the first origin, and the cause that he wills to consent and to persevere to the end, is the absolute and efficacious predestination of God, who through the special help of pre-operating grace truly, as an efficient cause, brought it about that the predestined man should consent and persevere to the end; which help was certainly not conferred on the other, who did not persevere, as was shown above. Nor is it to be admitted that it depends on the free cooperation of our choice whether the prevenient help of God has or has not the character of the gift of perseverance, or whether it is efficacious or not efficacious for bringing it about that free choice consents: for it has this inasmuch as it comes from God; although consent or dissent itself proceeds as from an efficient cause from free choice — consent indeed from free choice roused and moved by God through efficacious grace, but dissent and sin from free choice of itself and from its own natural faculty. For it has from itself that it sins, but from God that it works good and perseveres in it to the end, as has been said.

XIIII. But that which is added in the solution we are attacking, concerning the inscrutability of predestination and of the judgments of God, does not seem to agree well enough with the doctrine of St. Augustine and with the context of the Apostle. First, because the Apostle says that the predestined are elect and called according to purpose, as is plain from Rom. 8: who are called according to purpose, saints: and Augustine often says that the predestined are called according to purpose, but that the reprobate are not called according to purpose — which must be understood of the purpose of God, not of the purpose of man foreseen by God, as we showed in disp. 38, no. 14: therefore from that same purpose, before foreseen merits or demerits, God predestined some to eternal life, reprobated others, and willed to permit that they should fail from this end.

Nor, according to Augustine's mind, is the inscrutability of predestination and of the judgments of God to be reduced to that will alone by which he willed to distribute his gifts of grace to certain men in those circumstances in which he foreknew that they, by their innate freedom, would cooperate with that same grace and persevere to the end, while to others he determined to distribute the same gifts of grace in such circumstances in which he foreknew that they, by the same freedom, would not cooperate or persevere to the end: for, first, this way of speaking presupposes that there is in God, before every free decree of his will, a middle knowledge by which he knows with certainty what in particular the created will would do by its innate freedom on the hypothesis that it were touched in such circumstances by such an excitation — a foreknowledge which nevertheless St. Augustine did not acknowledge but rather excluded, as was seen in disputation 7: then also because, if the whole mystery of predestination and reprobation and the inscrutability of the judgments of God were to be reduced to this, it seems to follow that the ultimate resolution, into which it must be resolved that this man is predestined by God with an absolute will, would be the future cooperation of his choice foreseen by God, or foreknown through that same knowledge, and that God, in placing a man in those circumstances, would be only a condition without which that man would not be predestined; or at most he would grant that man only that he can act piously and persevere to the end if he wills, but would not bring it about that he wills, perseveres to the end, and is saved: which nevertheless is not to be admitted, as was shown above.

XV. As regards the last effect, a cause of reprobation is given on our part.— Fifth conclusion. Reprobation, as regards the last effect, presupposes in the sign of reason the foreknowledge of original or actual sin, on account of which sin the reprobate is damned. And so not only in execution but also in efficacious intention God did not have the will to punish anyone with eternal punishment except on account of foreseen guilt. This conclusion St. Augustine seems to teach in book 6 of the Hypognosticon and in the other passages alleged above. And it is proved: for the will to punish the reprobate forever belongs to vindictive justice, which necessarily presupposes guilt; for God is not the avenger except of sins which we have committed by our own will, or by the will of our first parent, which is reputed ours. And if anyone objects: for God, before foreseen merits, had the efficacious intention of conferring glory on the elect, as was said above: therefore in like manner, before foreseen demerits, he had the efficacious intention of inflicting eternal punishment on the reprobate, for the showing forth of his justice, even if afterwards he does not bring it into execution except on account of guilt; it is answered by denying the consequence, and the reason for the difference is: for the infliction of eternal punishment cannot in any way have the character of a gratuitous gift, but belongs necessarily to vindictive justice, which supposes guilt; whereas the efficacious intention of giving glory has the character of a gratuitous gift, insofar as in the sign of reason it precedes the foreknowledge of merits; whence glory itself is called in the sacred Scriptures not only a crown of justice but also a crown of grace; whence there is no parity.

XVI. To the arguments, however, made at the beginning, it is answered that they prove only the fifth conclusion; but insofar as they militate against the fourth conclusion set down above, the answer is given to the first. The Council of Valence does not say that in eternal reprobation evil merit precedes the just judgment of God, but that in the damnation of those who perish evil merit precedes the just judgment of God. The Council therefore speaks of damnation, or eternal punishment, which is not inflicted except on account of guilt, as has been said; but it does not speak of reprobation insofar as that imports the eternal decree of God by which God, with consequent will, willed not to confer on certain men eternal life, which was not owed to them, and to permit sin: for God had this will before foreseen sin, even original, if that sin be considered as the cause of reprobation. But the passages of Scripture adduced in the same argument have already been explained by us in disputation 33, in the solution to the 3rd and 4th.

Augustine's view concerning reprobation is weighed.— To the second argument, from the authority of St. Augustine, some Thomists answer that he had followed that opinion in order to temper the harshness which predestination and reprobation, as handed down by that same holy Augustine and drawn from the sacred Scriptures, seemed to the Pelagians to have. But it is answered in the second place that the passages of St. Augustine can be explained, first, as regards sufficiency; for original sin foreseen before the incarnation of the Word was a sufficient cause why God, if he had willed, could without injury to anyone have reprobated all men; in fact, however, it was not foreseen before reprobation as its cause, but only as the object, or disease of nature, for whose remedy Christ came. And in this reprobation differs from predestination, that in respect of predestination no cause is given on our part, not only efficacious but not even sufficient, on account of which God could have predestined anyone, because grace, which is not owed, precedes all our good merits. Secondly, St. Augustine can be explained concerning reprobation as regards the intermediate effect, which is hardening in sin; for its cause is preceding sin, at least original, as is plain from that passage to the Romans 1: For which cause God delivered them up to a reprobate mind, and also as regards the last effect, which is eternal punishment; for its cause is preceding guilt. But in predestination the merits of grace cannot be the cause on account of which God confers the gift of perseverance, because, as St. Thomas teaches, p. 2. q. 114. art. 9, perseverance does not fall under merit. And that this was the mind of St. Augustine is clear from this: for in the passages adduced above for the contrary opinion, and wherever he speaks of this matter, he never said that a cause of reprobation is given, but only said that on our part a cause of hardening, or of abandonment in sin, is given. The demeritorious cause of this hardening is indeed sin itself: but before that sin, even original, there is understood in God the permission of that same sin; which, in comparison with the reprobate, is the first effect of reprobation; and of this permission no cause is given on the part of the reprobate: and so no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation. And if the argument be made: for a cause is also given on our part of the last effect of predestination, because glory is conferred on men on account of their merits, and in like manner a meritorious cause is given of the intermediate effect, namely of the increase of grace, as was shown in disputation 60, no. 12: therefore as regards this there is no difference between predestination and reprobation; it is answered that although good works proceeding from grace are the meritorious cause of the last effect of predestination, just as evil merits are the cause of the last effect of reprobation, there is nevertheless a difference: that the good merits of grace are not in us from ourselves, but from God, as Augustine often teaches; but evil merits are in us from ourselves, and not from God. Whence St. Thomas, on Romans 9, lecture 2, at the end, says: The foreknowledge of merits cannot be any reason of predestination, because foreseen merits fall under predestination; but the foreknowledge of sins can be some reason of reprobation on the part of the punishment which is prepared for the reprobate, insofar as God proposes to punish the wicked on account of the sins which they have from themselves, not from God; but he proposes to reward the just on account of the merits which they do not have from themselves, according to that word of Hosea 13: Thy perdition, O Israel, is from thee; thy help is only in me. And it is in this same sense that Augustine speaks when he says: We seek the cause of predestination, and we do not find it; because, namely, even as regards the last effect we do not find in us a cause which is from us: but the cause of hardening we seek, and we find it, namely one which is in us from us in respect of the last effect of reprobation. But if the argument be made: for by the same reason it could be conceded that actual sin is the cause of reprobation, just as original sin is, which conflicts with the doctrine of St. Augustine; it is proved: for actual sin also is the cause of hardening, or of abandonment in sin, and in like manner is the cause of the last effect of reprobation, and is in us from us. It is answered that original sin is, in itself, a sufficient cause of reprobation in respect of all men, because it is the common sin of the whole of nature; but actual sin is not found in all, and so it could not be the cause of reprobation as regards sufficiency in respect of all men: but St. Augustine was speaking of the common cause of reprobation.

To the confirmation it is answered that St. Thomas does not say absolutely that the foreknowledge of sins can be any reason of reprobation, but with the addition, namely, on the part of the punishment. And although sin is not an effect of reprobation but something presupposed to it as regards the last effect of that same reprobation, nevertheless the permission of the sin on account of which the damned man is reprobated is truly an effect of reprobation according to St. Thomas, as has been said above.

To the other passage, however, adduced from 1. p. q. 23. ar. 5. in the solution to the 3rd, it is answered that it concludes only that predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of original sin insofar as it is the object for whose remedy Christ came, and insofar as it was the proximate final cause of the incarnation of the Word, but not insofar as it denotes an order to reprobation.

XVIII. What it is for God to hate someone.— To the third it is answered that God is said to hate someone not only insofar as he wills for him the evil of eternal punishment on account of guilt, but also insofar as, before foreseen demerits, of his own good pleasure and by a positive act, he willed not to give eternal life to certain men. Whence St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 23. ar. 3. ad 1, says that God loves all men, and even all creatures, insofar as he wills some good to all; yet he does not will every good to all. Therefore insofar as he does not will to certain men this good, which is eternal life, he is said to hate them, or to reprobate them.

To the fourth it is answered that it proves only that original sin was a sufficient cause of the reprobation of men, but not that in fact men were reprobated on account of it.

Original sin, as it was opposed to original justice, was not an effect of reprobation.— It is answered in the second place that, just as the grace of Adam in the state of innocence was not conferred on him from the merits of Christ, nor was an effect of his predestination, but belonged to a certain general supernatural providence, for the reason that it was not the grace of a redeemed man, so also original sin, insofar as it was opposed to the state of innocence and to original justice, was not the effect of anyone's reprobation, nor did it denote an order to reprobation, but is considered only in that prior stage, as the disease of nature and as the object for whose remedy Christ the Lord was predestined. Whence, insofar as it is understood beforehand, before the predestination and reprobation of men, it was not in fact foreseen as the cause of reprobation. If, however, the same sin be considered insofar as it is opposed to the grace of the Redeemer, then it is understood as subsequent to the reprobation of those who are damned on account of that sin; for the permission of that sin under this consideration was the first effect of reprobation, as has been said above. Whence to the argument in form it is answered that that consequence from the first to the last is null, because the kind of cause is changed, from an objective or proximate final cause into a meritorious cause; for in the antecedent the discourse concerns the proximate final cause of the incarnation, but in the consequent the meritorious cause of reprobation.

XIX. To the fifth argument it is answered that God wills all men to be saved with antecedent will, which is a will in a certain respect, but not with consequent will, which is will absolutely, as was explained in disputations 33 and 34.

To the sixth argument it is answered that reprobation, as regards the last effect, is an act of vindictive justice, and therefore, as regards that effect, presupposes guilt on our part; but as regards the first effect, which is the first permission of sin, in which the reprobate perseveres to death, it is not an act of vindictive justice, but of the simple will of God, as has been said.

God is not cruel in the reprobation of men.— To the confirmation it is answered that, just as God is not cruel in reprobating the angels before the foreknowledge of their future sin, so neither is he in reprobating men; for there is no cruelty, nor even unmercifulness, in not giving someone what is not owed to him. Whence even if God, before foreseen guilt, wills not to give glory to some, which is to reprobate them, there is no unmercifulness or injustice, since glory is owed to no one according to its nature.

To the seventh argument the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is answered that among the effects of reprobation is numbered the first permission of sin, on account of which sin the reprobate is damned, as St. Thomas teaches in the other passages adduced above, and that of this permission no cause is given on our part. This permission, then, the holy Doctor comprehends under the name of the withdrawal of efficacious help; for divine permission is presupposed to the sin on account of which God withdraws efficacious help. And by these points the answer is clear to the other passages of St. Thomas adduced in the same argument.

To the confirmation it is answered that even in reprobation made before the foreknowledge of future sin, men cannot reasonably complain of God, just as neither can the angels, as was shown from the authority of the Apostle in Rom. 9.

To the eighth it is answered by denying the antecedent; and to the first proof it must be said that, although of one sin there is only one permission according to one respect, nevertheless the same permission, or the same sin under one respect, precedes the predestination of Christ, and consequently also precedes the predestination and reprobation of men; and under another respect it is understood as subsequent to reprobation itself. Nor is it unfitting that the same thing, in respect of the same thing, according to a different respect and in a different kind of cause, be prior and posterior.

To the first proof it is answered that, although sin in itself stands equally toward all men, God nevertheless, by his will, which cannot be unjust, willed that in some the permission of sin should not be an effect of reprobation, but should be so in others.

To the second confirmation it is answered that the legitimate sense of the Council of Trent is that God does not deprive of habitual grace those once justified, unless they first in the order of nature commit mortal sin, by which they desert God and merit to be deprived of justifying grace; yet before that mortal sin by which man deserts God, there is understood in God the permission of that same sin, as has been said. And by these points the answer is given to the authority of St. Thomas: that before that negligence of Adam there preceded God's permission, of which Adam was not the meritorious cause; for before the first negligence no sin is understood. From these points the solution to the arguments of the second opinion is easy.

XX. To the first it is answered that from those passages it is gathered only that a cause of reprobation is given on our part as regards its last effect. Whence that causal particle for in the passage of Matthew adduced imports the cause on account of which the reprobate are punished with eternal punishment: but nevertheless before all sins there is understood the divine permission by which he permits the first sin of the reprobate, which permission is indeed the first effect of reprobation, and of this permission no cause is given on the part of the reprobate. In like manner it must be said, in regard to the passage of Ezechiel 18 and Ezechiel 33, that God does not will eternal death for sinners, that is, the punishment of sin, except on the supposition of the sin itself and of perseverance in it to the end: but nevertheless before every sin he willed to permit the first sin, as has been said. Secondly, those same passages can be explained of sin itself, or spiritual death, which God does not will but only permits. To the passage of Wisdom 11 it is answered that God loves all things that are, especially men, because he wills good to all, and the being that they have; but nevertheless he does not will this good, which is eternal life, to all men with consequent will: and according to this he is said to hate them, or to reprobate them. The solution is St. Thomas's, 1. p. q. 23. ar. 3. ad 2. To the passage of 1 Timothy 2 it is answered that God with antecedent will wills all men to be saved, but with consequent will he does not will all, but some, namely the predestined, to be saved. But how these two wills cohere with each other has already been explained above.

To the second argument it is answered by what has been said to the passages of Scripture adduced, and to the other like authorities of the Fathers, to which an answer was given in disp. 37. n. 18. and 20. But especially to those words of St. Prosper: They would then be predestined, if they were going to return; it is answered that he speaks according to a certain concomitance of inference. For it follows by a certain argument drawn a posteriori, or from the effect, that if a sinner returns to God and perseveres to the end, he is predestined; yet this return to God is not the cause of absolute predestination, but its effect, according to that word: If they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us.

To the third it is answered that, as was said in disp. 30, election and predestination to glory, insofar as it is in the divine intention, supposes no condition on our part, but before all foreseen merits of grace God in his intention willed eternal life absolutely for the elect; and this intention being supposed, he determined to provide the means by which he would efficaciously lead the elect to eternal life. But insofar as it is in execution, eternal life is never given to predestined adults except on the supposition of the merits of grace, because God neither willed nor ordained that in the exercise the elect should be saved whether they work good or work evil, but that they should be saved through good works, which also fall under divine predestination and are its effects. God therefore promised eternal life, to be obtained in the exercise, under the condition of good works; but God himself by his grace brings it about that that condition is put in being, and that the cooperation of our choice itself is put in being: for he makes us to do, and works that we may work. Whence St. Augustine, epistle 105, says: For the Apostle was dealing sufficiently with grace itself, and therefore he commended the children of the promise. For what God promises, none but God does: for it has something of reason and of truth that man promise and God do; but that man should say that he does what God has promised is the reprobate sense of proud impiety. And the Apostle signified this when he said: Therefore it is of faith, that according to grace the promise may be firm to all the seed. Explaining this passage, the same Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10, says: He promised not from the power of our will, but from his predestination. For he promised what he himself was going to do, not what men were to do: because even if men do the good things that pertain to worshipping God, he makes them do what he has commanded; they do not make him do what he promised: otherwise, for God's promises to be fulfilled, it would be in the power not of God but of men; and what was promised by the Lord would be rendered to Abraham by them. Whence the good works by which we obtain eternal life, although they are our merits, because they are freely elicited by us with the help of grace, are nevertheless accepted by God, who wills that to be our merits which are his own gifts. But in reprobation the last effect, which is perpetual damnation, is not inflicted on the sinner except on the supposition of sin, which sin nevertheless the reprobate does not have from God but from himself, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 23. art. 3. ad 2.

XXI. To the fourth it is answered that reprobation absolute, before foreseen demerits, derogates nothing from the divine goodness or from his justice, but agrees most fully with both. With goodness indeed, because his mercy is shown the more in the elect if, before foreseen merits or demerits, he chose this man and predestined him because he willed; and did not predestine that man, but permitted that he should fall into sin and fail from the supernatural end, because so it pleased him: which Christ the Lord seems to have signified when he said: Yea, Father; for so it was pleasing before thee. The divine goodness and mercy is shown also in the reprobate, while he confers on them helps by which they can act rightly and come to eternal life if they will, and offers efficacious helps, as far as lies on his part, to which nevertheless they themselves put an impediment by their own malice. Likewise also, because he does not permit them to fall into all the sins which they could commit by their free choice; because, as Augustine says: There is no sin that one man commits which another man would not commit, if there were lacking the helper by whom man was made. Whence the same Augustine says: I ascribe to thy mercy, he says, Lord, the sins which I have not committed. Finally, as St. Thomas says, 1. p. q. 21. artic. 4. ad 1, even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy appears, not indeed wholly remitting, but in some way lightening, while it punishes short of what is deserved. But the justice of God appears especially in the reprobate, while in many wondrous but true ways he punishes them forever for their offenses. Nor does he inflict injury on anyone if, of his good pleasure and without foreseen merits or demerits, he chooses one man and predestines him to glory, and does not predestine another but permits him to fail from the supernatural end. For since the beatific vision is not owed to any pure creature, but is a gratuitous gift of God, even if of two men existing in an equal case one be taken up and the other left, no injury is done to anyone: since, as St. Thomas says, and before him St. Augustine, in gratuitous things there is no place for respect of persons, or for injustice. For one can do a favor to one man because he wills, and not do it to another because he wills not. Nor does it follow from this that the greatest part of men is predestined by divine power to evil, or created in order to perish; because God, although he permits the sins of the reprobate and their perseverance in them to the end of life, is nevertheless not the cause of their sinning, as was shown in disp. 24, nor did he create them for this end, that they should perish, but he permits them to sin and inflicts eternal punishment on them for their sins, so that divine justice may shine forth in them, and greater mercy in the elect, as will be clear in the following disputation.

XXII. To the fifth it is answered that the same objection was once proposed against the doctrine of St. Augustine concerning predestination and reprobation before foreseen merits or demerits, as he himself reports in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 11, in these words, to which words and to the objection he answers: Indeed, since the Apostle says: Therefore it is of faith, that according to grace the promise may be firm: I wonder that men prefer to commit themselves to their own infirmity rather than to the firmness of God's promise. But, he says, the will of God concerning myself is uncertain to me. What then? Is your own will concerning yourself certain to you, and do you not fear? Let him who seems to stand see that he does not fall. Since, therefore, both are uncertain, why does not man commit his faith, hope, and charity to the firmer rather than to the weaker? and again he says: We therefore live more safely if we give the whole to God, and do not commit ourselves to him in part and to ourselves in part. And the reason for this is: for our hope, which, as the Apostle says, we have firm and secure for the soul, is founded not in man, not in our free choice, but in God: for the Prophet says: Cursed is the man who trusts in man, and puts flesh as his arm, and whose heart departs from the Lord. Whence the certitude and firmness of our hope ought to proceed from God himself and not from us, and consequently the predestination and absolute election of God according to his mere will ought to be reputed safer and firmer, because God is able to fulfill what he has predestined. The best counsel, therefore, will be for those who are disturbed by various perturbations concerning predestination and reprobation not to enter into this deep, but to think of the Lord in goodness, to seek him in simplicity of heart, to attend diligently to prayer and good works, and to keep his commandments. For it is most certain that he who perseveres to the end, he shall be saved. With this affection, with this due subjection of mind toward God, he expelled all perturbations and anxieties of heart in the consideration of God's judgments, who said: I have not departed from the commandments of his lips, and in my bosom I have hidden the words of his mouth. For he himself is alone, and no one can turn away his thought, and his soul, whatever he willed, that he has done. And when he has fulfilled in me his will, and many other like things, they are ready for him. To which agrees that word: But if he shall say to me, Thou dost not please; I am ready, let him do what is good before himself. Let the theologian read St. Augustine, book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14, and he will see all things touched and solved by St. Augustine which are inferred in the argument we are now treating from predestination and reprobation before foreseen merits of grace or one's own demerits. He will see also that St. Augustine, on account of those inconveniences, did not recede from the opinion which in his books he constantly taught and defended concerning that same predestination and reprobation. Let him read besides the above-mentioned disp. 2. num. 1. and 16, and from them he will gather how far the first opinion proposed above is distant from the doctrine of St. Augustine. Let St. Augustine also be seen, book 1, q. 2, to Simplician, where he treats the present difficulty at length.

But to those things which are brought forward for the second and third opinion, the answer is already clear from what has been said.

Disputatio CXI: Whether a sufficient cause of reprobation can be assigned on God’s part.

Disputatio CXII: Whether God grants all people, however hardened and reprobate, sufficient supernatural helps through which they can attain eternal life and actually attain it if they will.

Disputatio CXIII: Whether God from eternity, with absolute and efficacious will, before foreknowledge of the future determination of the created will, decreed not to give sufficient or efficacious supernatural helps to those who in fact do not receive them in time.

Disputatio CXIV: Whether infants dying with original sin will remain forever in limbo, condemned to death, or will lead a blessed life in this world after the day of judgment.

Book Twelve

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