De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Book Eleven
Introduction
Disputatio CIX: Whether reprobation includes a positive act by which God, with absolute will before foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, wills not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom.
Whether reprobation includes a positive act, by which God, by an absolute will prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, wills not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom.
I. It is proved that it includes only a negative act. First: God from eternity did not have a positive act by which he willed not to create another world, but bore himself only negatively: therefore in like manner, with regard to the reprobate, he bore himself only negatively, by not ordaining them to eternal life by an absolute and efficacious will. The consequence is clear from the parity of reason. The antecedent is proved: for to posit in God a positive act by which he wills not to do those things which in fact he will not bring about seems superfluous, since the same effect follows from positing in him a negative act concerning that object.
Secondly. The permission of the sin of final impenitence does not import in God a positive act: for such impenitence consists formally in this, that God does not confer the efficacious help by which the reprobate would be converted at the end of life; but this is not a positive act, but the denial of help: therefore in like manner reprobation does not consist in a positive act.
Thirdly. All the things that are handed down in the sacred Scriptures and in the Councils concerning the reprobation of angels and of men are most abundantly accounted for without our saying that reprobation means a positive act by which God wills not to admit the reprobate to eternal life: therefore.
Fourthly. It is proved that reprobation, although it includes a positive act of excluding the reprobate from eternal beatitude, that act is nevertheless not absolute, prior to middle, or conditioned, foreknowledge, but only a conditioned act, by which God willed to exclude the reprobate from his kingdom if they should sin, making bad use of the helps of grace: for it seems altogether unworthy of the divine goodness and clemency to establish in God an absolute act by which he wills not to admit some to eternal beatitude; nor is this agreeable to the sacred Scriptures. On the other hand, the opinion which asserts that God, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, reprobates no one and excludes no one from his kingdom, greatly commends the mercy of God, of whom Scripture very often says: It is not my will that the wicked man die: I do not will the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted and live, as is clear from Ezekiel 18 and 33. Therefore, etc.
This is confirmed: for otherwise it would follow that counsels are in vain, precepts in vain, by which the reprobate are induced to good; indeed such exhortations and reproaches, which on God's part are in the Scriptures, would seem rather mockeries and illusions than true and sincere signs of divine mercy: because in the end, however the reprobate may conduct himself, he will remain excluded from eternal beatitude, if prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice God has already from eternity excluded him by his absolute decree.
Fifthly. God, as far as lies on his part, willed from eternity by a positive act that all men without distinction be saved, nor did he except anyone in particular; as is clear from that passage of 1 Timothy 2: God wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth: but with this volition there is not compatible in God a positive and absolute act by which he has determined to exclude some from his kingdom, or not to admit them, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice: therefore reprobation does not include such a positive act.
Sixthly: God gives to all men, however hardened and reprobate, supernatural helps that are sufficient, by which they can come to eternal life, and in fact come, if they will. But that many are not saved through those helps, but remain reprobate, had no origin in any positive decree of God willing not to admit them into his kingdom, but proceeds only from their own malice; namely because they were unwilling so to use the helps of grace as to obtain eternal salvation; for if they used those same helps well, as they could, they would be saved and would be of the number of the predestined: therefore.
This is confirmed: since otherwise this causal proposition would have to be admitted: Because God reprobated such men or angels, and willed by an absolute will not to admit them into his kingdom, nor to confer on them efficacious helps; therefore they remain excluded from it. But this is not to be said: for it would be to throw back upon the divine will the damnation of the wicked; which is against Scripture and the passages of the Saints: therefore.
II. This difficulty paves the way to that famous question which must be treated in the following disputation: namely, whether on our part there is given a cause of reprobation, or at least a condition on which it depends. Hence the various opinions of the Doctors will have to be explained. The first is that of those who assert1 that God in that instant, or sign of reason, in which he predestined the elect to eternal life and willed to confer on them grace and glory, bore himself only negatively towards the reprobate; so that he is said to have reprobated certain ones because he did not choose them nor predestine them. From which it seems to be inferred that reprobation, as regards the essence of reprobation, does not include a positive act, but only as regards its last effect, which God brings about, sin being supposed. To this opinion Scotus adheres, in 1 Sent. d. 41, q. un., and in 3 Sent. d. 19, q. un., § in illa quaestione. Where he distinguishes five instants, or signs of reason, in God,2 or in the divine prevision; for first God understood himself under the aspect of the supreme good: in the second sign he understood all other creatures: in the third he predestined these to glory and grace, and towards the others he had a negative act by not predestining them: in the fourth he foresaw that they would fall in Adam: in the fifth he preordained, or provided, a remedy, how they might be redeemed through the passion of the Son: so that Christ in the flesh, as also all the elect, was foreseen and predestined to grace and glory before the passion of Christ was foreseen: as a medicine against the fall. This fifth sign of reason does not pertain to the present difficulty, but to another, which is usually disputed in the third part, q. 1, a. 3: namely, whether if Adam had not sinned the divine Word would have been incarnate: In the first instant, he says, God, out of all the future intellectual creatures represented to his intellect, willed to confer beatitude on certain ones by an efficacious will; but towards the remaining creatures he bore himself negatively. Hence according to this opinion a cause of reprobation is given on our part, but not of predestination. The foundations of it have been touched in the first three arguments made at the beginning.
III. The second opinion is that of certain of the more recent theologians, and it consists in four statements. The first statement is:3 God willed from eternity, by a positive act, that all men be saved, if it had not lain with themselves or with their first parent. From which they infer that, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice that will be future by hypothesis, in the establishing of such an order of things, God has reprobated no one by a positive act. The second statement is:4 The plan, or order, of means with which God foreknows that an intellectual creature will, by its own freedom, make good use of its choice and will come by those same helps to eternal life, together with the purpose of putting that same order into execution, is formally predestination. The third statement is:5 The same plan, or order, of means to a supernatural end, with which God foreknows that an intellectual creature will make bad use of its choice, so that in fact it does not come through those means to eternal beatitude, does not formally have the character of predestination, but retains the common character of providence in respect of a supernatural end. But if such providence has joined to it the will of permitting sins and perseverance in them up to the end of life, and finally the will of excluding men or angels from the heavenly kingdom on account of sins of this kind, by such a will the character of reprobation is completed. They prove the first statement by the last three arguments made at the beginning: but the reasons by which they prove the three later statements have been adduced in disputations 35, 36 and 37.
IIII. For the resolution, however, of this difficulty and the explanation of the opinion of St. Thomas, it must be noted that, as the same St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 23, a. 3, and on Romans 9, lect. 2 and 3, and 3 cont. Gent. c. 163, as predestination is a part of divine providence, so also is reprobation: whence whatever belongs essentially to divine providence must necessarily belong to reprobation. It must be noted secondly that reprobation is opposed to approbation: but approbation6 is the act of the intellect judging that some thing is apt and convenient to an end. Whence St. Augustine, lib. 1 contra Academicos c. 4, and in the Enchiridion c. 17, defines error as the approbation of the false as true: whence reprobation will be the opposite judgment, by which something is spurned and rejected, or judged not to be convenient to the end. It must be noted thirdly that exclusion from the heavenly kingdom can be taken in two ways. First, insofar as it has the character of privation and of the pain of loss, which corresponds to sin on the part of aversion, according to that word: Depart from me, you workers of iniquity: and Matt. 25: Go, you cursed: for in this word the pain of loss is expressed; as in the following words the pain of sense is described, corresponding to sins on the part of conversion, when it is added: Into eternal fire. Secondly it can be taken as importing a positive act of not giving beatitude to some, by ordaining this to his own glory and to the greater splendor of mercy in the elect.
V. Reprobation by God includes a positive act.— First conclusion. God's eternal reprobation includes a positive act by which he willed not to admit certain ones to eternal life. This conclusion seems to be expressly St. Thomas's, 1 p. q. 23, a. 3, and it is proved. First: for it does not suffice for reprobation that God bear himself merely negatively towards the reprobate, by not ordaining them efficaciously to eternal life: for God did not truly reprobate possible men or angels who will never exist, and yet he bore himself negatively towards them, by not ordaining them to eternal life: therefore reprobation includes a positive act. It is proved secondly. Election is the acceptance of one thing in preference to another; for he is properly said to choose who, two means to the obtaining of an end being proposed, accepts one and rejects the other: but God from eternity by a positive act chose certain ones to eternal life; for the Apostle says,7 He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, etc. Therefore by a positive act he willed to admit certain ones and not to admit certain others to his kingdom. It is proved thirdly. Reprobation, as has been said in the first foundation, is a part of divine providence: but divine providence essentially includes a positive act by which things are ordained to an end: therefore reprobation also includes a positive act.
VI. Second conclusion. If exclusion from the heavenly kingdom be considered insofar as it has formally the character of the pain of loss, it presupposes guilt. Concerning this conclusion too there is no difficulty; for all are bound to admit it: for punishment, in the character of punishment, and likewise vindictive justice, presupposes guilt. And this conclusion is efficaciously proved by the last three arguments made at the beginning.
Absolute reprobation precedes the foreknowledge of the future evil use of free choice.— Third conclusion. The positive act by which God from eternity willed not to admit certain ones into his kingdom was not conditioned, but absolute, preceding in the sign of reason the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice that will be future by hypothesis, that such an order of things be established. This conclusion is expressly St. Augustine's and St. Thomas's in the passages to be alleged below; and the Thomists defend it in common, especially Cajetan on Matthew 11, on those words: I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, up to those words, Yes, Father, for so it has been pleasing before you. But the truth of this conclusion is founded most of all on that opinion which asserts that no cause is given on our part in respect of the whole effect of reprobation, of which we must treat in the following disputation. If therefore no cause of reprobation is given, then reprobation does not depend on the foreseen evil use of free choice, even as on a condition without which it does not take place: therefore it imports an absolute act in God. The conclusion is proved: for the Apostle, Romans 9, after he had inferred from what he had said in the same chapter concerning predestination and reprobation: Therefore he has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens; immediately sets out the complaint of those to whom predestination and reprobation preceding the foreknowledge of merits seem harsh, and says: Why then does he still complain? For who resists his will? And he meets this objection by adding: O man, who are you, that you answer back to God? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it, Why have you made me thus? Or does not the potter have power over the clay, from the same mass to make indeed one vessel for honor, but another for dishonor? But this answer and reproach would have no place, if God, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, had reprobated no one by an absolute and efficacious will; for the Apostle could easily answer that it depended on the good or bad use of the created free choice, foreknown by God as on a condition without which it does not take place, that the supernatural providence of God has formally the character of reprobation in respect of one and not in respect of another. Nor is it enough to answer that the depth of predestination and reprobation consists in this, that no cause or condition is given on our part for which God determined to establish man in such an order of things, in which he foreknew that man would, by the freedom of his choice, use the helps of grace well or badly; so that by using them well he would come to eternal life, or by using them badly would fall away from it. For this solution has already been excluded in the treatise on predestination.8
Secondly. It is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, epistle 107 to Vitalis, where, after the middle of the epistle, he hands down our conclusion: and among other things he says: Many are not saved, not because they themselves will it, but because God does not will it; which is shown without any obscurity in little children. And the same he teaches in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 12, where he says that it is not to be ascribed to fate or to fortuitous chances that some little children die before they are baptized, but to the providence and will of God. The same says St. Prosper, lib. 1 de vocatione Gentium, c. 22, and lib. 2, c. 22 and 23. Therefore the positive act by which God reprobates some is not conditioned, as if it had lain with them, but absolute, according to the opinion of St. Augustine.
Finally it is proved by destroying above all the foundation of the contrary opinion: for supernatural beatitude is not due to any creature considered according to its natural endowments: therefore God could from eternity, according to his own will and without injury to anyone, prior to the foreknowledge of the good or evil use of free choice, choose certain ones to eternal life and will by a positive act not to admit certain ones, without doing injury to anyone: for, as St. Thomas says, q. 6 de veritate, a. 2, ad 8, in gratuitous things there is no place for injustice or respect of persons: For I can give to one and not give to another according to the pleasure of my will, even if both are equal. This conclusion will be clearer in the following disputation; concerning which those things also are to be seen which we have said in disputation 37.
VII. To the first argument from the facts at the beginning, the consequence is denied; for of possible things which will never exist there is not properly providence: but God properly has providence not only in respect of the predestined, but also of the reprobate; whence there is no similarity.
To the second it is answered first, that the denial of efficacious help, by which a man is converted at the end of life or perseveres in grace, is an effect of reprobation; whence before this denial there is understood in God a positive act by which he has reprobated certain ones. It is answered secondly, that the very denial of efficacious help imports also in God a positive act by which, for the manifestation of his justice, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, he decreed not to confer on the reprobate the efficacious help by which he would avoid the first sin, on account of which they are damned, but to permit them to fall into it.
To the third argument the antecedent is denied; for unless we posit a positive act in God in respect of the reprobate, that passage of Romans 9 does not seem able to be fittingly upheld: Not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated; which passage is explained of the eternal predestination and reprobation of Jacob and Esau, and of all the other elect and reprobate. Thus St. Augustine explains that passage, lib. 1 q. ad Simplicianum, q. 2, and epistle 105 to Sixtus, and in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, c. 98, and 16 de Civitate c. 35;9 St. Thomas, 3 cont. Gent., in the place cited above; Burgensis in his additions on Malachi 1; and many other Doctors; which explanation is the literal one. But in the propriety of speech, to hold someone in hatred does not import only a negation, but also a positive act.
VIII. To the fourth argument it is answered from what has been said in the third conclusion, that that act by which God reprobates is not conditioned but absolute. And to the impugnation it must be said that the mercy and justice of God in respect of a rational creature are according to the order of providence and of the divine will, because he works all things for himself. Whence it is said in Romans 9: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will show mercy to whom I have been merciful. But the divine will is to be known and investigated by us in those things which surpass the capacity of nature, through sacred Scripture, as St. Thomas teaches, 3 p. q. 1, a. 3, and not through natural reason, which cannot attain those things which are of the Spirit of God. But in Scripture it is had: that not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: Jacob I have loved, Esau I have hated: which words, and others which have been adduced in disputation 37 and will be adduced in the following disputation, do not obscurely signify that reprobation itself precedes the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice; for otherwise it should rather be said, not from him who calls, but from the diverse works foreseen, namely good or evil, it was said, Jacob I have loved; but Esau I have hated. Nor is this unworthy of the divine goodness and clemency, but greatly consonant with it: for in gratuitous things there is no place for injustice; for one can by his own freedom grant a favor to one, but not likewise to another. But the passages of Scripture which are adduced to the contrary are explained in two ways. The first explanation is,10 that they are to be understood of sin, which God does not will but permits. The second explanation is of eternal death: and the sense is, that God, by his antecedent will, does not will the eternal death of the sinner: for by this will he wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, as is said in 1 Tim. 2. Which passage St. Thomas explains of the antecedent will, 1 part q. 23, article 4, ad 3; nevertheless, sin being supposed, he wills to punish him in hell with perpetual punishment, as St. Thomas says in a. 3 of the same question.
IX. The exhortations of the reprobate are not in vain in respect of God.— To the confirmation an answer has already been given sufficiently by us above. And now we say briefly that exhortations and reproaches are indeed in vain in respect of the reprobate, insofar namely as through them they do not obtain the final supernatural beatitude, and that not through the fault of God but through their own; because, as is said in Job 24: They themselves were rebellious against the light; and in c. 21 Job says in the person of the reprobate: Depart from us, we do not wish the knowledge of your ways. They are not, however, in vain in respect of God: for he attains other ends, of which we shall speak in disputation 111. This solution can be illustrated by an excellent example: for as the sun does not in vain illuminate the whole world, even if he who closes his eyes, or the window, is not illuminated by its light, so proportionably God does not in vain exhort all to virtue, even if some by their own malice abuse the divine exhortations. For of it is said in John 1: He was the true light, which enlightens every man coming into this world. Let St. Thomas's example on this matter be seen, 3 cont. Gen. c. 159.
The antecedent and consequent will of God do not conflict with each other.— To the fifth it is answered with St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 23, a. 4, ad 3, that God by his consequent will, which is the will simply, does not will that all men be saved, which St. Augustine also acknowledges in the place cited above,11 but nevertheless by his antecedent will, which is the will in a certain respect, he wills that all men be saved; and with this will there stands in God the absolute act by which, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, he wills not to admit certain ones into his kingdom. For since that kingdom is not due to any creature, God can according to his will give it to whom he has willed. But that those two wills are not conflicting is manifestly clear: for he who throws his goods into the sea in time of storm simply wills to throw them away, in order to save his life; nevertheless he is unwilling in a certain respect, and would not wish to throw them away: therefore in the same way there stand together in God the will in a certain respect, namely the antecedent will, by which he wills that all men be saved, and the absolute will, by which he wills that some not be saved, for the manifestation of his justice. But whether the antecedent will formally imports in God a conditioned act, or a velleity, and in what it is distinguished from the consequent will, has already been explained in disputation 34.
To the sixth argument the answer will be clear from those things which must be said in disputation 112.
To the confirmation it is answered through those things which have been said in disputations 100 and 101.