De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Introduction
Disputatio CIII: Whether the gift of perseverance is necessary to remain in grace until the end of life.
Disputatio CIV: Whether the gift of perseverance is really distinct from the gift of confirmation in grace.
Disputatio CV: Whether the gift of perseverance, in its character as such and in its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of our choice with it.
Disputatio CVI: Whether, in the state of innocence, our first parents needed a special gift of perseverance to persevere in grace until the end of life.
Disputatio CVII: Whether the gift of perseverance is common to all the faithful, or is a gift proper to the predestined.
Disputatio CVIII: Whether, when all the helps of prevenient grace are entirely equal in two persons, it is possible, and sometimes happens, that one is converted, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other remains in sin and is damned.
Whether, when all the helps of prevenient grace are entirely equal in two men, it can happen, and does sometimes happen, that one is converted, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other remains in sin and is damned.
I. Some theologians follow the affirmative part, and they strive to defend the opinion of those who say that in the case posited it sometimes happens, by the sole freedom of each, that one believes and the other does not believe. It is true that they limit their opinion to the helps of prevenient grace in that respect in which it is prevenient: for in the one who is converted they acknowledge that there is a new simultaneous influx of grace, by which God produces the free consent together with free choice.
This opinion is proved. First, from that passage of Matth. 11: If the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which have been done in thee, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes. By these words it is signified that by the same signs and helps by which the Jews were not converted, the Tyrians and Sidonians would have been converted: therefore.
Secondly, the argument is made from two testimonies of St. Augustine, in which he seems expressly to hold this opinion. The first testimony is found in the book On Predestination and Grace, ch. 15, where, speaking of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, he says thus: As to nature, both were men; as to dignity, both were kings; as to the cause, both were holding captive the people of God; as to the punishment, both were admonished with scourges. What then made their ends different, except that the one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in the remembrance of his own iniquity; the other fought against the most merciful truth of God with a free choice? By these words he seems expressly to confess that, while the helps of grace stood entirely equal, one was converted because he willed it; the other was not converted because he willed it not. The other testimony is found in book 12 of The City of God, ch. 6, where, speaking of two men equally affected in mind and body and tempted by the same temptation, he says: If both are tempted by the same temptation, and one yields to it and consents, while the other remains as he was, what else appears but that one willed and the other willed not to fall from chastity? Whence, unless from their own will, when the affection of body and soul had been the same in both? Behold, he teaches that of those two men equally affected, one persevered in good because he willed it; the other consented to sin because he likewise willed it: therefore, with equal helps of prevenient grace, it will sometimes happen that one is converted to God, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other sins, persists in sin, and is damned.
Thirdly. The helps of prevenient grace do not predetermine the will to one side; and therefore whoever is moved by helps of this kind can, by his free faculty, consent to them and dissent from them, if he wills, as is gathered from the Council of Trent, session 6, On Justification, ch. 5, and canon 4. Then the argument is: if a possible thing is posited in being, no inconvenience follows: therefore no inconvenience follows if it be posited that in the case posited one is converted, as in reality he can be converted with those helps, while the other is not converted, as in reality he also can not be converted: therefore it will sometimes happen that, with the same helps of prevenient grace insofar as they are helps of prevenient grace, one is converted and the other persists in sin.
Fourthly. Of two men equally justified by God it happens that one perseveres in grace and is saved, while the other falls into mortal sin and is damned: therefore in like manner it can come about that of two men having equal helps of prevenient grace, one is converted and perseveres to the end, and the other is not.
Fifthly. The same is confirmed by all the arguments with which above we strove to prove that the same sufficient help which in one man is inefficacious, because he wills not to use it well, is efficacious in another, because he uses such a help rightly.
For the resolution of this difficulty it must be supposed that at present we can speak of all the helps of prevenient grace, both external and internal; secondly, we can speak only of external helps, or of internal sufficient ones.
II. With equal helps, external and internal sufficient, it holds that one man is saved and the other damned1.— First conclusion. If the discourse concerns the external helps of prevenient grace, or even only the internal sufficient ones, it can happen, and often does happen, that of two men equally called by God, one is converted while the other persists in sin; indeed it sometimes happens that he who is supported by the lesser sufficient help is converted, while the other, to whom greater external helps or internal sufficient helps were given, persists in sin. In this conclusion all agree, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it effectively, especially the authority adduced from ch. 11 of Matthew.
When all helps are equal in two men, it does not hold that one is saved and the other damned.— Second conclusion. If we speak universally of all the helps of prevenient grace, including the internal ones, it is impossible that, when the helps of grace are entirely equal in two men, one be converted and the other not; but always he who is converted receives some greater help of prevenient grace, which he who is not converted did not receive: and the same must be said of him who perseveres in grace to the end. This conclusion is St. Augustine's, book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 5 and 6. The same conclusion all Thomists teach. And it is proved from what has been said above: for he who is converted has an efficacious help, while he who is not converted does not have an efficacious help; for if he had it, he would be converted infallibly, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. q. 79, ar. 2, in the body, and 1. 2. q. 112, art. 3: therefore always he who is converted has some help of prevenient grace which he who is not converted does not have. The consequence is plain: for, as has been shown above, the efficacious help of prevenient grace is distinguished, according to some real power, from the help which is only sufficient.
It is confirmed, first. An efficacious help is a much greater help than all the other helps without the efficacious help: since, then, he who is converted has an efficacious help, which he who is not converted does not have, it manifestly follows that he who is converted has some greater help of prevenient grace.
III. Grace distinguishes the just man from the sinner.— It is confirmed, secondly: for otherwise one man would distinguish himself from another by something which he did not receive from the gift of grace, contrary to that word of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 4: For who distinguishes thee? The sequel is proved: for, as we suppose, the helps are equal, and yet one is distinguished from the other: therefore it is not by the helps, but by himself, or by his innate freedom, that he distinguishes himself from another; which is repugnant to the Apostle, as is plain from Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 5, where, expounding the aforesaid passage of the Apostle, he says: For are men distinguished from men by those gifts which are common to all men? But here he said first, For who distinguishes thee? and then he added, What hast thou that thou didst not receive? For a man puffed up could say against another: My faith distinguishes me, my righteousness; or whatever else. Meeting such thoughts, the good teacher says: What hast thou, then, that thou didst not receive? From whom, unless from him who distinguishes thee from another, to whom he did not give what he gave to thee? But if thou hast also received it, he says, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it? And a little after: Grace distinguishes the good from the evil, not that grace which is common to the good and the evil: therefore, according to Augustine, the good man is distinguished from the sinner by grace, which was not given to the other sinner.
IIII. That the greater help is so called in the respect of a benefit.— Nor does the solution which they apply satisfy; for they answer that he who is converted has a greater help in the respect of a benefit and in the respect of a gift: just as a sword given to someone in time of war, in which he is going to use it to avoid death, although it is physically the same, is nevertheless morally greater in the respect of a benefit and of a gift than if it were given to the same man in time of peace, when he does not need it and is not going to use it. For this solution does not seem to empty the force of the argument: for that it is a greater benefit and a greater gift is ultimately taken from the fact that free choice, in accordance with its innate freedom, will use such a help well and will cooperate with it: therefore the difference is ultimately traced back to the innate freedom of this man, and not to something received from grace.
To the first argument it is answered that the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have been converted by those outward signs and sufficient helps alone, but by an efficacious help, which God would have given them mercifully if those signs had been done among them, as was explained in disp. 7. n. 23.
V. Whence Nebuchadnezzar's repentance proceeded.— To the second argument, from the authority of St. Augustine, it is answered that the holy Doctor expressly holds our opinion in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, cited above; indeed even in the passages adduced in the argument he hands it down in the words that follow: for after those words adduced from the book On Predestination and Grace, ch. 15, asking the reason why of those two kings one was converted, he says thus: Whoever answers here that to the one, namely Nebuchadnezzar, a divine protection was present so that he might be changed, and to the other, so that he might be hardened, it was absent; and contends that this is unjust — wherefore the Apostle, establishing the ends of things themselves in the will of God, said: On whom he wills he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens; the Lord saying: Without me you can do nothing — let him understand that all those things are either accomplished with the Lord's help, or permitted when he forsakes. By these words he openly teaches that Nebuchadnezzar, in order to be converted, had a divine protection, that is, an efficacious help conferred on him by the gratuitous will of God, which nevertheless, by the just judgment of God, was not given to Pharaoh, who remained in sin.
To the other passage, from book 12 of The City of God, it is answered that in those words he only teaches that of those two men one sins voluntarily, and the other also voluntarily perseveres in chastity, which is most true. But immediately St. Augustine in ch. 7 and 8 seeks the first root, whence the evil will arises and whence the good. And in ch. 7 he teaches that the first and sole cause of defect and of sin is from our choice, because it was made from nothing; whence also it is capable of sin. And in ch. 9 he adds that the good will is not from us, but from God, from whom is the will: which he proves in the angels, saying: But if the good angels were first without a good will, and made it in themselves with God not working it, then they were made better by themselves than by him. Which teaching he confirms in book 1 of the Retractations, ch. 9, where he says: And because all good things, as has been said, both great and middle and least, are from God, it follows that from God is also the good use of free will, which is a virtue and is numbered among the great goods. And in the book On the Grace of Christ, against the Pelagians and Caelestians, ch. 13, he says: If it was given, it is not called our righteousness, but God's; because it is so made ours that it is to us from God, and the same he says in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14, and in book 2 On the Merit and Remission of Sins, ch. 14.
Efficacious grace predetermines free choice to act piously.— To the third argument it is answered that God through efficacious grace predetermines the will to act piously, not indeed by necessity, but according to the mode of a free power, as St. Thomas explains, 3 contra Gentes ch. 90, and 1. p. q. 23, art. 1, ad 1, and On Truth q. 5, art. 5, ad 1, and in the other passages adduced by us in disputation 25, where we treated this matter ex professo. Hence he who is moved by God with an efficacious help, even in the very instant in which he is moved, can dissent, if he wills; but he will not dissent: for grace itself brings it about that, although a man by free choice can dissent, he does not dissent, but freely and infallibly consents, just as the predestined man can be damned, but will never be damned. And when it is argued — for if a possible thing is posited in being, no inconvenience follows2 — it is answered with St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 23, ar. 6, ad 2, that if a possible thing be posited in being, another incompossible thing being supposed, a great inconvenience follows, namely one impossible thing, that is, that contradictories or contraries be verified simultaneously of the same subject, as is plain from a most evident example. For it is possible that Peter be white: if this possible thing be posited in being absolutely, no inconvenience or impossibility follows, because only this follows, that Peter is white; but if it be posited in being while it is supposed that blackness remains in Peter, which is incompossible with whiteness, one impossible thing follows, namely that the same Peter be simultaneously white and black. Proportionably we say in the present case that if this possible thing be posited in being absolutely — Peter, for example, can not be converted — no inconvenience follows; but if it were posited in being while it is supposed that he has the efficacious motion of God, one impossible thing follows, namely that the efficacious motion is not efficacious, or else that the absolute will of God is inefficacious and powerless, which is impossible.
To the fourth it is answered by denying the consequence. And the reason for the difference is: for habitual grace does not grant a man that he persevere to the end, but only that he can persevere. Whence it happens that of two equally justified men, one falls into sin by his own freedom and is damned, while the other through God's mercy perseveres to the end; because God grants to him the gift of perseverance, which he did not give to the other by a hidden but most just judgment. But efficacious help grants a man to act well, or to persevere to the end. Hence he who acts well, or perseveres, always has some actual help of prevenient grace which the other does not have, who falls into sin or persists in sin.
But the argument presses: we use habits when we will3: therefore if the just man uses them, as he can, to the end, he will be saved; but if he does not use them, while he is bound to use them, he will sin and be damned: therefore with equal helps on God's part it will sometimes happen that one man is saved and the other damned. It is answered4 that we indeed use habits when we will: but in order that we will to use them, the efficacious motion of God is prerequired, premoving free choice to use the habit for acting and to perform the good, especially when the habits are supernatural: because, since they belong to a higher order, they have a special character on account of which a merely natural power does not use those habits unless it be moved by a special help of God to use those habits, since things of a higher order are not subject to things of a lower order. Nor does that passage of 1 Cor. 14 stand in the way: And the spirit of the prophets is subject to the prophets: for the sense is not that the interior prophetic knowledge is subject to the prophets, or is in their power — for prophecy is not given by way of a habit, but by way of a transient motion — but the sense is that the spirit of prophecy is subject to the prophets, as regards utterance, as St. Thomas explains,5 because they can pronounce what has been revealed to them, and not pronounce it. But nevertheless, in order to pronounce it, they are also moved by God, as also to other good operations.
To the fifth argument an answer has been given in disputation 73 and 90.
The End of the Tenth Book.