De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Introduction
Disputatio CIII: Whether the gift of perseverance is necessary to remain in grace until the end of life.
Disputatio CIV: Whether the gift of perseverance is really distinct from the gift of confirmation in grace.
Disputatio CV: Whether the gift of perseverance, in its character as such and in its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of our choice with it.
Disputatio CVI: Whether, in the state of innocence, our first parents needed a special gift of perseverance to persevere in grace until the end of life.
Disputatio CVII: Whether the gift of perseverance is common to all the faithful, or is a gift proper to the predestined.
Whether the gift of perseverance is common to all faithful men, or is rather the proper gift of the predestined.
I. Some distinguish a twofold gift of perseverance: the one, they say, consists in a certain special help and protection, by which God so protects and fortifies certain men that they persevere in grace to death indeclinably and infallibly: such as was granted to the Apostles after they had received the Holy Spirit, and to those who are said to be confirmed in grace: which accordingly is not common to all the just. The other is the gift of perseverance, which consists in a certain help and protection by which God is so present to men that they can persevere in grace, if they will; and this gift, they say, is necessary for salvation and is given to all the just immediately in first act. This opinion can be proved.
First from St. Augustine in the places cited above, in which he expressly distinguishes a twofold gift of perseverance. The one, by which a man can, if he will, persevere to the end, but by his own fault does not persevere, such as was the perseverance conferred on our first parents in the state of innocence. The other, by which he not only can persevere, but also actually perseveres to the end; such is the gift conferred on the predestined through Christ. He holds, therefore, that there is some gift of perseverance common to all men, just and unjust, even if they be reprobate.
Secondly. Any just man, through habitual grace and the infused virtues, can in first act do any good whatever and fulfill all the precepts of the law: therefore he will be able also in first act to persevere, if he will, to the end: therefore to all the just there is given, together with grace itself and the infused virtues, the power of persevering to the end: therefore the gift of perseverance, by which they can persevere if they will, is common to all the just.
Thirdly. With the help on God's part, with which someone perseveres to the end, he can, if he will, not persevere; otherwise he would persevere necessarily and not freely: similarly also with the help with which someone1 does not persevere to the end, he can persevere, if he will; otherwise he would not sin by not persevering: therefore the gift of perseverance, as far as lies on the part of divine help, is common to the just who persevere and to those who do not persevere to the end: and the difference between them consists in this, that some, by the freedom innate to them, willed to use that help well, so as to persevere to the end, while others willed not to.
Fourthly. Predestination, as far as lies on God's part and on the part of the helps of grace, is common to the predestined and the non-predestined; for if the non-predestined had so rightly used their free choice as to obtain eternal salvation through the helps of grace conferred on them, they would have remained predestined, like the others who, rightly using their free choice, were saved with the same helps: therefore the gift of perseverance in first act is common also to those who are saved and to those who by their own fault perish, not using the same gift well.
II. Yet this opinion is neither true, nor does it seem founded on any probable reason. Hence let this be laid down:
The gift of perseverance is not common to all, but proper to the predestined.— First conclusion. The gift of perseverance is so proper to the predestined that it belongs to no one else. It is proved first: for the councils and the Fathers, especially Augustine, acknowledged no other perseverance than that of which it is written: But he who has persevered to the end, this one shall be saved.2 But perseverance of this kind belongs to the predestined alone: for they alone are truly saved: therefore. The major is proved from those words of the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, ch. 13: Likewise concerning the gift of perseverance, of which it is written: He who has persevered to the end, this one shall be saved: which indeed cannot be had from elsewhere, except from him who is able to establish him who stands, that he stand perseveringly; and to restore him who falls; let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certainty. And can. 16: If anyone shall say that he will certainly have that great gift of perseverance to the end with absolute and infallible certainty, unless he has learned this from a special revelation: let him be anathema. From which definition two things are had. The first is that the gift of perseverance is not that by which the just man can merely persevere, if he will, but that by which he actually perseveres to the end, as the passage of Matt. 10 adduced by the Council declares, and those words: Of which gift no one ought to promise himself anything certain with absolute certainty. And yet anyone can most certainly promise himself that God will be present to him, so that he can persevere, if he will. The Council holds, therefore, that for the gift of perseverance it is necessary that he to whom it is granted actually persevere to the end: this gift, therefore, is not common to all the just, not even to the reprobate. The second is that this gift cannot be had from elsewhere except from God,3 by which the opinion of those seems to be excluded who, as we shall observe in disputation 108, say that with an equal help of grace one perseveres to the end and another does not persevere; and that this is from no other source than that, by innate freedom, one willed to use the same help well so as to obtain eternal salvation, and the other did not. For since the sacred Council teaches that the gift of perseverance cannot be had from elsewhere except from God, it consequently seems to affirm that a gift of this kind, formally speaking, in the character of the gift of perseverance, is not had from created free choice, nor depends on its cooperation, even as on a condition without which it does not occur, as we showed in disputation 105.
III. Secondly it is proved by the authority of the Saints, who unanimously teach that the gift of perseverance is proper to the predestined, and that through it God grants to all of them not only to be able, but also actually to persevere to the end; so that they persevere indeclinably and infallibly. For St. Hilary, in his letter to Augustine, recalling the tenets of the Semi-Pelagians, says: But they are unwilling that this perseverance should be preached in such a way that it cannot either be suppliantly merited or contumaciously lost: nor do they wish themselves to be brought to the uncertainty of God's will, where, as far as they think, it is evident to them for obtaining or for losing, whatever sort it be, the beginning of the will. And a little after: Then they take it ill that grace, which was either given to the first man at that time, or is given to all now, is so divided, that he received perseverance, not that by which it should come about that he persevered, but without which he could not persevere by free choice: but that now to the Saints predestined to the kingdom through grace there is not given such an aid of perseverance; but such that perseverance itself is given to them, not only so that without this gift they cannot be persevering, but also so that through this gift they are not otherwise than persevering. And below: Hence they will that the nature of all men differ from the first man in this alone, that grace helped him willing, with the powers of his will entire, without which he could not persevere: but these, their powers lost and ruined, being only believers, it not only raises up the prostrate, but also supports those who walk. Otherwise, whatever may have been given to the predestined, they contend that they can both lose it and retain it by their own will. Which would then be false, if they thought it true that some received that perseverance in such a way that they cannot but be persevering. From which testimony it seems to be gathered that the opinion of the Massilians, which St. Prosper impugned, was that the gift of perseverance does not grant to the predestined through Christ that they persevere indeclinably and infallibly, but that they can persevere if they will; and that actual perseverance proceeds from the innate freedom of choice, because one willed to persevere with that help with which another did not persevere, because he willed not to.
St. Augustine confirms the same doctrine in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 6, where, replying to Prosper and Hilary, he says: But these brethren, as you write, are unwilling that this perseverance should be preached in such a way that it cannot either be suppliantly merited or contumaciously lost; in which they attend too little diligently to what they say. For we speak of that perseverance by which one perseveres to the end; which, if it has been given, one has persevered to the end; but if one has not persevered to the end, it has not been given: which we have already sufficiently treated above as well. And below: But perseverance to the end, since no one has it except he who has persevered to the end; many can have it, no one can lose it.4 For it is not to be feared that perhaps, when a man has persevered to the end, some evil will should arise in him, so that he not persevere to the end. This gift of God, therefore, can be suppliantly merited; but once it has been given, it cannot be contumaciously lost. For when anyone has persevered to the end, he can lose neither this gift, nor the others which he could lose before the end. For how can that be lost, through which it comes about that even what could be lost is not lost? By which words the holy Doctor most openly teaches that the gift of perseverance has infallibly joined to it actual perseverance to the end, and cannot be interrupted by the will of man or contumaciously lost. He holds, therefore, that the same gift is not common to all the just, since some of them persevere and some do not persevere to the end.
IIII. There is another distinguished testimony of St. Augustine for proving the same, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 12, where, establishing the difference between the gift of grace conferred on the first parents in the state of innocence and that which is conferred on the elect through Christ in fallen nature, he teaches that by the gift conferred on the first parents it was given to them that they should persevere if they willed, but it was not given to them that they should will. But to the predestined through Christ it is also given that they will to persevere and do persevere. Augustine's words are: That the first man, then, should not receive this gift of God, that is, perseverance in good, but that it should be left to his choice to persevere or not to persevere, his will had such powers, which had been established without any sin, and nothing from itself resisted it concupiscentially, that the choice of persevering might worthily be entrusted to such goodness and to such facility of living well: God indeed foreknowing what he would do unjustly, foreknowing nevertheless, not compelling to it, but at the same time knowing what he himself would do concerning him justly. But now, after that great freedom has been lost by the merit of sin, infirmity has remained to be helped even by greater gifts. For it pleased God, whereby he might most extinguish the pride of human presumption, that no flesh should glory before him, that is, no man. And he teaches the same in other words adduced above, but especially in these: The infirmity of the human will has therefore been helped, so that by divine grace it should be acted upon indeclinably5, and inseparably: and therefore, although infirm, it should not fail, nor be overcome by any adversity: and in those: For to the strongest he let go and permitted to do what he willed: for the weak he reserved it that, by his giving, they should most invincibly will what is good, and6 be most invincibly unwilling to desert this. Behold, St. Augustine says that help was given by the gift of perseverance not only to the Apostles and to others confirmed in grace, whereby they were acted upon indeclinably and persevered to the end, but also to human infirmity, which is found in all the elect: therefore, according to Augustine, this gift of perseverance is proper to all the predestined; so that it belongs to no one else. The consequence is proved: for to the reprobate there is not conferred by God any gift by which they should most invincibly will what is good, and7 be most invincibly unwilling to desert it; otherwise they would not fall from the grace which they received.
Hence St. Prosper, in his Response to the Chapters of the Gauls, ch. 7: How, he says, would the election preordained in Christ have them, when there is no doubt that perseverance in good to the end is a gift of God; which these men manifestly did not have from the very fact that they did not persevere? If therefore, according to Prosper, it is manifest that those who did not persevere in good to the end did not have the gift of perseverance, how is it asserted that such a gift is common to all the just? It must be said, then, that it pertains to the predestined alone.
V. Thirdly it is proved by reason. If the gift of perseverance is common to all the just, it follows that of itself, and as it proceeds from God, it grants them only to be able to persevere. The sequel is proved: for actually to persevere to the end is not common to all the just; otherwise one once justified would never sin mortally, nor fall from grace: which nevertheless is repugnant to the definition of the Council of Trent: therefore only to be able to persevere is common to them; and consequently, if the gift of perseverance is common to all the just, it will grant them only to be able to persevere, and those who actually persevere would have from the gift of God only to be able to persevere if they will: but actual perseverance they would have from themselves; namely because, by the freedom innate to them, together with the help granting only the ability, they willed actually to persevere to the end: which nevertheless is not to be admitted.
VI. Predestination to glory is not common to all the just.— Fourthly. Predestination to glory is not common to all the just, but only to those who in fact are saved: therefore neither is the gift of perseverance. The antecedent is clear from the words of the Apostle to the Romans 8: For those whom he predestined, he also called; and those whom he called, he also justified; and those whom he justified, he also glorified. And John 10, where Christ the Lord, speaking of the predestined, says: My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me, and I give them eternal life, and they shall not perish forever, and no one shall take them out of my hand. Hence predestination too, as regards the execution of the effect, is certain and infallible with the certainty of the order and causality of the means, as was shown in disp. 41. But the consequence is proved: for the gift of perseverance is the proper effect of predestination to glory: therefore, if predestination to glory is not common to all the just, neither will the gift of perseverance be common to them.
To this a certain author replies that predestination to glory is common to all men, at least to the just: for whose explanation he distinguishes a twofold predestination of God, complete and incomplete.8 Complete predestination he says to be that which extends to the whole series of means by which a man in fact attains salvation and perseveres to the end, such as that of which Augustine says in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14: Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which all who are liberated are most certainly liberated. Incomplete predestination he calls that which extends only to some series of benefits by which one tends to salvation, especially up to the grace of justification; but does not extend to the final term of life. He says, therefore, that incomplete predestination is common to all just men; but that complete predestination is not common to all, but proper to those who truly, with the help of prevenient and exciting grace, persevere to the end and are saved. But he says that this complete predestination depends on foreseen merits subsequent to prevenient grace: and the reason for this is that he thinks the elect, even the Apostles, John the Baptist, and other outstanding Saints, were not predestined to glory by God with an absolute and efficacious will, except under a tacit condition, if they should persevere to the end;9 he excepts, however, the Blessed Virgin out of reverence for her. In the same way he distinguishes a twofold gift of perseverance; one incomplete, by which a man can persevere if he will, which he calls the gift of perseverance efficacious in first act: the other complete, by which he actually perseveres to the end, and it is called the gift of perseverance in second act. Incomplete perseverance he says to be common to all the just; but complete perseverance, which he calls efficacious perseverance in second act, he judges to be proper to the predestined. He adds, however, that the efficacy of this depends on the free cooperation of choice; as he had said before of complete predestination to glory: for he thinks that no help of prevenient grace, in the respect in which it is prevenient, is prior in the order of causality to the free cooperation of our choice.
Yet this way of speaking contains many things which involve no little difficulty, and from what has been said above they remain sufficiently refuted. And in the first place, that distinction of a twofold predestination to glory, namely of complete and incomplete predestination, does not seem to be admitted; because it is found neither in St. Augustine nor in St. Thomas nor in any other weighty Doctor; but rather by the name of predestination to glory they understand only that predestination by which the elect are efficaciously ordered and conveyed to eternal life, whose effects are calling, justification, meritorious works which are done through free choice moved by God, and perseverance in grace to the end. But the other predestination to glory ought not to be called absolutely predestination to glory, but a common supernatural providence, which God has concerning the reprobate, whom he has not ordered efficaciously, or by consequent will, to eternal life, but only sufficiently, and by antecedent will, as was said above: they can nevertheless be called predestined to the gifts of grace which God confers on them, so that they can attain eternal salvation if they will: therefore, absolutely speaking, predestination to glory ought not to be called a gift common to all the just, but proper to those who in fact attain eternal life; and consequently the same must be said of perseverance to the end, since it is the effect of predestination to glory: for God's predestination is truly the efficient cause of all the benefits or means by which the predestined attain eternal life.
Moreover the same is impugned: for it would follow that God on his part only predestined men to glory with incomplete predestination; but that man himself, by using exciting grace well and by persevering with it to the end according to his innate freedom, made himself predestined with complete predestination; and consequently incomplete and imperfect predestination would be attributed to God, but perfect and complete predestination to man, and would depend on him: which does not seem able to be admitted. For although some effects of predestination depend efficiently on man's free choice, moved efficaciously by God, such as the pious and meritorious operations by which in execution he attains eternal life, nevertheless God's preordination, by which with absolute and efficacious will he determined to confer eternal life on the elect, in which the character of predestination consists, in no way depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or on foreseen merits, however much it be asserted that merits of this kind do not proceed from the powers of nature alone but presuppose a supernatural excitation of God, because even the cooperation of choice is in the predestined an effect of divine predestination, as was shown in disputation 36. Hence it is not to be admitted that God with absolute and efficacious will did not predestine all his elect, and a fortiori the Apostles and other outstanding Saints, to glory before the foresight of merits subsequent to God's excitation, or before the foresight of their cooperation by which they will to cooperate and persevere to the end. For already in disputation 37 it was shown expressly how, according to the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, absolute and efficacious predestination to glory does not depend on foreseen merits of grace.
What complete and incomplete perseverance is called.— But what the author says about the twofold efficacious help of the gift of perseverance, namely complete or incomplete, or in second act or in first act, does not seem to satisfy, nor to agree with the doctrine of St. Augustine: for if by the incomplete efficacy of the gift of perseverance, or in first act, he understands, as he seems to understand, the gift of perseverance by which one can persevere if he will: this is in truth not an efficacious gift for persevering, but only a sufficient one; nor is it the perseverance of the second Adam, but of the first, as Augustine says in the places adduced above. But if by the name of incomplete efficacious perseverance, or in first act, he understands the efficacy of the gift of perseverance insofar as in the order of reason and causality it precedes the free cooperation of our choice with it, and effects that we persevere to the end, his doctrine does not seem to stand: both because the perseverance of which we speak is not perseverance in first act, from which the second act of persevering to the end may sometimes be separated, as is clear from the words of Augustine adduced above. For this perseverance is not properly first act; otherwise it would only grant to those redeemed through Christ to be able to persevere if they will, and would not effect that they will: which is against St. Augustine in the places cited: but it is a certain mean between first and second act, and pertains to the complement of first act, as was said above of any other efficacious help. Nor is it to be admitted that the perseverance of which we speak, or its complete efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of choice: for that free cooperation itself is an effect of the efficacious gift of perseverance, although it does not effect it without us freely concurring. Hence the very willing to persevere, or the pious operations by which we persevere to the end, do indeed depend efficiently on our free choice moved by God with efficacious motion; but the efficacy of the gift of perseverance, and that by which it is formally constituted complete in the character of a gift of perseverance, does not depend on the free cooperation of choice, although it is never given without it. From which it is inferred that it is not in the power of our choice to make that we be predestined by God with absolute and efficacious will; or that God's predestination be complete and perfect predestination:10 for that alone is in the power of God, who by his mere and gratuitous will, which can be hidden but not unjust, has predestined to glory whom he wills: and whom he wills not, he has not predestined. Hence God himself by his grace effects that all the effects of predestination, from the first to the last, which is glorification, be completed. Which St. Augustine not obscurely teaches when he says:11 When therefore God promised to Abraham in his seed the faith of the nations, saying: I have made you the father of many nations;12 whence the Apostle says: Therefore it is of faith, that according to grace the promise might be firm to all the seed, he promised not of the power of our will, but of his predestination.13 For he promised what he himself was to do, not what men were to do: because even if men do the good things which pertain to the worship of God, he himself makes them do what he has commanded: not they make him do what he promised: otherwise, in order that God's promises be fulfilled, it would be in the power not of God but of men, and what was promised by the Lord would be rendered to Abraham by them. But Abraham did not so believe, but believed, giving glory to God; because what he promised, he is able also to do. He did not say, to foretell; he did not say, to foreknow: for he can foretell and foreknow even the deeds of others; but he said: He is able also to do, and by this, deeds not of others but his own. And below,14 after he had shown that the things which God requires of us in order that we come to eternal life are given to us by God himself, he adds: For therefore these things are both commanded to us, and shown to be gifts of God, that it may be understood that both we do them, and God makes us do them: as through the prophet Ezekiel he says most openly.15 For what is more open than where he says: I will make you do? Attend, dearest brethren, to that very passage of Scripture, and you will see that God promises that he will do those things, that they may do what he commands, that they may be done. From which words we have that the efficacy of divine absolute predestination and of the helps of grace, especially of the gift of perseverance, does not depend on the free cooperation of our choice: but rather, on the contrary, that our free cooperation, by which we persevere to the end, depends on the efficacious and absolute predetermination of God predestining; and consequently on the efficacy of the helps of grace, through which he makes us do, and works that we work: therefore the gift of efficacious perseverance is not common to all just men, but the proper gift of the predestined, or of those who attain eternal life.
VII. The gift of perseverance is common to all the predestined.— Second conclusion. Not only to the Apostles and to those confirmed in grace and to other Saints of outstanding virtue, but also to all the predestined is that great gift of perseverance common, by which God effects that they persevere infallibly and indeclinably. The conclusion is gathered from the Council of Trent and from the places of St. Augustine and Prosper cited above; for they make no distinction between the gift of perseverance granted to the Apostles or to others confirmed in grace, and that which is given to the rest of the predestined: but rather St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 12, cited, teaches not obscurely that a gift of perseverance of this kind is common to all the elect, as was shown above from the words of the same Augustine.
Secondly it is proved by the reason of the same Augustine in the place cited: for otherwise some of the predestined could glory in actual perseverance in themselves, or in their own powers, and not in God, and say: I give you thanks, Lord, who gave me only the kind of aid which was granted to the first man, without which I could not persevere even if I willed; but thanks be to me, who by the innate freedom of my choice willed to persevere, with you neither working nor effecting that I should will indeclinably, inseparably, and most invincibly. But the consequent seems to be repugnant to the words of the Apostle:16 What then do you have that you did not receive? But if you have received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? therefore it must necessarily be said that the gift of perseverance of which our conclusion speaks is common to all the predestined, and cannot be restricted to the Apostles alone, or to those confirmed in grace.
Thirdly it is proved: it would follow from the opposite opinion that the predestined, with the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and those confirmed in grace alone excepted, do not differ from the non-predestined as regards the order and causality of the means, but only as regards the foreknowledge of the event; namely because God foreknew that the predestined would use their choice well, and the grace received, so as to persevere in it and obtain eternal salvation; but the reprobate not so. But the consequent seems to be against the most open passages of Scripture and the sayings of the Saints, as St. Thomas teaches in question 6 On Truth, article 3: and it is clear from what was said in disputation 37, especially number 12. Therefore the gift of perseverance, by which all who persevere persevere infallibly and indeclinably, is common to all the predestined.
VIII. A certain new distinction concerning perseverance is impugned.— Third conclusion. That distinction of a twofold gift of perseverance cannot be admitted in the predestined, of which one should belong only to the Apostles and to those confirmed in grace, and the other to the rest of the predestined. This conclusion remains sufficiently proved from what was said in the two preceding. Moreover it is proved: for that distinction is not found in the ancient Fathers or in the Scholastic Doctors: but such a doctrine, especially in theological matters, is to be avoided, as Vincent of Lérins and the other Doctors cited in disp. 5, no. 5, say: therefore. Secondly it is proved: for the aforesaid distinction of the gift of perseverance does not seem unlike the other which Ambrose Catharinus establishes concerning predestination, distinguishing two classes of the predestined; to the first of which he says belong the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and a very few others, whom God from eternity by absolute decree and efficacious will predestined, and decreed to confer so many helps of grace that, with the freedom of choice preserved, they cannot fall away from eternal salvation. To the second class he recalls the rest of the predestined, whom he thinks are not predestined by God by an absolute, immovable, and efficacious decree of his will, but under a certain mutable condition of the good use of free choice; namely, if they themselves will to use the helps of grace well. For what Ambrose Catharinus established concerning predestination, this opinion which we impugn attempts to persuade concerning the gift of perseverance. But that distinction of the predestined of Ambrose Catharinus, as new, and involved in many difficulties and no few straits, is disapproved by learned and pious theologians, as we showed above from Sixtus of Siena, a disciple of the same Ambrose, and from other theologians in disputation 37 at the beginning: therefore in like manner the aforesaid distinction of the gift of perseverance will likewise be to be rejected. IX. Thirdly the same is proved: for it would follow from the opposite opinion that the gift of perseverance is not of the same kind in all the predestined;17 which nevertheless seems to be repugnant to the common consent of the Saints. The sequel is proved: for to be able to persevere and actually to persevere are distinguished in species, as act and potency, or habit: therefore if the gift of perseverance grants to some of the predestined only to be able to persevere if they will; but in others effects that they persevere infallibly; it follows that the gift of perseverance is not of the same kind in all the predestined.
To the first argument it is answered that that gift by which a man can persevere to the end if he will is not simply the gift of perseverance, but in a certain respect; because it is only perseverance in potency. Hence it must be established that there is another gift of perseverance, by which God effects that the predestined infallibly persevere to the end. And according to this doctrine are to be understood the things which St. Augustine says in the places cited above.
X. To the second it is answered that, as St. Thomas teaches in the first part of the second, q. 109, a. 9, in the body, he who has already obtained grace cannot by himself work good and avoid sin without a new help of God moving, directing, and protecting him: which was also shown expressly in disputation 88. Hence much less will he be able, by grace and the infused virtues alone, without a special help, to persevere to the end.
To the confirmation it is answered that the gift of perseverance, antecedently to the free cooperation of choice, grants the predestined not only to be able to persevere if they will, but most efficacious powers, by which God effects that they persevere freely and infallibly, as was said above of any other efficacious help. For between to be able to persevere and the pious operations by which one actually perseveres to the end, a mean is given, as is sufficiently clear from what was said in disputations 18 and 19. Hence it does not follow that free choice is merely passive in relation to the good acts by which it perseveres to the end: nor does it follow either that actual perseverance, taken for the actual efficacious help by which one perseveres to the end, depends on the free cooperation of choice, although the effect of the gift of perseverance in adults, namely the pious operations, proceed efficiently not from the gift of perseverance alone, but also from the free cooperation of choice with it, as was explained in disputations 90 and 105.
To the third it is answered that with the help on God's part by which one perseveres to the end, one can indeed, if he will, not persevere, absolutely speaking and in the divided sense; not however in the composite sense, as is clear from what has been said above:18 nor does it follow from this that he perseveres necessarily. Similarly also with the help by which one does not persevere to the end, one can persevere if he will, absolutely speaking; but yet with that help alone he will never persevere. For more things are required for a man actually to persevere than for him to be able to persevere, as was said above when the sufficient and efficacious help was discussed. Hence it does not follow that the gift of perseverance is common to all the just, whether they persevere or do not persevere to the end; or that the difference between those who persevere and those who do not is to be drawn only from the free cooperation of the one, which the other was unwilling to apply.
To the fourth it is answered that predestination is not common to all the just, but special to some, namely to those who in fact are saved. Nor is any case to be admitted in which the non-predestined should so use their free choice well as to persevere to the end with the helps of grace conferred on them and be saved. For although the non-predestined, absolutely speaking and in the divided sense, can die in grace and be saved; yet that is impossible in the composite sense, as was said above. Hence it does not follow that the gift of perseverance in first act is common to all the just, even the non-predestined.
Secondly it is answered that the gift of perseverance in first act can be taken in two ways. In one way for incomplete first act; namely for the very ability to persevere; or for the help by which one can persevere if he will; and in this acceptation it is common to all the just, even those who do not persevere. But this perseverance is not simply perseverance and in act, but in a certain respect and in potency, as has been said; nor does Christ the Lord speak of it when he says: But he who has persevered to the end, this one shall be saved.19 In another way it is taken for the last complement of first act; namely for the help by which free choice is efficaciously premoved to persevere, and forthwith20 perseveres to the end; and in this acceptation the gift of perseverance, even in the last complement of first act, is neither common to all the just, nor belongs only to the Apostles and to others confirmed in grace; but is the proper gift of all the predestined.