De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Introduction
Disputatio CIII: Whether the gift of perseverance is necessary to remain in grace until the end of life.
Disputatio CIV: Whether the gift of perseverance is really distinct from the gift of confirmation in grace.
Disputatio CV: Whether the gift of perseverance, in its character as such and in its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of our choice with it.
Disputatio CVI: Whether, in the state of innocence, our first parents needed a special gift of perseverance to persevere in grace until the end of life.
Whether in the state of innocence the first parents stood in need of a special gift of perseverance in order to persevere in grace to the end of life.
I. SOME have said that the first parents in the state of innocence, in order to avoid mortal sins and to persevere in grace to the end, did not need a particular help over and above the habits of original justice, of grace, and of the theological virtues. And so, according to this opinion, if the first parents had in fact persevered, they would have persevered by original justice alone, by the habit of grace and of the infused virtues, together with God's general concurrence, with every other special help excluded. They prove their opinion.
First: for it is the common opinion of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 109. art. 2. 3. 4. and 8, and art. 10, that man in the state of innocence could, through his free choice, with God's general concurrence alone, without any other special help, fulfill the whole law even for the longest time, as regards the substance of the act, which obliged to nothing supernatural: and so could keep himself from every sin, both venial and mortal, for any period, however long: therefore he could have persevered, and would in fact have persevered, had he willed, with the infused habits alone and God's general concurrence, with every other special help excluded. The antecedent is proved, because in that state there was no disorder of the sensitive appetite, no toil, no weariness, and no interior temptation, nor any other impediment standing in the way, that he could not with his free choice observe the whole law even for the longest time, even to the end of life, and keep himself from every mortal and venial sin.
Secondly. According to the common opinion of the doctors, Adam in that same state of innocence could, through the supernatural gifts of faith, hope, charity and grace, with the common and general help of God, work out his salvation and merit eternal life, without other special helps; since habits of this kind are accommodated to eliciting, with the natural powers and God's common influx, the acts to which they are ordered, and there was no difficulty in Adam either in eliciting or in continuing and multiplying those same acts: therefore with those same habits and God's general concurrence, with every other special help likewise excluded, he could have persevered to the end, and would in fact have persevered, had he willed.
It is confirmed. For we, when the habit of supernatural faith, hope or charity is present, can with God's common help elicit one or another act of supernatural faith, hope or charity, and elicit one or another meritorious work, although for a long time we cannot fulfill the whole law, on account of the rebellion of the sentient powers, the weakness of the body, and its irksomeness, as, among others, Soto affirms, book 3 of On Nature and Grace, ch. 4. Since therefore in Adam there was then no weakness, irksomeness or rebellion, it follows that with God's common help he could work out his salvation and merit eternal life, and persevere to the end.
Thirdly they prove the same by the authority of St. Augustine, the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 10 and the two following chapters; where he affirms that the first parents had the fullest freedom, and received grace and help, not indeed such that they could not fail to persevere in grace (for that belongs to the state of eternal happiness), but such that they could persevere and could fail to persevere: and it was by their free choice alone that they did not fulfill it in deed. He affirms likewise that they received the same fullness of freedom, Hypognosticon, book 3, at the beginning. Likewise also ch. 11 of the same book:1 That grace, he says, the first man did not have, by which he would never will to be evil; but he assuredly had that grace in which, if he willed to remain, he would never be evil, and without which, even with free choice, he could not be good; yet he could abandon it through free choice. God therefore willed that he too should not be without his grace, which he left in his free choice; since free choice suffices for evil; but for good (supernatural, understand, of which the discourse is) it is small, unless it be aided by the almighty good: which aid, if that man had not abandoned it through free choice, he would always have been good: but he abandoned it, and was abandoned. For such was the aid, that he would abandon it when he willed, and would remain in it if he willed; not such as to make him will. And ch. 12 he says: To the first man, therefore, who in that good in which he had been made upright had received the power not to sin, the power not to die, the power not to abandon that good itself, there was given an aid of perseverance, not such as to make him persevere, but without which he could not persevere through free choice. And below: That it might be left to his choice to persevere or not to persevere, his will had such powers, being established without any sin, and nothing from itself resisted it with concupiscence, that worthily with such great goodness, and such facility of living well, the choice of persevering should accompany it. Behold, he says that through the same habitual gifts, by which internal wars had been removed and by which he was inclined to good, Adam in the state of innocence obtained the choice and the capacity of persevering, if he willed.
II. I hold that the contrary opinion is true, and in accord with the mind of Sts. Augustine and Thomas; for whose explanation let this be laid down:
The first parents could persevere in the state of innocence through grace and the gifts conferred on them.— The first conclusion. The first parents in the state of innocence could persevere through the habit of grace and of original justice, through the infused virtues, and through the actual helps which in fact were conferred on them in that state, just as through sufficient help someone can be converted to God, although in fact he is never converted, by sufficient help alone. In this conclusion the authors of both opinions agree, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it efficaciously, and it is the express opinion of St. Augustine in the passages cited in the third argument.
Moreover it is proved: for a reprobate, through grace and the infused virtues, and through the actual helps which are given him by God while he is in grace, can persevere to the end, although actual perseverance to the end is incompatible with reprobation: therefore all the more the first parents in the state of innocence could, through the supernatural habitual and actual gifts conferred on them, persevere to the end, had they willed, although in fact they did not persevere.
It is confirmed. The efficacious help of the gift of perseverance is not necessary in order that one be able to persevere, but in order that one actually persevere; otherwise either all would persevere, or those who do not persevere could not in reality persevere; and consequently it would not be imputed to them as a fault if they did not persevere, because no one sins in that which he cannot avoid: therefore even if the gift of perseverance, by which they would actually persevere, was not conferred by God on the first parents in the state of innocence, they could still have persevered through the habitual gifts and the actual helps conferred on them.
III. Many actual helps of grace were conferred on the first parents in the state of innocence.— I said, through the habitual gifts and actual helps: because it is most certain that in the state of innocence there were conferred on the first parents not only supernatural habitual gifts, but also actual helps of exciting and helping grace, by which during that2 short time in which they persisted in grace they performed certain good works meritorious of eternal life, although through their subsequent sin they were deadened. For it has already been shown above that for any pious operation, besides the habitual gifts, the actual help of exciting and helping grace is necessary:3 and that for the reasons assigned there. By these gifts, therefore, the first parents in the state of innocence could have persevered, had they willed, although it was not given them by God that they willed.
IIII. The gift of perseverance was necessary for the first parents even in the state of innocence, in order that they might persevere.— The second conclusion. In order that the first parents in the state of innocence might actually persevere, there was needed a special actual help of the gift of perseverance, distinct from habitual grace and the infused virtues. And so, if they had actually persevered as they could, there would have been conferred on them a special prevenient help of the gift of perseverance, which in fact was not given them, and consequently they would not have persevered by original justice alone, habitual grace and the infused virtues: the conclusion is St. Thomas's, 3. contra gentes cap. 155, where among other things he says: Just as free choice does not suffice for this effect, which is to persevere in good, without God's exterior help, so neither does any habit infused into us suffice for this; for the habits that are infused into us by God according to the state of the present life do not totally remove from free choice its mobility to evil, although through them free choice4 is in some way stabilized in good: and therefore when we say that man needs the help of grace in order to persevere finally, we do not understand that beyond the habitual grace previously infused for acting well, another grace is infused from above for persevering; but we understand that, when all gratuitous habits are had, man still needs the help of divine providence governing from without. The same he teaches, 1. 2. quaest. 109. artic. 10.
First it is proved by the testimonies of Scripture which St. Thomas adduces for it in the cited 3. cont. gent.: for it is said, Philippians 15: He who began in you a good work will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ. And 1 Peter, last chapter: The God of all grace, who called us into his eternal glory, having suffered a little, will himself perfect, confirm and establish you. And: Who are you, that you judge another's servant? To his lord he stands or falls: but he shall stand; for God is able to make him stand.6 There are also found in sacred Scripture many prayers in which perseverance is asked of God; as in Psalm 16: Direct my steps in your paths, that my footsteps may not be moved. And 2 Thessalonians 2: May God our Father exhort your hearts, and confirm them in every good work and word. This very thing is also asked in the Lord's Prayer, especially when it is said: Your kingdom come:7 for the kingdom of God will not come to us unless we persevere in good. But it would be a mockery to ask something of God of which he himself were not the giver; therefore perseverance in good is from God for man, in whatever state he has been constituted. If it be said8 that, if man in the state of innocence had persevered, such perseverance would indeed be a gift of God, but would not have proceeded from a special help superadded, but from the habit of grace and of the infused virtues with God's general concurrence, man's free choice cooperating at the same time; against this it is urged:9 for, as we said above from St. Thomas, no infused habit is sufficient for persevering in good in this life: for according to the present state habits do not totally remove from free choice its mobility to evil, although through them free choice is in some way stabilized in good: therefore besides the infused habits there is needed for persevering a special help superadded, not only in the state of corrupt nature but also in that of integral nature, in which the infused habits likewise did not totally remove from free choice its mobility to evil.
The second and strongest reason is taken from the Council of Orange, ch. 19, where it is said: Human nature, even if it remained in that integrity in which it was created, would in no way preserve itself, unless its Creator aided it. Hence, since it cannot keep the salvation it has received without the grace of God, how will it be able to repair what it has lost without the grace of God? By these words it seems to be defined that, if human nature remained in that integrity in which it was created, it would have persevered through a special help of helping grace superadded to original justice and the infused habits. They reply10 supposing first that the Pelagians asserted that the natural powers alone of our choice, considered precisely apart from any help and gift of God superadded, sufficed both for preserving friendship with God and also for restoring and recovering it through penance after it had been lost through sin. They suppose secondly that the Fathers, when they spoke against errors of this kind of the Pelagians, or defined anything, understood by the name of the help of grace all that, being superadded to the powers of our choice, aids them so that they do not succumb and so that they perform supernatural works, whether this was a supernatural habit influencing together with the power, or a motion and influx without a habit. And all that they comprehended under the name of grace, of which they said against the Pelagians that our choice stands in need beyond its natural powers. This foundation once laid, they say that the Fathers of the Council of Orange in that chapter intended chiefly to define this conclusion against the Pelagians: that man cannot recover lost spiritual salvation by his own powers without grace, that is, without God's supernatural aid, in the manner explained a little before. But in order to define it, they premised: Human nature, even if it remained in that integrity in which it was created, would in no way preserve itself (namely, by its natural powers alone, as the Pelagians said), unless its Creator aided it; at least through the influx of the habits of original justice, of grace, and of the theological virtues. Hence, since without the grace of God—by the mere influx, that is, of its natural powers—it cannot keep the salvation it has received, how will it be able to recover what it has lost without the grace of God, that is, by its own powers alone? From this they infer that no one can gather from a definition of this kind that the first parents in the state of innocence needed, in order to persevere in grace, a supernatural help superadded to the habits of original justice, of grace, and of the theological virtues. This solution, however, besides presupposing some things that are false, does not evacuate the force of the argument, nor does it seem to defend the mind of the Council as far as is right.11 And, to begin from the refutation of the first foundation, we note that, although in the first stage of his heresy Pelagius laid down that the natural powers alone of our choice, considered precisely without supernatural aid and gift of God superadded, sufficed for fulfilling all the precepts of the law, for recovering grace through penance, and for meriting eternal life; yet afterwards, corrected by the brethren because he left no place for the grace of God through Jesus Christ, he added that an internal grace must be admitted for the power of acting, namely the illumination of the intellect and the rousing of the dull will, and God's subsequent aid for the determination of the created will, as is clear from what was said in the first disputation, where we proved this by the most open testimonies of Pelagius himself, which are extant in the books of St. Augustine, and from the opinion of Augustine himself.
V. What the holy Fathers meant by the name of the help of grace when disputing against the Pelagians.— Nor is that to be admitted which is insinuated in the second foundation, namely that the Fathers, when they defined against the errors of the Pelagians, understood by the name of the help of grace only the gift superadded to the powers of our choice, whether it was a supernatural habit or a concomitant motion; or that they understood the habits of grace and of the infused virtues to suffice for accomplishing the works of piety, which habits, together with our free choice determining itself, would influence those same pious operations without any other special actual help superadded to those same habits. For although under the name of gratuitous help they comprehend also habitual grace and the infused virtues, as St. Thomas understands, 1. 2. q. 111. art. 2. and 3, yet most of all in many definitions they are understood to mean the actual help superadded to the infused habits, as is clear from the Council of Mileve, can. 4, and of Orange, can. 4. 6. 9. 10. and 20, where it speaks expressly of the special help superadded, by which God works in us and with us, that we may work.
This is confirmed by all the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 88 that in one who has the infused habits for eliciting a supernatural act, a special help is necessary, not only of exciting but also of helping grace, superadded to those same infused habits.
Thirdly the conclusion is proved by showing that the Council of Orange, in the cited canon 19, understands by helping grace a special help superadded to habitual grace and the infused virtues: for in the first part of that canon it speaks of the first parents in the state of innocence, in which they were endowed with original justice, habitual grace and the infused virtues; and it defines that in them the aid of grace was still necessary in order to keep the salvation they had received: therefore it speaks of an aid, or special help, superadded to those same infused habits. Nor is it enough to answer that the very habit of grace and of the virtues, insofar as it influences a pious operation together with the free choice determining itself, has the character of a special actual help. For against this militate all the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 18 that the special help of God, like general concurrence, is an immediate influx into free choice, as into the cause, and something prior to the influx of that same choice, by which God premoves, applies and predetermines our will, that it may freely and infallibly cooperate with the moving grace.
VI. The supernatural habit, and that by which it is determined to act.— It is confirmed: for it would follow from the opposite opinion that man's free cooperation with the infused habits would be the cause that the habit of grace and of charity has an influx into the pious operations by which he perseveres to the end, and consequently that the gift of perseverance would depend, at least as on a condition without which it does not occur, on the free cooperation of our choice: the contrary of which was shown in the preceding disputation. The sequel is proved: for if a prior motion and determination through a special help is not required in order that the habit of grace and of charity influence pious operations together with free choice, then the free cooperation and determination of choice will be the cause that the habit of grace and of charity has a new influx into the operations by which man perseveres to the end, and consequently the gift of perseverance depends on the free cooperation of choice.
Fourthly it is proved. For in us, besides the habitual gift itself of sanctifying grace and the infused virtues, a special help of the gift of perseverance superadded to those same infused habits is necessary in order that we actually persevere to the end: therefore likewise in Adam in the state of innocence. The antecedent is the express opinion of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 109. art. 9. and 10, and it is had as defined in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustificat. can. 22, in these words: If anyone says that a justified man can persevere in the justice received without a special help of God, or that with it he cannot; let him be anathema. The consequence, moreover, is proved: for the reason on account of which St. Thomas teaches that he who has already obtained justifying grace needs a special help superadded,12 in order to work good and persevere to the end, is that no created thing can go forth into any act whatever except by the power of divine motion: but this reason also applies to the first parents in the state of innocence: therefore. VII. They reply by denying the consequence, and they assign the reason for the difference:13 for original justice restrained the lower part, lest it wage war against the higher, and lest the passions or temptations of the sensitive appetite rise up against reason; which habitual grace nevertheless does not effect in the state of fallen nature: and therefore the just man after the fall needs a special help superadded in order actually to persevere, but not so in integral nature. But against this solution there is an efficacious argument:14 for St. Thomas assigns a twofold reason why he who has already obtained grace needs, in order to act well, a special help superadded, by which he is moved by God to act rightly:1516 First, for a general reason, namely that no created thing can go forth into any act whatever except by the power of divine motion. Secondly, for a special reason, on account of the condition of the state of human nature, which indeed, although it is healed by grace as regards the mind, yet there remains in it corruption and infection as regards the flesh, through which it serves the law of sin, as is said in Romans 7. Therefore although in the state of innocence this second reason does not apply, the first reason still has place in it, and consequently, on account of it, it must be said that the first parent in the state of innocence needed a special help, superadded to the infused habits, in order actually to persevere.
VIII. The gifts of grace conferred on us through Christ are greater than the gifts of the state of innocence.— Fifthly it is proved: for St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace cited above, and with him St. Thomas, teach that we have received through Christ a greater gift than Adam received in the state of innocence; in that to Adam was conferred only the gift by which he could persevere if he willed, but not that by which he would actually persevere and will: whereas to the predestined there is given through Christ not only the gift by which they can persevere if they will, but also that by which they actually persevere and will. They hold, therefore, that the first parent in the state of innocence, in order actually to persevere, needed some special help or gift, which nevertheless was not conferred on him, as it is conferred on the predestined through the grace of Christ.
Had Adam persevered in the state of innocence, he would have persevered by a special gift.— It is confirmed: for, as was said above, it is one thing to be able to persevere, another actually to persevere; just as it is one thing to be able to act, another actually to act: but both to be able to persevere and actually to persevere are a gift of God; for Augustine says: It is his not only that we are able to do what we will, but also that we will what we are able: therefore if Adam had persevered as he could, he would have persevered by some gift of God superadded: which nevertheless in fact was not conferred on him; and consequently he needed in the state of innocence a special help in order actually to persevere. They reply17 that St. Augustine and St. Thomas understand this on the part of the effect, because the grace of Christ had a greater effect in adults who persevered to the end of life—their own free choice nevertheless cooperating unto perseverance—than the grace conferred on Adam had, by which, through Adam's defect in not willing to cooperate with it, he did not persevere: but that they did not deny, nor can they deny, that the grace conferred on Adam, if it had not been through Adam's choice, could in reality have had both effects, and that it was by Adam's fault alone that he did not have it. This explanation, however, does not agree with the words of St. Augustine and St. Thomas:18 for St. Augustine expressly distinguishes the aids of grace themselves:19 Those aids themselves, he says, are to be distinguished: one is the aid without which something is not done, and another is the aid by which something is done. And a little before he had premised that the grace given to the second Adam is more powerful than the first grace, which was given to the first Adam. He holds, therefore, that on the part of grace itself, and not only on the part of the effect, the grace conferred on the predestined through Christ, and on those persevering to the end, is more powerful and greater than the grace conferred on Adam in the state of innocence.
In addition to this: for if the same grace conferred on two men has in one the effect of persevering to the end, but not in the other, and this is not from elsewhere than because one, according to his innate freedom, willed so to use the same grace well as to obtain eternal salvation, and the other did not; it would follow that actual perseverance would in the end be reduced to the powers of nature, or to the innate freedom of created choice; which nevertheless cannot be admitted. Nor does the solution of those who assert this satisfy:20 that if Adam had persevered as he could, certainly an effect of this kind, that is, perseverance itself in grace, by keeping himself from every mortal fault, would not have been from Adam's powers alone, but principally from God's cooperation through the habitual gifts which he had conferred on him for persevering, and that it was through Adam alone that they did not have that effect for which, dependently nevertheless on his choice, they had been conferred on him. This solution, I say, does not stand;21 for it has already been shown above that our salvation is not to be reduced to grace itself alone as to a partial and even principal cause, but as to a total and adequate cause,22 because although our choice freely cooperates with God exciting and moving it, it is grace alone that effects that the choice itself cooperate. We confess therefore most willingly that it was through Adam alone that the grace conferred on him, by which he could persevere, did not have its effect; yet with this it is also necessary to confess that, if such an effect had in fact followed, with the free choice of the first parent cooperating, that effect would not have proceeded from the grace alone conferred on Adam and his free choice with God's general concurrence, but from a special help premoving his free choice to persevere, and granting him not only to be able to persevere but also to will.
IX. Finally it is proved by the reason of St. Thomas, 3. cont. Gent. c. 155. For everything that is of itself changeable, in order that it be fixed in good, needs the help of some unmoved mover; but man is changeable both from evil into good and from good into evil; in order therefore that he persevere immovably in good, which is to persevere, he needs divine help. But this reason also applies to man in the state of innocence; for his free choice was changeable from good into evil, since in fact it was changed: therefore.
It is confirmed by another reason of the same St. Thomas: for although man through his will and free choice is master of his act, he is nevertheless not master of his natural powers: and therefore, although he is free to will or not to will something, yet by willing he cannot bring it about that the will, in that which it wills, hold itself immovably toward that which it wills or chooses: but this is required for perseverance, namely that the will remain immovably in good. Perseverance, therefore, is not in the power of free choice: there is need, then, that the help of divine grace be present to man in order that he persevere. Which reason also applies to man in the state of integral nature. Let the other reasons in the same ch. 155 be consulted.
TO the first argument it is answered that that opinion is not only not St. Thomas's, nor common, but not even probable, which asserts that man in the state of innocence could, through his free choice with God's general concurrence alone, without any other special help, fulfill the whole law even as regards the substance of the act, or persevere to the end. For although he could by the capacity of nature, without special help, fulfill the whole natural law, yet he could not without a special help superadded fulfill the supernatural precepts, as is had 1. 2. q. 109. art. 4. in corp. But in order to persevere to the end it is necessary to observe not only the natural but also the supernatural precepts. Nor is it to be admitted that precepts of this kind can, as regards the substance of the act, be observed by the powers of nature alone, however integral and perfect, as is clear from what was said in Disputation 65. We add moreover that man in the state of innocence needed, for observing the natural precepts, the help of God moving, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. cited, q. 109. ar. 1. 2. 3. and 4. Hence, absolutely speaking, man in the state of integral nature could not, without a special help superadded to the infused habits, persevere to the end.
X. To the second, with its confirmation, it is answered similarly that, as was shown in Disputation 88, besides the infused habits, in order that one once justified may produce any pious operation, a special help of helping grace is necessary not only in fallen nature but also in integral nature; and that for the reasons assigned in the same disputation. Nor does Master Soto, in the place cited above, teach that anyone, when the habit of supernatural faith, hope or charity is present, can with God's general concurrence alone elicit one or another act of supernatural faith, hope or charity; but rather he teaches the opposite, from the opinion of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 109. ar. 9. Master Soto speaks only of a morally good work, which he thinks is in a just man meritorious of eternal life even if it be elicited without a special help of grace, just as it can be elicited by a man existing in mortal sin, as was shown in Disputation 50.
To the third it is answered that from all those passages of St. Augustine it is only gathered that there was given to the first parents in the state of innocence an aid of grace by which they could persevere, and would persevere if they willed; which we also willingly confess; nevertheless, according to the opinion of the same St. Augustine in the passages cited above, in order actually to persevere even in the state of innocence they needed a special help of preoperating grace, confirming free choice in good.