De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Introduction
Disputatio CIII: Whether the gift of perseverance is necessary to remain in grace until the end of life.
Disputatio CIV: Whether the gift of perseverance is really distinct from the gift of confirmation in grace.
Disputatio CV: Whether the gift of perseverance, in its character as such and in its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of our choice with it.
Whether the gift of perseverance, in the character of a gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of our choice with it.
I. This difficulty is almost the same as that which we treated above: namely, whether the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace depends on the free influx of our choice with that same help.
The first opinion, which certain of the more recent theologians follow, asserts that two things are necessary for the gift of perseverance: one on the part of God — namely, that he has determined to confer those helps with which he foresaw that an adult would persevere according to his freedom, although he could have not persevered according to the same freedom; the other on the part of the free choice of the adult, as a condition without which the will to confer such helps would not have had the character of a will to confer the gift of perseverance — namely, that the adult according to his freedom would so cooperate with them as to persevere: which has been placed within his own capacity. Whence on this opinion the efficacy of the gift of perseverance depends on the free cooperation of our choice, as on a condition without which it would not have the character of a gift of perseverance in relation to this man.
This opinion is proved. First from Augustine, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 6, where he says: Perseverance to the end, which no one has except he who has persevered to the end, many can have, no one can lose. For there is no need to fear that perhaps, when a man has persevered to the end, some evil will should arise in him, so that he should not persevere to the end. By which words he seems to teach that perseverance depends on the free choice of man.
The second argument is from the same Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 6, where he says: If we shall say that this perseverance, so praiseworthy and so happy, is so of man that it is not from God, we make void what the Lord said to Peter: I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail. Where it is signified that perseverance depends even on man, although not on him alone, but at the same time and principally on the help of grace. Finally, in the book On the Dogmas of the Church, ch. 21, it is said: That we may not slip in the gift of salvation once obtained is the concern of our solicitude and equally of divine assistance. The same is gathered from St. Prosper, book 2 On the Call of the Gentiles, ch. 26, where he says: Whether therefore we consider the beginnings, or the advances of the faithful, or the class of those who persevere to the end, no species of any virtue occurs which is had either without the gift of divine grace or without the consent of our will. By which words he confesses that perseverance to the end depends on the consent of our will.
Thirdly it is argued. With the help on God's part, with which one man does not persevere to the end of life, he can, if he wills, persevere; and similarly with the help with which he does persevere, he can, if he wills, not persevere: therefore to persevere or not to persevere is established in the power of our choice: therefore the gift of perseverance depends on it.
It is confirmed. The gift of perseverance is not efficacious according to its own nature, and as it comes from God himself, antecedently to the free cooperation of our free choice: therefore it is efficacious dependently on the free influx of that same choice. The antecedent is proved: for if it were efficacious antecedently to the consent of our choice, it would follow first that a man would persevere without the use of his own will, and so would persevere necessarily and not freely. Likewise it would follow secondly that the gift of perseverance would cause in us the very willing to persevere before the consent of our free choice. The sequel is proved: for if it is efficacious antecedently, then it effects something, but nothing other than the very willing to persevere: therefore it produces the very willing antecedently to the influx and consent of our choice: and so the choice would comport itself merely passively, receiving the very willing to persevere as produced by God alone.
Fourthly it is argued. An adult does not persevere in grace otherwise than by observing to the end of life all the commandments that bind under mortal sin: for perseverance is not interrupted except by mortal sin. But the observance of the commandments, since it is brought about through our free acts, depends on the influx of our free choice: therefore perseverance also depends on the influx of the same choice, and at the same time on the help of divine grace.
Fifthly it is proved: for, as is clear from the Council of Trent, decree on justification, canon 22, it is the man himself who perseveres: therefore perseverance depends on man.
Sixthly there is the argument which we touched upon at the close of disputation 91: for the efficacy of the gift of perseverance, although it does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice with it, nevertheless presupposes in that same choice a certain disposition, or negative non-resistance, by which it allows itself to be moved by God. For if free choice resists, and does not allow itself to be moved by God — which is placed within its capacity — the motion of God will not be efficacious, nor will it infallibly induce the effect which depends on the free cooperation of that same choice: therefore the efficacy of the gift of perseverance depends on the aforesaid negative disposition; and consequently the gift of perseverance will not be efficacious in itself.
This is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas, 3 Contra Gentiles, ch. 159, where he says that it is in the power of free choice to impede the reception of divine grace, or not to impede it. And from this he infers that the omission of a supernatural act which is commanded is imputed to man as a fault, even if he cannot fulfill that commandment without the help of grace: therefore St. Thomas admits a negative disposition, or non-resistance, of free choice, on which would depend the conferral of efficacious help, or the efficacy of that same help. The same negative disposition St. Thomas seems to establish in question 3 On Evil, art. 2, in the body, where for receiving the influx and motion of God he requires in a man some disposition according to which a good or an evil act is produced in him. But no positive disposition can be required beforehand, before the influx of God, since nothing positive can be done without God: therefore a negative disposition is required beforehand, or non-resistance, by which the choice gives place to God, so that he himself may do and lead free choice whither he wills.
Seventhly it is proved by all the arguments by which we strove above to prove that the efficacious help of prevenient grace depends on the free influx of our choice; for the same arguments proceed in the same way concerning the gift of perseverance.
II. The contrary opinion is held by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and the other doctors cited above, who teach that the efficacy of efficacious help does not depend — not even as on a condition without which it would not be — on the free cooperation of our choice: and since this opinion is most true and highly consonant with Catholic doctrine, for its explanation
The gift of perseverance is taken in two ways.— First it must be noted that the gift of perseverance can be taken in two ways. First, for the gift itself formally, or for the help of prevenient grace, through which God actively and properly effects that a man will to persevere and persevere to the end. Secondly, for the effect of the gift of perseverance itself, which in adults includes the free acts, namely the very willing to persevere and the other good moral acts by which he fulfills the divine commandments. The present controversy, therefore, does not proceed concerning the gift of perseverance as it is taken for its effect — for all Catholics confess that the free effects of the gift of perseverance proceed effectively from free choice moved by the help of grace, just as all supernatural free actions depend on free choice — but the difficulty proceeds only concerning the gift itself formally, insofar as it is efficacious perseverance, as it were in first act.
The gift of perseverance is called, and is, efficacious in two ways.— Secondly it must be noted that the gift of perseverance, like any other supernatural help, can be called efficacious in two ways: in one way, as it were in first act; in another way, in second act. It is called efficacious in first act insofar as, prior in the order of nature to the will's operating, it bestows on it most efficacious powers to will. But it is called efficacious in second act insofar as it effects actually, and in the very exercise, the free consent of the will together with the influx of that same will. Let this be laid down, then:
III. The efficacy of perseverance does not depend on the free cooperation of choice.— The first conclusion. The gift of perseverance, in the character of a gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, in no way depends effectively on the free cooperation of our choice; but on God alone, and on the efficacious and absolute decree of his will, who in his mercy bestows that gift on whom he wills. This conclusion is St. Augustine's and St. Thomas's, as will appear below, and all their disciples defend it with unanimous consent.
And it is proved: first from the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, ch. 13, where it is said thus: Likewise concerning the gift of perseverance, of which it is written, Matth. 10 and 24: He who has persevered to the end, he shall be saved: which indeed cannot be had from elsewhere than from him who can establish him who stands, that he stand perseveringly, and restore him who falls; let no one promise himself anything with absolute certainty. Behold, the Council teaches that the gift of perseverance cannot be had from elsewhere than from God: therefore it does not depend on our free choice; otherwise it could be had from elsewhere than from God alone. They answer this1 that the gift of perseverance is had from God alone because he alone produces in us effectively, without our freely consenting, the supernatural help with which he foreknows that a man will persevere according to his freedom: but because a man with that help can persevere and not persevere, as often as God foreknows by that middle knowledge that a man will persevere, such help obtains the character of a gift of perseverance. But if God foreknows by the same knowledge that a man, according to the freedom innate to him, will not persevere with that help, such help will not have the character of a gift of perseverance, but will retain the common character of a supernatural help sufficient for persevering. Whence, in the character of a gift of perseverance, it depends, as on a condition without which it would not be, on the future consent of the choice foreknown by God. But against this answer there is the argument:2 for the Council speaks absolutely and formally of the gift of perseverance: therefore, although the acts produced by free choice moved by God through the gift of perseverance depend on that choice, nevertheless the efficacy of the help in the character of a gift of perseverance in no way depends actively, or as on a condition without which it would not be, on the free cooperation of our choice.
Moreover: for the Massilians, against whom St. Augustine wrote the book On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance, explained the gift of perseverance in this way: for they said that God bestowed on man the supernatural help of prevenient grace, without which he could not persevere by free choice; but yet with that help a man persevered actually, if he willed; but if he did not will, he did not persevere. They affirmed, moreover, that that gift could be lost by the will of man; nor did they admit any gift of prevenient grace through which God would actively and properly effect that a man become willing from unwilling, and persevere to the end, as St. Augustine taught; and they were scandalized by his doctrine. This is clear from the words of St. Hilary in his letter to Augustine, where, speaking of the Semi-Pelagians, he says thus: Then they take it ill that grace is so divided — that which was given to the first man then, or is given to men now — that he received perseverance, not that by which it would be brought about that he persevered, but that without which he could not persevere by free choice: but now to the saints predestined to the kingdom through grace there is not given such an assistance of perseverance, but such that perseverance itself is given to them, not only that they cannot be persevering without this gift, but also that through this gift they are not otherwise than persevering. By these words of your holiness they are so moved that they say a kind of desperation is displayed to men. And a little below he adds: Whatever has been given to the predestined, they contend that it can both be lost and be retained by their own will. Which would then be false, if they thought it true that certain persons have received perseverance in such a way that they cannot be otherwise than persevering. Whence St. Augustine, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chs. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9, shows that the gift of perseverance cannot be lost by the contumacious will of man, but that through that gift he perseveres infallibly.
IV. It is proved secondly by the express authority of the same St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 8, where, explaining that word of Luke 22, I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail, etc., he says:3 Will you dare to say that, even with Christ praying that the faith of Peter might not fail, it would have failed if Peter had willed it to fail, that is, if he had willed not to persevere in it to the end? As though Peter4 would in any way will something other than what Christ had asked for him — namely, that he will? For who does not know that the faith of Peter would then have perished, if that will which was faithful had itself failed: and that it would have remained, if the same will had remained? But because the will is prepared by the Lord, therefore the prayer for him could not be in vain. When therefore he prayed that his faith might not fail, what else did he ask than that he might have in faith a most free, most strong, most invincible and most persevering will? And in ch. 12 he says: To the first man, therefore, who in that good in which he had been made upright had received the ability not to sin, the ability not to die, the ability not to desert that good itself, there was given an assistance of perseverance, not that by which it would be brought about that he persevered, but that without which he could not persevere by free choice. But now to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God through the grace of God there is given not only such an assistance of perseverance, but such that perseverance itself is given to them, not only that they cannot be persevering without this gift, but also that through this gift they are not otherwise than persevering. For he said not only: Without me you can do nothing:5 but he also said: You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and I have appointed you, that you should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain. By which words he showed that he had given them not only justice, but also perseverance in it. For since Christ so appoints them that they go and bring forth fruit, and that their fruit remain, who would dare to say, perhaps they will not remain? And a little below, explaining that word to the Romans 14, For God is able to establish him, he says: He therefore gives perseverance, who is able to establish those who stand, that they may stand most perseveringly, or to restore those who have fallen: for the Lord lifts up the broken. Behold, he teaches not obscurely that the gift of perseverance is from God alone, who is able to establish the predestined. For although the pious or meritorious operations, which are the effects of the gift of perseverance, are not brought about in adults without the free cooperation of created choice with grace, and consequently depend efficiently on free choice moved by God, nevertheless the gift of perseverance itself, by which God makes his elect persevere to the end, and the efficacy of that same gift, in no way depends on the free cooperation of that same choice, as has been said concerning the efficacy of the other helps of grace. Whence the same Augustine, at the close of the same ch. 12, adds: And therefore God did not will that his saints glory, even concerning perseverance in good itself, in their own powers, but in himself. Because there is given them not only such an assistance as he gave to the first man, without which they could not persevere, if they willed, but he also works in them even the willing. And after a few words: The infirmity of human will has therefore been succored, so that it is acted upon by divine grace indeclinably6 and inseparably, and therefore, although infirm, it does not fail, nor is it overcome by any adversity.
Finally, in letter 107 to Vitalis, at the beginning, he attacks those who say that God works7 in us that we may will, as far as in him lies; but if we do not will, we make the operation of God to avail nothing in us: therefore, in St. Augustine's mind, the efficacy of the gift of perseverance does not depend on the free influx of our choice; otherwise a man could effect, and would often effect, that that gift should not obtain its effect in us, nor lead a man to eternal life. The same doctrine St. Thomas teaches, 1-2, q. 109, a. 10, where he distinguishes the gift by which someone perseveres from that by which he can persevere.
Thirdly it is proved by reason. The actual influx of free choice, by which a man wills to persevere and perseveres to the end, is an effect of the gift of perseverance and of its efficacy, although it is not brought about in us without us freely concurring: therefore the efficacy of the gift of perseverance does not depend on that same influx of our choice. The consequence is clear: for the efficacy of an efficient cause does not depend on its effect — as the efficacy of fire, which it has for heating, does not depend on the heating, but on the contrary; and so8
V. The efficacy of perseverance precedes the cooperation of choice in the order of nature.— Fourthly it is proved. The efficacy of the gift of perseverance precedes, in the order of reason and of causality, the free influx of our free choice: for the efficacious gift of perseverance belongs to prevenient grace: therefore it does not depend on that same influx. The consequence is clear: for if it did depend on it, then efficacious grace would be subsequent to our choice and its attendant; and consequently the efficacious grace of the gift of perseverance would be joined to human humility and obedience, and would not subject the human will to itself: which nevertheless seems to conflict with the doctrine of the Council of Orange cited above.
Fifthly it is proved: for if the gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of choice, it follows that the perseverance which is given to the predestined through Christ only grants them to persevere if they will, but does not effect in them that they actually persevere and will; but that the persevering itself is left in their choice; and that if they do not persevere, this proceeds from their own fault. The consequent is false: for otherwise the gift of perseverance which is given to the predestined through Christ would be neither another, nor a greater or stronger gift, than the perseverance conferred on Adam in the state of innocence: because perseverance was given even to Adam, by which he would persevere if he willed: but the actual perseverance, or the very willing to persevere, was left in his choice, and by his own fault he did not persevere. This is proved from St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 11, where he says: For such was the assistance, that he would desert it when he willed, and remain in it if he willed, not that by which it would be brought about that he willed. This is the first grace, which was given to the first Adam, but mightier than this is that in the second Adam. For the first is that by which it is brought about that a man has justice, if he wills: the second therefore can do more, by which it is also brought about that he wills; and wills so much, and loves with such ardor, that while the will of the flesh lusts contrarily, he conquers by the will of the spirit. Nor was that indeed a small grace, by which the power of free choice was also shown: since he was so aided that without this assistance he would not remain in good; but he could desert this assistance, if he willed. But this grace is so much greater, that it is a small thing for a man through it to repair lost freedom: a small thing, finally, not to be able without it either to apprehend the good, or to remain in the good if he wills, unless it be also wrought in him that he wills. At that time, therefore, God had given man a good will: for he had made him in that will, who had made him upright. He had also given the assistance without which he could not remain in it, if he willed: but that he should will, he left in his free choice. He could therefore remain, if he willed, because there was not lacking the assistance through which he could, and without which he could not perseveringly hold the good which he willed. But because he willed not to remain, it is assuredly his fault; and it would have been his merit, if he had willed to remain. From these an argument is drawn. All the things that belong to the perseverance which is given to us through Christ would also belong to the perseverance conferred on Adam in the state of innocence, if it be once admitted that the efficacy of the gift of perseverance which is given through Christ depends on the cooperation of created choice. This is shown thus: for if God, or the efficacy of the gift of perseverance, does not truly and efficiently effect that those to whom it is granted will to persevere, but only makes them persevere if they themselves will, and if the fact that they do not persevere proceeds from their fault, while the fact that they do persevere with that same help proceeds from their innate freedom, and therefore it would have been their merit if they had remained — then certainly the gift of perseverance of the second Adam would have no greater efficacy, nor would it be a more powerful or stronger help than the gift of the first Adam: since the perseverance conferred on the first parent in the state of innocence also granted him to persevere if he willed, and by his own fault he did not persevere; and finally it would have been his merit if he had persevered, as is clear from the words of Augustine cited. Therefore it must be said that the efficacy of the gift of perseverance does not depend on the free cooperation of choice, but precedes it, and truly and efficiently effects that free choice will to persevere and actually persevere to the end.
The second conclusion. If the efficacy of the gift of perseverance be taken in second act, for the actual efficiency by which it effects pious operations in us and with us, by which the just man perseveres to the end, such efficacy is not without the free cooperation of choice: yet it does not depend on it. Each part of this conclusion is proved by the same reasons by which it was shown in disputation 90, conclusions 2 and 3, that, although the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace, taken for actual efficiency, is not without the free cooperation of choice, it nevertheless in no way depends on it: for the same reasoning holds a fortiori concerning the gift of perseverance and concerning any other efficacious help, since the gift of perseverance itself is the chief among all efficacious helps.
VI. The gift of perseverance does not take away from man the power of not persevering, if he wills.— The third conclusion. The gift of perseverance does not take away from man the power by which he can not persevere, if he wills, but effects that, when he can not persevere, he nevertheless perseveres infallibly. Whence these two are at the same time compossible: Peter has the gift of perseverance, and Peter can not persevere, if he wills. But these two are at the same time incompossible: Peter has the gift of perseverance, and Peter does not persevere. This conclusion is St. Prosper's, book 2 On the Call of the Gentiles, ch. 28, where he says: What God willed them to will, they willed, who to obey him so gives the willing itself that he does not take away even from those who will persevere that mutability by which one can will not. The same St. Thomas teaches in the places cited in disp. 18, n. 23, of which we shall speak again in disp. 115, n. 4, and disp. 122, n. 19.
Moreover it is proved by reason: for the gift of perseverance effects that a man freely wills to persevere: therefore it leaves in him the free faculty by which he can not persevere, if he wills. It is confirmed: for the gift of perseverance is given for this, that when a man can by free choice fall away from the ultimate end, he may not fall away, according to that word: He who could have transgressed, and has not transgressed; to do evil, and has not done it:9 therefore the gift of perseverance does not take away from man the power by which he can not persevere, if he wills.
This reasoning can be confirmed from the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, canon 4, where it is defined under anathema that the free choice of man, moved and aroused by God, cooperates in something by assenting to God arousing and calling, and can dissent, if it wills: therefore the efficacious help of the gift of perseverance, although it effects — as Augustine speaks — that a man perseveres insuperably, indeclinably and most invincibly, nevertheless does not take away from him the true faculty by which through free choice he can dissent, and not persevere, if he wills.
To the first argument it is answered that St. Augustine, in those words cited from ch. 6 of On the Gift of Perseverance, shows a posteriori that the gift of perseverance is unlosable. Whence from that passage it is concluded only that the free effect of the gift of perseverance itself depends on our choice moved by God: but not that the help itself, formally speaking, in the character of a gift of perseverance, depends on the free influx of our free choice. And by this answer is made to the other two passages of St. Augustine.
To the second argument, from the authority of St. Prosper, answer is made by what has been said to the passages of St. Augustine.
He who has the gift of perseverance cannot, in the composite sense, not persevere.— To the third it is answered that with the help by which a man perseveres to the end he can absolutely not persevere, if he wills, because, as has been said, that help does not take away the power of not persevering, but the act: for it effects that a man perseveres infallibly and freely. Whence in the composite sense it is impossible that one having the gift of perseverance should not persevere, since it cannot come about that these two be true at the same time — namely that the gift of perseverance be in a man, and that the man not persevere — as has been said concerning efficacious help in disp. 92 and the two that follow.
To the confirmation the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is answered from what has been said, that if perseverance be taken formally for the help itself, insofar as it is efficacious, as it were in first act, or insofar as it bestows most efficacious powers on the will, such help is in the predestined antecedently to their free consent, not indeed by priority of time, but of causality: and under this aspect it efficaciously predetermines free choice to persevere. But if it be taken for the free effect which it produces in us and with us, it is true that such effect depends effectively on our free choice moved by God with efficacious help. And by this answer is made to the other proof of the same antecedent; and similarly it must be said to the fourth and fifth.
To the sixth argument, certain doctors, even among those who think with us that God by efficacious help physically premoves and predetermines free choice to individual pious acts, admit that negative disposition, or non-resistance,10 which on the part of free choice is presupposed, in the genus of material cause, for the reception of efficacious help. And they add that, as often as a man is sufficiently aroused to believe, if he allows himself to be led, he will be infallibly determined by God to will to believe; and unless the will thus begins dispositively, it will never be determined by God. They are constrained to assert this, both by the authority of St. Thomas in q. 2 On Evil, adduced in the argument, and also because they think it necessary that the efficacious help which physically predetermines be in the free power of the man aroused by God, so that both the supernatural act and its omission may be voluntary to him.
This way of speaking, however, has never pleased me, nor does it seem to agree with what has been said above from the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas concerning efficacious help: and the aforesaid opinion can be impugned. First: for the efficacious help of prevenient grace does not depend on the free cooperation of choice, nor on a positive disposition of it, as was shown above: therefore neither on a negative disposition, or non-resistance. The consequence is proved: for the same inconveniences follow from a negative disposition of free choice preceding grace in some genus of cause, as follow from a positive disposition preceding it. For in the end it would ultimately have to be reduced to that negative disposition, that one man has efficacious grace, perseveres in grace, and is saved, and another not; namely because one of himself begins through that negative disposition, or non-resistance, which efficacious predetermining grace follows; and the other does not. And so, to those asking why this man has efficacious grace and the gift of perseverance, and another not, it could be answered that one of himself had that negative disposition, or non-resistance, and the other not; and thus would fall that sentence of St. Augustine so often repeated: why he draws this man and does not draw that one, be unwilling to judge, if you are unwilling to err. Likewise all the arguments made in disputations 56 and 58 militate against the same opinion, namely those made to prove that there is no law established by God concerning the infallible conferral of the helps of grace on those who do what in them lies from the sole faculty of nature. For it is also inconvenient, and perhaps more so, to assert that the gifts and helps of grace have an infallible order and connection with that negative disposition of free choice, than if it be said that they have an infallible connection with some positive act of the same choice: for then efficacious grace would be owed to nature, and consequently grace would not be grace. Nor is it enough to answer11 that that negative disposition does not proceed from the sole powers of nature, but on the supposition of the help of prevenient exciting grace: for against this stands12 that exciting grace does not of itself efficaciously bring it about that the man aroused does not resist that same grace, otherwise no one prevented by exciting grace would resist it. Therefore that this man does not resist exciting grace, but comports himself merely negatively, suspending every act, is referred to his natural freedom: therefore if on account of this disposition efficacious help is infallibly given to him, it seems to follow that the same efficacious help is owed to nature, when it disposes itself by that negative disposition. Secondly the same doctrine is impugned, because that non-resistance of free choice is either altogether natural, and preceding every act of the will, or it is free at least indirectly. If it is merely natural, and a pure negation, it contributes nothing to a man's having efficacious grace, or to its being said that efficacious grace is in the power of free choice; for a disposition merely natural, even a negative one, is not in the power of choice; otherwise it would not be merely natural, but voluntary. But by reason of a disposition which is not in the power of choice, efficacious help cannot be in the power of that same choice. But if it be said that that negative disposition is not merely natural, but free at least indirectly, it follows that that disposition of choice which is presupposed for efficacious grace is not only negative, but positive at least by reason of the act in which it is voluntary. Thirdly the same is proved, because that free choice does not resist but allows itself to be moved by God is an effect of efficacious grace: for efficacious grace overcomes and takes away all the resistance of choice, softens the heart13, and first of all takes away its hardness. For Augustine says:14 This grace, therefore, which is secretly bestowed on human hearts by divine bounty, by no hard heart* is spurned.15 For it is therefore bestowed, that the hardness of the heart be first taken away. Therefore such non-resistance of choice is not a disposition required beforehand for efficacious grace, and consequently the efficacy of the gift of perseverance does not depend on the same16 disposition. This is confirmed: for free choice does not resist efficacious grace for the reason that it consents and cooperates with it, but to cooperate with efficacious grace is an effect of that same grace, as was shown in disputation 86: therefore that free choice does not resist, but allows itself to be moved by God, is an effect of efficacious motion: therefore it is not presupposed for the efficacious motion itself. Fourthly the same is proved: for if efficacious grace depended on that negative disposition, or non-resistance of choice, it would follow that before the absolute decree of giving a man efficacious grace, by which he is actually converted and saved, there would be presupposed in God middle knowledge, by which he would certainly know that that negative non-resistance would be future on the hypothesis that the will were moved by such an excitation; and thus middle knowledge would have to be established in God, the contrary of which was shown in disp. 7. Likewise it would also follow that efficacious grace would be joined to that disposition, or human non-resistance, and would be its attendant; which nevertheless cannot be admitted, as is clear from what has been said above.
To the argument, therefore, it is answered that efficacious grace itself brings it about that, although free choice of itself can resist the divine call, it nevertheless does not resist, but freely and infallibly consents, and perseveres to the end. Nor is it necessary that efficacious help be in our power in order that the act which we produce by the power of that same help be free to us.
To the confirmation from the authority of St. Thomas, 3 Contra Gentiles, it is answered that it is indeed in the power of free choice, from the faculty of nature, to impede the reception of grace by dissenting from the divine call: but nevertheless, as the same St. Thomas explains in ch. 160 of the same book 3 Contra Gentiles: What has been said, that it is in the power of free choice not to offer an impediment to grace, applies to those in whom the natural power has been entire. But if through a preceding disorder it has declined to evil, it will not be altogether in its power to offer no impediment to grace. From which words it is had that free choice in fallen nature can indeed, for some short time, from its own powers, not add a new impediment to grace, because it can elicit some good moral work by which it avoids a new sin; but nevertheless the help of grace, especially of efficacious grace, does not have an infallible connection with that good work of nature, and much less can it have one with the negation of the work, or of the contrary vice. Whence as often as non-resistance is infallibly conjoined with efficacious help, it is necessary that that same non-resistance proceed from the efficacious help, from which it comes about that free choice consents, and consequently that it does not dissent, but allows itself to be moved by God. To the other passage of St. Thomas, from question 3 On Evil, art. 2, it is answered that St. Thomas in no way favors the contrary opinion there. For his words are these: When something is in due disposition for receiving the motion of the first mover, a perfect action follows according to the intention of the first mover. But if it is not in due disposition and aptitude for receiving the motion of the first mover, an imperfect action follows. And then whatever of action is there is reduced to the first mover as to its cause; but whatever of defect is there is not reduced to the first mover as to its cause, because such defect follows in the action from this, that the agent falls short of the order of the first mover. But by these words St. Thomas does not wish to teach that on the part of nature a disposition, or negative non-resistance, is presupposed before the motion of the first mover, so that he may move the will efficaciously to supernatural acts; and much less can it be gathered from the same words that efficacious help, predetermining free choice to a pious operation, has an infallible connection with that same negative disposition. The sense of St. Thomas, therefore, is that prior, in a sign of reason, to the will's eliciting a good or an evil act, some disposition is understood in it, by reason of which the operation it produces is good or evil; but nevertheless that same disposition, when the free act is good, is caused by the motion of the first mover; because God, since he is an agent of infinite power, does not await or presuppose in the subject a disposition which he himself does not cause. But if the act be evil, it is understood first that God moves the will to the act of sin insofar as it is an act, as is gathered from the premises in disputation 24. Then is understood the disposition of the will, by which it freely wills the act to which malice is annexed, as it proceeds from that same will failing from the rule of reason: and consequently the produced act has from that same failing will that it is a sin. Whence whatever deformity there is in that act must be reduced to the failing will, and not to God. And this is the legitimate sense of St. Thomas in the passage cited.
To the seventh argument, made at the beginning, answer is made by what has been said in disputation 90. For already there, and in several other disputations, it has been shown that the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace does not depend on the free cooperation of our choice with it, but has it from God alone, although the free operation to which it moves depends efficiently on that same choice aroused and moved by God: which St. Augustine also teaches in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 3, where, setting out the complaint of the man who did not receive such help, he says: How, he says, is it not imputed to my fault that I did not receive from him, from whom unless it be given there is altogether no other source whence such and so great a gift may be had? By which words St. Augustine supposes that efficacious help, and a fortiori the gift of perseverance, depends on no other than God.