De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Book Ten

Introduction

Disputatio CIII: Whether the gift of perseverance is necessary to remain in grace until the end of life.

Disputatio CIV: Whether the gift of perseverance is really distinct from the gift of confirmation in grace.

Whether the gift of perseverance is distinguished really from the gift of confirmation in grace.

I. The first opinion affirms that these gifts are not distinguished. Others say that, although they are distinguished accidentally by the greater or lesser intensity of the same help, they are nevertheless not distinguished really: but the same gift of perseverance, insofar as it more perfects a man in the spiritual life, is called the gift of confirmation in grace. Certain more recent theologians seem to favor this opinion, who assert that confirmation in grace adds something beyond the common gift of perseverance. While explaining this, they say that the gift of perseverance is of itself conferred through ordinary helps and gifts of grace, with God alone furnishing and providing this, that they be given at congruous times and in that number, or multitude of helps, which suffice for such an effect: but that confirmation in grace adds proper and peculiar gifts and helps, by which God precedes a man in individual acts, and especially in the occasions of sin, and moves his will morally most efficaciously, not only according to foreknowledge, but also according to the power of the helps: which, although they do not determine the will, so that it even physically cannot resist, nevertheless morally most efficaciously induce it. Which efficacy, together with the other congruity from foreknowledge, provides confirmation.

This opinion is proved first by the last argument made in the preceding disputation, with its confirmation.

Secondly it is argued. The gift of perseverance makes a man impeccable. But the gift of confirmation in grace effects this very thing, as St. Thomas teaches in question 24 On Truth, articles 8 and 9: therefore these gifts have the same effect: therefore they are not distinguished.

It is confirmed: for just as the gift of confirmation in grace cannot be interrupted by mortal sin, although it admits venial sin along with itself, so too the gift of perseverance is compatible with venial sin, but is never interrupted by mortal sin, as Augustine says in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 6. And its reason is: for a man, by the very fact that he sins mortally, desists from the good begun, and does not persevere: therefore it implies a contradiction that the gift of perseverance be interrupted by mortal sin, or admit it along with itself: therefore the gift of perseverance and of confirmation in grace are not distinguished.

Thirdly. Because no essential difference can be assigned by which these gifts are really distinguished: therefore they are not distinguished among themselves.

The second opinion is that of others, who admit a real distinction between the gift of perseverance and confirmation in grace: they say, however, that the difference consists in this, that in those confirmed in grace there does not remain freedom in the fulfillment of the precepts, but they fulfill them necessarily; which freedom nevertheless remains in those having the gift of perseverance: so think some more recent theologians. From which they infer that those confirmed in that grace in which they were confirmed necessarily persevere, and to that extent are saved not freely but necessarily. And they add that it will not be necessary to defend that predestined persons of this sort, or those confirmed in grace, obtain salvation freely. The strongest reason of this opinion is: for those confirmed in grace are preceded by divine help, by which they are predetermined to the good: therefore they necessarily perform it: therefore they are not saved freely. The consequence is clear: for it is impossible that something be done necessarily and freely. But this opinion is altogether to be rejected, as will be said below.

The third opinion is that of St. Thomas, and the common one of his disciples; for whose explanation let this be laid down:

II. In what way the gift of perseverance is distinguished from confirmation in grace.— The first conclusion. The gift of perseverance and the gift of confirmation in grace are not the same. The conclusion is St. Thomas's, 1 p. q. 100, a. 2, ad 1, where he teaches that if Adam had not sinned, he would not generate sons of hell from himself; namely, in such a way that they would contract sin from him, which is the cause of hell; they could nevertheless become sons of hell through free choice, by sinning, or if they were not made sons of hell through sin, this would not be because they were confirmed in justice, but because of divine providence, by which they were preserved immune from sin. He holds, therefore, that the gift of confirmation and the gift of perseverance are not the same.

Moreover: for otherwise the gift of confirmation in grace would be granted to all the predestined, and to that extent it would not be a singular privilege of certain saints. The sequel is proved: for the gift of perseverance is granted to all the predestined: therefore if the gift of perseverance and confirmation in grace are not distinguished, confirmation itself in grace will be common to all the predestined.

A man purely considered, while he is on the way, is always simply capable of sinning.— But in order that we may explain wherein these two gifts are distinguished, it must be noted from St. Thomas, q. 24 On Truth, a. 9, in the body of the article, that someone can be confirmed in good and made impeccable in two ways. First, totally from within, and simply; namely, in such a way that he has within himself the intrinsic principle of his confirmation, so that he cannot sin, and thus all the blessed are impeccable. Secondly, one can be made impeccable in a certain respect; and not totally from within, but partly from within and partly from without; which happens when some gift of grace is given to someone, by which he is inclined to the good, so that he cannot easily be deflected from it; yet he is not thereby so withdrawn from evil that he absolutely cannot sin, unless he be protected and guarded by divine providence.

Secondly it must be noted, with the same St. Thomas, that in the same way in which some power is impeccable, it ought to be unchangeable from good into evil. For sin then occurs, when a rational power is changed from good into evil. But unchangeability simply, and proceeding totally from within, cannot be found except in the blessed: and the reason for this is the one St. Thomas assigns in the same chapter. For from this the will is rendered unchangeable, because its capacity is totally filled, just as heaven is substantially unchangeable and incorruptible, because the whole capacity of the matter of heaven is filled by its form: but the whole capacity of the rational soul is not filled, except in the fatherland, where it will possess the highest good, and will have it present: therefore the will of man is only in the fatherland totally unchangeable from within, from good into evil: let this be laid down, then:

The second conclusion. Both those confirmed in grace, while they are on the way, and those having the gift of perseverance, are simply capable of sinning. Here we do not speak of Christ the Lord, who was simply and from within impeccable by reason of the suppositum. This conclusion is Ferrara's, 4 cont. Gent. c. 70, Med. 3 p. q. 27, a. 4, conc. 3, where he teaches concerning all the confirmed, that, while they were on the way, they were simply capable of sinning; although in a certain respect they were impeccable. It is proved: for this seems to be the express opinion of St. Thomas, q. 24 On Truth cited, where he says that only the blessed are simply confirmed in good, and 4 cont. Gent. c. 70, rat. 2, he says that the unchangeability of the will cannot belong to a man, except insofar as he attains the ultimate end, which he proves there by most efficacious reasons. And 1 p. q. 100, a. 2, in the body, speaking of confirmation in good simply, he says that from this the rational creature is confirmed in justice, that it is made blessed through the open vision of God, to which, once seen, it cannot fail to adhere, since it is the very essence of goodness, from which it cannot be turned away.

Moreover it is proved by a reason drawn from the foundations laid down. In order that a rational creature be simply impeccable, it must be simply unchangeable from good into evil: but it is not simply unchangeable, except through the beatific vision: therefore. The minor is proved, because only through the beatific vision is the whole capacity of the rational creature filled: therefore only through the beatific vision does it become simply unchangeable from good into evil. From which it follows that both those confirmed in grace and those having the gift of perseverance are only impeccable in a certain respect, and on a supposition, as long as they are on the way.

III. Those confirmed in grace are impeccable in a certain respect.— The third conclusion. The impeccability in a certain respect which is found in those confirmed in grace, comes partly from within, from the perfection of habitual grace and of the virtues; partly from without, namely from God's custody, protection and direction: just as Adam in the state of innocence was immortal partly from within, by reason of the vigor of nature; partly from without, namely on account of the tree of life, from which he fed; and on account of divine custody and providence, to which it belonged to remove everything bodily harmful. This conclusion, as to the first part, is against Durandus, who asserts that the impeccability which is found in those confirmed in grace comes only from without, namely from the direction of the Holy Spirit, removing all the occasions of sin. As to the second part, however, it is against other doctors, who assert that those confirmed in grace are impeccable totally from within, on account of the fullness of grace and of the virtues. But our conclusion, as to both parts, is St. Thomas's and Ferrara's, in the place cited above. And indeed, that that impeccability comes partly from within is proved from St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 27, a. 5, ad 2, where, speaking of the grace by which the most blessed Virgin was confirmed in good, he teaches that she had a certain intrinsic perfection: for he says that in the conception of the Son of God her grace was consummated, confirming her in good. By which words he shows that the grace confirming the Blessed Virgin in good was in itself perfect.

Moreover it is proved. The soul is confirmed in good, insofar as it is so perfectly inclined to it that it cannot easily be turned away from it: in that, through the perfection of grace, the defects inclining to sin are taken away, as St. Thomas teaches in question 24 On Truth cited: but that inclination belongs to the intrinsic perfection of grace itself and of the virtues: therefore the impeccability which is found in those confirmed in grace comes in some way from the intrinsic perfection of grace itself.

IIII. Wherein consists the grace confirming in good.— If anyone inquires wherein consists this greater perfection of the grace confirming in good, it is answered that it does not consist in a greater intensity of the same habitual grace. For grace not confirming in good is sometimes more intense than grace confirming in good, which is clear from this: for many are on the way, not confirmed in grace, who have grace and charity more intense than some who are in the fatherland. It must be said therefore that this perfection is considered according to a certain participation of the grace and charity of the fatherland, which in its mode is of another kind than non-confirming grace or charity, as St. Thomas says, 2 2 q. 24, a. 7, ad 3.

But the second part of the conclusion is proved: for to make a man impeccable totally from within is proper to the charity of the fatherland, as has been said: therefore the gift of confirmation in grace does not make a man impeccable totally from within, but partly from within and partly from without. It is proved moreover: for the grace existing in confirmed wayfarers does not take away from them every origin of sin, because it does not take away all ignorance and inconsideration, from which sin can arise; nor does it bring it about that the intellect and the will are always in second act with respect to the contemplation and love of God, and likewise it does not take away the tinder of sin, or every disorder of the sensitive appetite, from which sin can also arise: therefore it requires a special protection of God in order to make a man impeccable.

Those confirmed in grace are saved freely.— The fourth conclusion. It is by no means to be admitted that those confirmed in grace are not saved freely, but necessarily. It is proved: since, if they were saved necessarily, and not freely, it would follow that they would necessarily, and not freely, fulfill the precepts, and consequently would merit nothing in fulfilling them: which is by no means to be conceded: for otherwise the Blessed Virgin, who in everyone's opinion was confirmed in grace, and Christ the Lord, who by the nature of the divine suppositum was impeccable, would not have merited through acts of virtue, as through passion and death; but the consequent cannot be admitted: therefore.

Moreover: for those confirmed in grace are necessitated to good only by a conditioned necessity and on a supposition, not however by an absolute one: but a conditioned and suppositional necessity, since it is a necessity in a certain respect, does not destroy freedom, as was shown in disp. 25: therefore.

From these it follows that the difference between the gift of perseverance and confirmation in grace consists in this, that the gift of perseverance constitutes no intrinsic perfection in habitual grace itself; which intrinsic perfection, however, confirmation in grace confers on it, as has been said.

V. By these things an answer is given to the first argument from the facts at the beginning, which was the third of the preceding controversy. For we say that the gift of confirmation in grace is indeed not simply necessary for obtaining eternal life: yet from this it does not follow that the gift of perseverance is not simply necessary. And to the attack it is answered that the gift of perseverance and the gift of confirmation in grace, although they agree in some things, yet not in all, as is clear from what has been said: whence they are not simply the same help.

Confirmation in grace includes the gift of perseverance, and not conversely.— To the confirmation it is answered that the gift of confirmation in grace includes the gift of perseverance, and not conversely. For everyone confirmed in grace perseveres to the end: but not everyone who perseveres to the end is confirmed in grace. Whence from the fact that confirmation in grace is not simply necessary for obtaining eternal life, it does not follow that the gift of perseverance is not necessary for that. Secondly it is answered to the same confirmation, that in that division of actual supernatural help assigned above, by which it is divided into those three members, only those helps are comprehended which place no intrinsic perfection in habitual grace itself by way of something permanent, but only the helps by which God, by way of something transient, actually moves a man to perform supernatural works well. Whence it is not necessary that confirmation in grace belong to any of those three helps, because, as has been said, it places some intrinsic perfection in habitual grace.

To the second, with its confirmation, and to the third, the answer is clear from what has been said: for we say that, although the gift of perseverance and of confirmation agree in this, that neither is interrupted by mortal sin, they are nevertheless distinguished from another root, as has been said.

To the fourth argument for the second opinion it is answered that that determination does not take away freedom, but perfects it, because it is not a determination to one thing from necessity, but according to the mode of freedom, namely because it so determines to good that it at the same time leaves in the will the capacity by which it can perform the opposite, if it wills, or not perform it, as was shown in disputation 18 and 22: concerning which also it will have to be treated below, when disputing about the reason for the concord of the freedom of our free choice with the efficacy of the divine helps of grace.

Disputatio CV: Whether the gift of perseverance, in its character as such and in its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of our choice with it.

Disputatio CVI: Whether, in the state of innocence, our first parents needed a special gift of perseverance to persevere in grace until the end of life.

Disputatio CVII: Whether the gift of perseverance is common to all the faithful, or is a gift proper to the predestined.

Disputatio CVIII: Whether, when all the helps of prevenient grace are entirely equal in two persons, it is possible, and sometimes happens, that one is converted, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other remains in sin and is damned.

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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