De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Whether this causal proposition is true: Because man, once roused by God, does not will to use sufficient grace; therefore he is not helped by God, nor is he converted.

I. The first reason for doubting can be taken from what was said above: for man cannot rightly use sufficient grace unless he is helped by God; and indeed the good use of sufficient grace, even as it flows from free choice, is an effect of helping grace, as was shown in disputation 36. Therefore man is helped by God before he uses exciting grace or sufficient help well; therefore this causal proposition will be a false proposition: Man is not helped by God, nor is he converted, because he does not will to use sufficient help well.

Secondly. Free choice, even when moved and roused by God, cannot do anything by which it may obtain helping or efficacious grace; otherwise, to one doing what lies in him with sufficient and exciting help, the help of helping, that is, efficacious, grace would be given infallibly and by a fixed law; which is contrary to what was said above in disputation 58. Therefore the reason why he is not helped by God, or does not act piously, cannot be assigned on the part of free choice, namely because he does not will to use exciting or sufficient grace well. The consequence is proved: for that which is not in man's power ought not to be attributed to him, especially as to a moral cause.

Thirdly. God, by his mere will, before our foreseen merits or demerits, gives the help of helping grace to whom he wills; and to whom he does not will, he does not give it, as is clear from that passage: I give thanks to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and have revealed them to little ones: yes, Father, for so it was pleasing in your sight. Otherwise a cause of predestination or reprobation would be given on our part, which is contrary to what was said above: therefore the first reason, absolutely speaking, why this man or that man is not helped by God is to be taken from the side of the divine will, and not from the side of free choice that does not will to use exciting or sufficient grace well.

It is confirmed. The reason why the remedy is not applied to little children who die with original sin alone is that God does not will it, as is clear in those who die before they are born from the womb: for Augustine says: When it is said that all men would have received it, namely grace, if those to whom it is not given had not by their own will refused it, since God wills all men to be saved, although it is not given to many little children, and without it very many die who have no contrary will: and sometimes, with parents desiring it and hastening, the ministers also willing and prepared, God not willing, it is not given; when suddenly, before it is given, he expires, for whom they were running that he might receive it. Hence it is manifest that those who resist this truth so perspicuous do not at all understand in what manner of speaking it was said that God wills all men to be saved; since so many are not saved, not because they themselves do not will, but because God does not will, which is manifested without any darkness: in little children. And in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 12: What shall I say, that a little child sometimes expires before help can be brought to him through the ministry of the baptizer? For very often, with parents hastening and ministers prepared, that baptism be given to the little child, yet God not willing, it is not given, who did not keep that little child in this life so that it might be given. Prosper confirms the same doctrine in bk. 1 of On the Calling of the Gentiles, ch. 13 and 14. Therefore the ultimate reason why some men are not helped by God, nor converted, is not that they themselves do not will, but that God does not will.

II. Fourthly, the argument is taken from the same Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 6, saying: Many hear the word of truth: but some believe, others contradict. These, then, will to believe; those do not will. Who does not know this? Who denies it? But since for some the will is prepared by the Lord and for others it is not prepared, it must certainly be discerned what comes from his mercy and what from his judgment. By these words he seems openly to teach that just as some believe because their will is prepared by the Lord, so others do not believe but contradict because their will is not prepared by God; for those words seem to suggest this: since for some the will is prepared by the Lord, for others it is not prepared. Therefore the reason why men are not helped by God, nor converted, is not that they themselves do not will, but that their will is not prepared by the Lord, or that God does not will.

On the contrary is what Anselm says in the book On the Fall of the Devil, ch. 3: This is the cause why God does not grant the Devil grace, that he himself did not will to receive it, nor was he prepared. Weighing this passage, St. Thomas says, that the defect of the first grace has its cause from us: but the conferring of the first grace has its cause from God, according to that of Hosea 13: Your destruction is from yourself, Israel; only in me is your help.

III. The resolution of this difficulty is easy from what was said in the preceding disputation. For its clarity, that distinction handed down and explained in the same disputation must be presupposed: namely, that the absence of helping grace, or of conversion, can be taken in two ways. First, as it is a mere negation: which is said both of what is and of what is not, and by the theologians is usually called non-conversion. And in this acceptation that causal proposition suggested in the arguments made can be conceded: Therefore some men are not helped by God, nor converted, because God does not will, as is clear from what was said in the disputation referred to above. Secondly, it can be taken as it is the privation of helping grace; and in this acceptation it must be said that this causal proposition is true: Because man does not will to act, or to use exciting or sufficient grace well, therefore he is not helped by God; because man has hindered himself, that helping grace be given to him, therefore it is not conferred. The passage of Hosea adduced proves this effectively, as do the authorities of St. Anselm and St. Thomas.

Besides, it is proved from St. Augustine, bk. 2 of On the Merits and Remission of Sins, ch. 17, saying that men are not helped by God, the cause is likewise in themselves, not in God. And in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 5 and 6, which St. Thomas cites in 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1, he says that the help of grace, to whomever it is given by God, is given mercifully: but to those to whom it is not given, it is not given out of justice, as a punishment for preceding sin, and at least original sin. And in bk. 2 of On the Merits and Remission of Sins, ch. 18, he says: Wherefore, that we turn away from God is ours, and this is the evil will: but that we turn to God, unless he rouses and helps us, we cannot; and this is the good will: therefore according to St. Augustine this causal proposition is true: Because man does not will to act piously, but to persist in sin, therefore he is not helped by God.

Secondly, it is proved from St. Prosper, bk. 2 of On the Calling of the Gentiles, ch. 26, where he says that the will of man has from its own mutability that it fails; from the aid of grace that it advances: which aid is applied to all through innumerable modes, whether hidden or manifest; and that it is rejected by many belongs to their own wickedness; but that it is received by many belongs both to divine grace and to the human will.

IV. Thirdly, it is proved from St. Thomas, in the First Part of the Second Part and the Second Part of the Second Part cited, where he expressly teaches this view. And bk. 3, Against the Gentiles, ch. 159. he says that although someone by the motion of free choice can neither merit nor acquire divine grace, he can nevertheless hinder himself from receiving it. And below: God, as far as in him lies, is prepared to give grace to all; for he wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, as is said in 1 Tim. 2. But they alone are deprived of grace who set an obstacle to grace in themselves: as, when the sun illuminates the world, it is imputed as a fault to him who closes his eyes, if some evil follows from this: although he cannot see unless the light of the sun goes before him. From these passages it is clear that a man is therefore not helped by God because he does not will to act, or because he sets an obstacle to grace.

V. Fourthly, it is proved by reason: for man by preceding sin, at least original, has deserved to be forsaken by God and not helped by the help of grace: therefore, as often as God, by his just judgment, does not give someone the help of grace that he be converted, it is man's fault that he does not receive such help; but every fault is voluntary: therefore man does not have the help of helping grace because he does not will to have it, or to be converted. But for greater explanation it must be noted that one can set an obstacle to grace in two ways: in one way by preceding sin, at least original; for neither habitual grace nor the efficacious help by which one is actually converted and loves God above all things stands together with such a sin. In another way by the obstacle of present sin, which a man commits when, roused by God, he resists him; as is had concerning certain men in Job 21: They said to God, Depart from us, and we do not will the knowledge of your ways. And Job 24: They themselves were rebels against the light. And Acts 7: You have always resisted the Holy Spirit. When, therefore, free choice roused by God resists the divine call and wills to persist in sins, or to commit a new sin, by that it hinders itself that efficacious help for conversion, which is incompatible with that same sin, be conferred. But whether original sin suffices that, by reason of it, or as its punishment, special help, even sufficient for believing or loving God above all things, be not in fact conferred on man, will have to be examined below. This, however, must be noted for now, that one who has once been disordered by original sin, or by actual mortal sin, if he is left long to himself, will fall into sin, by which he sets a new obstacle to grace; which St. Thomas observed in these words: But what was said, that it is in the power of free choice not to set an obstacle to grace, applies to those in whom the natural power has been entire. But if through preceding disorder he has declined to evil, it will not be altogether in his power to set no obstacle to grace. For although for some moment he can by his own power abstain from some particular act of sin, yet if he is left long to himself, he will fall into sin, by which an obstacle to grace is set.

VI. Fifthly, it is proved. For from the opposite view it would follow that it is not to be imputed to man, but to God, that he lacks helping grace, or does not act; which is nevertheless repugnant to the sacred Scriptures, especially to those words of Eccles. 15: Do not say, "It is through God that it is wanting"; for what he has hated, do not do. The sequel is proved: for if this causal proposition is false: Because man does not will to act, or to use exciting grace well, therefore he is not helped by God: then that he is not helped by God, or does not act, is not from man himself, but from God, and consequently it will not be to man that it is to be attributed that he is not helped, or not converted, or does not act piously, but to God alone, who in execution, without any fault or obstacle on man's part, does not give man helping grace, necessary for acting, because he does not will it.

To the first argument it is answered that man can indeed, absolutely speaking, rightly use sufficient grace: yet he will never in fact use it unless he is helped by God; for, as was said above, the help of helping grace is not necessary so that with sufficient grace one can really act piously if he wills; but so that he in fact wills. Hence, although it is prior in the order of reason that man be helped by God than that he use sufficient grace well, it is not nevertheless prior that he be helped by God than that he be able to use that same sufficient grace well. Since, therefore, before helping grace a man can use sufficient grace well if he wills, it is therefore rightly said that he does not use that same grace well because he does not will; and consequently it is rightly said also that he sets an obstacle to helping grace, which God on his part is prepared to confer on all, as is clear from what has been premised and from what will be said below. Wherefore that causal proposition is most true: Because man does not will to use sufficient help well, therefore he is not helped by God, nor is he converted.

VII. To the second it is answered that, although our choice, moved and roused by God, cannot do anything by which it may obtain helping or efficacious grace, it can nevertheless, by its own fault, hinder itself and demerit that helping or efficacious grace be not conferred on it; and consequently, on the part of free choice, the cause can be assigned why that same grace is not conferred on it: namely because it has set an obstacle, or has not willed to use sufficient grace well.

To the third it is answered that the argument concludes only that the absence of helping grace, as it is a mere negation, is traced back to God's free will alone; nevertheless, as it has the character of privation and punishment in comparison with such a subject, it ought not to be traced back to God, but only to the malice and defect of the created will. Nor does it follow from this that a cause of predestination or reprobation is given on our part: for although in execution God does not give men helping grace on account of their preceding fault, at least original, nevertheless in his intention, before all foreseen demerits, he had the absolute will of not giving the reprobate glory, and consequently neither efficacious helps, by which they would in fact attain to that same glory; and therefore no cause of reprobation is given on our part, as will be manifest in disputation 110.

To the confirmation it is answered that by his antecedent will, as God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, so he wills for all the means to salvation, among which the laver of regeneration is counted. But by his absolute and consequent will he does not will that this kind of remedy be applied to certain persons, as a punishment for preceding sin, at least original; as in little children who die without baptism; and according to this doctrine the words of St. Augustine adduced above are to be taken. But what is God's antecedent will and what his consequent will was explained in disputation 34.

VIII. To the fourth it is answered that from Augustine's words it is not gathered that certain men do not believe because the will is not prepared for them by the Lord, but only that the will of those who do not believe is not prepared by God by a just judgment, which is most true: for if their will had been prepared by the Lord, they would infallibly believe, as is clear from what was said above. But from this absolute proposition it is not permitted to infer the causal one, namely that they therefore do not believe because their will is not prepared by the Lord. But that this is the mind of St. Augustine is gathered from the same context, where he refers their unbelief not to God, who does not prepare the will, but to the malice of that same will: for after a few words he adds: Behold mercy and judgment; mercy in the election, which has followed the mercy of God: but judgment in the rest, who have been blinded: and yet those believed because they willed; those did not believe because they willed not. Whence the same Augustine, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 22, says: Nor is that which follows to be said at all, namely, "But the rest of you, who linger in the delight of sins, you have not yet risen because the help of pitying grace has not yet raised you." And the reason for this he assigns elsewhere, because the cause of no human fault is to be cast back upon God.

IX. But against this explanation a certain passage of Augustine is urged, bk. 2 of On the Merits and Remission of Sins, ch. 17, where, discussing the proposed question, he speaks thus: Since, with divine grace helping the human will, man can be without sin in this life: why he is not, I could most easily and most truthfully answer, because men do not will. But if it is asked of me why they do not will, we go a long way. Yet even this I will say briefly, without prejudice to a more diligent inquiry. Men do not will to do what is just; either because it lies hidden whether it is just, or because it does not delight. For we will each thing so much the more vehemently, the more certainly we know how good it is: and we are delighted in it the more ardently, etc. But that what lay hidden may become known, and what did not delight may become sweet, is of the grace of God, which helps the wills of men. By these words he teaches most openly that the human will does not abstain from sin, by acting piously, because helping grace is not given to it by God, through which what lay hidden might become known, and what did not delight might become sweet.

That men are not helped by God, the cause is in themselves.— It is answered that in the words immediately following the holy Doctor explains himself, when he adds: By which, namely grace, that they are not helped, the cause is likewise in themselves, not in God; whether they be predestined to be damned for the iniquity of pride; or to be judged and instructed against that same pride, if they are children of mercy. By these words he ultimately refers it to the malice of the human will, as to its cause, that one is not helped by God, or does not act piously. That causal proposition of Augustine could also be explained of the absence of pious action, as it is a mere negation, but not as it is the privation of a due act that ought to be present, according to what was said to the third. For, as was said in the preceding disputation, the negation of efficacious grace is the cause of non-conversion as it is a mere negation, but not as it is a privation, or the moral omission of a conversion due to be present: for under this aspect it is reduced to the deficient will alone, as was explained there.

End of Book Nine.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

↑ Top of work