De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Whether this causal proposition is true: Because a man is not helped by God, therefore he is not converted.

I. After it has been shown in the preceding disputations that the conferring of efficacious help is the cause, and an adequate cause, of a man's being converted, it must consequently be explained: whether the denial of the same efficacious help is the cause of a man's not being converted.

In this part a twofold contest must be undertaken by us, one with the heretics, the other with the Catholics; for among the ancient heretics Simon Magus, Marcion, the Manichees, Luther and others cited in disp. 3 said that God is truly the cause of sin, and that by his providence men sin and fall. This opinion is proved.

First: for in the passages of Scripture it is signified that the denial of efficacious help, by which a man is converted and acts piously, is the cause of his sinning, being hardened, or persisting in sins; for it is said in Exodus 7, I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, and he will not hear you; and Isaiah 6, Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes, lest perhaps they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and be converted, and I heal them: by which words it is signified that hardening and blinding are the cause, upon which there follows infallibly that a man does not hear, does not understand, is not converted, but persists in sin; but hardening and blinding, as St. Augustine and St. Thomas teach, import the denial, or subtraction, of efficacious help, by which the heart is softened and turned to God: therefore such a denial of help is the cause of a man's not being converted. Likewise also in John 10 it is said: You do not believe, because you are not of my sheep; by which words it is signified that they do not believe for this reason, because they were not predestined, nor did God give them the help by which they would believe.

This is confirmed by the authority of St. Augustine, book de praedest. Sanct. ch. 6, saying: Many hear the word of truth, but some believe, others do not believe. These, then, wish to believe, but those do not. Who does not know this? Who denies it? But since the will is prepared by the Lord for some and not prepared for others, it must be discerned what comes from his mercy and what from his judgment. From these words it seems to be gathered that those unbelievers, to whom the gospel is sufficiently proposed, do not wish to believe for this reason, because their will has not been prepared by the Lord.

Secondly. The argument made above is pressed: for if the affirmation is the cause of the affirmation, the negation is the cause of the negation, as Aristotle teaches in 1. post. ch. 3. Since, therefore, the conferring of efficacious help is the cause of a man's being converted, as was said above, it remains that the denial of the same help is the cause of a man's not being converted; and so this causal proposition will be true: Because a man is not helped by God, therefore he is not converted.

II. Thirdly. A cause is that upon which the effect follows; but once the denial of efficacious help is posited, it immediately follows by necessity of consequence that a man is not converted, since these two cannot be true at the same time, namely that Peter, for example, does not have efficacious help for conversion, and nevertheless is converted: therefore the denial of efficacious help, or of helping grace, is the cause of a man's not being converted: therefore the same denial will be the cause of his sinning.

Fourthly. God certainly and infallibly knows future sins not only in their real existence in eternity, but also in the efficacious decree of his will, by which he has determined to premove the created will to the act of sin insofar as it is an act, and to permit the malice of sin, not giving efficacious help to avoid it: therefore from such permission and denial of help it infallibly follows that a man sins, or is not converted: therefore the denial of the same help is the cause of a man's sinning.

Fifthly. He who removes an obstacle is the cause of the stone's falling downward by its own weight; but God, by withdrawing efficacious help, removes the obstacle that prevents sin: for as St. Thomas says, 1. 2. q. 79. art. 1. in the body, If God gave efficacious help to avoid sin, man would not sin; since, therefore, this help being removed, man falls into sin by his own weight, according to what Gregory says, A sin which is not blotted out by penance presently draws one to another by its own weight, it remains that the subtraction of efficacious help is the cause of a man's not being converted, but persisting in sin, or falling.

But that we may deal with the Catholics, and their various opinions may be understood, and we may explain what is to be thought of certain ways of speaking which they use, it must be noted that the denial of conversion to God can be considered in two ways. In the first way, as it is a simple and pure negation of being, so that that lack or absence of conversion is considered not as the privation of an act that ought to be present. In the second way it can be considered as the privation of conversion, or of another action that ought to be present here and now, which nevertheless is not present because of a defect of free choice. There is, then, the first opinion of certain theologians, who assert that it must in no way be conceded that the denial of efficacious help is the cause of non-conversion to God, even if it be considered insofar as it is a pure negation of being, and not insofar as it is the privation of an act that ought to be present. And they judge this opinion so certain that they think the opposite cannot be defended: which they attempt to persuade by the following reasons.

Let the sixth argument, then, be: for in Hosea 13 it is said, Your perdition is from yourself, Israel; only in me is your help. Where Hosea refers non-conversion, or perdition, in Israel to Israel as to its cause, and not to the denial of help. For if the denial of efficacious help were the adequate cause of non-conversion, the perdition of man should be imputed rather to God's will, which is unwilling to supply those helps, than to the human will, and it could more rightly be said, "Your perdition is from me, Israel," than your perdition is from yourself.

This is confirmed from Ecclesiasticus 15, which says: Do not say: 'It is through God that it is lacking'; but it would be God's fault that a man is not converted, since it would be God's fault that efficacious help is not given, whose denial is the cause of non-conversion to God: therefore.

Seventh: for the contrary opinion contradicts the holy Fathers, especially Hilary, on Ps. 118, on those words, Incline my heart, O God, to your testimonies, where he says that it belongs to an impious will to think that he does not attain the things that are proper to believers for this reason, because they were not granted to him by God; and this he calls an impious excuse. It contradicts also Augustine, book 2 de peccat. merit. et remiss. ch. 17, especially there: I know it belongs to my correction that I am less helped by you. And after some things: Therefore refer no cause of human guilt to God. And book 4 confes. ch. 11, especially in those words: Love is not deserted, if it does not itself desert. It contradicts Fulgentius, book 1 to Monimus, ch. 28, from Augustine, chiefly in that place: That they are not helped by God is in themselves, not in God. It contradicts Prosper, 2 de vocat. gen. ch. 19, chiefly in those words: According to those measures by which God gives, he knows how to heap general gifts upon special ones, so that both those who have been without a share of grace may be convicted of their own wickedness, and those who have shone with his light may glory not in their own merit but in the Lord. And ch. 26 he says this: Having it from his own mutability, if he fails; from the help of grace, if he advances; which help is applied to all through innumerable ways, whether hidden or manifest: and that it is rejected by many is of their own wickedness; but that it is received by many is both of divine grace and of the human will. If it be said that God is the cause of non-conversion insofar as it is a simple negation, but not insofar as it is a privation, one argues against this:

III. Eighth: as the authors of the opposite opinion admit, in this way God is said to blind and harden the heart of the sinner, namely by denying efficacious help for conversion; from which denial it immediately follows, by necessity of consequence, that he is not converted: therefore in their opinion God will be the cause of blinding and of hardening; and these two, no one doubts, must be referred not to a simple negation but to a privation of help, and consequently they are bound to admit that God is the cause of non-conversion as it is a privation, and of sin.

This is confirmed. It involves a contradiction that someone be the cause of the negation of a form in a subject that is by its own nature capable of it, and yet not be the cause of the privation of the same form; since no one can be the cause of the negation of light in the air without being the cause of its privation and of darkness; or the cause of the negation of sight in an animal without being the cause of blindness: for privation, as is clear, adds to negation only the aptitude, or the obligation in the subject, to receive the form; and he who deprives a subject of a form which that subject by its own nature requires is beyond doubt said to be the cause of its privation. Since, therefore, according to the opposite opinion, God is the cause of the negation of conversion in a man who ought to have it, it follows that he is the cause of the privation of the same conversion, since the negation of a conversion that ought to be present is a privation.

Ninth, it is argued. The opposite opinion greatly favors the doctrine which the heretics embrace especially at this time, and the foundation from which they deduced that all culpable omissions are to be ascribed to God: therefore it must not be asserted that the denial of efficacious help is the cause of a man's not being converted, even if non-conversion be considered as the negation of conversion.

IIII. The second opinion is that of certain Thomists, who say that there is nothing to fear in conceding that, just as divine help is the efficacious cause of grace and of conversion to God, so the denial of efficacious help is the cause of non-conversion to God insofar as it is a pure negation of being; indeed, in this way God is said to blind and harden, by denying that efficacious help; from which denial it immediately follows by necessity of consequence that someone is not converted. These words are not so to be taken that the particle "just as" states a complete likeness, as if it were said that God is equally the author of non-conversion and of conversion. For this sense is not intended by the author, nor is it signified by that proposition, as it has seemed to certain theologians. Nor could such a proposition have fallen from a Catholic man only moderately instructed in theological principles, since in the Council of Trent he is anathematized who has said that God works evil works just as good works. But it is only signified that the denial of efficacious help is the cause of non-conversion, if it be considered precisely as it is a simple negation of the act, not indeed according to the cause of being, but according to the cause of consequence; for it follows: If Peter does not have efficacious help, he will not be converted: and in this sense this opinion is true, and is to be defended by us.

God is not even indirectly the cause of a man's sinning.— Let the first conclusion, then, be against all the heretics cited above. God is not, nor can he be, the cause of a man's sinning, not only directly but not even indirectly. The conclusion is of faith; St. Thomas establishes it in 1. 2. quaest. 79. art. 1 and quaest. 3 de malo art. 1; and Medina on the same quaest. 79. art. 2 and the other Doctors who wrote against the heretics prove it by many passages of Scripture, by the authorities of the holy Fathers, and by theological reasons.

And it is proved especially from Ecclus. 39 All the works of the Lord are very good. And Hosea 13, Your perdition is from yourself, Israel. And Romans 9, Is there iniquity with him? And 1 John 3, He appeared, namely God, to take away our sins, and there is no sin in him: therefore he does not cause a man to sin.

Secondly it is proved by the arguments made for the second opinion, from the decrees of the Councils and other testimonies of Scripture, which efficaciously prove this conclusion also: therefore, etc.

Thirdly it is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers: for among the Greeks, St. Dionysius the Areopagite, ch. 4 de divinis nominibus, says: Thus there is no evil in God, and there is no divine evil, nor is evil from God. And below: Evil, therefore, is not from God, nor in God, nor is it simply, nor according to time. Clement of Alexandria, book 1 Paedag. ch. 8, says: But guilt cannot be laid to God's charge: and he repeats the same in book 5. Basil the Great in a certain homily, where he expressly proves that God is not the author of evils. And Damascene in the Dialogue against the Manichees confirms the same truth. Among the Latins, moreover, Clement of Rome teaches the same in book 10 recogn., where he says: God does not make evil; but those who were created by him, while they do not believe that they are to be judged, indulging their own pleasures, have been carried away from piety and justice. St. Augustine, book 2 de pecc. merit. et remiss. ch. 17, says: Refer no cause of human guilt to God. And ch. 18: To say that an evil will is to be referred to God as its author is a crime. St. Prosper in the respons. ad capita Gallorum ch. 14 says: God is the author of good things, not of evil things. Fulgentius, book 1 to Monimus ch. 19: An evil will, he says, does not belong to the most good creator. And ch. 21: And as it befits the good God to be the cause of every good work, so it is incongruous that the cause of any evil work be imputed to him. St. Gregory the Great, book 29 Moral. ch. 31, says: The Lord is the author of nature, not of guilt. And hom. 9 on Ezechiel: Our evils are only our own; but our goods are both of Almighty God and our own. And finally Philo the Jew, in the book de confus. linguarum, acknowledged this truth and set it forth in these words: It remains to consider this, that God is the cause only of good things, but of evil things of none at all. Since he himself is the most ancient and most perfect good of all things. But it befits the best to work what is proper to his nature, namely the best things; but that the punishments of the wicked are sanctioned by his ministers.

Fourthly it is proved by the reason of St. Thomas; for every sin is by a withdrawal from the order which is toward God as its end; but God cannot be the cause that someone withdraws from such an order, since he inclines and converts all things to himself as to the ultimate end, as Dionysius says, ch. 1 de divin. nomin. Therefore it is impossible that God be directly the cause of anyone's sinning.

Fifthly it is proved that he cannot be the cause of sin even indirectly, because then someone is indirectly the cause of another's sin when he can and ought to draw him back from sin and does not, as the helmsman is indirectly the cause of the sinking of the ship when he can and ought to steer it and does not: but God, although he can draw all back from sin by conferring on them efficacious help to avoid sin — which if he gave, they would not sin — nevertheless is not bound to confer help of this kind, or to draw them back from sin; because, according to the right order of his divine providence, he confers help of this kind on some, and not on others in like manner; since it belongs to the perfection of that providence to permit defective causes to fail at times, as is clear 1. p. q. 23. a. 5. ad 3. therefore.

VI. The denial of efficacious help is the cause of non-conversion, as it is a pure negation.— Second conclusion. If non-conversion be considered as it is precisely the negation of conversion, it must be conceded that the denial of efficacious help is the cause of non-conversion, not indeed by influencing, even indirectly, but only by way of inference; for it follows well: If God does not give Peter efficacious help to act, he will not act. This conclusion Bañes teaches in 1. p., and Medina in 1. 2. q. 79. art. 2. ad 1, where he says: God is said to blind, because he withdraws the divine light, which being taken away, nothing remains but darkness. He is said to harden, because he withdraws the help of divine grace, which being removed, our hearts harden together with the stones. And the Thomists commonly hold the same, indeed also many holy Doctors of old, whose testimonies I shall bring forward below. Several arguments from those made at the beginning efficaciously prove the same conclusion. It is proved first by the authority of St. Thomas, who seems openly to teach this opinion in 1. 2. q. 79. art. 1. at the end of the body, where he says that God does not bestow help on some to avoid sin; which if he bestowed, they would not sin. He holds, therefore, that God, by subtracting help, is a non-impeding cause of sin, and consequently is the cause of non-conversion as it is a mere negation, in the way explained above. And more expressly in q. 75 of the same part, art. 1. in the body, he teaches the very same; for asking whether sin has a cause, he says that a twofold cause of any negation can be assigned. The first is the defect of the cause of the affirmation: for upon the removal of the cause follows the removal of the effect, as the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. The second is that cause of the affirmation upon which the negation follows; for that is the cause per accidens of the consequent negation, as fire, by causing heat from its principal intention, consequently causes the privation of coldness. And immediately he adds that the first, namely the defect of the cause of the affirmation, can suffice for a simple negation, but not for the inordination of sin; because it is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something is born to have and ought to have. From these words an efficacious argument is drawn. According to St. Thomas, the defect, or absence, of the cause of the affirmation of conversion suffices for the simple negation of conversion; but the conferring of efficacious help is the cause of the affirmation of conversion, for by that help God brings it about that a man is converted: therefore the denial of the same help is the cause of the negation of conversion, as it is a simple negation. This is confirmed. Upon the removal of the cause follows the removal of the effect, as St. Thomas says; but the conferring of efficacious help is the cause of conversion: therefore the removal of the same help will be the cause that the effect be removed, and that there be non-conversion, if it be considered as it is a simple negation of conversion.

Secondly it is proved by the authority of St. Isidore, book 2 de summo bono ch. 5, where he says: God is said to blind certain men, not that he himself makes that same blindness in them, but because, for their useless merits, he himself does not take away the blindness from them. And Bede on Mark 3 says: He who can make a soul safe or destroy it, that is, cure a man or not — it is the same as what he had premised, to do well or ill: not that God, supremely good, can be to us the author of evil or of perdition, but that his not saving is called destroying by the custom of Scripture; as the heart of Pharaoh is said to have been hardened, not that he hardened a soft heart, but that, hardened by preceding merits, he was unwilling in his mercy to soften it.

VII. Thirdly it is proved by destroying the chief foundation of the contrary opinion: for from this it proves that God, by denying efficacious help, is not the cause of non-conversion as it is a negation; otherwise he would be the cause of non-conversion as it is a privation, and as it is sin: because a denial of this kind in such a subject, in which conversion ought to be present, is a privation: but this reasoning concludes nothing: therefore. The minor is proved: for God is the cause permitting sin, and perseverance in it, because, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion to Laurentius ch. 95, Nothing is done unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it to be done or by doing it himself: therefore in like manner he will be able to be the cause of non-conversion as it is a negation, in the way in which negations can have a cause, without his being the cause of sin, or of non-conversion as it is the privation of a conversion that ought to be present.

This is confirmed; for, as was shown in disp. 24, God is the first author of the act of sin insofar as it is an act and a being, and yet he is not the cause of sin, although, God's permission being posited, a man infallibly sins: because moral malice does not follow upon the act of sin except as it proceeds from a created will that is defective: therefore in like manner God, by subtracting efficacious help, will be able to be the cause of non-conversion as it is a negation, without being the cause of non-conversion as it is the privation of a conversion that ought to be present, or of sin. The consequence is proved: for that privation of conversion does not follow upon the subtraction of help, but upon the created will, insofar as without the rule of reason it tends of itself toward some changeable good; upon which there follows per accidens, or beyond the intention of the agent, the privation of conversion, or of the goodness that ought to be present, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 75. ar. 1. in the body.

VIII. The cause of a man's not being converted is his own evil will alone.— Third conclusion. The cause of non-conversion, as it is a privation, is man's evil will alone. And so the proper cause why a man is not converted is that he does not will it. For the understanding of this conclusion it must be noted that, as St. Thomas teaches, negations or privations do not have a cause per se, but per accidens, because a privation or negation is not intended by any agent, but follows beyond its intention upon the appetite for some particular good, upon which there follows the privation of another good. Whence the created will, lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the divine law, intending some changeable good, causes the act of sin indeed per se, but the inordination of the act per accidens and beyond its intention: for the defect of order in the act comes from the defect of direction in the will. The arguments made for the first opinion of the Catholics efficaciously prove this conclusion thus explained.

Moreover it is proved from Augustine, book 12 de Civit. Dei ch. 6, where he says: Whoever, then, says that he who consented to the tempter and persuader, to whom another did not consent, to use illicitly a beautiful body which was present to both alike to be seen, when before that vision and temptation both were alike in mind and body — whoever says that he made for himself an evil will, who certainly was good before the evil will, let him ask why he made it; whether because it is a nature, or because it was made from nothing: and he will find that the evil will did not begin to be for this reason, that it is a nature, but from this, that the nature was made from nothing. For if nature is the cause of the evil will, what else are they compelled to say but that good produces evil, and that good is the cause of evil: since an evil will is produced from a good nature. Whence can it happen that a good nature, although mutable, before it has an evil will, does something evil, that is, the evil will itself? And ch. 7 he concludes thus: Let no one, then, seek from me to know what I know that I do not know; unless perhaps that he learn to be ignorant of that which one must know cannot be known. And below: This I know, that the nature of God can never, nowhere, in no respect fail; and that those things can fail which were made from nothing. Yet these, the more they are and do good — for then they do something, when they have efficient causes — but insofar as they fail, and from this do evil (for what do they then do but vain things?), they have defective causes. And he confirms the same in ch. 8. This doctrine of St. Augustine St. Thomas sets out in Scholastic style and proves, 2 sent. dist. 37. q. 2. art. 1. ad 2; for he says that the created will is capable of defect from this, that it is from nothing; and dist. 34. q. 1. art. 3, but especially at the end of the body of the article, where he says: Thus, therefore, it is clear that in the way in which evil can have a cause, good is the efficient cause of evil, namely per accidens; but not that which is perfect and the supreme good: which is clear by a likeness in natural agents, in which some universal agent and some particular agent are found. The particular agent, which has an action determined to one form, as it is the cause of that form, so is it the cause of the privation of the other form, as is clear in fire or water. But the sun, since it is a universal agent cause in respect of every lower bodily form, is not the cause of the privation of a form except by its withdrawal, as is said in 2 de Generatione. Likewise also that which is a particular good, by causing some determinate good, excludes another good which is not compatible with it; but the complete good, which is universally the cause of every good, is not the cause of the defect of any good, nor even by its absence, because it, as far as in it lies, is always present, suffering no vicissitude of absence and presence. And in the solution to the fourth, summing up all that has been said in a brief resolution, he adds that in the created will a twofold defect is found. One, which is the potential cause of evil, namely from nothing: for from this, that it is from nothing, it can fail by sinning, according to the vertibility of election: yet this defect is not the actual cause of evil, because it would follow that the will would always fail, as a lame leg always limps. The other is an actual defect, according as it actually fails, and whatever proceeds from it, insofar as it stands under this defect, is wholly evil: but of that defect which is in the act of the will, it is not necessary that some other defect actually pre-existing in the will be the cause, because thus one would go on to infinity: but the will itself, considered in itself, is the cause of that defect. For that defect is in the will according as the will is turned to something in some undue way. But of this, that it be turned to a created good in an undue way, the will has dominion, because it is free toward either alternative: for it is not alike in the case of the will and of a natural agent; for a natural agent is determined to one thing by its nature, whence it cannot be the cause of an inordinate action except through this, that some defect is in the agent itself. But the will is not determined to one thing, but determines itself, according as it cleaves to this or that, and in such adherence the first evil of the will consists; whence of the first evil of fault, which is in the act of the will, a good thing, namely the will, is the cause: but per accidens, as has been said: but of the second evil, which is in the exterior act, the will itself, now evil through the interior act, is the cause. All these words of St. Thomas I have deliberately reported, so that it may appear that the authors of the second opinion, which we defend, have used the very formal words of St. Thomas.

IX. Moreover it is proved by the authority of the Council of Valentia, ch. 2, where it speaks thus: We faithfully hold, and it pleases us to hold, that God foreknew that the wicked would be wicked through their own malice. And below: Nor has the foreknowledge of God imposed necessity on any evil, so that it could not be otherwise; but what he was going to do from his own will, he, as God, who knows all things before they come to be, foreknows from his omnipotence and unchangeable majesty. Nor do we believe that anyone is condemned from his prejudice, but from the merit of his own iniquity: nor do the wicked themselves perish for this reason, that they could not be good, but because they were unwilling to be good, and by their own fault remained in the mass of damnation, either by original or also by actual merit. Fulgentius confirms the same in the book de Incarnatione et Gratia ch. 24, and more fully in book 1 to Monimus toward the end, where for the confirmation of the same doctrine he brings forward and weighs many testimonies of St. Augustine. Finally it is proved by the reasons adduced for the first conclusion, which efficaciously demonstrate this one also.

X. To the first argument from the passages of Scripture it is answered, with Chrysostom, that to hand over and to blind is nothing other than to permit a man to hand himself over to a reprobate sense and to be made blind. Two other explanations I have given on Isa. ch. 6, num. 48 and following, which whoever wishes may see in that place. To the passage of John ch. 10 it is answered that that word "because" does not import a true causality, but an infallible concomitance of inference, as if it were said: If it is not predestined by God, nor given to anyone to believe, he will not believe, because no one has ever believed, or will believe, unless it has been given to him from above.

To the confirmation from the authority of Augustine it is answered that he does not assert what is inferred from his words, namely that unbelievers do not believe for this reason, because their will is not prepared by the Lord: and granted that he had asserted it, he would have to be understood as the passage of John 10 adduced is understood. Only this, then, can be gathered from his words, that the will of those who do not believe is not prepared by the Lord, and that this is done by a just judgment. But properly speaking, they do not believe for this reason, because they are unwilling to believe, as has been said; yet they would most certainly believe if the will were prepared for them by the Lord.

That proposition — if the affirmation is the cause of the affirmation, the negation is the cause of the negation — is explained.— To the second argument some answer that that proposition of Aristotle, "If the affirmation is the cause of the affirmation, the negation is the cause of the negation," is to be understood when it is the adequate cause of the affirmation, having no partnership with another cause, as, for example, because to be rational is the cause of something's being risible, the negation of rationality will be the cause of something's not being risible. But the conferring of efficacious help is not the adequate cause of conversion, because it is not the sole cause, since free choice also concurs with it, as is defined in the Council of Trent. Whence from the fact that the conferring of efficacious help is the cause of a man's being converted, it does not follow that the subtraction of the same help is the cause of his not being converted: and so it is reduced only to the defect of the created will that a man is not converted. This solution, however, seems to suppose one thing that we do not admit, namely that the conferring of efficacious help is not the adequate cause of a man's being converted, but concurs partially with free choice; as two men hauling a ship concur to the motion of the same ship: which opinion has already been impugned by us. For although efficacious help is not the adequate and sole cause of the act of conversion, it is nevertheless the adequate and sole cause making a man to be converted.

Otherwise, then, it is answered that the argument proves that the denial of efficacious help is the cause of a man's not being converted, according as non-conversion is a pure negation. Nor does it follow from this that it is the cause of non-conversion insofar as it is a privation; as was said above, and will appear more fully in the solution to the 8th argument.

XI. Upon the denial of efficacious help there does not intrinsically follow that a man sins.— To the third it is answered that, just as the inordination of sin does not follow intrinsically upon the act of the sin of hating God, as it is an act, but only as it proceeds from a created will that is defective — for which reason the entity of that action is attributed to God, but the inordination only to the created will that is defective, as was said above — so proportionably upon the denial of efficacious help there does not intrinsically follow that a man is not converted, if the negation of conversion be taken privatively, as signifying the lack of a conversion that ought to be present: but this privation follows only from the created will that is defective, which voluntarily is not converted when it could and was bound to be converted to God; but there follows upon the denial of help only the lack of conversion, as it is a simple negation. Whence the privation of conversion is attributed only to the created will that is defective. But someone will insist: Upon the negation of conversion here and now, when a man is bound to be converted to God, there follows necessarily the privation of the same conversion, because the negation of a form that ought to have been present is a privation: therefore if the subtraction of help is the cause of non-conversion as it is a negation, it will also be the cause of non-conversion as it is a privation.

It is answered that that privation of conversion does not follow upon the negation of conversion considered in itself, but only as it is from a defective will, as was said of the inordination of sin: whence the argument contains nothing against our opinion.

To the fourth it is answered that, for God certainly to know future sins in the decree of his will, it is not required that such a decree be the cause of a man's sinning or not being converted, if non-conversion be taken as it is a privation and sin; but it suffices that the same decree be the cause of the act of sin insofar as it is an act, and that it permit the malice which follows from the defect of the created will.

XII. When a remover of an obstacle is the cause of the damage that follows.— To the fifth M. Bañes answers abundantly, 1. p. q. 23. ar. 3. dub. 2. at the end; and the solution consists in this, that when a remover of an obstacle could and was bound not to remove it, if any sin or damage follows, it is imputed directly to him who removes the obstacle: but God is not bound not to remove helps which would impede future sins if they were given to men; but, as St. Thomas says, according to the order of his divine providence, he mercifully bestows these helps on some, but justly does not bestow them on others: whence from the fact that he does not give efficacious help it is not inferred that he is the cause of sin even indirectly, or of non-conversion as it is a privation.

To the sixth argument made for the prior opinion of the Catholics, from the authority of Hosea 13, it is answered that the perdition of Israel does not consist in the negation of conversion as it is a negation, since a negation is not formally a fault or a sin, but consists in the deordination of sin and the privation of the rectitude of conversion, or of another act that ought to be present; and because deordination or privation of this kind is reduced not to God but only to the created will that is defective, therefore it cannot rightly be said, "Perdition is from me, O Israel," but "Your perdition is from yourself, O Israel." To the other passage from Ecclus. 15 it is answered that it is not God's fault that a man is not converted, but the man's own: for God, as far as lies on his part, is ready to give grace to all; for he wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, as is said in 1 Tim. 2; but through his own fault man puts an obstacle to that same grace. Whence it is imputed not to God but only to man, if he incurs any damage or sin, from the fact that he does not have efficacious help. The solution is St. Thomas's 3. cont. gent. cap. 159, which passage, with the commentary of Ferrariensis, must necessarily be seen.

By these things the solution to the 7th argument, from the passages of the holy Fathers, Hilary, Augustine, Fulgentius and Prosper, is clear.

XIII. To the eighth it is answered that from the negation of help, considered in itself, there does not necessarily follow by necessity of consequence the privation of conversion, but only its negation: but the privation of conversion and the deordination of sin proceed from the created will that is defective, as was said in disp. 18. num. 21 and disp. 24. to the 12th arg.

The negation of a form and its privation are not always attributed to the same cause.— To the confirmation it is answered that, although it involves a contradiction that the negation of a form be in a subject naturally apt for it without the privation of it, nevertheless it is not necessary that to whomever the negation of that form is attributed, the privation of it be attributed also: because it can happen that someone who is the cause of the negation is not bound to remove it from the subject by inducing the form which is denied of that subject; as is most evidently clear in the example introduced above, of the helmsman who withdraws his steering from a ship that he is not bound to steer. The privation of conversion, therefore, is inseparably conjoined with its negation in comparison with the created will, which could and was bound not to put an obstacle to the help of grace; yet it is not conjoined with the same privation in respect of God, who, although he can, is nevertheless not bound to bestow efficacious help for conversion, nor does he do injury to anyone if he helps whom he wills to help, and does not help whom he does not will to help, as Augustine teaches in the book de dono persev. ch. 11 and 12.

To the ninth it is answered that the heretics were deceived when by a fallacious consequence they inferred that all culpable omissions are to be attributed to God, from the fact that he does not confer efficacious help for fulfilling the commandments, which if he conferred, they would not sin. But how empty this deduction is, is already clear from what has been said above.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

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