De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Whether the conferring of efficacious help is the adequate cause that free choice be converted.

I. This doubt can be agitated under other equivalent words: whether, namely, grace alone is to be called the cause of our salvation: for an adequate cause and the sole cause seem to signify the same thing: and this difficulty almost coincides with that which we discussed in Disputation 85: whether grace and free choice are two partial causes of a pious operation, like two men dragging a ship. Nevertheless, on account of the insistence of certain persons who doubt much about this matter, it has seemed good to settle the present controversy under these terms, and to bring forward certain ways of speaking of Scripture and of the holy Fathers, and to confirm and explain them by theological reasons, lest novice theologians be either scandalized at them or stick fast in them.

The first opinion, then, is that of certain persons who contend that it can in no way be conceded that the conferring of efficacious divine help is the sole and adequate cause that a man be converted to God: which they prove.

First, from those words of Zechariah 1 which the Council of Trent uses to confirm this opinion: Return to me, and I will return to you. Similar are those of Joel 2: Return to me with your whole heart. Ezech. 18: Make yourselves a new heart; and ch. 36: I will make you walk in my precepts; for these testimonies most clearly teach that God, or the conferring of efficacious grace, is not the adequate or sole cause of conversion, since free choice also concurs with it and cooperates with God.

It is confirmed from the testimony of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15: I labored more abundantly than all; yet not I, but the grace of God with me: which testimony St. Bernard elegantly presses, whose words will be adduced below: for he shows from the Apostle that free choice is a companion and cooperator with God: to which agrees that of Wis. 9: Send her from your holy heavens, that she may be with me and labor with me: and 1 Cor. 3: We are God's helpers. Whence Pope Celestine, epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 12, calls us cooperators of the grace of God.

Secondly, it is argued from the express definition of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 5, where it is held that a man is disposed by exciting and helping grace to convert himself, by assenting to and cooperating with the same grace, and that the man himself acts when he receives God's inspiration; and acts in such a way that he can reject it. And in can. 4 those are damned under anathema who have said that free choice, moved by God, does nothing by assenting to God who excites it, whereby it might dispose and prepare itself for the grace of justification, nor can it dissent if it wills: therefore, if free choice, according to the mind and definition of the Council, cooperates by assenting to grace, and so acts that it can reject the inspiration and dissent if it wills; it cannot be said that the conferring of efficacious help is the sole and adequate cause that a man be converted.

II. Thirdly it is argued from the authority of the Saints, who expressly teach that God, or his grace, is not the sole and adequate cause of conversion. For St. Augustine, explaining that text of 1 Cor. 15, Yet not I, but the grace of God with me: Not I, he says, but the grace of God with me: that is, not I alone, but the grace of God with me, and by this neither the grace of God alone, nor he alone, but the grace of God with him. And St. Bernard, expounding the same passage, speaks thus: Paul, when he had recounted the many good things which God had done through him, says: Yet not I, but the grace of God with me. He could have said "through me," but because that was less, he preferred to say "with me," presuming that he was not only a minister of the work, through the effect, but in a certain way a companion of the one working, through consent. And below: God uses, namely, angels and men of good will as his co-helpers and fellow soldiers. Whence Paul boldly declares of himself and of those like him: For we are God's co-helpers. And below: And so God kindly established merits for man, when he deigned to institute that something good be done through him and with him. Hence we presume that we are co-helpers of God, and cooperators of the Holy Spirit, deservers of the kingdom, because through voluntary consent we are joined to the divine will. And a little below: It, namely grace, rouses free choice when it sows the thought, heals it when it changes the affection, strengthens it that it may lead it to act, preserves it lest it feel defect: but it so works with free choice that it precedes it only in the first stage, accompanies it in the rest, preceding it indeed for this, that it may thereafter cooperate with it: yet in such a way that what was begun by grace alone is completed equally by both; so that they work mixedly, not singly; together, not in turn through each several advance. Likewise St. Augustine, explaining that of Psalm 26: Be my helper, do not forsake me: God is called, he says, our helper, and no one can be helped unless he also strives of his own accord; because God does not work our salvation in us as in insensible stones, or as in those in whose nature he did not create reason and will. And book 2 against the two epistles of Pelagius, ch. 9, he says: Although without his help, without whom we can do nothing, we cannot open our mouth, yet we open our mouth by his assistance and our work. And in the first book to Simplician, q. 2: To will, he says, he willed to be both his and ours; his by calling, ours by following. And in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 3, and book 1 of the Retractations, ch. 13: Both are ours, namely to will to believe and to do good, on account of the choice of the will; and yet both are given through the Spirit of faith and of charity. And in the book On the Spirit and the Letter to Marcellinus, ch. 43: To consent to the call, or not to consent, is of one's own will. And in the book On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 15: But let it not be thought that men there do nothing through free choice: that is said in the Psalm: Do not harden your hearts. And through Ezekiel it is said: Cast away all your iniquities. And in the book On the Grace of Christ, ch. 14: Who does not see that for anyone to come or not to come is in the choice of the will? But this choice can be alone if he does not come; it cannot be, except helped, if he comes. Similar things he teaches in tract. 72 on John, epistle 89, q. 2, and epistle 106, and in many other places. Finally St. Prosper, book 2 On the Calling of the Gentiles, ch. 26: The grace of God, he says, chiefly prevails in all justifications, by persuading with exhortations, etc.; but the will of man is also subjected to it and joined to it, so that it may cooperate with the divine work in itself, and begin to exercise unto merit what it conceived unto zeal from the heavenly seed. And below: That it is rejected by many is their own wickedness; but that it is received by many is both of divine grace and of human will. And ch. 3 against the Collator, expounding those words of Cassian: But it is ours to follow humbly the grace that draws us daily; he says that they were rightly spoken by Cassian, and adds: Lest it should be thought that nothing remains to be done through free choice. Therefore God, or the conferring of efficacious help, is not the adequate or sole cause that a man be converted.

III. Fourthly it is argued by reason: for this proposition, "The Father alone is God," is false in the propriety of speech, as St. Thomas teaches in the body of 1. p. q. 31. art. 3, because that word "alone," holding itself on the side of the subject, excludes any other supposite whatsoever from the fellowship of the predicate, and thus makes this sense: the Father is God, and no other supposite distinct from the Father is God. As if it be said, "Socrates alone writes," the sense is that Socrates writes, and no one is his partner in writing: therefore similarly this proposition, "God alone is the cause that a man be converted," makes this sense: God is the cause of the act of conversion, and no other supposite besides God is the cause of the act of conversion, or a partner with God in producing the act of conversion; but this sense is false: for according to the Catholic faith, man is also a true efficient cause of the same conversion: therefore.

Fifthly: for it was Calvin's error, condemned in the Council of Trent, that grace alone works the whole in us, and that God alone is the cause of our conversion, and that our free choice has no part in it. Calvin's words are: But there will be those who grant that the will, turned away from good by its own native bent, is converted by the Lord's power alone; yet in such a way that, once prepared, it then has its own parts in acting, etc. But it is wrongly attributed to man that he obeys prevenient grace with a following will. And § 11: And he moves the will, not in the way that has been handed down and believed for many centuries, that it should afterwards be our choice either to obey the motion or to resist it; but by effectually affecting it. Therefore that saying so often repeated by Chrysostom must be repudiated: Whom he draws, he draws willing. And in another place: Let them answer, he says, whether he who effects in us to will simply helps the will. Paul claims the whole for God; these men ascribe nothing to him beyond a prop; but in what do they join man as a companion to God? Finally Calvin concludes thus: Let this be the sum: they do wrongly who so divide between God and us as to transfer to us the obedience of the pious will which assents to God's grace, when it is God's own work. Calvin therefore holds that God is the adequate cause of conversion: therefore it ought not to be attributed to the sole efficacy of divine grace that a man be converted and act piously.

It is confirmed: for if the efficacy of divine help is the sole and adequate cause that a man be converted to God, then besides God and the efficacy of the divine concurrence there will be no other cause of conversion. For an adequate and sole cause excludes any other cause whatsoever: and hence the will will in no way be a cause of conversion, namely because the will's very effecting is the effect of God alone, who by efficacious help so determines the will to conversion that in the composite sense it cannot dissent if it wills: which is nevertheless the only thing that Calvin and the other heretics maintain; since they do not deny that the will actively concurs in its acts, and physically produces them, as many learned men have noted.

IIII. The second opinion is that of others, who in a sound and Catholic sense hold that it can and ought to be conceded that the conferring of efficacious help is the adequate cause that a man be converted and act piously. For they say that the very concurrence of free choice is an effect necessarily following, by necessity of the consequence, from efficacious divine help, so that that saying of the Apostle is verified, that that conversion is not of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy: which opinion Capreolus taught earlier, and indeed St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and other Fathers, as will presently appear. Not because a man can convert himself unless he wills, but because God himself by his mercy efficaciously converts the will of man to himself; so that the actual conversion itself is the effect of divine mercy, and not only the ability to be converted, according to that: Convert us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be converted.

I judge this second opinion, if it be rightly understood and explained, to be true, and greatly conformable to the manner of speaking of sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers, especially Augustine and Thomas. For its evidence it must be considered that there is a great difference between this proposition, "God alone is the cause that a man be converted," and this one, "God alone is the cause of the act of conversion," because the predicate of each is not the same. For in the former proposition the predicate is that whole complex, "cause that a man be converted," in which is involved the concurrence of the free choice of man, whereby it flows into the act of conversion, and that whole is predicated of God alone; and so the proper sense of that proposition is that God, and no one other than God, effects that a man be converted: which sense is most true, as is clear from the premises. But in this proposition, "God alone is the cause of the act of conversion," the predicate is that complex, "cause of conversion," which predicate is indeed affirmed of God alone: but that word "alone" holds itself on the side of the subject, and excludes any other supposite besides God from the fellowship of the predicate, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 31. artic. 3. and so the sense is that God, and no other supposite besides God, effects the act of conversion; which sense is false, as has been said.

V. Grace alone does not cause conversion, but free choice also does.— Let the first conclusion, then, be: It is not to be conceded absolutely that God alone, or the conferring of efficacious help alone, is the cause of the act of conversion. In this conclusion the authors of both opinions agree, nor has any Catholic ever denied it, or been able to deny it: for it is of faith, as is evidently clear from the arguments made from the beginning. I said in the conclusion, speaking absolutely: for with an addition it can be conceded, as if it be said: God is the adequate or sole cause from which conversion first begins, and to which, as to the first root and per se efficient cause, conversion itself is reduced. For although a man is converted freely, God alone it is who by his efficacious grace makes us do, and works that we work, as will be manifest from the following conclusion.

God alone is the adequate cause making a man be converted.— Second conclusion. Absolutely, and without any addition, it can and ought to be conceded that God, or the conferring of efficacious help, is the adequate or sole efficient cause that a man be converted and freely cooperate with God who moves. The conclusion is St. Thomas's, 1. 2. quaest. 111. art. 2, where, when to prove that grace alone does not work salvation in us he had adduced that saying of Augustine: He who created you without you will not justify you, without you; he answers: That God does not justify us without us: because through the motion of free choice, while we are justified, we consent to God's justice. Yet that motion is not the cause of grace, but its effect; whence the whole operation belongs to grace. By which words he attributes the whole salvation of man to grace, because through it God effects that free choice cooperate and consent. The authors of the second opinion also intend to teach this conclusion, which Capreolus likewise expressly establishes in 2 Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12, where he says: That God not only helps us to will good by partially co-effecting; but also by a certain special making, that the will itself partially concur; so that the will itself partially co-causes, applied and as it were instrumentally moved by God to thus partially co-causing. And after he had cited certain passages of Augustine, to be adduced below, in confirmation of this doctrine, he adds: That he, namely Augustine, distinguishes a twofold manner of God's working in respect of our willing good: one is proper to him, in which our will does not cooperate, namely to make us will; therefore he says: That we may will, therefore, he works without us; without us, I say, working, namely that we may will: because although the will wills, and causes the volition, yet it does not make itself will, or cause the volition. Nor yet, because God does it, does it therefore not cause; but rather for that reason it causes. Behold, he affirms that God is the sole and adequate cause making us will.

VI. It is proved first by the testimonies of St. Augustine which Capreolus adduces for the same doctrine, in the place cited above. For in the book On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 16, he says: It is certain that we will when we will: but he makes us will the good, of whom it is said: The will is prepared by the Lord; of whom it is said: who works in us to will. It is certain that we do when we do: but he makes us do, by supplying most efficacious powers to the will: who says: I will make you walk in my justifications, and observe my judgments, and do them. Likewise a little later: That we may will, therefore, he works without us. But when we will, and so will that we may do, he works with us: since without him either working that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we can do nothing for the good works of piety. From which words Capreolus infers that God alone is he who by his special help effects that a man will, cooperate, and be converted. Augustine therefore holds that God is the adequate and sole cause which makes a man be converted. Two other passages of Augustine Capreolus adduces, which were established as a canon in the Council of Orange, in the places alleged above. Moreover the same Augustine, explaining how a man is drawn by God and comes gladly and willingly, says: Who is drawn, if he was already willing? And yet no one comes unless he wills. He is therefore drawn in wondrous ways, that he may will, by him who knows how to work within the very hearts of men, not that men, which cannot happen, should believe unwilling, but that willing men should be made out of unwilling. By which words he teaches not obscurely that, although a man wills through free choice, God alone nevertheless, by sweetly drawing him with his grace, effects that he will. The same doctrine Augustine confirms more often, and gathers from several places of Scripture, especially from that to the Romans 9: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. and 1 Cor. 4: For who distinguishes you? And to the Philippians 2: For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish, for good will. For Paul did not say: God is he who cooperates, nor did he say "with us," but "in us," that it may be understood that God alone is he who by efficacious grace makes us will and cooperate. Whence from the same testimonies, and others which are very many in both Testaments, he convicts the Pelagians that God alone is he who works that we work. And in the book On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 5, he says: That the Apostle Paul might be converted by a most efficacious calling, the grace of God was alone. "Alone," he says, because the human will did not cooperate with God in that action by which it was prevented and prepared to will to be converted, and by which God effected that it be converted; but it cooperated only by freely and effectively producing the very act of conversion. Moreover St. Cyprian, Gregory Nazianzen, Anselm, Bernard, and other Saints whose testimonies we adduced in disp. 85, n. 3, teach that the whole is to be attributed to God, and to his grace, in those things which pertain to salvation. Since therefore the cooperation of our free choice with grace pertains to salvation, it will also have to be attributed to God, and consequently God, or the conferring of efficacious help, will be the adequate and sole cause that a man be converted.

VII. For the same purpose there are two distinguished testimonies of St. Prosper, in which he expressly teaches that it is grace alone which makes a man be converted. The first testimony is found in On the Ungrateful, ch. 14, where he speaks thus.

That nevertheless the hearer be advanced in these studies,
not the teacher, nor the disciple, but grace alone
effects, and rears the plantings into heavy fruit.

And ch. 15.

But the Almighty saves a man with grace.
She herself completes her work; for whom the time of acting
is ever at hand, who wills what is done. No delay for her
is made by habits, nor is she held in suspense by any causes;
Nor what she alone can do does she perform by the care and office of a minister,
or commit the turn of acting to servants:
who, though the many commands of the one who calls bring them near,
knock, but do not enter the souls. God therefore raises the buried
and looses those bound in the shackle of sin.
He gives understanding to darkened hearts;
he makes the just out of the unjust, instills love,
by which the lover may be loved in return, and the love which he confers is himself.

Behold, St. Prosper says that grace alone effects that a man be converted and bring forth salutary fruits.

Secondly it is proved by reason: for, as has been shown, grace and free choice are not partial causes of conversion, like two men dragging a ship; but grace itself determines free choice to act, and effects that it concur with it to conversion: therefore grace is the total and adequate cause making free choice act.

Thirdly it is proved. The efficacy of grace is that by which God effects that a man be converted: but the efficacy of the same grace is from God alone, and in no way depends on the cooperation of created choice, as was shown in disp. 73 and 90: therefore God is the adequate and sole cause which makes a man be converted.

Fourthly it is proved by all the arguments by which we showed in the preceding controversy that God is he who first begins our conversion, insofar as by his grace he effects that a man by his free choice consent to God who excites and calls. All of which can be confirmed from what was said about general concurrence in disp. 18. By these the answer to all the arguments made at the beginning is easy; for they prove only the first conclusion: but insofar as they seem to fight against the second, each must be met.

VIII. To the first, from the passages of Scripture, the Council of Trent itself answers, cited in the same argument: That, when it is said in the sacred writings, "Return to me, and I will return to you," we are admonished of our liberty. When we answer, "Convert us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be converted," we confess that we are prevented by the grace of God. By which words it teaches that a man indeed freely effects the act of conversion, but that the prevenient grace of God makes him be converted and cooperate, as has been said.

To the confirmation from the authority of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15, it is answered that his testimony most favors our opinion, according to the explanation which Pope Gelasius applies, in the words adduced in disp. 96, conc. 2, in which he teaches that grace cooperates by preventing, and free choice cooperates by following. Since therefore the Apostle, as Gelasius noted, before those words, But the grace of God with me, placed that negative, namely, not I, he doubtless signified that in conversion itself there is something which was to be attributed to God alone, namely, that by his grace he effects that free choice be converted and act. To the other testimonies of Scripture it is answered that they prove only the first conclusion.

To the second argument from the Council of Trent it is answered that according to our opinion free choice is not excluded from the causality by which God produces with us the very act of conversion: for God does not work to will and to accomplish except through free choice, but it is only excluded from that causality, or from that effect of divine causality, by which God effects that free choice be converted. For although the choice itself wills, it does not make itself will, because it is not the first determining itself to will; but God alone works that it will, as has been said.

IX. To the third, from the authority of the Saints, it is answered that they, in the places alleged for the second conclusion, expressly taught our opinion. Whence when Augustine says that neither grace alone nor man alone works, he speaks of the operation by which the consent of choice and the other free acts are immediately produced; but not of the operation according as through it God effects that a man consent and cooperate. For this God alone works, nor does choice itself have a companion or cooperator in it, as the same Augustine teaches in the other places adduced above, when he often inculcates: It is certain that we do when we do, but he makes us do. And according to this sense the other places of Augustine, Bernard and Prosper adduced in the same argument are to be explained and understood, as is gathered from their words and from the others adduced for the second conclusion.

To the fourth it is answered similarly, that God has no other supposite as companion in respect of this effect, which is, by his grace to effect that free choice cooperate and be converted, as is clear from the premises, and therefore that proposition, "God is the adequate and sole cause making a man cooperate and be converted," is true.

To the fifth it is answered that, as was said in the preceding disputation, at the reply to 6, Calvin did not err because he said that free choice has no parts in that operation by which God, by his power and efficacious grace, makes us do: but he erred because, from the fact that God alone makes us do, by a most evil consequence he inferred that it is not in our power either to obey God's motion or to resist it, as was said in disp. 22, n. 30, and disp. 92, n. 13.

To the confirmation it is answered by what was said to the fourth argument.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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