De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.
Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.
Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.
Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.
Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.
Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.
Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.
Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.
Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.
Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.
Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.
Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.
Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.
Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.
Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.
Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.
Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.
Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.
Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.
Whether this causal proposition is true: Because a man prevented by exciting grace wills to be converted, therefore he is helped by God, and is converted; or on the contrary, therefore he is converted because he is helped by God.
I. This question was one of the most important which St. Augustine disputed against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, about which Prosper and Hilary also consulted the same holy Doctor; and it is closely connected with the preceding questions, and not a little necessary for understanding and explaining the efficacy of divine grace.
Those authors, then, who held that the efficacy of prevenient grace, in the respect in which it precedes the cooperation of our free choice, is only moral, and cannot physically predetermine the will to a pious operation while its freedom is preserved, said consequently that although God and the will begin to act at the very same moment of time and of nature, nevertheless God acts because our will acts; and that this is what some mean when they say that the will acts prior in nature to God, not by priority of the instant in which, but of that from which. And according to this doctrine this causal proposition will be true: Because a man wills to consent, therefore he is helped by God; because a man wills to be converted, therefore exciting grace passes into helping, or cooperating, grace. Four classes of arguments can be brought forward for this opinion.
The first class contains the arguments which contend to prove that God, by an absolute and efficacious decree, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the good use of free choice, has not predetermined all our free acts, nor applies our will physically to producing those acts by a prior motion, but leaves it indifferent, so that if it wills it consents, and if it does not will it does not consent. For from this principle, by an evident consequence, it is deduced that this causal proposition is true: Because our will wills to consent and to concur, therefore it is helped by God. But since these arguments were proposed and solved in disp. 18, 22 and 23, it will be superfluous to repeat them in the present place. The reader, if he wishes, can see them in the disputations cited above.
The second class contains the arguments by which they strive to persuade us that free choice, by its sole innate freedom, contributes its influx and cooperates with God who excites, and together with him constitutes one integral total cause with respect to the free operation, comprising two partial causes, as when two men drag a ship; and consequently that the influx of free choice is not to be reduced to God as to a prior cause that is efficient through itself. And to the same class belong the arguments by which they prove that created free choice begins its consent first: for from these it is evidently inferred that this causal proposition is false: Because a man is helped by God, therefore he cooperates and consents; but that this one is true: Because free choice, by its innate freedom, wills to cooperate, therefore it is helped by God. But since all these arguments were adduced and solved in disp. 85 and 97, we refer the reader to that place.
The third class of arguments relies on the reasons by which it is usually proved that created free choice has dominion over its own actions, and consequently that the rights of the natural freedom which God conferred on it require that it consent or dissent of itself, by its innate freedom, when it wills, as it wills, and because it wills; from which those causal propositions at issue in the present disputation immediately follow by infallible deduction. But these arguments will be brought forward more conveniently in book 12, disp. 115 and the two that follow, where the freedom of created choice must be treated.
The fourth class brings forward those arguments by which it is usually proved that God, by a law he has established, confers further helps of helping, or efficacious, grace on those who use well the prior helps of exciting, or sufficient, grace; from which it seems to be inferred that this causal proposition is true: Because a man wills to use well the help of exciting grace, therefore the help of helping grace is conferred on him. But these arguments too were proposed and solved in disp. 58.
II. This argument will be dissolved in disp. 101.— But from the proper matter of this subject an argument can be made in favor of the same opinion. For, as Aristotle says, 1 Posterior Analytics, ch. 3, if the affirmation is the cause of the affirmation, the negation is the cause of the negation: therefore, if this affirmative causal proposition is true, namely: Because a man is helped by God, therefore he is converted; the negation of helping grace will be the cause that he is not converted: and so this causal proposition will be true: Because a man is not helped by God, he is not converted; and consequently it would have to be attributed to God, and not to man, that he is not converted.
The Thomists teach the opposite opinion, which I consider to be the express opinion of St. Augustine, St. Prosper and St. Thomas, and therefore in the present place it must be explained and defended by us.
For an understanding of this it must be supposed, first, that the most important controversy of St. Augustine with Pelagius, and of Saints Prosper and Hilary with the Massilians, was about the help of helping grace, by which God precedes human wills and effects that they freely consent: which is shown thus. First: for St. Augustine, epistle 107 to Vitalis, expressly affirms it, when he says: You recognize, I think, in these things which I said we know, that I did not wish to commemorate all the things that pertain to the Catholic faith, but only those which pertain to this question which is being treated among us concerning the grace of God: whether this grace precedes or follows the will of man, that is, to say it more plainly: whether it is therefore given to us because we will, or through it God also effects this, that we will. Behold, St. Augustine most clearly says that the question concerns the help which precedes the will of man, by which God effects that we will, or by which he effects that we will: therefore the principal controversy was not about prevenient exciting grace, nor about the grace which cooperates with us if we will, but about the help of grace, through which God truly and efficiently makes us will. Moreover, in the book On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Caelestius, ch. 10, the same St. Augustine reports that Pelagius asserted:1 Not by the help of God, but from ourselves in ourselves is a good will effected: and in the same chapter the holy Doctor vehemently attacks Pelagius because he attempted to expound that passage of the Apostle: For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish,2 which he saw to be vehemently contrary to his own dogma, as referring only to the operation which is done by God through the illumination of the intellect and the excitation of the stupefied will, as is clear from the words of the same Augustine adduced above. And in the same book On the Grace of Christ, ch. 47, St. Augustine says several times that his question with Pelagius concerns the help of God's grace. For he says: If therefore he has consented that the will itself and the action are divinely helped, so that without that help we neither will nor do anything, and that this is the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, etc. there will remain, as I think, no controversy among us concerning the help of God's grace; therefore the most important question of St. Augustine with Pelagius was not about exciting grace, but about helping grace. Secondly, this is clear: for Pelagius admitted exciting grace, that is, the illumination of the intellect and the excitation of the will, preceding all the merits of man, as is clear from the very words of Pelagius adduced in disp. 1, num. 6. For he confessed that God3 works in us to will what is good, while he inflames us, given over to earthly desires,4 and, in the manner of mute animals, loving only things present, with the greatness of future glory and the promise of rewards: while by the revelation of wisdom he rouses the stupefied will to the desire of God: while he persuades us of everything that is good, which you elsewhere do not fear to deny. In these words Pelagius not obscurely admits the prevenient illumination of the intellect and the excitation of the will antecedent to human merits: which those words indicate: While we, given over to earthly desires, etc., and those: he rouses the stupefied will, that is, one that works no good work before it is excited, and desires not heavenly but rather earthly things. Whence, when St. Augustine reproaches Pelagius for having asserted that grace is given according to our merits, he speaks of helping grace, by which God effects that we will.
Thirdly: for, as is clear from the passages of St. Augustine adduced, and from the Council of Milevis, can. 4, and from Trent, sess. 6, can. 2, the controversy of St. Augustine with Pelagius was about the grace of Christ, that is, about that grace which is given to us through Christ our Redeemer, as it is distinguished over against the grace conferred on Adam in the state of innocence. For although sufficient grace, which grants a man the ability to act piously5, if he wills, is given to us from the merits of Christ, nevertheless this grace is not distinguished from the help of grace conferred on Adam. But the grace which is proper to Christ is helping grace, by which God makes us will: therefore the most important question with Pelagius was about this grace.
Fourthly. The same can be gathered from the reason by which Pelagius, when convicted, denied prevenient grace, namely because he thought that the freedom of our choice could not cohere with it. But it could not have occurred to Pelagius that the freedom of choice is destroyed by exciting grace, since that has no appearance at all: for if, after God has excited a man, free choice consents if it wills, and does not consent if it does not will, and God through pre-operating grace does not make him consent; how could Pelagius suspect that the freedom of choice is destroyed by prevenient grace? It is a sign, therefore, that he spoke of prevenient helping grace, by which God, after he has excited us, truly and efficiently makes us will and act piously. Concerning this helping grace, then, which is distinguished from exciting grace, the present difficulty proceeds: namely, whether God helps us because we will to act piously, or on the contrary, whether we will because we are helped by God.
In what sense it is true that free choice cooperates with God because it wills.— Secondly it must be noted that this causal proposition: Because a man excited and moved by God wills to consent and to cooperate, therefore he consents and cooperates; can be explained in a twofold sense. The first is that this causal proposition imports the second, or proximate, cause of the consent of choice, and gives the reason of that same consent drawn from the same proximate cause; and in this sense it is most true that our choice, moved by prevenient grace, cooperates and consents because it wills to consent; or because it wills to determine itself to consent, when it could freely have dissented; and in the same sense it is most truly asserted that free choice freely consents because its nature has this, that if it consents, it consents freely and not from necessity. For if it consented from necessity, it would no longer consent as free choice holding itself indifferently toward many things, but as a nature determined to one. Nor on this point is there, or ever was there, any disagreement among Catholic Doctors. The second sense, which pertains to the present disputation, is that according to which that causal proposition imports the first root and the per se efficient cause, to which it is ultimately reduced, that this man, prevented and moved by such exciting grace, consents to God who calls him and cooperates with him. And in this sense it must be said that this causal proposition is false: Because a man wills to consent and to cooperate with God who excites, or to be converted; therefore he consents, cooperates, or is converted. And the reason for this is that, as was said above, the very cooperation of free choice is reduced to God as to a prior per se efficient cause. Hence, if it be asked why Peter, moved by God, is converted, we shall rightly answer, because he wills to be converted; if that causal proposition imports the proximate cause. But if it be asked in turn why he wills to be converted, one must not answer, because he wills, nor must one stop in the faculty of free choice itself, as some think, but one must have recourse to another prior cause, namely the divine will, and say: because God willed that Peter be converted, because God by his efficacious grace made him cooperate: for it is proper to the divine will that it have no cause prior to itself by which it is determined to act, since it is itself the first cause of all existing things, as was said above; but every created will has a prior cause, namely God, on whom it depends in being and in acting.
Free choice is not for that reason helped by God, because it wills to cooperate6.— Let the first conclusion, then, be: This causal proposition is entirely false: Because a man prevented by exciting grace wills to consent and to cooperate, therefore he is helped by God.
Because God works, man cooperates7.— Second conclusion. These causal propositions are true: Because God works, therefore the free choice of man cooperates: Because God helps a man to consent and to be converted, therefore he consents and is converted: Because God wills that man will, therefore man wills. Both conclusions follow from the preceding, and can be proved by all the arguments by which it was shown in disp. 86 that the cooperation of free choice, and its causality with respect to the act of willing, is an effect of God and of his operation in the genus of efficient cause. Both conclusions are likewise established by all the arguments by which it was shown in disp. 18 that God's general concurrence is an immediate influx into second causes, and efficaciously predetermines them to act in conformity with their own nature. The same is confirmed by those passages of Scripture: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy.8 For who distinguishes you?9 and similar passages, with which St. Augustine often triumphed against the Pelagians in the places adduced above: for from them by good consequence it is deduced that a man wills because he is helped by God. But, lest I seem to oppose to the classes of arguments already proposed similar classes drawn from other matters, our opinion is proved from its own proper grounds.
First, by the express authority of St. Augustine, epistle 107 to Vitalis, where he affirms that one of his most important controversies with Pelagius concerned the aforementioned causal proposition, as is clear from the words adduced in num. 2. And in the same epistle the holy Doctor shows that the help of grace is not given to us because we will, but that through it God also effects this, that we will. And in book 3 of the Hypognosticon he says: In every holy work, therefore, the will of God is prior, the will of free choice posterior; that is, God works, man cooperates. But if you say, as you are accustomed to say, that I willed first, and God willed afterwards, you are already making merit, so that grace from works is now no longer grace, but a wage. By these words he openly teaches that grace is given according to our merits, if anything precedes from us on account of which grace itself is conferred: therefore, etc.
They will perhaps answer that Pelagius denied all prevenient grace, even exciting grace; and therefore that this causal proposition cannot pertain to his opinion: Because a man prevented by exciting grace wills to cooperate, therefore he is helped by God. For the causal proposition of Pelagius condemned by Augustine was this: Because a man from the sole powers of nature wills to be converted to God and to act; therefore he is helped by him. But from this causal proposition the other causal propositions about which we dispute are very far removed; namely: Because a man prevented by exciting grace wills to be converted, therefore he is helped by God. For in the causal proposition of Pelagius, nature simply and absolutely precedes all grace, both exciting and helping. Whence Augustine most rightly inferred against Pelagius that grace is given according to our merits. But in the causal proposition with which we are now dealing, grace precedes nature. Whence the whole operation is ultimately reduced to grace, as to the first beginning of our salvation and of any pious operation whatsoever.
But by this solution satisfaction is not given to St. Augustine's argument. First: for, as was shown above, Pelagius in the last state of his heresy conceded the help of interior grace for the ability, but denied the help of grace through which God effects that we will: for the motion, or consent, of the will does not begin physically from exciting grace, but only morally: therefore, if a man excited by God is therefore converted, or helped, because he wills, the first physical beginning of our salvation proceeds from free choice, and consequently salvation and grace will be given according to our merits. Secondly: for the same argument proceeds even if it be asserted that exciting grace precedes the consent of man: for if his free choice, excited by God, is therefore helped because it wills to cooperate, it follows that such cooperation precedes helping grace; whence helping grace would be a handmaid, and not prior to the cooperation of choice and of human merits, and consequently it would have to be said that helping grace is given according to our merits, although the first exciting grace is entirely given gratis. If it be said that Pelagius in the last state of his heresy never admitted that that interior grace, which, pressed by St. Augustine's arguments, he conceded for the ability, is simply necessary for salvation, but only that a man might more easily fulfill through grace the divine commandments which he could simply fulfill through nature; against this there is an efficacious argument: for, as was said in the first foundation, the most important controversy of St. Augustine with Pelagius was not about exciting grace, but about helping grace, by which God truly and efficiently makes us will; and this helping grace Pelagius asserted to be necessary so that a man might more easily fulfill through grace what he could simply fulfill through nature. Thirdly: for at least the Semi-Pelagians, as we saw above, expressly admitted that exciting grace precedes all works of piety;10 yet because they said that helping grace is therefore given to us because a man, prevented by that same exciting grace, wills to cooperate and to consent to God who calls, they are rightly attacked by St. Prosper, in his epistle to Augustine, saying: Whence, because in these remnants of Pelagian depravity a fiber of no mean virulence is nourished, if the beginning of salvation is wrongly placed in man, if the human will is impiously preferred to the divine will, so that one is therefore helped because he willed, and does not therefore will because he is helped: because, he says, he is helped, not because he is excited: therefore in the aforementioned causal proposition they were speaking of helping grace, and not only of exciting grace.
V. Secondly it is proved by reason: for if God helps the will because the will wills, and not the other way round, then God works because the created will cooperates, and not the other way round: and so it follows that the operation of God depends on the created will, and is in some way predetermined by it to concur actually: which is impossible, since no action of a second cause can universally precede the operation of the first agent, as St. Thomas teaches, 3. con. gen. cap. 149.. It is confirmed. What is eternal cannot be dependent on anything temporal; but the efficacious decree of God, by which he determined that Peter be converted at such a time, is eternal; but Peter's cooperation is temporal: therefore the efficacy of the same divine decree cannot depend on the cooperation of Peter's choice: therefore neither can the temporal causality of God, which has its force from the same decree, depend on the causality or cooperation of created choice, although it is not without it: therefore God does not work in time because man cooperates, but the converse. They answer that God does not depend on, nor is determined by, the human will, although he works because that works:11 for God freely created the free will, and could have not created it: and again he freely willed, and decreed from eternity, to concur to the work of the free will when it should will to act: and finally he can also, when he wills, not concur, or, if he wills, bring it about that something be done outside the order established by himself. And so for God to work because the will works is not for God to depend on the creature, but on his eternal institution and will. But this solution does not seem to empty the argument of its force.12 VI. For we contend that it implies a contradiction that God should have willed, or by his providence ordered or instituted, that the efficacy of the eternal decree of his will, by which he made all things whatsoever he willed in heaven and on earth, and his temporal causality, should depend on the causality and cooperation of created choice, or be preceded by it; which nevertheless seems impossible to avoid, if it is once admitted that God works because the created will works. For although God does not work a free act without free choice cooperating, since the free act intrinsically depends on free choice as on its proximate cause, nevertheless God's operation does not depend on the cooperation of choice, or on the free act itself: for a cause does not depend on its effect, but on the contrary the effect depends on its cause; and the opposite would posit a great imperfection in the divine operation, and consequently in God himself, and in the efficacious decree of his will, as is clear from what has been said above.