De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.
Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.
Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.
Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.
Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.
Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.
Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.
Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.
Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.
Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.
Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.
Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.
Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.
Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.
Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.
Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.
Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.
Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.
Whether, supposing exciting grace, the consent or cooperation of free choice is first to be begun by the created will, or rather by the divine will, that is, by the efficacious help of grace operating beforehand.
I. An explanation of this difficulty is very necessary for a full understanding not only of what has been said in the preceding, but also of what will be said below concerning efficacious grace. On this difficulty few things have been written by the Scholastic Doctors; some more recent authors have nonetheless touched on it briefly; and therefore it must be discussed more laboriously in the present place.
Some have said that many expressions not only of the Saints but even of divine Scripture cannot be sufficiently understood and reduced to true practice, if the supernatural consent, even with the excitation posited and the other things prerequisite on man's part, is to be begun by the efficacious will of God, predetermined to one thing. By these words they seem to have signified that the determination of the will, given exciting grace, which only morally moves the will to a free act, is first begun by that same created will, in accordance with its innate freedom. This opinion is proved
First, by the authority of St. Prosper, book 2 On the Calling of the Gentiles, ch. 26, where he says: The grace of God stands foremost in all justifications, persuading by exhortations, etc. But the will of man also is subjected to it and joined to it, which has for this been roused by the aforesaid helps, so that it may cooperate with the divine work in itself, and begin to exercise unto merit what it has conceived unto zeal by the heavenly seed. Behold, he teaches manifestly that, given exciting grace, the created will is the first to begin its cooperation or consent. It is not God, then, who first begins or initiates that same consent. This is confirmed from that of Prover. 16: It is man's part to prepare the heart, and the answer of the tongue is from the Lord. But to prepare the heart is to begin the good: therefore it is man's free choice that physically begins the good act by which he is prepared for justifying grace.
Secondly: for by the very fact that God gave man free choice, and willed him to act freely, he set him in the hand of his own counsel, Ecclus. 15, so that out of his innate freedom he determine himself to whichever part he wills: therefore it is choice itself that begins its determination to the one part or the other, when it wills and as it wills: God, then, does not first begin it through efficacious grace.
II. Thirdly. God, after he has gone before man with his exciting grace, waits for the will itself to will; according to that of Is. 30: The Lord waits, that he may have mercy on you. And Apoc. 3: Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if any man shall open to me, I will come in and sup with him, and he with me: therefore it is the will of man, roused by God, that begins its own willing. The consequence is clear: for if God, prior in causality to the will, began that willing, he would not be said to wait for the will to will; for no one waits for what he himself effects, but for what another does.
Fourthly. If it were not in the power of the created will to begin this willing unless God first begins, it follows that, absolutely speaking, it is not in its power to will and not to will, but only in the power of God, who, when he wills, begins the act of the will, and when he does not will, does not begin it; and so man in truth would not have free choice. The consequence is proved: for to will and not to will cannot be in the power of the created will unless the beginning also of the act of willing or not willing is in its power: for the act of the will is indivisible: therefore if its beginning is not in our power, but in the power of God, the whole act will be in the power of God, and not in the power of our will.
Fifthly. The beginning of the act of willing is not really distinguished from the act of willing itself: but in no prior, even of nature, does God effect the act of willing before our free choice concurs effectively to it: otherwise our choice, in order to the act of willing, would comport itself merely passively, receiving that act produced by God alone, which is the heresy of Luther, as has been said above: therefore the first beginning of the act of willing, and its initiation, is not from God antecedently to the free concurrence and cooperation of our choice.
It is confirmed: for from this St. Augustine proves that the first beginning of faith is not in us from us, but from God;1 for otherwise the whole of faith in us would be from us: for he who could establish for himself what he did not have, could himself increase and perfect what he has begun: therefore, if God, antecedently to the cooperation of our choice, begins in us the very willing, God will also work in us the whole of that willing, and perfect it, antecedently to the free cooperation of our choice: and so our choice would comport itself merely passively, receiving a free act produced efficiently by God alone, which nevertheless, as is clear from the Council of Trent, cannot be affirmed without prejudice to the faith.
III. Sixthly: for Calvin, whose doctrine has been condemned in the holy Council of Trent, denied on this ground that the liberty of choice is in us, because he believed that the consent of our choice is begun by efficacious grace. Calvin's words are:2 Accordingly, as Christ previously denied that men are fit for believing unless they be drawn, so now he pronounces the grace of the Spirit efficacious, by which they are drawn, so that they believe of necessity. By these two members the whole faculty of free choice is utterly overturned: for if we begin to come to Christ only then, when the Father has drawn us, the beginning of faith is in no way in us, nor is there any preparation. Again, if all come whom the Father has taught, he does not give them merely the option of believing, but faith itself. Therefore, that we spontaneously obey the direction of the Spirit, this is a part of grace, and as it were a seal: because God would not draw us, if, with hand merely outstretched, he left our will hanging in the middle. Properly, however, he is said to draw us when he extends the power of his Spirit even to the full effect of faith. And book 2 of the Institutes, ch. 3, n. 10, he says: In this manner, therefore, the Lord both begins and perfects the good work in us: so that it is his, that the will conceives the love of what is right, that it is inclined to the zeal of it, that it is stirred and moved to the effort of pursuing it. Then, that the choice, the zeal, the effort do not fail, but proceed even to the effect. Finally, that man goes on in them constantly, and perseveres even to the end. In these words he says first, that through efficacious grace we begin to come and to will: so that our willing begins first from the drawing grace itself. Secondly, that the beginning of faith is not in us, that is, in our power, but in the sole power of God who draws. Thirdly, that no preparation precedes in us, in order that God may draw us. Fourthly, that God does not give those who believe the option of believing or not believing, but faith itself. Fifthly, that God would not draw us, if, with hand merely outstretched, he left our will hanging in the middle. From these by an evident consequence he inferred that to obey, or to consent to, the grace of God, is not of our choice, but is the effect of that same grace, and as it were its seal, and consequently that man does not have free choice: therefore it must not be conceded that grace is what first begins or initiates our consent.
Seventhly. The whole act of willing is vital, even its first physical beginning: but it is impossible that a vital act be produced, or begun, by God alone antecedently to the concurrence of the vital power; for such an act expresses an intrinsic order to the vital power, as St. Thomas teaches in many places: therefore the first beginning of the act of willing cannot be from God effectively, nor be begun by efficacious help antecedently to the free cooperation of our choice.
IIII. Eighthly. In no prior, whether of time or of nature, does God attain the very first beginning of willing, in which he does not attain it effectively through our free choice; otherwise nothing would be left to be produced by that choice, since that act is indivisible: therefore God through efficacious grace does not first begin the very willing; but God himself and free choice together effect that beginning, as also the whole act of willing.
These arguments, and others which are commonly multiplied by various authors, have persuaded some that the opposite opinion is difficult and almost unintelligible: but from their solution, and from the explanation of the ancient doctrine of the Saints, especially of Augustine and of Thomas, with God's favor the matter will be so plain to all that they will contribute greatly to confirming that same doctrine.
V. For its evidence, all that has been said and explained above concerning God's general concurrence with second causes must be presupposed,3 as also what we have noted concerning partial causes in disput. 85. For it has been shown that God and free choice are not partial causes of the consent of that choice, like two men dragging a ship, of whom neither is moved by the other, or predetermined by him to concur with him; but that both God and free choice are the total cause of that same consent: God indeed as first cause, choice however as second and proximate cause, essentially subordinated to God himself not only in being but also in acting.
Secondly, it must be presupposed, from the common opinion not only of the Scholastics but also of the holy Fathers, defined at the Council of Trent against the Lutherans, that our choice truly, efficiently and freely cooperates with God moving it by efficacious grace, with a true faculty toward either side, namely by which it can consent and dissent, if it wills. For although with the efficacious motion of God, by which he moves free choice to consent, it does not stand together that that choice actually dissent: nevertheless with that same motion, however efficacious, there stands together in the same choice a true faculty and power by which it can dissent, if it wills, as will be made manifest below in its place by the most evident testimonies of the Saints and by theological reasons.
Thirdly, it must be presupposed that all Catholic Doctors, even those with whom we dispute, agree in this, that God by his prevenient grace first begins and initiates whatever beginning of our salvation there is, namely insofar as by his exciting grace he goes before our willing, and the very consent and cooperation of free choice. For this has been defined in every opinion at the Second Council of Orange, can. 4 and 6, and at Trent, sess. 6, On Justification, ch. 5 and 6, where it is said: But they are disposed to that very justice, when, roused and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God. And the same is defined in can. 1 and 3 of the same session. But since God, by exciting or persuading grace alone, or by grace that only morally moves man's free choice, does not physically, or truly efficiently, begin the free consent itself and our willing, but only morally, by alluring, inviting and metaphorically drawing; the difficulty remains, by what our willing is first begun physically, or truly efficiently, whether by efficacious grace or by our free choice; or whether it must be said to be begun by both together, so that grace, or God, through efficacious grace does not begin that consent prior in nature to our free choice's concurring to it, nor on the other hand does our choice concur prior in nature to efficacious grace. In order that this may be explained by us more clearly
VI. The priority of causality can be explained in two ways.— It must be noted fourthly that in the present matter the initiation of the choice's consent is not to be attended to, or taken, according to priority of time, but according to priority of causality: for in one and the same instant of time God and free choice, roused and moved by divine grace, simultaneously begin, attain and produce that very willing, or consent of that choice. God indeed as first cause, choice however as proximate cause, subordinated to God not only in being but also in acting. Now the priority of causality can be explained in two ways. First, so that in some prior of nature the free act is understood to be begun by God alone, before our free choice concurs to it. Secondly, so that the priority of causality be attended to only between the causality of God and the causality of our choice, in respect of the consent of that choice, by reason of which the cooperation of our choice is an effect of the divine causality, or cooperation; and consequently so that this causal statement be true: Because God works, man cooperates; because God effects that the created choice consent and will, therefore it consents and wills. For its fuller explanation it must be considered that the first cause includes two things. For it has it that it is first, and according to this it expresses a relation to the second cause, which it moves and applies to act. It has also that it is a cause, and according to this it expresses a relation to the effect, or operation, which it produces through the second cause. Similarly also in the second cause these two accounts, or relations, are distinguished: for insofar as it is second, it expresses a relation to the first cause, by which it is moved and applied to act; but insofar as it is a cause, it expresses a relation to the effect, or operation, which, moved and assisted by God, it produces. In the first cause, however, the relation to the second cause is understood prior to the relation to the effect which it effects through that same second cause. Similarly also in the second cause there is prior in account the relation to the first cause, by which it is moved, than the relation to the effect which it produces, because the second cause does not move unless moved by the first, as has been shown in disput. 18 and 23.
From this it is inferred that, when God by his helping grace cooperates with us to will and to perfect, his operation regards two things, namely our will, which he moves efficaciously to do this, and our very willing, which he effects together with the will itself. Our will, however, has only one respect in which it acts, namely in comparison with the free act, or effect, which it produces, since it does not flow into itself antecedently to the production of the free act: but it flows only together with God and helping grace into the free act itself.
First conclusion, then. If the priority of causality be taken according to the relation which the first and the second cause express to the effect they produce, or to the free act; it must be said that God does not physically begin our willing prior in nature or in causality than our choice concurs to it. This conclusion is effectively proved by several of the arguments set out from the beginning: for since God does not work that willing except through our free will, which he moves and applies so that it may will, and adjusts his concurrence in the second cause itself in conformity with its nature; it is impossible that God in any prior of time or of nature effect in us that very willing, or anything of it, in which our free choice does not concur to effecting it.
How it is to be understood that God begins our willing prior in nature.— Second conclusion. If the priority of causality be taken according to the immediate relation which the first cause expresses to the second cause, and the second cause to the first, by which it is premoved and predetermined to act; it must be said that the consent of our choice is first begun physically by God alone, insofar as by efficacious motion he effects that we will: nor is it to be admitted that the created will begin it first, but it must necessarily be confessed that the causality of our choice is later in the order of reason than the causality of God, and is its effect. And so, prior in reason to our free choice's causing, acting or willing, God by his grace effects that the choice itself cause, act and will.
This conclusion is proved first from the Second Council of Orange, can. 25, where it is said thus: This too we profitably profess and believe, that in every good work we do not begin, and afterwards are helped by the mercy of God: but he himself, with no good merits preceding, first inspires in us both faith and the love of himself. Behold, the Council says that in every good work we do not begin: therefore it is God who begins and initiates, by effecting that we will. And can. 9: As often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work. And can. 20: Many good things are done in man which man does not do; but man does no good thing which God does not grant him to do. From these places it is held that the causality of free choice, in respect of consent and of any pious operation whatever, is an effect of the divine causality, or operation: and consequently that the divine causality is prior, according to the order of reason, to the causality of our choice: therefore it is God who first begins. Likewise we are taught at the Council of Trent, sess. 6, On Justification, ch. 16, that Christ, as the head into the members, and as the vine into the branches, pours power into the justified themselves, which power always goes before, accompanies and follows their good works. If it always goes before: therefore it first begins our conversion, by effecting that we consent.
Secondly it is proved from that collect of the Church: We beseech thee, Lord, go before our actions by inspiring them, and pursue them by helping them; that all our prayer and work may always begin from thee, and, once begun, be finished through thee. Therefore it is God who will first begin.
Thirdly it is proved by the authority of the Saints, especially of Aug., who says: He, namely God, works that we may will, by beginning; who cooperates with them that will, by perfecting,4 that is, he confers on us without us the prevenient efficacious grace, by which the work of conversion begins, not only by alluring the will and rousing it to consent, as certain men perversely interpret, but by truly effecting that the choice freely cooperate and consent: and after a few words: That we may will, therefore, he works without us; but when we will, and so will as to do, he works with us: yet without him, either working that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we can do nothing for the good works of piety. Expounding this passage, Capreolus, on 2 Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, art. 3, ad 12, speaks thus: By these words, if they be well considered, it is clear that he distinguishes a twofold manner of God's working in respect of our good willing. One is proper to him, in which our will does not cooperate, namely, to make us will. Therefore he says: That we may will, therefore, he works without us: without us, I say, working, namely, that we may will: because although the will wills and causes the volition, it does not nevertheless make itself will, or cause the volition. Nor yet, because God does it, does the will therefore not cause; but rather for this very reason it causes. And therefore, to exclude that, Augustine, in On Correction and Grace, ch. 7, concerning the sons of God, of whom the Apostle says that they are led by the Spirit of God, says: For they are led, that they may act, not that they themselves do nothing. Another manner is common to him and to the will, namely, to cause the volition. Therefore he says: When we will, he works with us; and because both are necessary to us, nor does either alone suffice for willing well, therefore he adds: Yet without him working, that we may will, etc. Likewise in On True Innocence: As often as, he says, we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work. Likewise in the same work: Many good things God does in man which man does not do: but man does nothing which God does not do, that man may do it. Augustine therefore holds that God first begins our conversion, not indeed without us cooperating at the same time, but without us making ourselves will and cooperate. And he teaches the same more expressly in book 2 Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 8, where he says: For if without the grace of God the desire of good begins through ourselves, that very beginning will be a merit, to which the help of grace should come as it were by debt. And adducing in confirmation of this that of John 15, Without me you can do nothing, he adds: That he might answer even these future men, he did not say: Without me you can perfect nothing; but, do. For if he had said to perfect, these men could say that the help of God is necessary not for beginning the good, which is from us, but for perfecting it. But let them hear the Apostle also. For the Lord, when he said, Without me you can do nothing, by this one word comprehended both the beginning and the end: but the Apostle, as the expounder of the Lord's sentence, distinguished both more openly, saying: Because he who has begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus. And a little below: They are deceived by not understanding well, namely the Pelagians, so as to think that to prepare the heart, that is, to begin the good, belongs to man without the help of the grace of God. According to Augustine, therefore, for beginning a good work the help of grace is required, by which God effects that man begin that good work: which he also shows in ch. 8 following. St. Prosper teaches the same, when he says:5 Who would doubt that free choice then obeys the call of him who calls, when the grace of God has begotten in it the affection of believing and obeying? Otherwise it would suffice that man be admonished, and not that a new will be made in him also; as it is written: The will is prepared by the Lord; and as the Apostle says: For it is God who works in you both to will and to perfect, for a good will. For that good will, unless it be the one God has wrought in them, so that what he had given them to will, he might give them also to do? And in his letter to Augustine he says that the man evil from his origin is wrongly believed to begin the reception of good not from the supreme good but from himself. He holds, therefore, that God first begins the good work. To this opinion that saying especially favors which Sixtus of Siena reports from Chrysostom:67 That whatever good we have, we have from the benignity of grace that goes before, calls, and always begins; and that there is no merit in us which is not the gift of God; whose goodness is indeed so great that it wills those things to be our merits which are its own gifts. Bernard agrees, when he says:8 To this end, surely, prevenient grace is given, that thereafter free choice may cooperate with it, yet in such a way that what has been begun by grace alone is perfected by both together, so that they work jointly, not singly; together, not in turn through the individual advances.
Fourthly it is proved by reason: for the causality of the influx, and the cooperation of free choice, by which it wills to cooperate with God moving it, and does cooperate, is an effect of God and of efficacious help in the genus of efficient cause, as has been shown above: therefore in the order of nature and of causality the operation of God is prior to the cooperation of free choice; therefore God himself begins the consent of the choice, by moving it to cooperate.
VIII. Sixthly it is proved. Free choice cooperates with God, and with his grace, by following after: for Pope Gelasius says, whom we have already adduced above:9 What Christian would dare to say that he has anything good without grace, when the Teacher of the Gentiles cries out, concluding all good things in himself: By the grace of God I am what I am; and: The grace of God in me was not in vain?10 that he might show that he did not go before the gift of grace, but followed after it; and might show that he is a cooperator with grace, by following after. And St. Gregory teaches the same, hom. 9 on Ezekiel: With grace, he says, going before, and the good will following after, that which is the gift of Almighty God becomes our merit. Which Paul well explains in a brief sentence, saying: I labored more than all of them: who, lest he should seem to have attributed to his own power what he had done, added: Yet not I, but the grace of God with me, etc. As if he should say, in the good work I labored, not I, but also I. For in this, that I was gone before by the gift of the Lord alone, not I: but in this, that I followed the will of the Lord, also I. And in book 33 of the Morals, ch. 20, he openly teaches that our free choice cooperates with God by following after: therefore God, and his efficacious grace, cooperates with that same choice, by going before it and by preceding it in the order of causality.
Seventhly. If it is the created will that first begins its consent, when it wills and as it wills, according to its innate freedom; it follows that the proximate beginning of our salvation, by which the just man is distinguished from the sinner, is in us from us; and consequently that what is imperfect and invalid would be from God, while what is perfect and firm would have to be attributed to nature, and not to grace; which nevertheless, without prejudice to the faith, no one can concede. The consequence is proved: for the consent of free choice cooperating with God who calls is a preparation, or proximate disposition, to justification, as is held from the Council of Trent: therefore if the first beginning of this consent, and its initiation, is from us according to the innate liberty of choice, and God only begins that consent by rousing and alluring our will to it; it follows that the proximate beginning of salvation is from nature, and not from prevenient grace.
Why the created will is not the first free being.— It is confirmed. If it is the created will that first begins its consent, it follows that it is the first free being, the first root and the first cause of its own determination. But the consequent is not to be granted; for since every created free being is free by participation, it must necessarily be reduced, as to a prior cause, to the first free being, which is such by essence, namely to God: otherwise there would be given two first principles, as we deduced above from St. Thomas.11
Certain men answer that it does not follow that a free will, so acting, is the first free being, unless there be a great equivocation in this word: for that is properly called the first free being which is free by essence, or which has a liberty wholly independent of another: but neither of these belongs to the created will, since it has no liberty except what is participated from the liberty of God, and dependent on it in its determinations. If, however, the first free being be called that agent from which, in its own genus, a free determination first is; then it is true that every free will can in its own genus be called the first root of its determination, because namely without it it cannot come about, nor otherwise than from its intrinsic and free application. But this, they say, is a most improper acceptance of this word; and therefore it is not to be used, nor to be attributed to the created will.
This solution, however, seems to evade the difficulty of the argument: for it not only proves that a free will, in its own genus, that is, in the genus of proximate cause, is the first root and cause of its determination (which all confess), but it also concludes that, without any addition, it must be called the first cause of its determination, if the initiation of that same free determination is first from the created will itself, and not from God effecting through efficacious help that the will determine itself: for the first efficient cause of any operation is that from which the operation first begins, and which has no other prior cause of that same operation, concerning which many things have been said in disp. 24, n. 17 and 18.
IX. To the first argument it is answered that that passage of Prosper favors our opinion rather than the opposite. For immediately after the words alleged he adds: Having it from his own mutability, if he fails; from the help of grace, if he advances. And in the following ch. 28 he adds that God gives the very willing. And elsewhere he says expressly that God by his grace first begins and starts, by subjecting the human will to himself.12 I add that by the name of excitation Prosper comprehended efficacious grace, by which God makes that we do; works that we work; which is gathered from the words adduced; for he says: But the will of man is subjected to it and joined to it, that it may cooperate with the divine work in itself, namely by following after the divine cooperation.
To the confirmation it is answered that it is man's part to prepare the heart, yet not without the help of grace, by which God effects that man himself prepare the heart. Whence Augustine, book 2 Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 8: That which is written, he says, it is man's part to prepare the heart, they are deceived by not understanding well, so as to think that to prepare the heart, that is, to begin the good, belongs to man without the help of the grace of God. And attacking this false understanding he adds: Far be it that the sons of promise so understand it, etc. Far be it that any so understand it except the proud defenders of their own choice and the deserters of the Catholic faith. For it is written for this reason: It is man's part to prepare the heart, and the answer of the tongue is from the Lord; because man prepares the heart, yet not without the help of God, who touches the heart: which he proves there most copiously, and in the following ch. 9, by many testimonies of Scripture. Which can also be confirmed from that of Acts 16: And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple of the city of the Thyatirans, a worshipper of God, heard, whose heart the Lord opened, to attend to the things that were said by Paul. If, then, God by his grace touches the heart, that it may attend to the things that are preached; much more will the same help be necessary, that he may begin the good works that are preached.
To the second argument it is answered that man is not so set in the hand of his own counsel that, without God deliberating beforehand and predetermining, he determine himself to whichever part he wills, according to his innate freedom, by first beginning his own act: nor does created liberty demand this, as has been said above and will be explained more fully below; but because, from the free judgment of reason, he determines himself to the one part, as a second and proximate determiner, under the powerful hand of the first determiner, which is God. According to this doctrine is to be understood the passage adduced from Ecclus. 15, as is clear from what has been said in disput. 21, n. 11. Thus St. Augustine explains it, book On the Proceedings of Pelagius, ch. 3, cited in disput. 91, n. 9, p. 608, where he speaks thus: It is manifest that if he puts his hand to the fire, and evil and death please him, it is the will of man that works this: but if he loves good and life, not the will alone does it, but it is divinely assisted. For the eye suffices to itself for not seeing, that is, for darkness; but for seeing, it does not suffice to itself by its own light, unless the help of a clear light be furnished to it from without.
To the third it is answered that God, after he has roused us, does not wait for our will—which is in us from us—to be willing to be cleansed, but for our will, or cooperation, which is in us from God effecting that we will to cooperate.
To the fourth it is answered that to will and not to will is in our power as in a proximate cause; but to will the good is reduced to God as to a prior efficient cause of free choice's concurrence, as has been said above.
To the fifth it is answered that it only concludes that the act of willing is not in any prior from God in which it does not proceed efficiently from the created will, moved by God: it does not, however, prove that the causality of God, which effects that our will cooperate and consent, is not prior in the order of nature to the free cooperation of that same will.
To the confirmation it is answered that, just as the first initiation and the first beginning of faith, and of any other good work whatever, is from God moving, so also the whole act of faith, and of any other virtue whatever, is from God moving, and this alone is concluded from that reasoning of St. Augustine. Nor does it follow from this that our free choice comports itself merely passively in order to consent, because God does not produce that consent in us without us freely cooperating and consenting.
X. Wherein Calvin's error consists.— To the sixth it is answered that Calvin did not err because he said that God through efficacious grace first begins and starts our willing, and gives faith itself to those who believe: nor did he err because he asserted that no preparation precedes in us, in order that God by his efficacious help may draw us to himself: but he erred because he held that God so gives us faith itself by his efficacious grace that our will does not freely cooperate with God moving it, but only with a spontaneous and not coerced motion. He erred besides, because from this Catholic antecedent, that it is God who first begins our willing, he inferred by a most wicked consequence that it is not in our power either to obey the motion of God or to resist it, as has been said above.
To the seventh it is answered by what has been said concerning the second conclusion, and to the confirmation of the fifth argument.