De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.
Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.
Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.
Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.
Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.
Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.
Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.
Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.
Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.
Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.
Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.
Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.
Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.
Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.
Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.
Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.
Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.
Whether the good use, or the cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God exciting and calling it, proceeds from its alone and innate freedom,
I. This difficulty is closely akin to the preceding one; but for its fuller explanation I judged it necessary to treat it under the terms proposed. Some say that if the good use is taken for the free operation itself, or for the act of the will which a man moved by God through exciting grace elicits, then nothing is found in such a good use that proceeds from its alone and innate freedom, but whatever of entity or of formal character is in it proceeds together from God as from the more principal efficient cause. If, however, the good use is taken for the actual influx itself, by which free choice, as a partial cause, as they say, flows together with God into the same act, they assert that a good use of this kind proceeds from the alone and innate freedom of choice; and consequently that it is to be reduced to that same freedom, and not to God. Hence they also lay down this assertion: if two persons equal in all things in every respect look upon the same beautiful woman, it can happen from the alone freedom of choice of each that one consents to sin by desiring her, while the other does not; and the same reasoning holds for those affected in the same way and equally called by God to the faith: for from their freedom alone it can happen that one embraces the faith and the other despises it. They also concede, and say it must not be doubted, that many are tormented in hell who were endowed by God with far greater helps unto salvation than many who enjoy the divine presence in heaven, etc. But that these, predestined with greater helps, were not saved, while those, predestined with lesser helps, were saved, came from no other source than that the former, by their innate freedom, were unwilling so to use their choice as to obtain salvation, while the latter were most willing. By saying "came from no other source" they clearly signify that it proceeds from the alone and innate freedom not only that one man with greater helps dissents and is damned, but also that another with lesser helps consents and is saved. To explain this more fully they add: that likewise of two who are gone before and moved by an equal motion of grace, one consents, concurs with grace, elicits the act, and is converted, while the other does not—this certainly proceeds only from the innate, proper, and intrinsic freedom of each, common to good and evil, to reprobate and predestined. But to temper the rigor of these assertions they say that, if one must speak in the utmost rigor, when equal helps of prevenient grace are given to two adults, one must not absolutely affirm that with equal helps one of them is converted and the other is not converted, unless one adds and says "of prevenient grace." For when one of them is converted by his own freedom, the help of prevenient grace conferred on him already has in him a new influx of cooperating grace together with his choice, which it does not have in the other. Nor again must one affirm, when equal helps of prevenient grace exist in two adults, that one of them is converted by his alone freedom and the other not; since, although that conversion depends on freedom and is brought about by the choice according to its freedom, it is nevertheless not brought about by its freedom alone, but with the simultaneous cooperation of the help of prevenient grace through the influx from which it takes the character of cooperating grace; although, since it is at hand and accompanies prevenient grace dependently on the cooperation of choice, only the cooperation of our free choice is required. This opinion is proved.
II. First. For Justin Martyr, in the Responses to the Christians on necessary questions, in the response to the eighth, openly teaches this in the following words: The question was: If we have received from God the knowledge of good and evil, and likewise of our condition, how comes it that he is not the cause of either, who for the sake of explaining them has implanted in us, as it were by nature, both the notion and the power of both? Justin's explanation, or response, follows: God not only gave us that power, that we might exist and know good and evil and do them, but he also granted us free choice and gave us the power of choosing that which seemed good in accordance with the presentation of the things that are known; nor did he place our virtue or vice in the knowledge of the things that are known, but in the election of the things that are chosen. God, therefore, is not the cause of our virtue and of our vice, but our purpose and will. For as he who sees a harlot and knows her to be a harlot is not a fornicator from that knowledge and cognition; but if the will assents to the motion,1 then at last he is a fornicator,2 either in deed or in affection; so too it is not the knowledge that is the cause of men being good or evil, but the will, which from the presentation of things has followed what seemed good. By these words he teaches that our virtue and our vice are not to be referred to God—since he bestows on us the powers by which we exercise them and the natural knowledge of vice and virtue—but to our own choice and to ourselves, who freely bend it to one side or the other, as to their particular and most proper cause.
Secondly it is argued: for the chief foundation on which Calvin asserted that man does not cooperate freely with God exciting and moving him is that God, through the efficacious help of divine grace, effects in him the very concurrence of the will.3 For he says that grace is not merely offered by the Lord, to be received or rejected by each one's free choice, but that it is grace itself which forms both the choice and the will in the heart, so that whatever good work follows is its fruit and effect; nor does it have a will obedient to it other than the one it has made. He proves this by the authority of Augustine, who says that the Lord draws men by their own wills, but by wills which he himself has wrought; and in another place: Every good work in us is wrought by grace alone. Therefore the opinion which asserts that the good use of free choice is to be reduced to God as to a prior cause efficient of itself seems to favor Calvin's error.
Thirdly it is argued, from the authority of St. Aug., De Civitate Dei, bk. 12, c. 6, where he teaches the opinion set forth above; for he says that if two persons equal in all things in every respect look upon the same beautiful woman, it can happen from the alone freedom of choice of each that one consents to sin by desiring her, while the other does not: therefore the same can happen with respect to consent or dissent in those who are equally called by God. Therefore he who consents to God exciting consents by his alone and innate freedom: therefore the influx of free choice, by which it assents to God exciting, must not be reduced to God as to a prior cause efficient of itself, but to the alone and innate freedom of created choice.
Fourth. Because, although no one can believe or repent or love as is necessary for salvation unless divine grace goes before him, nevertheless the help of grace is not the sole and entire cause that faith is assented to; since, any prevenient grace whatever being posited, man always remains free, so that through his free choice he can fail to consent, as is defined in the Council of Trent:4 therefore he who assents to God calling assents by his alone and innate freedom, and similarly he who dissents effects it by the same alone and innate freedom; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
III. Fifth. The consent of the will does not have it that it is a free act insofar as it proceeds from God or from prevenient grace, but only has it that it is free, and consequently a work of virtue worthy of praise, insofar as it proceeds from the innate, proper, and intrinsic freedom of created choice, common to good and evil, to reprobate and predestined, in whose power it is established to consent or to dissent to God calling: therefore such consent, insofar as it is formally an influx of free choice, must be reduced to the alone freedom of created choice, and not to God or to prevenient grace itself as to a prior cause efficient of itself. The consequence is clear: since no other efficient cause of that consent can be given except the freedom of choice and prevenient grace, or God operating through prevenient grace: therefore if the consent of free choice, insofar as it is a free act, is not reduced to God or to the help of prevenient grace as to a cause efficient of itself, it must be reduced only to the freedom of created choice. And the antecedent is proved: for that consent, insofar as it is chiefly from God cooperating at the same time through grace, only has it that it is supernatural and such as is necessary for salvation: therefore, insofar as it proceeds from God cooperating through grace, it does not formally have it that it is a free act: therefore, etc.
Sixth it is argued. That good use is proper to free choice itself, and therefore on account of it man is worthy of praise and of the reward of eternal life, just as when the use is evil, on account of it he is worthy of blame. Hence Bernard says:5 What is less in us, he supplies—God, namely—yet that little, whatever it is that is ours, he does not suffer to be kept back. And the Council of Trent says: We are truly named and are just, receiving justice in ourselves, each one his own, according to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes to each as he wills, and according to each one's own disposition and cooperation.67 And afterwards it anathematizes those who say: The good works of a justified man are so much the gifts of God that they are not also the good merits of the justified man himself:8 therefore that good use, or influx of choice, proceeds from its alone and innate freedom; otherwise it would not be proper to free choice, but common to it and to God.
IIII. Seventh. It is in the power of free choice to use exciting grace well, or not to use it, as it pleases it; since it uses it altogether freely: therefore, when it uses it well, it effects this by its own freedom: therefore it must be reduced to the alone created freedom that, since a man can fail to use grace, he uses it well: therefore the good use of free choice proceeds from its alone and innate freedom.
Eighth. In order for a man to use exciting grace well, a new grace is not required, but only that free choice will to use it and to cooperate with it; otherwise exciting grace and sufficient help would not be truly sufficient for conversion and for salvation: therefore the good use of exciting grace is not effectively from that grace itself, and consequently will not be effectively from God, since God effects nothing effectively in man pertaining to salvation except through grace: therefore the good use of grace is effectively from the alone and innate freedom of man.
Ninth. This causal statement is true: Man does not use exciting grace well because he does not will to: therefore this one will likewise be true: Man uses exciting grace well because he wills to. For whenever a negation is the cause of a negation, the affirmation must also be the cause of the affirmation: therefore the alone freedom of created choice is the cause of the good use of grace, and so it will not be reduced to God as to a prior cause efficient of itself.
Tenth. God does not attain the good use of free choice in any prior point of time or of nature before free choice produces that same good use; otherwise, since that use is indivisible, the whole would be produced by God alone, and nothing would be left to be produced by created choice itself, and consequently it would conduct itself merely passively, receiving in itself a free act efficiently produced by God alone: which is repugnant both to the freedom of that same choice and to the doctrine of the Council of Trent:9 therefore the good use proceeds from the alone and innate freedom, if the word "alone" excludes only another prior cause efficient of itself.
This is confirmed. God does not produce that good use immediately, but mediately, since he produces it through free choice, and not otherwise, in that the good use is a vital action, which cannot then be produced except by a vital second cause: therefore no prior point can be assigned in which God attains that same good use antecedently to the concurrence of free choice: therefore that good use does not have any cause efficient of itself prior to free choice in causing; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
Eleventh, it is proved by all the arguments with which in Disputations 22 and 23 we contended to prove that God by the help of pre-operating grace does not predetermine free choice to the good use of exciting grace: for from this it is manifestly deduced that that same good use is not to be reduced to God, or to the actual help of divine grace, as to a prior cause in causing; which the arguments adduced in Disputation 18 also seem to conclude, to persuade that God's general concurrence is not God's immediate influx into the cause, but an influx simultaneous with the second cause into its operation.
V. This opinion, however, must be rejected; and although it remains sufficiently refuted by what was said in Disputations 36, 82, and 86, for greater abundance of doctrine three conclusions are laid down.
First conclusion. The good use of free choice, by which it consents to God calling and exciting, does not proceed effectively from its alone and innate freedom, but must necessarily be reduced to God himself as to a prior cause operating through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, and effecting that man cooperate freely. A prior cause, I say, not indeed by priority of time, but of reason only and of causality, namely so that this causal statement be true: Because God operates by going before the free influx of created choice in the order of reason and of causality, while free choice itself, following after, cooperates. The conclusion is proved by all the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 36 that the good use of the helps of grace, insofar as it emanates from free choice, is an effect of predestination: and the same is established from what was said in Disputation 82. Furthermore it is proved from the Council of Sens, in which it is thus decreed:10 For it is necessary that one approaching God first believe, aided by the gift of divine grace, and then intend good works, in effecting which both free choice operates and grace: yet first and more principally grace. When it says "yet first and more principally grace," it declares plainly enough that the good use of free choice, and all works of piety, are to be attributed to grace itself not only more principally, or as to the more principal cause, but also first, that is, as to the prior efficient cause:11 which the preceding words do not obscurely intimate, namely: In effecting which both free choice operates and grace. The Council therefore holds that the good use of free choice is to be reduced to God himself, and to the aid of efficacious grace, as to the prior cause efficient of itself.
VI. The authority of the Apostle, "Who discerns thee?" is weighed.— Secondly it is proved by the authority of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 4: For who discerns thee? But what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it? By this testimony St. Aug. shows that it is not to the alone and innate freedom, which is common to good and evil, to elect and reprobate, that it is to be referred that free choice gives assent to God exciting and calling to the faith, but to the aid of divine grace, through which it comes about that one man uses his choice well, believing in God, and is discerned from another who persists in unbelief: for thus he says:12 For are men discerned from men by these gifts which are common to all men? But here he said first: Who discerns thee? and then he adds: But what hast thou that thou hast not received? For a man puffed up against another could say: My faith discerns me, my justice; or whatever else. Meeting such thoughts, the good doctor says: But what hast thou, that thou hast not received? From whom, if not from him who discerns thee from another, to whom he did not give what he gave to thee? But if thou hast received it, he says, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it? Is it, I ask, he says, anything else than that he who glories should glory in the Lord? But nothing is so contrary to this sense as that anyone should so glory in his own merits as though he himself had made them for himself, and not the grace of God; but the grace which discerns the good from the evil, not that which is common to good and evil. If, according to Augustine's opinion, the grace which discerns the good from the evil is not that which is common to good and evil, then it must by no means be conceded that the good use of free choice, by which the good are discerned from the evil, comes solely from the innate, proper, and intrinsic freedom of each, common to good and evil, to reprobate and predestined.
They answer that there is nothing in our justification, no work or action discerning us from another, that is from us and not at the same time and chiefly from God, who raises it to supernatural being through his helps and gifts: for whatever is seen in the justified is wholly a supernatural gift of God, whether they cooperate with it through their choice or not; and for that reason Paul rightly says, Who discerns thee? as if naming the author and chief cause of the gifts by which you surpass others and differ from them. Nevertheless, they say, it must be conceded that there is given in the justified something supernatural, discerning them from the impious, which, not simply but precisely insofar as it emanates from free choice as from a part of the entire cause, and insofar as it has the character of the proper concurrence of free choice, is to be referred to the alone innate freedom of that same choice, and not to God, except as to the author of nature and of that same choice, who conferred on us that faculty, that in that way we might freely cooperate with him in our good actions, and that for that reason they should redound to our praise and merit, as being in that way in our power: nor does the Apostle intend to deny this. For this is why he who is justified, and who after receiving justice cooperates with grace and merits its increase, is worthy of praise and to be honored by the heavenly Father in eternal beatitude.
VII. This explanation, however, seems to agree neither with the Apostle's words nor with Augustine's doctrine: for the Apostle intends to teach not only that God is the chief, or more principal, cause which through his grace discerns the just from the impious and the predestined from the reprobate, but that he is the total and entire cause to which, as to the first root, must be recalled whatever discerns the just man from the sinner; which those words openly show: What hast thou. For since the consent, or good use of choice, even under that aspect under which it is considered as emanating from free choice—under which aspect its cooperation is spoken of—is something, it remains that under the same aspect it is received from God, and consequently, according to the Apostle's mind, is to be reduced to God himself (because by his efficacious grace he truly efficiently makes man cooperate freely), and not to the alone and innate freedom of that same choice. Furthermore: for otherwise the Apostle would not have said absolutely and without any addition: Who discerns thee? but would have added: who discerns thee as principal cause and chief author. For if the just man, through the proper influx of his choice together with exciting grace—an influx which he did not receive from God, nor from the aid of that grace, as from a properly efficient cause—discerns himself, though less principally, from another, then he could certainly have answered the Apostle asking: The influx of my free choice discerns me, although less principally; and consequently I shall be able to glory, as far as this influx is concerned, in myself and not in God—which nevertheless seems repugnant to the Apostle's mind and words. And Augustine intends to teach the same in the cited place. This can also be gathered from other testimonies of his, especially from the Enchiridion to Laurentius, c. 32, where from the Apostle's words to the Romans 913—It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy—he concludes that it proceeds from God's will and operation alone, as from the first root, that a man excited by God wills and runs. And bringing in the explanation of certain men, who assert that it was said for this reason, It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, because the will of man does not suffice unless the mercy of God be present, since the consent of man is made from both—he attacks it in these words: Since without doubt, if a man is of such an age as to use reason, he cannot believe, hope, love, unless he wills, nor reach the prize of God's heavenly calling unless he has run by willing, how then is it not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy; unless because the will itself also, as it is written, is prepared by God? Otherwise, if it was said for this reason, It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, because it is made from both, that is from the will of man and the mercy of God, so that we take what is said as though it were said: The will of man alone does not suffice, if the mercy of God be not also there—does the mercy of God alone then suffice, if the will of man be not also there? And therefore, if it was rightly said, It is not of him that wills, but of God that shows mercy, because the will of man alone does not fulfill it, why is it not also rightly said on the contrary, It is not of God that shows mercy, but of him that wills, because the mercy of God alone does not fulfill it? Further, if no Christian will dare to say: It is not of God that shows mercy, but of him that wills—lest he contradict the Apostle most openly—it remains that it is rightly understood to have been said for this reason, It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, in order that the whole be given to God, who both prepares the good will of man to be aided, and aids it when prepared. He repeats the same doctrine in many other places.
The whole is to be attributed to God.— Thirdly the conclusion is proved, and more strengthened, and the efficacy14 of the preceding argument is opened up, by the authority of the holy Fathers, who unanimously teach that the whole that is found in our justification—even the consent of free choice—is to be attributed to God. These are Cyprian, Greg. Naz., Basil, Paulus Orosius, Anselm, Bernard, Damascene, whose testimonies we reported in Disputation 85, no. 3. The holy Fathers teach that the whole is to be attributed to God because he, through the help of pre-operating grace, effects that free choice applies its influx together with grace: therefore, although the good use of grace is efficiently produced by free choice as by a proximate cause, it must nevertheless be reduced to God himself as to the prior cause efficient of itself: it must not therefore be reduced to the alone innate freedom, if the word "alone" excludes any other prior cause in causing. This is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas, who, treating that question:15 Whether grace is suitably divided into operating and cooperating, sets up this as the second argument on the negative side: If grace works something in us, it most of all works justification in us; but this16 is not worked in us by grace alone; for Augustine says: He who created thee without thee will not justify thee without thee: therefore no grace should be called simply operating.17 And answering this argument he says: That God does not justify us without us is because through the motion of free choice, while we are justified, we consent to God's justice; yet that motion is not the cause of grace, but its effect; whence the whole operation pertains to grace. By these words he openly teaches that the motion which proceeds from free choice is to be reduced to grace itself as to the prior efficient cause. For if the influx of choice itself is an effect of grace, it is necessary that grace, and God himself through grace, be prior by priority of reason in causing than created choice: therefore the influx of free choice into the pious operation must be reduced to God as to the prior efficient cause, and not to the alone and innate freedom of created will. Hence 1. p. q. 105. art. 1. ad 3. he says that this very thing, that second causes are determined to determined effects, is theirs from God. Other passages of St. Thomas that favor this opinion we adduced in Disputation 22, no. 11.
Fourthly it is proved. Grace is what first begins the good use of free choice, as will appear in Disputation 98: therefore the good use of free choice does not proceed from its alone and innate freedom, but from another prior efficient cause, namely from God moving and applying the choice that it consent freely.
This is confirmed. Created free choice, insofar as it is free, has no more that it consent to God calling than that it dissent, or that it be borne to one of the opposites rather than to the other, since by its own nature it holds itself indifferently to both, as was said above and will appear more fully in what follows: therefore it does not come from its alone and innate freedom that it consents to God calling and exciting.
VIII. Created freedom in its formal concept imports dependence on uncreated freedom.— Fifth. All created wisdom in its formal concept imports dependence on uncreated wisdom, because created wisdom is a certain participation of uncreated wisdom; but everything that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by essence, and depends on it in its being, as St. Thomas and Aristotle often teach—as every hot thing depends on the first hot, and every luminous thing on the first luminous: but the freedom which is found in actual exercise in the good use of free choice is created freedom, and consequently is freedom by participation: therefore in its formal concept it imports dependence on uncreated freedom, or on the free and efficacious decree of God's will; and consequently it must be reduced to him as to a prior cause: therefore the good use of free choice, even under the aspect under which it proceeds from free choice, since it is free by participation, has another prior cause, namely God, on whom depend all things that in any way have being: it does not therefore proceed from the alone and innate freedom of the created will.
This is confirmed. As was shown in Disputation 64, the vitality which is found in the act of beatific vision, and in any other supernatural act of faith, hope, and charity, does not proceed from the natural power alone, but is produced effectively by a supernatural principle, as by the principle by which it is produced, namely by the habit of the light of glory, or by another supernatural habit, and by God's actual help: therefore in like manner the freedom of the good use of free choice, consenting to God calling, does not proceed from its alone and innate freedom, but, as by the principle by which it is produced, must be reduced to the help of pre-operating grace itself.
IX. The influx of free choice into a supernatural act is supernatural.— Sixth. The influx by which free choice flows into the pious operation, or into the good use of exciting grace, is supernatural, since it is concerned with a supernatural object: therefore it must come from a supernatural principle; for operations are specified by their active principles, as St. Thomas often teaches. But the alone and innate freedom does not include any supernatural active principle, since freedom in itself belongs to the order of nature: therefore that influx cannot come from the alone and innate freedom. If it be said that the pious operation has it that it is supernatural, not indeed from man's innate freedom, but from the influx of exciting grace, which, with free choice now consenting, produces that same pious operation together with it;18 on the contrary: for free choice moved by God truly produces a supernatural operation—of charity, for example, or of penance:19 therefore the influx into that same pious operation, and its causality, must be supernatural; for it is impossible that an act be supernatural with respect to some power or active cause, and that the causality, or the influx, of that same cause be not supernatural but merely natural: otherwise the same indivisible act would be intrinsically composed of a natural and a supernatural entity. For if the supernaturalness of the act is from grace alone, and not from free choice, while the freedom of that same act is effectively from the alone innate freedom, then something natural is found in the good use of free choice that is to be attributed to that same choice by its alone and innate freedom, and something supernatural that is to be referred to grace alone as to the efficient cause; and so the same act will be composed of a natural and a supernatural entity.
This is confirmed. For, as St. Thomas teaches,20 that which is from free choice and that which is from predestination are not distinct, just as that which is from a second cause and that which is from the first cause are not distinct either: for divine providence produces effects through the operations of second causes: therefore the same supernaturalness of the act of charity or of penance, which is produced by God through grace as by the first cause of the supernatural order, must be produced effectively by free choice as by the proximate cause through a supernatural influx: therefore it will not be able to flow into a supernatural act, or into the good use of exciting grace, from the alone and innate freedom: therefore that same good use will not be able to be reduced to the alone and innate freedom of created choice.
Finally it is proved: for the concept of being, because it is the most universal concept, is intimately enclosed in all things, even in the ultimate differences, so that there is nothing that escapes the concept of being; but the divine operation or causality is most universal, since it is the operation of the first cause: therefore no created causality or concurrence can be given that does not proceed efficiently from the divine causality, or that escapes it: therefore the good use of free choice is to be reduced to God as to the prior cause efficient of itself.
X. When the helps on God's part are equal, whence it comes that one is converted and the other is not21.— Second conclusion. That of two who are gone before and moved by an equal motion of grace, one consents, concurs with grace, elicits a pious act, and is converted, while the other remains in sin, does not come from the alone, innate, proper, and intrinsic freedom of each, common to good and evil, to reprobate and predestined; but that the one is converted is to be referred to the absolute and efficacious decree of God, who mercifully willed to convert him and to go before him with the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, yet left the other justly in the mass of perdition with only sufficient help.
This conclusion follows manifestly from what was said in the preceding conclusion, and is proved by all the arguments by which we shall show in Disputation 108 that to him who is converted there is always conferred by God some greater and stronger help of prevenient grace, which nevertheless was not given to the other who is not converted. For from this it is evidently concluded that it does not come from the alone and innate freedom that, of two who have altogether equal helps of prevenient grace, one of them is converted while the other remains in sin. For although he who remains in sin persists in it by his alone and innate freedom, nevertheless he who is converted to God is converted to God not by his alone innate freedom, but by a special efficacious help which was given to him and not to the other.
Third conclusion. Even if it be added and said "with equal helps of prevenient grace," insofar as they are helps of prevenient grace, it must not be asserted in the case posited that one of those two men is converted to God by his alone and innate freedom. It is proved, because in him who is converted there is not only a new influx of prevenient grace, producing the pious operation together with free choice, but there is also some new help of prevenient grace, namely the efficacious help, which is not in the other: for the efficacious help of helping, or cooperating, grace, insofar as it is helping, precedes in the order of reason and of causality the free influx and cooperation of choice, as was shown in Disputations 23, 81, and 91. But these things must be treated more fully in the cited Disputation 108.
XI. To the first argument, from the authority of Justin Martyr, it is answered that in the words adduced he intends only to teach that the act of virtue or of vice is not made without us cooperating freely, yet with proportion preserved. For the act of virtue, both insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is of virtue, is attributed to God as to the first moving cause, and as to the author of the whole entity and even moral goodness that is found in that act; but it is attributed to free choice as to the second and proximate cause, freely cooperating with God moving. But the act of vice, or of sin, insofar as it is an act, is also attributed to God as to the first author, and to free choice as to the proximate cause; but insofar as it is morally evil, or is sin, it is to be referred only to the deficient created will:22 as was said in Disputation 18, nos. 21 and 22, and in Disputation 24.
Calvin's error.— To the second it is answered that Calvin did not err in what he asserted, that it is grace itself which effects in the heart both the choice and the obedient will; but in that he said this is done by God through efficacious grace without us freely concurring and cooperating: which is manifestly gathered from the Council of Trent, in which the errors of the Lutherans and Calvinists are condemned. For it does not condemn these heretics because they said that God through grace effects in us an obedient will, but because they held that the obedient will is not free, nor can truly dissent from God exciting it, if it wills, or cast away his grace.
XII. To the third, from the authority of Augustine, De Civit. Dei, bk. 12, c. 6, it is answered that he only means to teach that of those two men one sins voluntarily, while the other also voluntarily abstains from sin; as was said concerning the authority of Justin Martyr. For Augustine's words are these: For if two men equally affected in mind and body see the beauty of one body, on seeing which one of them is moved to unlawful enjoyment, while the other perseveres stable in a chaste will, what do we think is the cause that a bad will is made in that one and not in this one? And below: If both are tempted by the same temptation, and one yields to it and consents, while the other perseveres as he was, what else appears than that one willed and the other willed not to fall away from chastity? whence, if not from their own will, when the affection of body and soul was the same in both, the same beauty was seen equally by the eyes of both, the same hidden temptation pressed equally upon both? Yet Augustine does not understand that to abstain from sin is in us from ourselves, as also to consent to sin: for he immediately establishes a difference between the two. For in chapters 7 and 8 immediately following, inquiring into the cause of the evil will,23 or of sin, he teaches that the first and total cause of the defect, or of sin, is from our choice, because it was made from nothing; whence it is also defectible. But in chapter 9, similarly inquiring into the cause of the good will, he says that the good will is not from us, but from God, from whom is the will: which he proves in the angels, adding: But if the good angels were first without a good will, and made it in themselves while God did not work it, then they were made better by themselves than by him. And below: But if they could not make themselves better than he had made them, than whom no one does anything better, then certainly they could not have the good will by which they would be better, except with the cooperating aid of the Creator. This doctrine he confirms in bk. 2, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, c. 18, where he says: Wherefore, that we turn away from God is ours; but that we turn to God we cannot, unless he excites and aids us.
XIII. Grace alone makes us do.— To the fourth it is answered that, as will appear in Disputation 100, although the efficacious help of divine grace is not the sole and entire efficient cause of the consent of free choice, but our will also freely concurs to producing it, moved by God by that same help, nevertheless efficacious grace itself, or God through efficacious grace, is the sole and entire cause that physically premoves our will to free consent, and that actively and properly effects that free choice concur to it. Hence, although in the same instant in which it is efficaciously premoved by God to consent it can dissent, if it wills, by its alone and innate freedom, nevertheless that it assents to God calling it does not have by its alone and innate freedom, but by its innate freedom gone before by God with the aforesaid efficacious help, which was not given to him who is not converted, as was said.
The freedom of a supernatural act is, as by the principle whereby, from the help of grace.— To the fifth it is answered that, as is established from what was said in Disputation 64, the vitality and actual freedom which are found in a supernatural act are not to be referred to the alone innate and intrinsic freedom of created choice, common to good and evil, to reprobate and predestined, but to the free will, moved by God through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace. Hence the consent to the pious operation, insofar as it is formally a free act concerning such a supernatural object, is reduced to created free choice as to the eliciting principle, as that which elicits; but otherwise, as to the formal principle by which it is elicited, it must be reduced to the efficacious help itself, as was explained in the cited place.
How the consent is called the proper act of free choice.— To the sixth it is answered that if "proper" be called that which so proceeds from free choice as not to depend on another prior agent, no act can be something proper to free choice, because, as was said above, it has nothing from itself, but has received all things mercifully from God. But if "proper" be called that which is produced by an intrinsic active principle with dominion over the act, then the good use of grace is a proper act of free choice, because namely, as by an intrinsic principle freely moving and determining itself, it is produced efficiently by the free choice of this man and not of that one; but it is not produced by it by its alone freedom, as was said.
XIIII. To the seventh it is answered that not to use exciting grace, and to abuse it, is established in the alone freedom of created choice; but to use that same grace is indeed established in the same freedom of man, yet not in the alone freedom, but in the freedom of choice gone before by God with the special help of pre-operating grace.
The good use of exciting grace is efficiently from helping grace.— To the eighth argument it is answered that for the actual good use of exciting grace another grace is required, namely helping and efficacious grace; whence free choice will never will to use divine grace and to cooperate with it, unless it be efficaciously premoved by God to such cooperation; whence the good use of exciting grace is not effectively from free choice alone by its innate freedom, but also proceeds efficiently from efficacious grace, as by the principle by which it is produced, as was said. Nor does it follow from this that sufficient help is not in its own order truly sufficient for salvation, as was shown in Disputations 18 and 23.
To the ninth the consequence is denied, with St. Thomas, 2. p. q. 112, art. 3, ad 2; for the defect of grace has its first cause from us; but the first cause of the conferring or of the good use of grace is from God, according to that of Hosea 13: Thy perdition is from thee, O Israel; only from me is thy help. Whence the bad use of free choice is to be referred to free choice itself as to the total cause, but the good use to God as to the first author and mover: and therefore this causal statement is true: Because man does not will to use the help of prevenient grace well, therefore he does not use it. But this causal statement is false: Because man wills to use the same help well, therefore he uses it well—if that causal statement imports the first root of that good use. For although a man willing uses the divine calling and exciting grace itself well, by freely consenting to that grace and cooperating with it, yet the first root and the first effective beginning of this good use is not taken from free choice, but from the mercy of God, which through efficacious help acted actively and properly, or physically, as distinguished from merely morally, so that free choice used that same grace well by consenting to it. This the Council of Orange explained and taught in these words: Men do their own will, not God's, when they do what displeases God.24 But when they so do what they will as to serve the divine will, although willing they do what they do, yet their will is his by whom is prepared and undertaken what they will. And can. 24: They are in the vine as branches, so as to confer nothing on the vine, but to receive from it whence they live. And the same is the perpetual doctrine of St. Augustine in the places alleged above.
To the tenth it has already been answered in part in Disputation 89. Now we say briefly that although God in the same instant of time produces the pious operation, and the good use of exciting grace, together with free choice, yet he begins in a prior point of reason: for the first beginning of that same good use is from God, not indeed by priority of time, but of reason only and of causality. Nor does it follow from this that in some prior point God produces the good use of free choice, in which free choice does not concur to it: because the priority of nature and of causality is not a prior point in which the thing is, but a prior point from which it is. Or it must be said that God's operation is prior insofar as it efficaciously premoves free choice to cooperate, but nevertheless in no prior point does God attain our free act in itself, in which our choice does not at the same time effect that same act, as will appear in the following disputation.
To the confirmation it is answered similarly that it only concludes that the good use of free choice is produced efficiently by free choice, and not by another extrinsic cause that is prior in causing by priority of time; but it does not prove that it is not from another cause efficient of itself and prior in causing, by priority of nature only.
To the eleventh argument abundant satisfaction has already been given in the disputations alleged with that same argument. Hence there is no need to answer it specially. Let the things said above in Disputation 91 be consulted.