De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who stirs and calls it.

I. To make the title of the question clear and to reveal where the difficulty lies, we should note that, as can be gathered from St. Thomas, free choice can be understood to be moved or to do something of itself in two ways. First, so that being moved of itself means the same as being moved by an intrinsic principle. Second, so that being moved or doing something of itself means acting not from some prior agent or from another extrinsic cause that is per se efficient, in such a way that free choice itself cooperates.

Accordingly, those theologians who think that the influx of free choice with grace, insofar as it proceeds from free choice, does not proceed effectively from grace itself or from God operating that same influx through grace, consequently hold that free choice, when it consents to God who calls it, contributes something of itself in this second sense; namely, that the influx of free choice itself does not proceed from God as the prior per se efficient cause of free choice's consenting. This opinion can be proved.

He who is helped by another does something.—First, whoever is helped by God does something of himself, as Augustine shows in his exposition of Psalm 78, “Help us, O God our Savior,” where he says: “When he wishes us to be helped, he is neither ungrateful for grace nor does he take away free choice; the one who is helped also does something by himself.” And in Tractate 4 on the First Letter of John he says: “If you say, ‘Be my helper,’ you are doing something; for if you do nothing, how does he help?” He teaches the same in On the Words of the Apostle, sermon 13, and in On the Perfection of Righteousness, against Caelestius. But free choice is helped by God to consent, as the Council of Trent defines. Therefore it does something of itself when it consents to God who calls it.

Second, that is called free which is from an intrinsic principle moving itself of itself. But our choice freely consents to God who stirs it, in such a way that it can dissent if it wishes, as is stated in the Council of Trent. Therefore, that consent proceeds from an intrinsic principle moving itself of itself, and consequently, when free choice consents to God, it does something of itself.

Third, if free choice did nothing of itself when it consents to God who calls it, it would follow that in justification it behaved as purely passive, receiving an operation caused by God alone, just as a stick behaves as purely passive when moved by another, receiving motion produced by an extrinsic cause. But that consequence is contrary to the explicit definition of the Council of Trent. Therefore, free choice does something of itself.

II. Fourth, created will has this by its nature: its inclination is not from another but from itself, as St. Thomas teaches in De veritate, q. 22, art. 4, in the body of the article. There he establishes the difference between the appetite of brute animals and that of a rational creature as follows: “The inclination of brute animals is not in the power of the animal that is inclined; it is determined for it from elsewhere. But rational nature has the inclination itself in its power, so that it is not necessary for it to be inclined toward the apprehended object of appetite; it can be inclined or not inclined. Thus the inclination itself is not determined for it by another, but by itself.” Therefore, when free choice consents to God who calls it, it does something of itself—that is, not from another extrinsic cause producing it by per se efficient causality.

Fifth, the motion of free choice toward God cannot be violent, since no violence or compulsion can be inflicted on the will, as St. Thomas often teaches. Therefore, when it consents to God who calls it, that motion is in it not from some extrinsic cause but from itself; otherwise it would be moved toward God violently, as a stone is moved when thrown upward. For, according to the Philosopher, Ethics 3, chapter 1, something is called violent when its principle is external, with the subject undergoing violence contributing nothing. But it often happens that free choice contributes no force—for example, if before being called by God to conversion it resisted that same conversion by a contrary act of will. Therefore.

Yet this opinion, understood in the sense just explained, does not please the other theologians, and rightly so. For all theologians who hold that the efficacy of the help of pre-operating grace is not merely moral, but physically predetermines the created will so that it consents freely and infallibly, consequently teach that the contrary opinion is the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and entirely true. Since this opinion conforms to Scripture and the Councils, two conclusions must be established to explain it, taking as presupposed the distinction of St. Thomas set out at the beginning of this disputation:

First conclusion. When free choice consents to God who stirs and calls it, it does something of itself if the expression “of itself” is taken to mean the same as “from an intrinsic principle that freely moves and determines itself.” All theologians agree on this conclusion, for it follows by evident consequence from the principles of the faith, as the arguments presented at the beginning show.

Second conclusion. While created free choice consents to God who stirs and calls it, it does nothing of itself in that second sense just explained. Rather, the very act of doing something—that is, its causal influx into the consent and pious act—must be traced back to the absolute and efficacious decree of the divine will as its prior per se efficient cause, although God does not produce that same consent in us without our freely cooperating. This conclusion is gathered from Pope Gelasius, Letter 5 to all the bishops throughout Picenum, where he says: “But what Christian would dare say that he possesses any good apart from grace, when the Teacher of the nations cries out, summing up all gifts in himself: ‘By the grace of God I am what I am,’ and ‘his grace in me was not empty’? He showed that he did not precede the gift of grace, but followed it, and thereby showed himself to be a coworker with grace by following it. ‘But,’ he says, ‘I labored more than all of them.’ And again, fearing that he might seem to presume upon himself, he added: ‘Not I, but the grace of God with me.’ He did not say, ‘I, and the grace of God with me,’ but put grace before himself, as preceding him.” But cooperating with God who calls is something good. Therefore, free choice does not have that from itself, but from cooperating grace, through which God bestows the willing of good. St. Augustine teaches the same conclusion in many places, especially in Retractions, book 1, chapter 9, where he says: “And since all good things, as was said, great, intermediate, and least, are from God, it follows that the good use of free will is also from God; it is a virtue and is counted among the great goods.” And in On the Grace of Christ, against Pelagius and Caelestius, chapter 13: “If it is given,” he says, “it is not called our righteousness but God's, because it becomes ours in such a way that it is from God for us.” And in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14: “If we are to glory in nothing, since nothing is our own, then surely we are not to glory in the most persevering obedience either, nor is it to be called ours as though it had not been given to us from above.” And in On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, chapter 18: “But people labor to find in our will something good that is ours, that is not from God; how it can be found, I do not know.” Since, then, the concurrence of our consenting will, by which it cooperates with God who calls and moves it, is something insofar as it is the concurrence of the will, it follows that it has this from God. The same point can be confirmed by another remarkable testimony of Augustine in On the Proceedings of Pelagius, which we mentioned in Disputation 91, no. 9. For in chapter 14 he says of the Apostle: “He himself cries out, he himself testifies, and, to commend God's gifts in himself, he glories not in himself but in the Lord.” A little later: “The Apostle says, ‘I am not worthy to be called an Apostle.’ The monk Pelagius says that the Apostle was worthy to receive all graces,” and so on. “The Apostle says, ‘I labored more than all of them.’ Therefore, he did not labor in order to receive grace, but received grace in order to labor; and so, while unworthy, he received grace freely, by which he would become worthy to receive the rewards due to him. Nor indeed did he dare to claim the labor itself for himself. For after saying, ‘I labored more than all of them,’ he immediately added, ‘Not I, but the grace of God with me.’ O great teacher, confessor, and preacher of grace! What is this? ‘I labored more’: ‘not I.’ The will raised itself somewhat, but piety immediately kept watch, humility trembled because weakness recognized itself.” The holy Fathers also support this opinion, teaching that everything is to be attributed to grace. They are Cyprian, Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil, Ambrose, Paul Orosius, Anselm, Bernard, and Damascene, whose words were cited in Disputation 85, no. 3. St. Prosper teaches the same in Against the Collator, definition 11, when he says: “That is an impious opinion which thinks the person to whom God has given nothing happier than the one to whom he has granted everything.”

Second, the conclusion is proved by the authority of the Council of Orange, canon 16, which says: “Let no one glory in what he seems to possess as though he had not received it, or think that he received it merely because the letter appeared externally to be read or sounded to be heard.” “For, as the Apostle says: ‘If righteousness comes through the law, then Christ died for nothing.’” “‘Ascending on high, he led captivity captive; he gave gifts to men.’” “From there comes whatever anyone possesses. But whoever denies that he has it from there either truly does not possess it, or what he possesses will be taken away from him.” By these words the Council seems to determine that the good use of free choice has God as its efficient cause.

Free choice's acting has God as its efficient cause.—Third, it is proved by reason. Created free choice does not have being from itself but from God. Therefore it does not derive its acting from itself; it derives it from God, from whom it received its being. For, as St. Thomas teaches in Sentences 2, distinction 37, question 2, article 2, in the body of the article, that whose being is from another must also have its operation from another. Hence the Son of God, because he has being not from himself but from the Father, confesses of himself: “The Son can do nothing of himself.” And the Council of Florence says in its decree of faith: “And since the Father gave his only-begotten Son by begetting him all that belongs to the Father, except being the Father, the Son himself eternally has from the Father that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; he was also eternally begotten by the Father.” If, then, the Son, who proceeds from the Father not by a gratuitous but by a natural communication, can do nothing of himself, how will created free choice, to which being was given not by natural emanation but by gratuitous and voluntary communication, claim for itself the glory of being able to do anything of itself?

Fourth, God operating through grace and free choice are not two partial causes with respect to a pious act; rather, each is a total cause in its own order, and one of them—namely, free choice—is subordinate to the other, namely, God moving it through grace, as was shown in Disputation 85. Therefore free choice does nothing of itself while it contributes causally to a pious act; rather, it receives its very causal contribution from helping grace itself. The consequence is proved as follows: if free choice did something of itself, God and free choice would concur as two partial causes. For whenever two causes concur together in producing the same effect, with each contributing causally of itself without being predetermined by the other or receiving its actual causal influx from the other, they agree in producing that effect as partial causes, as is evident in the case of two people towing a ship.

Fifth, as we showed in Disputation 23, God by his actual help premoves and predetermines all secondary causes, even free ones, to every good act in particular and in all its circumstances. Therefore every free act, especially a supernatural one, proceeds from free choice insofar as it is premoved by God's actual help. Therefore free choice has from God who moves it, not from itself, its consenting to God who calls it. This is confirmed: otherwise it would follow that the good use of grace in us came from us, which seems contrary not only to the opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas but also to Catholic doctrine, as we showed at length in Disputation 38 and will show more fully in Disputation 97.

Sixth, the conclusion is proved by all the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 18 that God's general concurrence is not merely a causal influx together with a secondary cause in its effect, but also an immediate causal influx upon the secondary cause itself. For those arguments also establish that grace and free choice are not partial causes, and consequently that free choice's own causal influx is not its own in such a way that it has it from itself and does not receive it from God as its prior per se efficient cause. In reply to the arguments made at the beginning, we say that they prove only the first conclusion; insofar as they seem to argue against the second, each must be answered individually.

IIII. He who is helped by another does something.—To the first argument, the reply is that it is not necessary that the person helped by another do something so entirely of himself that he has not received it from God. It is enough that he do something of himself, that is, from an intrinsic principle freely applying itself, even though the act itself is received from another. Thus, just as God helps free choice in the order of reason and causality, preceding or premoving it and at the same time producing a free consent together with that same choice, so too our choice freely cooperates with God by following him and freely contributing causally to that same consent at the same instant of time, as was shown especially from the authority of Pope Gelasius in Disputation 83, no. 3.

V. To the second argument, the reply is that a free act is indeed from an intrinsic principle that moves itself; but that principle need not be a first, unmoved principle, nor one not predetermined by another, nor does the causal influx proceeding from the intrinsic principle have to be independent of another prior efficient cause. We therefore will, but God makes us will, as Augustine says: it is certain that we will when we will, but he makes us will the good. He proves this at great length there, as we saw in Disputation 86, no. 3. Explaining the words of John 6, “No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him,” he observes that Christ did not say “‘led,’ which would allow us to understand the will as in some way preceding. Who is drawn if he was already willing? And yet no one comes unless he is willing through the one who knows how to work inwardly in people's very hearts—not so that people believe unwillingly, which cannot happen, but so that unwilling people become willing.”

VI. The difference between free choice and a stick.—To the third argument, the reply is that free choice does not behave as purely passive when it consents to God who calls it, but actively and freely, because from an intrinsic principle not necessarily determined to one thing, it truly produces the consent itself. The case of a stick is not the same: a stick moved by another does not move itself but only receives motion produced by another extrinsic agent. Free choice, however, when moved by God, moves itself through the deliberation of reason. For, as St. Augustine often teaches: “Those who are sons of God are acted upon so that they may act, not so that they themselves do nothing.”

How the inclination of the will is from the will itself.—To the fourth argument, the reply is that created will, insofar as it is created, has this: in its operation and causal influx it depends on the decree and operation of the uncreated will. Therefore its causal influx must be traced back to the efficacious decree of the divine will as its prior efficient cause. But insofar as it is will, its inclination or determination is not from another as an object, because, as long as the will is free with respect to the exercise of its act, an object cannot efficaciously determine it with respect to that exercise. Therefore God, insofar as he is an object, never determines the will in this life with respect to the exercise of an act, as St. Thomas teaches. Nevertheless, every inclination of the will is from God as the first efficient cause. Therefore, when St. Thomas says that the inclination of the will is not determined for it by another but by itself, he does not mean that the same determination is not from God as its prior efficient cause—for in other places cited in Disputation 97 he explicitly teaches the contrary—but only that it is not from another as an object, as is clear enough from the context itself. For he draws a distinction between the appetite of brute animals and rational appetite: the appetite of brute animals is necessarily carried along, without rational deliberation, by an appropriately presented object, and it is not in their power to reject it. Rational appetite, however, is not carried along by an appropriately presented object; rather, it always remains in its power to follow or not follow it. Or one may say that St. Thomas excludes from free power only a necessary determination to one thing—a determination from another in such a way that the will itself does not determine itself with a true capacity not to determine itself, if it wishes. In this way it cannot be determined to one thing even by God as the prior efficient cause, for such a determination is incompatible with its freedom, as was said in Disputations 22 and 23.

VII. The motion of free choice is not violent.—To the fifth argument, the reply is that the motion of free choice toward God is not violent for it, because although it is in it from an extrinsic agent, namely, God, nevertheless it contributes force through an intrinsic principle, namely, through its own inclination, which it has received from God who gives it. For something to count as violent, the thing acted upon must contribute no force but must resist through a contrary inclination actually present in it. St. Thomas develops this solution in De veritate, question 22, article 8, in the body of the article, where he says: “However much the will is changed by God toward something, it is not said to be compelled toward it. The reason is that willing something is itself an inclination toward it, whereas compulsion or violence is contrary to the inclination of the thing that is compelled. Therefore, when God changes the will, he brings it about that another inclination succeeds the preceding inclination, so that the first is taken away and the second remains. Hence what he induces the will to do is not contrary to the inclination now present, but to the inclination that was previously in it; thus there is neither violence nor compulsion. For example, by reason of its gravity a stone has an inclination toward a downward place. If, while that inclination remains, it is thrown upward, the motion is violent.” “But if God takes away the stone's inclination of gravity and gives it an inclination of lightness, then its being carried upward will not be violent. Thus a change of motion can occur without violence, and in this way we must understand that God changes the will without compelling it.” Since, then, by moving free choice to consent, God gives it an actual inclination by which it moves itself and consents, such consent is not violent for it, nor is it necessary by absolute necessity, but only by conditional necessity or necessity on a supposition, which does not hinder freedom, as was shown in Disputations 18 and 25, and will be shown more fully in Disputations 115 and 116.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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