De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Whether, after God has mercifully stirred created free choice, he awaits its free consent so that it may will to be cleansed or justified.

I. Some theologians defend the affirmative side, which they prove

First, from Revelation 3: “Behold, I stand at the door and knock. If anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in to him,” and so on. These words signify two things: one that God does not await the human will but precedes it, namely, the divine stirring, by which God is said to stand at the door and knock; the other, which God does await from us, namely, hearing his voice, opening the door, and entering into his presence. For he requires this of us because it must be carried out through our free choice.

To confirm the same opinion, one may cite the testimony of Isaiah 5: “I waited for it to bear grapes, but it bore wild grapes”; and chapter 30: “Therefore the Lord waits to show you mercy.” These words clearly signify that, after God has mercifully stirred the will, he awaits its free consent, so that he may show us mercy and infuse justifying grace into us.

Second, they argue from the authority of St. Ambrose, Sermon 19 on Psalm 118. Explaining the words “My eyes have gone before you at dawn,” he says: “The Sun of Justice wishes to be preceded, and waits to be preceded”—not to be preceded before the call, but to be preceded by disposition before he enters to dwell in a person through justice. Hence Ambrose adds: “Hear how he waits and desires to be preceded. He says to the angel of the church of Pergamum: ‘Write. Repent,’” and so on. “And to the angel of Laodicea: ‘Repent. Behold, I stand at the door and knock,’” and so on. In these passages it is clear that God's call comes first, and yet God waits for a person's free disposition before dwelling in him through grace. Ambrose develops this at greater length in the same sermon on the words “You are near, O Lord.”

This is confirmed by the authority of St. Augustine, lib. 83. quaestionum, q. 68, who says: “It is little to will unless God shows mercy; but God, who calls to peace, does not show mercy unless the will has gone before. Yet, since no one can will unless admonished and called, it comes about that God also works in us that very willing.” Augustine explained himself in this way as well in lib. 1. retractat., chapter 26.

Third, they argue as follows. God did not forewill or predetermine absolutely and by an altogether efficacious will that, for example, Peter should consent and cooperate with God who stirs and calls him; rather, God did so as if under an implicit condition: if Peter himself should freely will to consent. Otherwise the freedom of choice would be taken away, because consent or dissent would no longer be in his power. Therefore, after God has stirred man's free choice by his prevenient grace, he awaits the free determination of the man's will, so that, if he wishes, he may consent, and, if he does not wish, he may not consent.

They confirm this. By his efficacious grace God does not physically predetermine the human will to consent, but moves it only morally, by inward persuasion, invitation, and attraction, so that it may consent; otherwise its freedom would be taken away, since that freedom consists in true indifference, or the ability for either side of the contradiction—that is, to will or not to will. Therefore, after the first stirring or call, he awaits our will, so that we may will to be cleansed and healed.

II. God does not await our will so that we may will to be cleansed.—All the theologians who hold that the efficacy of grace in no way depends on the free cooperation of our choice, whether foreknown by God through what they call middle knowledge or foreseen by him in any other way, defend the contrary opinion. I consider this to be the opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and the truest one; it is proved from canon 4 of the Council of Orange: “If anyone contends that God awaits our will so that we may be cleansed from sin, but does not confess that it comes about through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit in you that we may also will to be cleansed, he resists the Holy Spirit, who says through Solomon: ‘The will is prepared by the Lord,’” and the Apostle, preaching for our salvation: “It is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good will.” § In this definition the holy Council seems to teach that, even after God has stirred man's free choice, he does not await the will, or its free consent, so that the person may will to be cleansed; rather, through his grace he efficaciously brings it about that free choice itself wills to be cleansed and saved. For no one is said to await what he himself is going to do. III. They reply that the Council means that, before the first call, God does not await the sinner's disposition and free act in order to begin justification in him, by which he is cleansed from sin. They prove this from the Council's reasoning: whoever says that God awaits our will so that we may be cleansed from sin contradicts the Holy Spirit, who says, “The will is prepared by the Lord.” But someone who says that God awaits a person's free consent after he has stirred and called him does not deny that the will is prepared by the Lord. Therefore, only the person who says that God awaits the human will before the first call, in order to begin justification in the person, denies this. Yet this explanation does not seem to satisfy the words of the Council of Orange. As we began to say in our commentaries on Isaiah, chapter 30, no. 12, the Council's definition is directed against the Massilians, who asserted that, after God calls a sinner to penance, he awaits the sinner's will, so that, if he wished, the sinner would consent to the one calling him; God did not efficaciously and infallibly bring about the person's assent. This is clear enough from the letters of Saints Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, and from Augustine himself. Explaining the words of Psalm 36, “The steps of a man are directed by the Lord, and he will desire his way,” he says: “He did not say, ‘and he will learn his way,’ or ‘keep it,’ or ‘walk in it,’ or anything of that kind—something you could say as follows: the Lord indeed gives this, but to a person already willing, so that God's gift, by which he directs a person's steps so that he may learn, keep, and walk in his way, is preceded by the person's good will, and he merits this gift of God by that preceding will. Rather, he said, ‘The steps of a man are directed by the Lord, and he will desire his way,’ so that we might understand that the good will itself by which we begin to will to believe (for what is God's way but true faith?) is the gift of the one who first directs our steps for this very purpose: that we may will. For Scripture does not say, ‘The steps of a man are directed by the Lord because he willed his way’; instead, it says, ‘They are directed, and he will desire his way.’ Therefore, they are not directed because he willed, but he will desire it because they are directed.” Augustine then reports the explanation of some people, which Vitalis embraced, and continues: “Here perhaps you will say again: this is done by the Lord when his teaching is read or heard, if a person assents by his own will to the truth he reads or hears. For, you say, if God's teaching were hidden from him, his steps would not be directed; once they were directed, he would will God's way. Accordingly, you think that the Lord directs a person's steps toward choosing God's way only because the truth cannot become known to him without God's teaching, and he can assent to that truth by his own will. If he assents to it, you say, since this is within his free choice, his steps are rightly said to be directed by the Lord so that he may will the Lord's way: he follows the Lord's teaching, with persuasion preceding and consent following; he does this by natural freedom, if he wishes, and does not do it if he does not wish, and will receive reward or punishment for what he has done.” In these words the theologian should observe that, according to the opinion of Vitalis of Carthage and those who thought with him, the illumination of the intellect—which occurs through teaching, even inward teaching—the persuasion of the will, and its stirring preceded the will's free consent. After the prior stirring or persuasion, the will followed by its natural freedom if the person wished, and did not follow if he did not wish. The words plainly show this: “He follows the Lord's teaching, with persuasion preceding and consent following; he does this by natural freedom, if he wishes, and does not do it if he does not wish.” The same is clear from the beginning of the same letter, whose words we cited in Disputation 73, no. 2. Yet St. Augustine immediately attacks this teaching: “This,” he says, “is that evil teaching of the Pelagians, ill-reputed and rightly condemned, and condemned at the judgment of the Eastern bishops even by Pelagius himself, who feared being condemned: that God's grace is not given for each individual act, but is located in free choice, or in the law and teaching.” Therefore, one must necessarily say that God not only does not await our will in order to stir us, but also, after he has enlightened the intellect and stirred the sluggish will, does not await our will so that, if we wish to be cleansed, we may be cleansed from our sins, and, if we do not wish it, remain uncleansed. For this is why the Council of Orange and St. Augustine teach that God does not await our will so that we may will to be cleansed: God works in us the very willing to be cleansed, though not without our freely consenting and cooperating. God does not work this willing and accomplishing in us through exciting grace alone, but chiefly through helping grace, as is clear from the words of the Council of Trent: “So that those who had turned away from God through sins may be disposed, through his exciting and helping grace, to turn themselves toward their own justification, freely assenting to and cooperating with that grace”; and canon 3 says: “If anyone says that a person can believe, hope, love, or repent without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help,” and so on, “let him be anathema.” In these words the Council joined both things, namely, the stirring or inspiration and the help of grace, to indicate that even after God has stirred us we still need the help of prevenient grace in order to believe and perform other pious acts. Therefore, after God has stirred us, he does not await our will so that we may will to be cleansed. Rather, once stirred, we must await and ask God for the help of grace, by which we may efficaciously produce the pious act inspired through exciting grace. Hence St. Augustine concludes in the same letter to Vitalis as follows: “How does God await the wills of people to precede him, so that he may give them grace, when we rightly give him thanks for those to whom, while they did not believe in him and persecuted his teaching with an impious will, he granted mercy, and by his almighty ease converted them to himself, making willing people out of unwilling ones? Why should we thank him for this if he did not do it himself?” By these words Augustine proves that God does not await a person's will so that he may will to be cleansed, since by his helping grace he brings it about that the person wills. Therefore, God awaits a person's will neither before the first call nor after it, so that the person may will to be cleansed. For although a person wills to be justified and saved by his free will, God, by his prevenient and helping grace, not only persuades morally, attracts, and invites, but also truly and efficaciously brings it about, by efficient causality, that the person wills, as we expressly showed in Disputation 86.

This is confirmed, and the force of the argument is made clearer. The Council does not say that God does not await the human will in order to precede us with his exciting grace; rather, it says that he does not await the human will “so that we may will to be cleansed.” It gives this reason: the very will by which we will to be cleansed comes about in us through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit, according to the Apostle's words: “God is the one who works in us both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will.” Here the Council, like the Apostle in saying “works,” did not understand “operation” to mean merely moral operation, or operation by way of persuasion, even inward persuasion. For, as shown above, this is called operation metaphorically and not properly. Rather, they meant physical operation, or operation in the manner of a physical cause—that is, a true and proper operation—just as the Council of Nicaea, cited in Disputation 22, no. 2, understood “physical union” to mean a true and real union. Nor does the Apostle say, “God works with us to will and accomplish,” but “who works in us,” to indicate a certain precedence and causal priority of the divine operation. For God and free choice do not concur in a pious act as two partial causes, neither of which predetermines the other to concur with it, as the authors of the opposing view whom we have criticized above think; rather, each is a total cause in its own order, yet in such a way that man's free choice is premoved by God to concur with him, as we have shown in several places above.

IIII. Second, this is proved as follows. For, as we expressly showed in Disputation 89, and will show more fully in Disputation 98, God does not begin our justification only remotely, at the first stage, by stirring man's will; he also truly brings it about that free choice cooperates. Otherwise a person would assign the remote beginning of justification to God but claim the proximate beginning for himself, which, as shown above, cannot be said. Therefore, even after God first stirs a sinner, he does not await that person's will or free cooperation so that he may will to be cleansed. They say, however, that God awaits our will, freely consenting and disposing itself with divine help to be cleansed from sin; for, as the Council of Trent defines, God does not justify a sinner without a free disposition and free choice's own causal influx and cooperation. The Council of Orange, however, condemns only those who think that God awaits our will, freely consenting and disposing itself without divine help, so that we may be cleansed from sin. Yet this reply is ambiguous and does not remove the force of the argument. For when they say that God awaits our will, freely consenting and disposing itself with divine help, either they mean by divine help a concomitant help, flowing into the pious act together and simultaneously with free choice as it determines itself by its innate freedom; and then they do not seem to satisfy the argument. For the Council teaches that God works through the help of grace so that we may will; consequently, through this help he acts not only alongside free choice in its effect but also immediately upon free choice itself, as a cause, moving and applying it to concur with grace, as follows from the premises. Hence the help of grace is not merely concomitant with the free cooperation of choice, but precedes it in the order of reason and causality. If, on the other hand, they admit—as in fact they must—that the help of grace by which God makes the unwilling willing is prevenient, then one cannot assert that, even after the first call, God awaits our will to consent freely with divine help, since God himself, through that help, brings it about that a person consents freely.

Third, it is proved as follows. An efficient cause does not await its effect but produces it. But through the help of pre-operating grace God is the efficient cause of a person's willing to be cleansed and saved. Therefore, even after the first stirring, he does not await the human will by which a person wills to be cleansed and saved. If someone says that an efficient cause does not await its effect when it produces it without the intervention, concurrence, or cooperation of another free cause; but that, if it produces the effect with the intervention and cooperation of another free cause, without which the effect would not be produced in reality, then one cause must await the cooperation of the other cause freely determining itself in order to produce that effect—against this there is an effective argument. For not only our very willing and pious act, but also the free cooperation itself and the actual causal influx of our free choice, are effects of the divine operation. For, as will be shown in Disputation 97, this cooperation and determination of our choice does not proceed from its innate freedom alone, but must necessarily be traced back to God as the prior efficient cause of free choice's concurrence. Therefore, after the first call, God awaits neither our willing nor the free causal influx and cooperation of our choice, so that we may will to be cleansed.

V. Fourth, it would follow from the opposing opinion that divine grace does not subject the human will to itself, but is instead subordinated to it and made its attendant. Yet even the authors of the contrary opinion do not admit this consequence, for it seems contrary to canon 6 of the Council of Orange, which says: “If anyone subordinates the help of grace to human humility and obedience, and does not acknowledge that it is the gift of grace itself that makes us obedient and humble, he resists the Apostle who says: ‘What do you have that you did not receive?’” It would likewise follow that someone is helped because he willed, rather than wills because he is helped. This consequence cannot be admitted, as was shown in Disputation 1 and will be made clearer in Disputation 99. Therefore.

To the first argument, the reply is that those passages of Scripture establish only that a person freely cooperates, consents, and opens to God who stirs, calls, and knocks; but that very consenting and opening must ultimately be traced back to God as its prior per se efficient cause, as was said. For God does not require from us a free consent that comes from us alone, but one that is also God's gift, so that he may be found truthful who said: “What we have received from your hand, we give back to you.” Hence Pope Celestine says: “So great is God's goodness toward all people that he wills our merits—which are his gifts—to be ours, and he will give eternal rewards for what he has bestowed. For he acts in us so that we both will and do what he wills.” In particular, regarding the passages from Isaiah cited above, the reply is that when he says, “The Lord waits to show you mercy,” “I waited for it to bear grapes,” and the like, the meaning is not that God waits for a sinner's free cooperation or causal influx, which the sinner has not previously received as a gift from grace that efficaciously premoves and predetermines the will to concur with God; rather, these words signify the free cooperation God requires from the sinner in order to justify him. Thus Isaiah, in the same context, to suggest this interpretation, after saying, “The Lord waits to show you mercy,” adds, lest anyone attribute a pious act and consent to himself but fail to recognize from whom he received not only the ability to do good but also the very willing of the good: “Blessed are all who wait for him.” We are to understand that if the Lord waits to show us mercy, he surely waits for his own gifts and benefits by which he deigns to free us, just as Augustine speaks of foreknowledge. He waits for the time at which, by his generous will, he predetermined to show mercy to sinners. He waits for the order established by his divine providence, according to which he has fulfilled what he predestined. VI. In light of this doctrine, the words of Ambrose cited at the outset in the second argument must be explained and understood, as can be gathered from the context itself. For a few lines later he adds: “He himself first shines into the secret place of your heart. To you who say, ‘My spirit watches for you in the night,’ he will make the morning light shine in the times of night, if you meditate on the words of God.”

To the confirmation.—As for St. Augustine, it is already clear from the words of his cited above that he explicitly taught our opinion, which he also indicates in that Question 68 when he says that God works in us even that very willing—a statement he understood of operation properly so called. Further, according to St. Augustine's opinion, the help of grace does not consist only in simultaneous concurrence, by which God concurs causally with free choice in its operation, but also in prior concurrence, by which he premoves and applies that same free choice to cooperate and consent, as is clear from what has been said above. Nor does Augustine say anything in the first book of the Retractions that could be brought forward in favor of the contrary opinion; on the contrary, he supports us there. For, recalling and explaining the words cited from Question 68, he adds: “This was said after penance, for God's mercy also precedes the will itself; without it, the will would not be prepared by the Lord. And to that mercy belongs the very call, which also precedes faith.” Here by “call” he does not mean mere stirring, since the will is not prepared by the Lord through this alone; rather, it is prepared above all through helping grace, as has been shown from the Council of Trent and Augustine himself in Disputation 82.

To the third argument, the reply is that God, without any presupposed or implicit condition and antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future cooperation of created free choice, forewilled and predetermined by an efficacious and absolute will all the good acts that take place in time, especially those by which the predestined attain eternal life. Such willing or predetermination in no way harms the freedom of that same choice, as we expressly showed in Disputations 22 and 23. There we also explained how indifference and a true capacity for either side of a contradiction can stand together with that same predetermination, since this capacity is intrinsic to freedom. This will be treated at greater length in Disputations 115 and 116, where we shall explain the nature of free choice. This also answers the confirmation.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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