De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.
Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.
Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.
Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.
Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.
Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.
Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.
Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.
Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.
Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.
Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.
Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.
Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.
Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.
How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that man's free choice, moved by God with efficacious help, cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.
I. We briefly touched on this difficulty in Disputations 18 and 23, and it will have to be treated again in Disputation 115. For now, however, it must be discussed and explained expressly, since some theologians—even among those who admit that one must grant efficacious help that physically predetermines our will to supernatural acts, while preserving its freedom—say that the composite sense in the proposition just mentioned is the same as when the help is posited and explained, whereas the divided sense considers the will absolutely and without help. Thus says Father Pedro Alorca, Doctor of Complutense, 1. 2. q. 111. ar. 3., near the end. Those also who think that freedom of choice is destroyed if we assert that our will cannot, in the composite sense, dissent from God's efficacious calling or motion make this claim because they do not explain the composite sense correctly. For they say that the proposition “Free choice, moved by God with efficacious help, cannot dissent in the composite sense” means nothing other than that, so long as that efficacious motion is in a person, he cannot dissent from it; but once the motion is removed, he can dissent—as though the motion's presence in the will took away its power to dissent, if it wished. They attribute this sense to the theologians who accept the proposition, although it is wholly foreign to their meaning. They prove their view as follows: the composite sense is the one in which efficacious motion, or another form, is posited in a subject, or composed together with it, as is clear from the very etymology of the name. The divided sense, by contrast, is the one in which that same form is separated from the subject and divided from it. Therefore to say that man's free choice cannot dissent from efficacious motion in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense, is nothing other than to assert that throughout the whole time that motion is in a person, he truly cannot dissent from it; but once that same motion is separated and divided from him, he can dissent or fail to act.
The Lutherans and Calvinists, failing to grasp the foregoing distinction between necessity in the composite or divided sense, and not admitting it, removed freedom of choice from the picture. For since they admit that Scripture and the Fathers—especially St. Augustine—explicitly teach that a person cannot do otherwise (which must be understood in the composite sense) than what God willed him to do by an absolute and efficacious decree, and to which God impelled him, and consequently they cannot deny this, they asserted that free choice is a thing in name only, or a name without a thing. They could not understand how its freedom could stand together with the efficacy of the divine decree and motion, which the created will cannot resist in the composite sense.
II. The composite and divided senses are explained.—Therefore, to open an easy path by which Lutherans and Calvinists may return to the Catholic Church, and to establish the true meaning of the composite and divided senses now under discussion, we must first presuppose a proper definition of free choice, which we shall set out and explain in Disputation 115, where we shall also explain many other matters that greatly help to untie the present knot.
Second, we must presuppose that free choice has at once a power for opposites, but not a power for having opposites at once. For free choice has at once the power to assent and dissent, which are contraries, and to act or not act, which are contradictories; yet it does not have a power to assent and dissent at once, or to act and not act at once. The reason is that the power for one act is not opposed to the power for the contrary act; but two contrary acts are incompatible in the same subject and cannot both be predicated of it at once, just as two contradictories cannot both be true of the same thing. We can explain this in other terms by saying, with Capreolus1, that free choice contains a simultaneity of power for opposites, but not a power of simultaneity—that is, a power for having opposites at once.
What it means that free choice cannot dissent from efficacious help in the composite sense.—Therefore, when St. Thomas or his disciples say that man's free choice, moved by God with efficacious help, cannot dissent or fail to act in the composite sense, nothing other than this is signified: that the efficacious motion and an actual dissent cannot be posited at once in the same free choice. This sense is Catholic, and consequently the proposition is Catholic. In this same sense, some of the authors who attack efficacious, physically predetermining grace explain the proposition “A predestined person can be damned”: it is true in the divided sense, but false and impossible in the composite sense, because it signifies that freedom extends so far that it can join damnation and predestination together in one person, which is impossible. To the argument usually raised—that predestination is a supposition antecedent to our will; therefore, if someone cannot be damned in the composite sense once predestination is presupposed, it follows that he is saved necessarily and not freely—they reply that the inference must be denied without qualification. They give this reason: for freedom absolutely and simply, this power, spoken of in the divided sense, is sufficient. In the predestined person the power for either alternative truly and really remains, notwithstanding God's predestination, because even if the person is supposed to be predestined, he still truly retains the power to sin and to persist in sin, if he wishes; although this power will never be actualized in an act contrary to predestination. This is the common understanding of the theologians, as can be inferred from what was said in Disputation 25. This is proved as follows: the composite sense is not the one in which the form signified by one extreme is posited in a subject, but the one in which the two forms signified by both extremes are posited together in the same subject. For example, when we say “What is white can be black” in the composite sense, we do not mean that whiteness is, or can be, separately in some subject, or that blackness is, or can be, in some subject; rather, the sense is that whiteness and blackness are compossible together in the same subject. That is why the proposition is false in the composite sense: it is impossible for something to be white and black at once. Likewise, when it is asserted that free choice, moved by God with efficacious help, cannot dissent in the composite sense, this does not mean only that efficacious help is, or can be, in man's free choice, or that dissent is, or can be, in free choice; it means that efficacious help and actual dissent cannot be in the same free choice at once.
III. This doctrine can be confirmed by an argument ad hominem against the authors of the opposing view. For when pressed by the arguments commonly used to prove that the freedom of our choice cannot coexist with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge—for, given the foreknowledge by which God foresaw that Peter would consent, it is impossible for him to dissent—they reply that this is impossible in the composite sense, because these two things cannot both be true at once: that God knows Peter will consent, and that Peter nevertheless does not consent but dissents; otherwise divine knowledge would be falsified, which is impossible. Nor can they explain the composite sense in any other way. Therefore, likewise, when we assert that free choice, moved by God with efficacious help to consent, cannot dissent in the composite sense, the meaning is that it involves a contradiction for these two things to be true together: that efficacious help toward consent is in a person, and that the person dissents. From this we conclude once again that, just as the foreknowledge by which God knows Peter will consent does not take away from him the power by which he can dissent, if he wishes, but only removes the act of dissenting from him, and consequently in no way takes away or impedes the freedom of our choice, even as regards its actual exercise, so too the eternal, absolute, and efficacious decree of the divine will, by which God brings about Peter's consent through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, does not take away from him the power by which he truly can dissent, if he wishes; it only brings it about that, although by the freedom of his choice he can dissent from God who calls him, he nevertheless does not dissent. We have said more about this in Disputation 18, no. 23, and throughout Disputation 23.2 They reply that necessity in the composite sense, that is, on the supposition of divine foreknowledge, is not on the same footing as necessity in the composite sense, that is, on the supposition of efficacious help of grace physically predetermining free choice to consent.3 For the former necessity follows upon the free operation of free choice that is going to occur; the latter, however, is antecedent. Therefore, according to Anselm's teaching, the former necessity does not harm freedom, whereas the latter is wholly incompatible with it. But this objection was raised and answered in Disputation 22, nos. 40 and 41.4 There we examined Anselm's teaching and showed that necessity in the composite sense, that is, on the supposition of an efficacious decree of the divine will, which precedes in the order of reason the foreknowledge of the future cooperation of free choice—even on the hypothesis that the person were placed in such circumstances—is not the antecedent necessity of which Anselm speaks. Hence there is no need to repeat here what was said there.
IIII. From these points the theologian will easily be able to answer all the arguments by which the efficacy of grace as we explain it, or the freedom of choice—as though it could not coexist with that efficacy—is attacked. To the objection proposed at the beginning of this disputation, the reply is that the composite sense is not the one intended by the argument, but the one we have explained in the course of this disputation and in other places.
Next we must treat the help of helping and efficacious grace in comparison with the help of exciting and sufficient grace. Eight questions are to be considered concerning this:
I. Whether, after God has mercifully stirred up created free choice, he awaits its free consent, so that it may will to be cleansed or justified. Here the decree of the Council of Orange, canon 4, is examined.
II. Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who stirs and calls it.
III. Whether the good use, or cooperation and causal influx, of free choice by which it consents to God who stirs it proceeds from its own innate freedom alone.
IIII. Whether, given exciting grace, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be initiated by the created will, or by the divine will—that is, by the efficacious help of pre-operating grace.
V. Whether this causal proposition is true: “Because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and is converted”; or, on the contrary, whether he is converted because he is helped by God.
VI. Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice stirred and moved by God.
VII. Whether this causal proposition is true: “Because a person is not helped by God, he is not converted but persists in sin.”
VIII. Whether this causal proposition is likewise true: “Because a person stirred by God does not will to use sufficient grace rightly, he is therefore not helped by God and is not converted.”