De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, properly speaking of resistance.

I. Since in the foregoing we have explained in what sense free choice can dissent from God calling and moving, and reject prevenient grace, it remains for us to explain whether, properly speaking, it can resist efficacious help; or whether, just as it cannot resist God and his consequent will, according to what was said in Disputations 31 and 32, so also it cannot resist efficacious help.

Those authors who deny that God, by his efficacious help, actively and properly effects that man’s free choice piously cooperates teach, as a consequence, that although a created will cannot resist God or his will of good pleasure, it can nevertheless truly resist every created motion and every help, however efficacious. This opinion can be proved

First: for the Council of Trent expressly defines that man’s free choice, moved and aroused by God (and it speaks also of choice moved by efficacious help), can dissent from that same help. But to dissent is the same as to resist: for choice resists help only by dissenting and not performing the act to which it is moved, or even by performing the contrary act. And in the decree of faith 15 of the Council of Sens it is defined: Nor is the help of God who draws such that it cannot be resisted: Therefore.

Second, an argument is made from the authority of St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, art. 7, ad 2, where he says that God moves all things according to their mode; and therefore divine motion is participated in by some with necessity, but by rational nature with freedom, because rational power is related to opposites; and therefore God so moves the human mind toward the good that it can nevertheless resist this motion. By these words St. Thomas proves that man’s will is moved freely by God because it can resist his motion. He therefore holds that man’s will can resist efficacious motion; otherwise it would not be moved freely by it.

Third: a cause that has equal or greater power can resist another having lesser power or activity; but free choice has greater power than any motion or entity received in it. For such a motion is inferior to choice and, as regards its use, subject to the power of that same choice, just as are the habits that we use when we will. Therefore it can resist any motion of God, however efficacious.

II. Efficacious help can be considered in two ways: namely, according to its own entity, and as an instrument of the divine will.—The Doctors who hold, in the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, that by his efficacious grace God not merely morally but also properly effects that free choice cooperate and consent to God calling and arousing, answer this question with a distinction. I consider their opinion true and in close agreement with Sacred Scripture and the Councils. For clarity, one must observe that efficacious help can be considered in two ways. First, simply according to its own entity, that is, insofar as it is a certain real motion, or created entity received in the intellect and will. In this respect there is no controversy between the authors of either opinion, since all admit that free choice can resist efficacious help if it is considered simply according to its own entity. In another way it can be considered according to all the real power it has as coming from God and as an instrument of the will of God, who efficaciously wills to convert to himself the man whose heart he moves. In this respect it must be said that created free choice cannot resist efficacious help, properly speaking of resistance, just as it cannot resist God or his will. This is proved by all the passages of Scripture, the testimonies of the holy Fathers, and the theological arguments by which it was shown in Disputations 31 and 32 that free choice cannot resist God or his efficacious will. For the same arguments prove this of efficacious help inhering in created choice, insofar as it is an instrument of the divine will, which through that help works whatever it wills. We can frame the argument as follows. Efficacious help, as an instrument of the divine will, contains the power of God in an intentional mode; for the power of the principal agent is in the instrument in a certain incomplete mode, as St. Thomas teaches in q. 3. de potentia, art. 7. ad 7. and in 4. sent. dist. 1. q. 1. art. 4. q. 1. c. But created free choice cannot resist God or his absolute will, as was shown in Disputations 31 and 32. Therefore neither can it resist efficacious motion insofar as it is the instrument of God willing to convert man to himself. The consequence is proved: to resist an instrument insofar as it is being moved in act by the principal agent is to resist the power of the principal agent, since every instrument acts by the power of the principal agent and, insofar as it is an instrument, has no action other than the very action of the principal agent, who works through the instrument and limits his power in it to cause the effect through that instrument, and not otherwise.

This is confirmed: St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 112. art. 3. in corp., from the fact that God’s intention, which is in his motion or efficacious help, cannot fail, concludes that if it is God’s intention in moving that the man whose heart he moves should obtain grace, he infallibly obtains it, according to the saying of John 6: Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me. The same point he proves in 2. 2. q. 24. ar. 11. in corp., speaking of the act of charity. Therefore, just as created free choice cannot resist the intention of the divine will, so too it cannot resist efficacious help insofar as it contains, in an intentional mode and in a certain incomplete mode, the power of that same divine intention.

This is confirmed by the authority of St. Jerome, who, explaining the passage in Ephesians 1, Predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will, says: Predestination and purpose are set together, according to which God works all things: according to the counsel of his will, whereby he does all that he does with counsel and will, so that they are full of reason and of the power of the one acting. For men will to do many things with counsel, but the effect by no means follows their will. But no one can resist him so as to prevent him from doing all that he wills.

III. Resisting and being able to dissent from the help of grace differ from one another.—The first argument, from the Council of Trent and the Council of Sens, has already been answered sufficiently, I think, in the preceding disputation and elsewhere. Now we say that the Council of Trent, which spoke more formally about grace and free choice, never used the word resist, but the words dissent and reject, to indicate that it is not formally the same thing to resist, or to be able to resist, efficacious help as it is to be able to dissent from or reject the grace of calling—unless resist is taken in a certain general sense, meaning the same as dissent. For if these words dissent and resist are taken strictly, they differ in this: being able to dissent belongs intrinsically to a free power that consents, because the capacity for opposites—namely, to act and not to act—is of the intrinsic character of a free power, as will be clear below. Hence, precisely because God decreed and ordained that free choice should freely consent to God arousing and calling, he consequently ordained that it should so consent that it could dissent if it wished. Accordingly, from the fact that free choice can dissent from God moving it, it does not follow that it can resist God or his efficacious will; rather, it is inferred that it carries out the divine will according to the mode that he established for that created choice, as St. Thomas explains in 1. 2. q. 10. art. 4. ad 1., and 1. p. q. 19. ar. 8, especially in the reply to objection 2, and q. 83, art. 1. Moreover, the word resist, in its formal meaning, implies a certain opposition, which cannot belong to any creature in relation to God, for the reasons given in Disputations 31 and 32. Hence, although choice moved by efficacious help toward consenting can dissent if it wishes, it cannot nevertheless resist God or his efficacious help insofar as it is an instrument of the divine will. IIII. In keeping with this, one must answer the Council of Sens that when it says, Free choice can resist the help of God drawing; it speaks of help, as an entity and a certain particular cause, not as containing within itself the intention of the divine will, which is the universal cause of all beings. For if in this respect it could resist efficacious help, it could also resist the will of God, the contrary of which was shown above. This teaching, or interpretation, has a strong foundation in St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 103. ar. 8. in cor. There, when asking whether anything can strive against the order of divine governance, he answers that nothing can strive against the order of divine governance insofar as it proceeds from the universal cause governing the whole; yet it can do so insofar as it proceeds from a particular cause that executes divine governance. But we have already treated this expressly in Disputations 31 and 32. Or the Council can be explained as speaking of resistance in a certain general sense, insofar as being able to resist means the same as being able to dissent if one wishes, as the holy Council of Trent puts it. Or, if the theologian prefers, let him say that the Council of Sens speaks of efficacious help offered by God, not efficacious help received in choice itself; this interpretation is gathered from the context itself. For the passages of Scripture cited by the Council show that it speaks of efficacious help offered, which the Jews resisted.

The answer to the second argument, from the authority of St. Thomas, is given by what was said in reply to the Council of Sens.

To the third argument it is answered that free choice has greater power than any motion received in it if that motion is considered according to its own entity, abstracting from the decree of the divine will, whose instrument it is; but not if it is considered as an instrument of God efficaciously willing to convert man to himself, and insofar as it contains within itself, in an intentional mode, the power of the divine will, which no creature can resist. Nor, under this aspect, is such a motion subject, as regards its use, to the power of created choice; rather, it subjects the human will to itself and makes it obedient, as was shown in Disputation 87.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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