De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.
Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.
Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.
Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.
Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.
Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.
Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.
Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.
Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.
Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.
Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.
Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.
Whether free choice, moved by God through efficacious help, can dissent from that same help in the composite sense and fail to be converted.
I. SOME have said that, while any help of prevenient grace remains in a person, according to every real power and perfection it has as it comes from God, that person can also dissent in the composite sense and fail to be converted. They prove this opinion.
First, from the Council of Trent, Session 6, on justification, chapter 5, where it says that a person freely assents to exciting and helping grace, so that when God touches the human heart through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, the person does something, receiving that inspiration, since he can also reject it. In these words the Council seems plainly to teach that a person can reject efficacious grace in the composite sense. For the words when God touches the human heart and since he can also reject it clearly speak of the inspiration by which a person is actually touched and moved, and the Council says that a person can reject this. It therefore holds that, even on the supposition of that same motion, a person can dissent in the composite sense by rejecting that inspiration. And in canon 4 of the same session it defines: If anyone says that the free choice of a human being, moved and roused by God, cooperates in no way by assenting to God who rouses and calls, so that the person may dispose and prepare himself to obtain the grace of justification; and that he cannot dissent if he wishes, but, like some inanimate thing, does nothing at all and is merely passive, let him be anathema. Therefore, according to the Council’s definition, after a person has been roused and moved by God, he can dissent; therefore he can do so in the composite sense, that is, on the supposition of an efficacious motion.
This is confirmed by the definition of the Council of Sens, decree of faith 15. Speaking of efficacious help by which a person is drawn by God to be justified, it says: Nor is God’s help in drawing such that it cannot be resisted. Here too it seems to speak in the composite sense and on the supposition of such help. This is clear because, after the Council taught against the Pelagians that the will needs the help of prevenient grace in order to turn to God, it adds against Luther: Nevertheless, so great a necessity of grace does not prejudice free choice, since grace is always ready, not even a moment passing in which God does not stand at the door and knock; if anyone opens the door to him, he will enter and dine with him; and, finally, God’s help in drawing is not such that it cannot be resisted. To prove this, it cites Matthew 23: How often I wished to gather your children, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling? And what Saint Stephen said to the Jews in Acts 7: You have always resisted the Holy Spirit. The Council therefore holds that a person moved by efficacious help can dissent from it even in the composite sense, and can combine actual dissent with the whole being and intrinsic power of that same help.
II. Second. The words dissent, resist, reject, which the Councils use, refer to a present thing, that is, to an actual existing excitation from which a person can dissent. For a person is not properly said to dissent from a temptation by which he is not really touched. Therefore the dissent which the Council determines a person can make against God’s motion is understood in relation to a motion actually existing in the person; therefore he can dissent from it in the composite sense.
Third. To say that such help is placed in us before the consent of our will, and that once this help is in place people cannot dissent but necessarily act on the supposition of such help, is to say that, on the supposition of this same help, they do not act freely, and thus do not exercise freedom. Therefore.
This is confirmed. If God wished, by his absolute power, to necessitate the will to some act, he would do so only by impressing on it a motion such that, once it was in place, the will could not fail to perform that act. Therefore, if, once an efficacious motion is in place in a person, the will cannot dissent in the composite sense, it follows that the will is necessitated to consent. For this is how the blessed are necessitated in heaven to love God: once the beatific vision is in place, they cannot fail to love God. Therefore.
Fourth. As Albert Pighius of Kampen reports, this was Calvin’s explicit doctrine: he asserted that, on the supposition of an efficacious motion, a person cannot dissent. Calvin’s words are these: He moves our will—namely, God—not as has been handed down and believed for many centuries, so that it should afterward be up to our choice to obey his motion or oppose it, but by his efficaciously affecting it. Therefore the opinion which asserts that the will cannot dissent from efficacious helps in the composite sense coincides, at least in words, with Calvin’s error.
Fifth. The Council defined two things against the Lutherans and Calvinists. One is that free choice, roused and moved by God, is not merely passive but freely cooperates with the divine motion. The other is that it can dissent, if it wishes. But the first is plainly understood in the composite sense; therefore so is the second. Otherwise there would be equivocation in the Council’s words, which occur in the same context; this must not be admitted, since that definition would then be highly ambiguous.
This is confirmed because the Lutherans and Calvinists never said that a person cannot dissent from an efficacious divine motion in the divided sense, that is, if God’s efficacious motion is removed. Rather, they spoke in the composite sense, that is, on the supposition of the motion. For it would be ridiculous to say that they thought a person could not dissent from efficacious grace if efficacious grace were removed from the subject. Instead, they taught that a person cannot dissent from grace in the composite sense, that is, on the supposition that he is moved by God through that grace. Therefore, when the Council defines against those same heretics, it understands that a person can dissent from efficacious grace even in the composite sense.
III. Sixth. The Council could not have defined that a person can dissent from efficacious grace in the divided sense; therefore it holds that he can dissent from it in the composite sense. The antecedent is proved: to say that a person can dissent from efficacious grace in the divided sense signifies that a person can be without the efficacious motion, and that, if he is without it, he will dissent. But this sense involves a manifest contradiction: for, simply by lacking a call, it is impossible for someone to dissent from it positively, morally speaking.
This is confirmed. The Council is not speaking of a metaphysical and remote power, but of a physical and proximate power that can morally be reduced to act by human freedom, even while the efficacious motion itself remains. Otherwise the proposition A person can dissent from the efficacious help by which he is touched would be no truer and would hold in no different sense than A blind person can see. For even in the divided sense—that is, with blindness divided and separated from the person—it is not contradictory for him to see.
Seventh. An act that is necessary on the supposition of some antecedent prior to the free consent of our will is absolutely necessary and not free, as is clear from the explicit teaching of Saint Anselm, lib. de concord. cap. 1. and lib. 2. cur Deus homo, cap. 17. et 18. There he distinguishes two suppositions, one antecedent to our will and the other consequent upon it, and says that the former removes freedom whenever, on its supposition, the act is necessary, but not the latter. For a person sits freely, although on the supposition that he is sitting, it is necessary that he sit. Therefore, since the supposition of efficacious help is, according to the opposing opinion, a supposition wholly antecedent to the free influx of our will, it follows that an act of the will which is necessary on the supposition of such help is absolutely necessary and not free.
IIII. The contrary opinion is true and is the mind of Saint Thomas and all the doctors whom we cited in Disputation 25.1 To explain it, we must first assume, following Saint Thomas, that there are two kinds of modal proposition.2 The first is composite, also called a modal de dicto. The second is divided, commonly called a modal de re. A composite modal is one in which the dictum is the subject and the mode is predicated, as in: That the predestined be damned is impossible. A divided modal is one in which the mode is inserted into the dictum, as in: It is impossible for Socrates to run. Likewise, a modal is divided when the mode attaches to the verb, as in: A white person can be black. This foundation is commonly accepted by all dialecticians. Ferrara teaches it in 1. contra Gentes, cap. 67., near the end, and Soto in lib. 3. summularum, cap. de modalibus.
Second, it should be noted that the forms signified in a modal proposition by the terms of the dictum sometimes signify first act, or potency, as when we say, It is possible for what is capable of laughter to be capable of weeping; sometimes they signify second act, as when we say, It is impossible for one who is laughing to weep. When, then, the terms of the dictum signify second act, for the truth of a composite modal de possibili it is sufficient that it be required3 that each act signified by the terms of the dictum be compossible in the same subject at the same instant. For the proposition It is possible for something white to be black is false in the composite sense, because whiteness and blackness cannot be present together in the same subject. But when the terms signify first act, it is sufficient and necessary for the truth of a composite modal de possibili that the potencies themselves be compossible in the same subject. Thus, in the proposition It is possible for what is capable of laughter to be capable of weeping, for its truth it is sufficient and necessary that the potency for laughing and the potency for weeping can exist together in the same subject; it does not require the acts of laughing and weeping to be compossible together in the same subject.
When one term of the dictum signifies first act, but the other signifies second act, for the truth of a composite modal de possibili it is sufficient and necessary that the first act and the second act signified by the terms of the dictum be able to exist together in the same subject. For the proposition It is possible for what is capable of laughter to be white is true because the potency for laughter and whiteness can be present together in the same subject.
V. A true modal proposition is necessary, and a false one is impossible.—Third, note that if a modal proposition is true, it is necessary, and if it is false, it is impossible. So teaches Soto in the place cited above and Saint Thomas in the places cited in Disputation 7, no. 7. For the truth of an affirmative modal de possibili, it is sufficient and necessary that its de inesse proposition be possible. For example, It is possible for something white to run is true because its de inesse proposition, that is, Something white runs, is possible. From this I infer that the composite sense of a modal proposition is not that in which one form among those signified by the dictum is combined with the subject, as the authors of the contrary opinion wrongly suppose, but that in which the two forms signified by the terms of the dictum are combined together in the same subject.
What “impossible in the composite sense” means.—Let the first conclusion, then, be this. When theologians or dialecticians say that something is possible in the composite sense, they mean nothing other than that a composite modal modified by the mode possible is true. Likewise, when they say that something is impossible in the composite sense, they mean that a composite modal de possibili is false. For example, when it is said that a predestined person cannot be damned in the composite sense, it means that being predestined and being actually damned cannot belong to the same person together. For it is impossible for someone to be predestined and damned at the same time. Accordingly, in the present controversy, when it is said that a person moved by efficacious help cannot dissent in the composite sense, this means nothing other than that the efficacious motion and actual dissent are not compossible together in the same person. It does not mean that efficacious motion and the potency for dissenting are incompossible in the same person. Saint Thomas explains this conclusion in the cited passage of the First Part, and in Against the Gentiles, book 1, chapter 67, and in the First Book of the Sentences, distinction 38, single question, article 5, reply to objection 5, as does Ferrara in the place cited above. The conclusion follows from what has been said. For the composite sense belongs properly to a composite modal. Therefore, for the proposition A person moved by efficacious help can dissent in the composite sense to be verified, the composite modal must be true. But for a composite modal to be true, it is necessarily required that the terms signified by the dictum be compossible together in the same subject. Therefore, for the proposition A person roused by efficacious help can dissent in the composite sense to be true, it is required that that efficacious motion and actual dissent be able to exist together in the same person. But it is impossible for God’s efficacious motion toward consent and actual dissent to coexist in the same person. Therefore. The minor premise is proved: otherwise God’s motion would not be efficacious. The same minor premise is confirmed by the explicit authority of Saint Thomas, Disputed Questions on Truth, question 23, article 5, reply to objection 5, whose words I shall cite in the next conclusion.
VI. While under one act, free choice retains at the same time the potency for the opposite.—Second conclusion. If a single act is combined with the potency for its opposite, it is most truly affirmed that a person moved by God through efficacious help at the same time retains the potency by which he can dissent, if he wishes. This conclusion is plainly gathered from Saint Thomas, Disputed Questions on Truth, question 23, article 5, reply to objection 5. He says that, although the nonexistence of an effect of the divine will cannot coexist with the divine will, the potency to fail to produce4 the effect does coexist with the divine will. For these are not incompossible: God wills that this person be damned, and this person can be saved. But these are incompossible: God wills that this person be saved, and this person is damned. He says the same in other places cited in Disputation 18, no. 23. Correspondingly, we say that these are compossible together: Peter is moved by God through efficacious help, and Peter can dissent, if he wishes. These two, however, are incompossible: Peter is moved by efficacious help, and he dissents. This is proved. Efficacious help and the potency for dissenting are not opposed to one another; only efficacious help for consenting and actual dissent are mutually incompatible. Therefore efficacious help and the potency for dissenting are compatible together in the same subject. The antecedent is proved: efficacious help moves a person to turn freely; therefore it infallibly effects his turning in such a way that he can also fail to turn, if he wishes. For this belongs to the nature of freedom: the potency directed toward one of two opposites retains the capacity to perform the opposite act, if it wishes. A free potency is indifferent toward either alternative, as will be shown in Disputations 115 and 116. Therefore efficacious help is not opposed to the potency for dissenting, but is compatible with it. This is confirmed: sitting and being able to stand are not opposed to one another. By sitting, a person does not destroy any real potency in himself; sitting and standing together are simply opposed. Likewise, the form of wood by which prime matter is actualized is not incompossible with the potency that the same prime matter has for the form of fire or another substantial form. It is incompossible only with another form in the same matter. Otherwise the matter of wood would have no appetite for another form, and wood would be incorruptible; indeed, every other natural being would likewise be incorruptible, which is contrary to philosophy and experience. Therefore God’s efficacious motion and the potency for dissenting are likewise not opposed; therefore they can exist together.
VII. Free choice cannot resist efficacious help in the composite sense.—Third conclusion. If efficacious help is combined with actual dissent, it is impossible in the composite sense for a person moved by God through efficacious help toward consent to dissent from the help of grace or reject it. This conclusion is taught by Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas. For Saint Thomas, in the First Part and in the cited Disputed Questions on Truth, question 23, explicitly affirms that a predestined person cannot be damned in the composite sense, because these two things—someone’s being predestined and his being damned—are incompatible together. Likewise Saint Augustine, in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 95, explicitly teaches that it is impossible for God to will something to happen and yet for it not to happen because a human will resists or impedes it. Augustine’s words are: Our God is above in heaven, and in heaven and on earth he has done all things whatsoever he willed. This would certainly not be true if he had willed some things and had not done them; and, what is more shameful, if he had not done them because a human will impeded what the Omnipotent willed to happen. And below: For he is truly called Omnipotent for no other reason than that he can do whatever he wills; nor is the effect of the Omnipotent Will impeded by the will of any creature. The conclusion is proved by reason. For to be impossible in the composite sense means nothing other than that a composite modal de possibili is not true, as is clear from the foundations laid down. But this composite modal is not true: For a person moved by God through efficacious help to dissent is possible. Therefore. The minor premise is proved: for the truth of a composite modal de possibili, it is sufficient and necessary that its de inesse proposition be possible. But the de inesse proposition corresponding to the modal in question is impossible, namely, A person moved by efficacious help dissents; for it has the same impossibility as A predestined person is damned. Therefore. To this they reply5 that, although efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, and actual dissent cannot coexist in the same person, nevertheless efficacious help considered in its own being and according to its intrinsic power, which it has, and actual dissent can coexist in the same person. For they suppose that no help of divine grace is efficacious intrinsically and prior to our free consent. But this solution was already refuted in Disputations 18, 23, and 91,6 where it was shown that efficacious help has a certain real power, insofar as it is God’s instrument when he wills to convert a person to himself—a power that help which is merely sufficient does not have.
When the Council of Trent defines that a person can dissent from the help of grace, it speaks also of efficacious help.—Fourth conclusion. When the Council of Trent and the Council of Sens determine that a person roused and moved by God can dissent, if he wishes, they speak in the divided sense, if the subject is efficacious help. Accordingly, in keeping with the Council’s determination, a person can dissent from any help of prevenient grace, absolutely speaking, if he wishes. It is not necessary, however, that a person be able to dissent from every help of prevenient grace in the composite sense. VIII. To explain this conclusion, it should be noted that some theologians say the Council of Trent speaks of sufficient help, not efficacious help. I, however, think we should say with others that it speaks also of efficacious help. For it speaks of the help a person has at the instant of justification, which is evidently efficacious help. There is, however, a difference. If we are speaking of sufficient help, a person roused by such help can dissent from it even in the composite sense, for actual dissent and sufficient help can coexist in the same person. But if we speak of efficacious help, free choice moved by such help can dissent absolutely and in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense; and the Councils speak in accordance with this teaching. This is proved first: the Councils’ propositions are not composite modals and do not have the form of a composite modal, but are divided; therefore they produce the divided sense. The antecedent is proved: as we said above, following Saint Thomas, a modal proposition is composite when the dictum is made subject and the mode is predicated, as in the proposition It is possible for something white to be black. But in the aforementioned propositions, the dictum is not made subject, since the mode is interposed between the parts of the dictum, as occurs in a divided modal. For the Council says that free choice, moved and roused by God, can dissent, if it wishes. There the mode is placed between the terms of the dictum; therefore it speaks in the divided sense. A second proof: the proposition A white thing can be black—A predestined person can be damned—as it stands, is not a composite modal and does not yield the composite sense; otherwise it would be false, contrary to Saint Thomas in the places cited above. Therefore, likewise, the proposition A person moved by God through efficacious help can dissent is not a composite modal and does not yield the composite sense, but the divided sense. A third proof comes from the Councils’ intention. In those passages they intend to condemn the heresy of the Lutherans, who assert that divine providence and efficacious grace destroy the freedom of free choice. To condemn this, it sufficed to define that at the instant when free choice is moved efficaciously by God, it retains a free and unimpeded faculty by which it can fail to act, if it wishes; for this suffices for freedom with respect to the exercise of an act. Therefore the Councils did not intend to define that a person moved by God7 through efficacious help can dissent in the composite sense. This is confirmed: as we said above, it is impossible in the composite sense for a person moved by God through efficacious help to dissent. For this proposition is impossible: A person moved by efficacious help dissents. Therefore the definition of the Council of Trent cannot be understood in the composite sense. This is also gathered from the Council’s words, for it says that free choice, roused and moved by God—that is, by efficacious help—does something by assenting to God who calls, although it can dissent if it wishes. In this it designated both the efficacy of grace and the freedom of free choice. It designated the efficacy of grace because by its power a person always consents, since efficacious grace itself makes him consent. And it designated the freedom of free choice because, although dissent never coexists with efficacious grace, nevertheless the same grace also coexists with a true and unimpeded faculty by which a person can dissent if he wishes. In this consists the true freedom of free choice, as will become clear in Disputations 115 and 116.
IX. Necessity on a supposition neither removes nor diminishes freedom.—Fifth conclusion. Necessity on the supposition of an absolute and efficacious divine decree, or necessity on the supposition of the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, neither removes nor diminishes the freedom of choice with respect to the exercise of an act; rather, it perfects and strengthens it. The same must be said of conditional necessity, of the consequent8, and of infallibility, and of necessity in the composite sense. This conclusion belongs to Saint Thomas, who formally acknowledges that freedom of choice coexists with necessity on a supposition, conditional necessity, necessity of the consequence, and infallibility. Saint Augustine and the Doctors generally teach the same, as was expressly shown in Disputation 25. It is further proved. For even the authors of the opposing opinion, when pressed by arguments, admit the necessity on a supposition of some antecedent. When it is objected that freedom would be removed, they reply by that distinction between what is necessary in the composite or in the divided sense. Explaining the freedom of Christ the Lord in fulfilling the commandments, they rightly say that Christ the Lord freely fulfilled the commandments, although on the supposition of the commandment he could not fail to fulfill it in the composite sense. And when speaking of the confirmation of the Blessed Virgin, they say that she freely performed good works, although on the supposition of the confirming grace she could not, in the composite sense, fail to act well when a commandment was in force, nor could she sin. If, then, they use this distinction to answer the arguments raised against freedom of choice, and say that it coheres perfectly with necessity on the supposition of the grace that confirms, we too may use the same distinction and preserve the freedom of choice together with necessity on the supposition of efficacious pre-operating grace. It is further proved by reason. For Sacred Scripture contains many things that cannot be reconciled except by the common distinction between the composite and divided senses. John says: Whoever is born of God, does not sin, but cannot even sin, which everyone understands in the composite sense, because these two do not coexist: that someone have habitual grace, which is the seed of glory, and commit a mortal sin. Hence Saint John himself adds: Because the seed of God remains in him,—as if to say that the seed of God and mortal sin cannot coexist. Finally, the conclusion is proved by showing the inconsistency of the opposing opinion, whose claims are not mutually consistent. On the one hand, it contends that necessity on the supposition of some antecedent, which is not within our power but has God alone as its efficient cause, removes freedom of choice. On the other hand, it admits a similar necessity. For it teaches that, on the supposition of congruous grace foreknown by God through middle knowledge to be going to have its effect, a person is necessarily converted with the necessity of the consequence and of infallibility. The argument is then this. In their opinion, that congruous grace precedes our consent, and that grace has God alone as its efficient cause. It is not within the power of our free choice that God give us that grace at this time or that; rather, God himself, in his sheer freedom, grants it to whom and when he wills. Therefore, on their opinion, freedom is removed by that congruous grace; or, if it is not removed, neither is it removed by efficacious grace, which we maintain, although on its supposition a person cannot fail to be converted in the composite sense, as has been explained. This teaching will become clearer from the replies to the arguments.
X. To the first argument, it is answered that the Council does indeed speak of a person actually roused and moved through efficacious grace, and determines of him that he can dissent, if he wishes. But it does not follow from this that the Council speaks in the composite sense. To the objection, it is answered from what has been said that the composite sense of that proposition is not the one in which efficacious help is combined and joined with the subject, namely, with free choice, as the argument intends; rather, it is the sense in which efficacious help and actual dissent are joined together in the same subject. The same answer is given to the confirmation drawn from the Council of Sens, which will be treated more fully in the following disputations.
To the second argument it is answered that actually dissenting from God’s motion and actually rejecting it do refer to a present motion and inspiration by which free choice is actually touched and moved by God; and of this we say that a person can dissent from it, if he wishes. But he will never dissent, as is clear from what has been said. Just as a white person can be black, but as long as he is white he will never be black. A second answer is that, although actually dissenting refers to a present motion, being able to dissent does not refer only to a present motion, but to a present or possible one, because the verb can extends all the terms before and after it to possible things. Hence free choice can dissent not only from God’s motion by which it is actually touched, but also from the motion by which it can be touched and moved. A person’s actual dissent, however, is always in relation to the motion by which he is actually roused.
XI. To the third argument it is answered that, even when efficacious help is posited in the will, the potency to dissent is combined with it, although there is no potency to combine actual dissent with efficacious help. For, as has been said, efficacious help is opposed not to the potency for dissenting but to actual dissent. For being able to dissent is one thing, and actually dissenting another. Therefore such help in no way harms or impedes the actual exercise of our freedom.
To the confirmation it is answered that, if God wished to necessitate the will to some act in such a way that, in its exercise, it would not be free with the freedom required for merit or demerit, he could do this by impressing on the will a certain quality or prior motion,9 so that through it the will would be determined naturally, or in the manner of nature, to one alternative, by means of a judgment likewise naturally determined to one alternative. That is, the intellect would judge that the good proposed to the will had a necessary connection with the good in general, toward which the will is naturally determined. In this way the will in heaven is necessitated to love God. The reason is that through the beatific vision the whole capacity of the intellectual creature is fulfilled, and with respect to that object the indifference of judgment on which freedom of the will is founded is removed. For in heaven the intellect cannot propose to the will, as a good, abstaining from the act of beatific love. Therefore, with respect to such an act, the will is necessitated by a most blessed kind of necessity. But this reasoning does not apply to efficacious help with respect to a pious act performed in this life. For such help does not remove the power by which the intellect can propose to the will, as a good, ceasing from that act; nor is there removed from the will the capacity10 by which it can fail to act, if it wishes. But an argument presses against this:11 for beatific love too is necessary only on the supposition of the light of glory. Indeed, if the light of glory were removed, no necessity to love God would remain. Therefore beatific love is necessary by exactly the same necessity as the act of charity is necessary in this life. XII. It is answered from what was said in Disputation 22, no. 43,12 that although beatific love is necessary on the supposition of the light of glory and the beatific state,13 nevertheless it is necessary absolutely, and not merely by a necessity on supposition. The reason is that in that state the whole capacity of intellectual nature remains fulfilled. Hence it will not merely lack an act contrary to the beatific vision or love; it will not even be able to have such an act. So the matter of the heavens will not merely lack a form other than the one it actually has; it cannot have another form, because its entire capacity is fulfilled by the form it has. This reasoning, however, does not apply to the act of charity had in this life. Therefore beatific love is necessary absolutely and is not free with the freedom sufficient for merit. The sinner’s conversion, however, is free simply, although in a qualified respect it is necessary by a necessity on supposition, as was explained in Disputations 22, 23, and 25.
XIII. Pelagius and Calvin, convicted by the same argument, fell into contrary errors.—To the fourth argument it is answered that Pelagius, Calvin, and Luther, convicted by the same method and the same argument, fell into contrary errors. For they thought this inference evident: Efficacious prevenient grace is given, through which God makes us act; therefore by it the freedom of our choice is removed. One of them, namely Luther, by admitting efficacious grace, impiously asserted with his followers that it destroys the freedom of choice, so that free choice in a person is merely a thing in name. The other, namely Pelagius together with the Semi-Pelagians, argued from the denial of the consequent to the denial of the antecedent: Free choice exists in a person; therefore efficacious prevenient grace, through which God makes us act, must not be admitted. Thus, while admitting free choice, they impiously said that grace was merely a thing in name, denying the help of efficacious prevenient grace. There was, it is true, a difference between Luther and Calvin. Luther asserted that free choice is merely passive, receiving only good and evil works, which, he said, are performed in us by God alone, as is clear from the definition of the Council of Trent made against him, Session 6, chapter 5 and canon 4. Calvin, however, as we observed above,14 somewhat moderated Luther’s error and asserted that a person actively concurs in his own act, yet not freely but spontaneously, because he did not resist, like a horse or mule when led by its rider and not kicking back. We, however, assert that this inference is utterly bad, and that the freedom of choice is therefore perfectly compatible with and preserved together with the efficacy of pre-operating grace. Calvin did not err by saying that God works in us the willing through efficacious grace; for the Apostle teaches this. He erred because he asserted that God works the willing in us in such a way that free choice does not freely produce that very willing. We, however, say that God works the willing in us and that we freely cooperate with God by producing that willing through the power of efficacious motion.
XIIII. To the fifth argument it is answered that the composite or divided sense belongs properly to a composite or divided modal proposition. But the proposition Free choice, roused and moved by God, is not merely passive but freely cooperates is not a modal proposition; it is a simple proposition that, in ordinary speech, is always understood in the same way. The other proposition, namely, Free choice moved by God can dissent, if it wishes, truly is modal; and since it has the form of a divided modal, it yields the divided sense, as was shown above.
To the confirmation it is answered that the Lutherans and Calvinists thought that, together with efficacious help, there could not also be a potency for the opposite act, nor a capacity by which a person could dissent if he wished. We, however, assert that together with efficacious help there is also a potency for the opposite act, namely, dissent. Saint Augustine expressly teaches this both in the cited passages and in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 6, where he says: How can that be lost by which it is brought about that even what can be lost is not lost? He was speaking of the gift of perseverance. Correspondingly, we say that actual dissent does not coexist with efficacious help, for the help itself effects that a person does not dissent, even though through free choice he can dissent if he wishes.
The Council of Trent’s statement concerning efficacious grace is examined.—To the sixth argument, the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is answered that the proposition Peter, moved by efficacious help, can dissent, when taken in the divided sense, has a legitimate and clear meaning. It is verified in this way: Peter is, or can be, moved by God through efficacious help, and Peter can dissent if he wishes. For each proposition is most true, just as the proposition A white Peter can be black, taken in the divided sense, is verified in this way: Peter is, or can be, white, and Peter is, or can be, black. Therefore a white Peter can be black. The reason is that the verb can extends the terms before and after it to possible things.
XV. And if an argument is made that the proposition Peter can dissent from efficacious help is false because the corresponding de inesse proposition, by which it is immediately regulated, is impossible—namely, Peter dissents from efficacious help—for, as has been said, it is contradictory for these two things to be true together: that efficacious help is in Peter and that Peter dissents.
It is answered that the proposition is true. In reply to the objection, we say that the truth of this proposition does not require the simultaneous truth of these two things: that efficacious help is in Peter and that Peter dissents. For when we say Peter dissents from efficacious help, the meaning is not that he dissents from efficacious help actually in Peter, but that he places an impediment to the efficacious help offered to him by God when he is moved through sufficient grace. It is like the highest degree of whiteness impeding any degree of blackness, not one existing in a subject at the same time as the highest whiteness—for no degree of blackness is compossible with the highest whiteness—but one that would exist if it were not impeded by the highest whiteness. But the argument presses further,15 because free choice can not only resist or dissent from efficacious help offered to it, but also from efficacious help that it receives in itself. Therefore the de inesse proposition will be possible: Free choice resists or dissents from the efficacious help by which it is actually moved; consequently, efficacious help and actual dissent can be combined, or posited together, in the same subject. It is answered16 that the proposition Free choice can dissent from the efficacious help by which it is actually moved by God is indeed true, absolutely speaking and in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense. It ought not, and cannot, be regulated or proved by the de inesse proposition because of the virtual connotation, or mode, which attaches to the predicate and is equivalently reduced to a connotation on the part of the subject. Because of this, if it were reduced to a de inesse proposition, it would yield the composite sense and have the same meaning as the de inesse proposition of a composite modal. Hence the aforementioned proposition must be regulated or proved only by the simple compatibility of its terms. Therefore, since being able to dissent from efficacious help belongs to free choice when it is moved by that same help to act, the proposition is true in the divided sense.
To the confirmation, we grant that the Council speaks of a physical potency that can be reduced to act, absolutely speaking. Nevertheless, that potency will never be reduced to act while efficacious help remains in a person, because the help itself ensures that the potency is not reduced to an act opposed to that same help. For example, the potency that the matter of wood has for the form of fire is physical and real, but it will never be reduced to act as long as the form of wood persists in that same matter. Otherwise the same matter would be actualized at the same time by two substantial forms, namely, the form of wood and the form of fire, and thus would have a twofold substantial being, which is impossible.
The answer to the final argument is now clear from what was said in Disputation 25: it is possible for the freedom of our choice to coexist with necessity on the supposition of the divine will or of efficacious help. The objection was answered already in Disputation 22, no. 40, where we showed with the greatest clarity that Anselm does not oppose our opinion but rather supports it, and we explained the legitimate sense of his words cited there.