De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Whether God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, predetermines free choice to consent by way of a physical cause—that is, truly as an efficient cause.

I. How moral and physical determination differ.—Wherein moral and physical predetermination differ.—ALTHOUGH, when we treated the general concurrence of God in general, the present difficulty was discussed at sufficient length in Disputations 22 and the two following it, and although in Disputations 73, 83, and 90 we also briefly touched on certain helps of grace that predetermine free choice to consent, nevertheless, for a fuller explanation of the doctrine, after so many settled questions that can shed considerable light on this one, it seemed good to treat the proposed difficulty about the helps of grace in particular. To make this clear, we should consider that, as we first observed in Disputation 23, determination is of two kinds: one moral, the other physical, or by way of a physical cause. Moral predetermination is that which takes place through persuasions by which the human will is invited and drawn from without or within, and inclined on the part of the object to pursue a good proposed to it as suitable. This predetermination, as the authors with whom we dispute admit, cannot be so perfect as to bring about with certainty and infallibly the effect to which it predetermines the will, except with moral certainty, to which, absolutely speaking, the possibility of something false is not incompatible. The reason is that, as we said above on the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, persuasion does not compel an unwilling person, nor make a willing person out of one who is unwilling. Hence, even supposing any persuasion or moral predetermination whatever toward one act, the will can still, even in the composite sense, do the opposite or not act. Physical predetermination, or predetermination by way of a physical cause, is that by which God not only persuades, draws, and invites morally, but also truly as an efficient cause brings it about that our free choice freely determines itself and cooperates. The difference between moral and physical predetermination, then, is this: the former brings it about only morally that we act, as someone does who asks, persuades, or advises; the latter brings it about physically, or truly as an efficient cause, as was shown in Disputation 86. A further difference follows from this: moral predetermination does not infallibly bring about the effect toward which it moves, whereas physical predetermination does bring it about infallibly, for it is its true efficient cause; but, as Aristotle says, a cause is that which is followed by an effect. The third difference is that moral predetermination is not predetermination simply and absolutely, but only in a qualified sense, just as moral causation is causation in a qualified sense, as is clear from what was said above. Physical predetermination, by contrast, is predetermination simply and absolutely, just as physical causation, without any qualifying addition that diminishes it, is true and real causation.

This doctrine excludes the opinion of those who say that moral predetermination differs from physical predetermination chiefly in this: moral predetermination leaves the power for the opposite even in the composite sense and therefore, although it precedes or comes before the free use of the will, does not impede freedom; whereas physical predetermination does not leave the power for the opposite once the composition is made, since that composition rests on a supposition entirely antecedent to and causative of the thing and is incompatible with freedom. For this difference was refuted in Disputations 18 and 23, where it was shown that physical predetermination toward one act does not remove the same free choice’s power for the opposite. It only brings it about that, although by his innate freedom a person can dissent if he wills, he does not dissent, but consents freely and infallibly.

II. The first opinion says, first, that no predetermination, not even a moral one, is necessary to produce free consent or a supernatural act. Second, it says that physical predetermination is not only unnecessary for good acts, even those of the supernatural order, but also incompatible with their freedom; and consequently, that God does not physically predetermine free choice to a pious action through the efficacious help of grace.

First argument.—They prove this as follows. First, otherwise no exciting grace that did not produce this moral determination in a person would be, in its own order, a sufficient help for conversion or for producing a supernatural act. The consequence is clear, because that grace is called sufficient which, in its own order, suffices for the effect for which it is said to suffice; this is what the very word “sufficient” means. If, then, a greater excitation is necessary, the lesser one cannot truly be called a sufficient help in the character of exciting grace. Yet, all else being equal, or with respect to the same person, a greater or more intense excitation is required to determine the will morally than to move and incline it without such determination. Therefore, if morally determining excitation is necessary, every lesser excitation that is insufficient to predetermine the will morally will likewise be insufficient for that person’s conversion. But the consequence is plainly false; otherwise either none, or certainly very few, of those sufficiently excited to believe or do penance would resist the call; or, conversely, speaking morally—that is, according to what happens more frequently—everyone who in fact does not believe or consent when called would not be called sufficiently. No Catholic would dare concede this, since otherwise very few, or almost no one, would sin by not believing or not doing penance, as is clear from what was said above about sufficient grace.

They confirm this. A will morally predetermined to consent either never dissents, or does so scarcely and rarely, although it can; therefore, once this predetermination is posited, supernatural acts too are regularly or almost always performed. Therefore, if it is absolutely necessary for a supernatural act, since people ordinarily neither have it nor can have it, they will ordinarily not have sufficient help either.

Second, of itself, the will does not need that antecedent moral determination in order to perform natural acts freely, either by absolute necessity or by moral necessity. Therefore, it will not need it for supernatural acts either. The antecedent is clear both from experience—for a person more often acts with moral indifference, and at most such moral determination intervenes when he acts from habit, a vehement affection of concupiscence or fear, or a clear apprehension or strong judgment of the object to be pursued—and from reason. For, when an object is proposed under an adequate aspect to draw the will toward it, a person has a proximate physical power to be carried toward it by his will, and that power is not impeded from elsewhere, as we suppose. Therefore, even if he is not further determined, either physically or morally, he can act physically and morally, or not act, and choose this means or that.

Third, the divine will chose this person for glory rather than that one, or chose to create this world rather than another, not by any physical or moral predetermination but by its own freedom. Therefore, our will too can act, through its participated freedom, without such predetermination. If it is said that this sort of predetermination is necessary, not absolutely, but as a rule, the following argument is made against that claim.

III. Fourth, all the physical causes necessary for such an act can concur without any physical or moral predetermination, both on the part of the object and the intellect, and on the part of God, who sufficiently rouses and offers his help; nor does any impediment necessarily intervene that obstructs the will or imposes great difficulty preventing it from being morally able to use its freedom and join the other causes in eliciting a supernatural act. Therefore, speaking per se, there is no reason why this moral determination should be necessary, even morally and as a rule, although by accident it may be necessary in a particular subject because of its great indisposition, as in hardened people.

Fifth, they argue specifically that the aforesaid efficacious help that physically predetermines is not necessary for giving free and supernatural consent. For the help called sufficient is truly and really sufficient for this, if free choice wills to cooperate with divine grace; therefore, no other help is absolutely necessary. Conversely, if such efficacious help, in the sense that it physically and of itself predetermines our will, is absolutely necessary for a supernatural human act or supernatural free consent, it follows that those who are not converted do not have sufficient help to be converted, or even to be able to be converted. The consequence is proved as follows: sufficient help includes in some way everything necessary for the effect for which it is called sufficient; but the help given to someone who is not converted does not in any way include a motion that physically and efficaciously predetermines free choice. Therefore, if this physical premotion is necessary, that help is not sufficient.

They confirm this: the Lutherans and Calvinists, seeing that sufficient grace is removed by an irrefragable consequence if one asserts that the physically predetermining help of grace is necessary for consenting to the divine call—since, on the other hand, they themselves place efficacious help in a similar motion and determination of the human will by the divine will—consequently deny that sufficient help is left to those who are not given efficacious help. For, they ask, how can something be sufficient if it lacks something necessary? This is how the Catholic authors who have written against them in our time report it. Those authors do not attack them because they draw a bad inference, but because they draw a heretical doctrine from a false principle; nor do they think they can answer them by denying the inference, but by denying that physically predetermining efficacious help is necessary for conversion or pious action. If it is said that such help is not necessary for a person to be able to be converted, but for him in fact to be converted; for more is required for someone actually to act than to be able to act, as is clear from what was said above; against this there is the following argument:

IIII. Refutation.—Sixth argument: either this efficacious help is necessary by way of a principle, or by way of an immediate concurrence in the act itself. If the first is said—as the authors of the opposing opinion must necessarily say, since they do not place this help immediately in the effect, or act, but in the cause, that is, in the will, so that it may elicit the act—then it follows that this help is necessary for being able to will, and not merely for willing, because without it a sufficient principle, or sufficient power to act, has not yet been constituted. Consequently, it is contradictory to conceive of sufficient help without efficacious help: a principle is called sufficient in relation to an effect when no further active principle beyond it is required. If, however, this efficacious help is said to be necessary only by way of concurrence, it is indeed true that such help, as actually conferred and bestowed, is necessary for acting or willing, but not for being able; for help considered in this way is nothing other than our action as proceeding from God. Nevertheless, for a person to be simply able and have sufficient help to elicit such an act, before this help is bestowed in second act, it is necessary that he have that help so prepared or offered on God’s part that it lies in the person’s hand and power to have it if he wills. Further, help given by way of concurrence is not an influx into the power but into the effect; therefore it cannot physically predetermine that power to consent.

Seventh, an argument is made against the same predetermination. For, although we grant for the sake of argument that something may be necessary for an action which is not necessary for the power to act—and this is true of actual concurrence, not of concurrence in first act—nevertheless, for a person to have the proximate power simply, that is, one duly prepared to act with all prerequisites, it is necessary that he have, at least in first act or in his power, whatever is necessary for the action. Otherwise the power will not be proximate, especially morally, but only remote and insufficient. Therefore, if efficacious help is necessary for willing, it must at least be in a person’s power to have it; otherwise one cannot say in any way that the person has sufficient help and the moral power to elicit these acts. Consequently, it cannot be attributed to his will that he does not elicit them.

V. Eighth, they prove that no such physically predetermining grace is possible, or at least that in fact it is not given to anyone. For every actual grace is either exciting or helping, operating or cooperating; but none of these graces physically predetermines the will to free consent. Therefore such a grace is not only unnecessary but impossible. The major premise is clear from what was said in Disputation 70 about the division of the helps of grace. The minor premise, as regards exciting grace, is manifest to authors of both opinions. For, as was seen above, exciting grace moves a person to consent only either by enlightening the intellect, in which respect the whole of this motion is reduced to the object, or by affecting or frightening the will through certain imperfect and indeliberate movements of fear, affection, or joy. But neither of these ways of moving the will suffices to determine it physically. Therefore exciting grace does not physically determine the will. The minor premise is self-evident as to the first part, because outside the beatific vision no particular object determines the will, especially as to the exercise of an act. The same minor premise is proved as to the other part: those movements of exciting grace that arise or are inspired in the will are, in their own order, imperfect, mere simple affections or certain wishful inclinations. Therefore their intrinsic force cannot physically determine the will to give full and absolute consent. For the will is not determined by the force of one act to another unless the acts have a necessary connection with each other, as there is between the choice of the only means and the efficacious intention of the end. But an efficacious and absolute will has no such connection with a simple and imperfect wishful inclination. Indeed, if such a necessary connection intervened, since the movement of exciting grace is not free but necessary, the consent necessarily connected with it would also be not free but simply necessary. There is, then, no basis for saying that exciting grace alone can of itself physically determine the will.

They prove the same about operating grace. For, according to the mind of St. Augustine, operating grace is nothing other than exciting grace, as the passages cited in Disputation 81 seem to show. Therefore, if exciting grace does not physically predetermine the will to free consent, neither does operating grace. That helping or cooperating grace does not physically predetermine this same will is proved as follows: insofar as this grace is helping and cooperating, it does not precede the free determination of free choice, but likewise flows into the pious action along with it. Therefore it does not physically predetermine free choice to consent. For whatever has the power physically to predetermine a power to its operation must flow immediately into that power and precede its determination.

In confirmation of this same opinion, they offer all the arguments set forth in Disputations 22, 23, and 24, by which they try to prove that God, as author of nature, does not physically predetermine the will to good free acts proportionate to its nature, or to the act of sin insofar as it is an act, either by an extrinsic decree of his will or by an intrinsic help or motion inhering in the will. From these arguments they infer that God, as author of grace, does not physically predetermine this same will to supernatural acts. Among other points, they often repeat the argument stated several times above: physical predetermination removes the indifference that is of the essence of freedom and consequently removes freedom itself, at least as regards its actual exercise.

The second opinion belongs to other theologians, who follow a certain middle way. They say that God by an efficacious physical motion predetermines the will to certain supernatural acts: namely, to the pious act by which an unbeliever is converted to faith and a sinner to God, and likewise so that a person may persevere to the end; and in this way he brings it about that we act, while freedom remains safe and unharmed. They consider this to be St. Thomas’s opinion and an indisputable doctrine. They add, however, that it is possible and often happens that efficacious help is some moral motive proposed inwardly and outwardly by God, together with his protection and governance; nor is it necessary that God always precede the will by a physical motion, predetermining it efficaciously to each act, even supernatural ones. They prove their opinion by the following arguments. Hence next in order comes

Ninth argument. For neither St. Augustine nor St. Thomas ever taught that the created will needs a prior motion of God that predetermines it for every act, not only natural acts but even supernatural ones; rather, in many places they insinuate the contrary clearly enough. Therefore. The antecedent is proved. For St. Thomas says in I–II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3: God moves the human will as a universal mover toward the universal object of the will, which is the good, and without this universal motion a human being cannot will anything. But by reason a human being determines himself to will this or that, whether truly good or apparently good, although at times God moves some people to will something determinate, as in those whom he moves through grace. See: determination to particular objects comes from the will itself, on the judgment of reason; it is denied that it comes universally from God. Nor can one say that this determination of the will first comes from God, because he adds that God sometimes determines a person to will something determinate. What he says sometimes happens, then, he denies is always necessary; otherwise there would be no reason for him to say that it sometimes happens through God, if it always happens and cannot happen through the will unless God precedes it.

They confirm this by the authority of Cajetan and Conrad. Cajetan interprets the passage of St. Thomas just cited as asserting that the universal motion which St. Thomas teaches to be necessary is a motion toward a certain act of willing the good in general, which precedes every act of the will; once this act is presupposed, the will is determined to particular acts by itself, not by God. Whether this interpretation is true concerning that prior act of willing the good in general is often discussed in the First Part of the Second Part, and it does not matter here: it is enough that Cajetan’s authority confirms that it is not necessary for the will to be determined by God for every act. Conrad, explaining the same reply, among other things offers these words: If God moves someone determinately toward the good, this is not general but gratuitous.

Tenth, they prove this by the authority of St. Thomas, I–II, q. 10, a. 4, where he says: God moves the will in such a way that he does not determine it necessarily to one thing. And in q. 80, a. 1, ad 3, he says that God is the universal principle of every interior human movement, but that a person is determined to evil directly by the human will, and indirectly by the devil, by way of one who persuades or proposes something desirable.

Eleventh, they argue from reasons touched on in Disputations 22 and 23, so it will suffice here to indicate them. The first reason is that it would follow that God predetermines the will to the act of sin insofar as it is an act and a being. The second is that, if God must initiate every action of the will, every moral cause for determining the will would be superfluous and useless—namely, causes that advise, command, persuade, threaten, and any others of this kind. For, if divine premotion must be awaited, whatever moral causes are applied to the will will do nothing toward its determination. Even if many such causes intervene, only what God has moved and determined the will to do will happen, and it would happen just as much in their absence.

Twelfth, they prove this specifically about supernatural acts. For the opinion that asserts this efficacious help, which premoves and predetermines free choice to every pious and supernatural operation, has no foundation in the teaching of the Fathers or in the Church’s definitions. Whenever the Fathers and Councils discuss the need for grace to perform works of piety, they assign no other reason why nature is insufficient and grace is required than the injury to free choice after sin and the many occasions of sin that assail a person because of the rebellion of his appetites, the devil’s temptations, and the allurements of the world. This is clear from the letters of Innocent, Zosimus, and Celestine, cited several times, from the Councils of Milevis and Arausio, and frequently from Augustine. Yet they never said that grace is necessary for this reason: that a creature depends on the Creator in every operation and therefore must be premoved and predetermined by him. No trace of this reason is found among them.

Thirteenth, he argues that the opposing opinion would entail that no one who does not have efficacious help within himself has help that is truly sufficient. For, if a secondary cause cannot perform supernatural acts unless it is efficaciously moved and predetermined by God, whatever else is conferred without this motion will not be sufficient, since it does not have all that is required for acting piously.

VI. The will needs motion on the part of the end and on the part of the power.—The third opinion is that of the Thomists, which I consider to be explicitly the opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. To explain it, we should assume that created free choice needs two motions in order to act actually. One is on the part of the object and the end. For, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, q. 1, aa. 1 and 2, it belongs to rational nature to act for an end, moving itself toward that end. Hence it must be moved by the end itself as previously conceived, and determined to produce a determinate effect; otherwise it would not produce this action rather than that one. The other motion is on the part of the power: that is, it is moved by God truly as an efficient cause and applied to acting. This is so both because, since it is in potency to act this way or that, or even not to act, it must be moved on the part of its power and reduced to act by God, who is pure act, and also for the other reasons we adduced in Disputations 18, 22, and 23. The first motion is commonly called moral motion because, although it is something real and physical in itself, it does not move the power by efficient causality to a free act but only by way of persuasion. The second motion is called physical: through it God moves and applies free choice to acting physically, or truly as an efficient cause, as was said in Disputation 23. St. Thomas establishes both motions in On Evil, q. 3, a. 3, body; I, q. 106, a. 2; and q. 111, a. 2. Hence the same holy Doctor, in I–II, q. 9, after explaining in article 1 how the will is moved by the end, immediately explains in article 4 how on the part of its power it is moved by God as an efficient cause. Let the following, then, be stated:

Moral predetermination is necessary for each supernatural act.—First conclusion. Moral predetermination, which is on the part of the object and the end, is necessary for eliciting supernatural acts. This conclusion needs explanation more than proof. To see this clearly, consider that moral predetermination can take place either by persuasion that, morally speaking, brings about an effect, or by proposing—even inwardly—an object so suitable that through its delight it draws the will to itself, according to what St. Augustine says: If the poet was allowed to say: Each is drawn by his own pleasure—not by necessity but by pleasure, not by obligation but by delight—how much more should we say that a person is drawn to Christ, who delights in truth, delights in blessedness, delights in justice, delights in eternal life, all of which Christ is? And below: You show a green branch to a sheep and draw it; nuts are shown to a boy and he is drawn; and he who runs is drawn, drawn by love. He is drawn without bodily injury, drawn by the bond of the heart. If, then, the things revealed among earthly delights and pleasures draw those who love them—since it is true that each is drawn by his own pleasure—will Christ, revealed by the Father, not draw? He pursues the same point in On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 34; Eighty-Three Questions; and book 1 of To Simplicianus, question 2, whose words we cited in Disputation 75, nos. 1 and 2. Further, in that same question 2 of To Simplicianus, near the end, he says: Who can believe unless he is touched by some call, that is, by some testimony of things? Who has it in his power that his mind be touched by such a sight as moves his will to faith? Who embraces in his mind something that does not delight him? Or who has the power either to have something capable of delighting him come before him or to find it delightful when it has come before him? Since, then, we are delighted by those things through which we make progress toward God, this is inspired and bestowed by the grace of God. A little further below he says: The will itself, unless something appears that delights and invites the mind, cannot be moved in any way. But for this to appear is not in a person’s power. What did Saul will, except to attack, drag away, bind, and kill Christians? What a frenzied, furious, blind will! Yet, struck down by a single voice from above, when such a sight appeared—that is, one by which his mind and will, its violence broken, would be turned back and corrected toward faith—he suddenly became a more remarkable preacher of the Gospel than he had been a persecutor. By these words he teaches clearly enough that moral predetermination, which takes place through the delight and suitability of a proposed object, is necessary for a person in fact to be converted to God and to act piously.

St. Prosper proves the same point from many passages of Scripture, especially from John 6: No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, as is clear from his words cited in Disputation 75, no. 1. Yet one cannot infer from these passages that, according to Augustine and Prosper, the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace consists only in moral motion and drawing. For, although this sort of motion is presupposed for physical efficacy, by which God truly as an efficient cause brings it about that we act, moral predetermination or motion alone does not infallibly bring about the effect, according to the opinion of St. Augustine and St. Prosper, unless it is joined with efficacy, or physical premotion, as was shown in Disputation 83, no. 7 and those that follow. God also often moves and morally predetermines free choice to conversion or observance of the commandments through fear of punishments, especially of hell, the consideration of which usually moves imperfect people forcefully to turn away from evil and do good. Finally, this kind of moral predetermination, which is required before free choice moves itself to act rightly, is sometimes brought about in various other ways.

With these points assumed, the conclusion is proved from what has been said: the cited passages of St. Thomas show that the will needs to be determined to act by an end previously conceived. But this predetermination is moral, because it takes place by way of persuasion and the proposal of a suitable object. Therefore moral predetermination is necessary for each act.

Second, this is proved as follows. As was shown in Disputation 88, conclusions 1 and 2, even in a justified person, besides the infused virtues, a special help of exciting grace is necessary for each supernatural act. But this sort of help moves and morally predetermines free choice to act piously. For moral predetermination is that which takes place by persuasion and by the proposal of a suitable object, by which free choice is enticed and, as it were, invited to pursue that good; and it is clear that this happens through exciting grace. Therefore.

Second conclusion. In fact, there is efficacious help that physically predetermines free choice to supernatural acts. The proponents of the second opinion establish this conclusion, and some authors of the first opinion admit it, asserting that such help was conferred for greater abundance on certain eminent saints, although it is not absolutely necessary for producing supernatural works. The latter claim will be challenged in the following conclusion; now the former is proved. For the soul of Christ our Lord was physically predetermined to the good, since it could neither sin nor fall away from the good. Likewise the most blessed Virgin’s soul was physically predetermined, at least in those actions that concerned our redemption, as when she said, Behold the handmaid of the Lord; let it be done to me according to your word, and in similar acts she was predetermined by the help of grace to elicit them. Otherwise the order of divine providence concerning the salvation of the human race could have been impeded or frustrated by a contrary will of the Virgin, which is impossible, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, and so on.

VII. This is confirmed. The conversion of the Apostle Paul, since it was miraculous and completed in a single instant, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, q. 112, a. 2, ad 2, was accomplished through the physical predetermination of grace, by which he was made a vessel of election from a persecutor: this seems to be suggested by those words of Acts 9: It is hard for you to kick against the goad, as though it said: However much you strive with free choice to resist God’s most efficacious call, you strive in vain and will accomplish nothing, for by God’s grace you will be established in the good. The same argument can be made about those confirmed in grace, who are so strengthened in the good through supernatural gifts that they cannot fall away from it. Augustine teaches this concerning Peter’s faith in On Correction and Grace, ch. 8, and in ch. 12, speaking of the gift of perseverance, he says: But now, for the saints predestined to the kingdom of God through God’s grace, not merely such help of perseverance is given, but help of such a kind that perseverance itself is bestowed on them—not only so that without this gift they cannot be persevering, but also so that through this gift they are persevering and can be nothing else. Yet the gift of perseverance or confirmation in grace would not bring this about unless it had the power physically to predetermine the will to the good. For, as Augustine says: If, in the great weakness of this life—a weakness in which virtue nevertheless had to be perfected to repress pride—their will were left to them, so that they might remain in God’s help, without which they could not persevere, if they willed, and God did not work in them so that they would will, then among so many and such great temptations their will itself would succumb through its weakness; and therefore they would not be able to persevere, because, weakened, they would not will, or, in the weakness of their will, would not will in such a way as to be able. Therefore it must be said that through such gifts our will is physically predetermined to pursue and hold fast to the good. This conclusion will become clearer in the following conclusion.

VIII. Efficacious help that predetermines free choice to the good is necessary for each supernatural act.—Third conclusion. The help of grace that physically predetermines free choice to carry out the good is absolutely necessary for eliciting each supernatural act. That is, in fact, created will never produces any supernatural act unless it is physically premoved and predetermined by efficacious help to produce that same act. This conclusion directly opposes the authors cited above, but it is proved as follows:

First: besides the infused habits, special help of helping grace is absolutely necessary for each act, as was shown in Disputation 88, conclusion 3. But this sort of help physically predetermines free choice to cooperate with God’s grace. Therefore physically predetermining help is absolutely necessary for each act. The minor premise is proved: the help of helping grace precedes the free cooperation of free choice in the order of nature and causality, and is God’s immediate influx into free choice itself as a cause, applying it to act, as was shown in Disputations 18, 22, and 23. Therefore for each act help of grace is necessary that physically predetermines our will to consent. The consequence is proved: the help by which God flows immediately into the will as a cause, applying it to act, is help that physically predetermines it to act.

Second, the help by which God not only persuades, draws, invites, or otherwise attracts us morally, even inwardly, but truly and efficaciously as an efficient cause brings it about that we act, physically predetermines free choice to cooperate. For, as is clear from what was said above, to predetermine is nothing other than to bring it about that free choice itself determines itself; just as to premove free choice physically is nothing other than to bring it about, by a motion inhering in it, truly by efficient causality, that free choice itself moves itself. But efficacious help of grace is necessarily required for each supernatural act, by which God not only persuades, draws, invites, or otherwise attracts us morally, even inwardly, but truly and efficaciously as an efficient cause brings it about that we act, as was shown in Disputation 86. Therefore help of grace that physically predetermines free choice to act is necessary for each supernatural act.

Third, help that is not subject, as to its use, to the power of our free choice, as the habits we use when we will are, but instead subjects free choice to itself and makes it obedient, physically predetermines it to act. But the efficacious help of divine grace is not subject as to its use to the power of our free choice, as habits are subject to us; instead it subjects free choice to itself and makes the human will compliant, as is clearly established by the premises in Disputation 87. Therefore efficacious help of grace physically predetermines free choice to act. Since, then, efficacious help of prevenient grace is absolutely necessary for each supernatural act, it follows that help physically predetermining free choice to cooperate is absolutely necessary for those same acts.

IX. Fourth, help that is efficacious of itself, independently of the free cooperation of free choice, physically predetermines it to act. For, as the authors of the opposing opinion admit, for help to be efficacious of itself is the same as for it to be physically predetermining. But the help of pre-operating grace is efficacious of itself, independently of the free cooperation of free choice, as was shown in the preceding disputation. Therefore it physically predetermines free choice to consent. Since, then, help of pre-operating grace is necessary for each supernatural act, as is clear from the premises in Disputation 88, it follows that efficacious help physically predetermining our will to consent is necessary for each supernatural act.

X. Fifth, it is impossible for help inhering in free choice, by the sole real and intrinsic power it has as it comes from God, excluding middle knowledge, to bring about consent certainly and infallibly unless it has the power physically to predetermine the will to elicit that same consent. For, if physical determination and foreknowledge of the consent that would occur on the hypothesis that free choice is placed in such circumstances are excluded, there is no foundation on which the certainty and infallibility of the future consent can rest, as was said above. But the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, by its own real and intrinsic power as it comes from God, excluding middle knowledge, brings about the will’s consent certainly and infallibly. For middle knowledge must not be admitted, as is clear from the premises in Disputation 7; consequently, the infallibility of the future consent of free choice cannot be founded on it. Therefore efficacious help has the power physically to predetermine the will to elicit consent.

This is confirmed. For divine providence and predestination, as regards the execution of the intended effect, are certain and infallible with the certainty of the order and causality of the means, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore the efficacious means and helps on which this infallibility rests have the power physically to predetermine the will to the consent God wills to be produced by the human being.

This is confirmed a second time. Help with which dissent cannot coexist in free choice physically predetermines free choice to consent, as the authors of the opposing opinion admit. But dissent of free choice cannot coexist with the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, as is clear from the premises and will become clearer in Disputations 92 and the two following ones. Therefore this sort of help, which is necessary for each act, physically predetermines free choice to consent.

Finally, the same conclusion can be proved from passages of Scripture, the Councils, and the holy Fathers, especially Augustine and Thomas, whose testimonies were cited in Disputations 18, 22, and the two following ones, and especially from On Correction and Grace, ch. 2, and other places cited in Disputation 18, no. 16, where Augustine asserts that those who are sons of God are acted upon so that they may act. This does not happen without a prior motion that predetermines them to act. For Augustine is speaking of a motion followed by an effect, as is clear from these words: You act and are acted upon, and then you act well if you are acted upon by him; for the Spirit of God, who acts upon you, is a helper to those who act. To this I add another special passage of St. Augustine in the book On the Deeds of Pelagius, against the adversaries of the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, addressed to St. Aurelius the Bishop. Augustine includes this book among his works in book 2 of the Retractations, ch. 47, but it was thought not to be extant, as the doctors of Louvain noted at the end of On Nature and Grace. Later it was found in manuscript in the Library of St. Bartholomew in the diocese of Fiesole, of the Order of the Lateran Canons Regular; a copy of it came into my hands in Rome. In ch. 3 of that same book, explaining the Apostle’s words, All who are acted upon by the Spirit of God are sons of God, and attacking Pelagius, who contended that all are ruled by their own will, Augustine speaks as follows: For without a doubt, to be acted upon is more than to be ruled. One who is ruled does something, and is ruled by God so as to act rightly. One who is acted upon scarcely seems to do anything himself; and yet the grace of our Savior does so much for our wills that the Apostle does not hesitate to say: “All who are acted upon by the Spirit of God are sons of God.” Nor can free will in us act better than by entrusting itself to be acted upon by him who cannot act badly; and when it has done this, it should not doubt that it was helped by him to do so, to whom it is said in the Psalm: “My God, his mercy will go before me.” And below, explaining the words I called, and the spirit of wisdom came to me, he says: For by this Spirit, those who are sons of God are ruled and acted upon, not by the powers of their own will. Augustine therefore holds that God, through helping grace, premoves and predetermines our will by efficient causality to each supernatural act. He confirms this also in On Correction and Grace, ch. 8, speaking of Peter’s faith, for which our Lord Christ prayed that it might not fail; for he says: When, then, he prayed that his faith might not fail, what else did he pray for than that Peter might have a supremely free, strong, unconquerable, and persevering will in the faith? And in ch. 11 of the same book: For the help was of such a kind that he could leave it if he willed, and remain in it if he willed; it was not such that it would make him will. This is the first grace, given to the first Adam; but the second Adam’s grace is more powerful. The first is that by which it is brought about that a person has righteousness if he wills; the second, then, can do more, since by it a person is also made to will, and wills so much and loves with such ardor that by the will of the spirit he conquers the will of the flesh, which desires what is contrary. And in ch. 12: The weakness of the human will was therefore aided, so that the will might be acted upon by divine grace without wavering and inseparably; and therefore, although weak, it would not fail nor be overcome by any adversity. Certainly, these and many other things Augustine says about the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ do not apply to prevenient exciting grace alone, or to grace that merely persuades morally. For this alone is not a more powerful grace than the grace conferred on Adam; it alone does not confer the most efficacious powers, nor make our will act well most invincibly, without swerving, and insuperably. All these things, however, apply to the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, which physically premoves and applies our will to act piously. Therefore, according to Augustine, this sort of help is necessary for each supernatural act. Hence Augustine says in On the Grace of Christ, ch. 23: Great indeed is the help of divine grace, by which God himself inclines our heart wherever he wills. But to incline the heart is to determine it to act as God wills. Therefore, and so on.

Finally, our conclusion is proved against the authors of the second opinion. For they themselves admit that efficacious prevenient help (and they are speaking of predetermining efficacious help) is required for a person to be converted from unbelief to faith, from sin to righteousness, and to persevere in the good to the end, so that only those whom this help has preceded attain these effects, and not others. They prove this from John 6: No one can come to me unless my Father draws him; John 10: For this reason you do not believe, because you are not among my sheep; and 2 Thessalonians 3: For faith is not possessed by all. Of repentance it is said in 2 Timothy 2: If perchance God gives them repentance, and they recover from the snares of the devil; and Jeremiah 31: Convert me, Lord, to you, and I shall be converted; for after you converted me, I did penance. Of perseverance it is said in the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 13, that it cannot be obtained from elsewhere than from him who is able to establish the one who stands. The same is found in canon 16. But these and similar testimonies also apply, for the same reason, to all supernatural operations, especially when they are meritorious of eternal life. Therefore.

This is confirmed: sacred Scripture states in many places, without distinction and absolutely, that efficacious prevenient help is necessary, even in the justified, to carry out works of piety. For it is said in Ezekiel 36: I will make you walk in my commandments, etc.; in Philippians 2: It is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish for a good will; and in Romans 9: It is not of the one who wills, nor of the one who runs, but of God who shows mercy. Hence the Council of Arausio seems to have understood these testimonies universally when it says in canon 9: Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may act. And in canon 20: A human being does no good that God does not grant him to do. These and similar testimonies, which we adduced in confirmation of this opinion in Disputation 88, no. 5 and following, are understood of the efficacious help of pre-operating grace; for to bring it about that we act and to work so that we may act pertain to this sort of help. Therefore. The authors of the second opinion reply that these testimonies may be explained if we understand them to mean that this gift is necessary at least mediately, insofar as the first justification and faith depend on it, without which no supernatural good action would occur; but that we should not understand them to deny that some supernatural good can be done by a person once justified without special efficacious help. They add that this solution may be gathered from St. Augustine, To Simplicianus, book 1, question 2, where, treating of the conversion of the Thief, he says: His good works would have followed if, after receiving grace, he had lived a long time among human beings, but they did not precede so as to merit grace. And below: We are commanded to live rightly; but who can live and act rightly unless justified by faith? We are commanded to believe, etc. But who can believe unless he is touched by some call? In these words, he seems to concede that good action is possible once justification has been received. This solution and explanation can, however, easily be refuted: for, by the same reasoning, someone could explain the passages of Scripture and the Councils that assert a special help or gift is necessary to persevere to the end as meaning that it is necessary mediately—namely, insofar as first justification depends on the special help of efficacious prevenient grace, and faith likewise, without which no one would persevere to the end. But this cannot be admitted.

To the first argument, we reply that exciting grace is, in its own order, sufficient grace, even if it does not efficaciously predetermine free choice to consent. For this sort of predetermination is not necessary for someone truly to be able to be converted or act piously, but for him in fact to be converted or act piously, as was said about physically predetermining help. This also answers the confirmation. We add, moreover, that although a person sometimes does not have an excitation that morally predetermines him to act piously, nevertheless, as long as he is on the way, he can have it, as was said above about physical predetermination.

The will is moved by the object.—To the second argument we reply that created will never elicits an act proportionate to its nature unless it is morally predetermined by an object, or by someone proposing an object as delightful and suitable to that same will. This is for the reasons given above, which apply not only to supernatural acts but also to natural ones; for in both cases, in order for the will to act, something that delights, entices, and draws the will must appear in the object, so that the will may pursue that object. This certainly does not happen without moral determination.

To the third argument the consequence is denied, and the reason for the difference is this: as St. Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 20. ar. 2, in the body of the article, our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by an object: The divine will, however, is not moved by a goodness presupposed in a created object; rather, it causes that goodness by the act of love. Therefore God’s will need not be morally predetermined by the object itself in order to have an act of love concerning it, whereas this is required in created will. There is another difference as well: the divine will is pure act, possessing freedom by its essence: therefore it need not be predetermined physically or morally by another; the divine will itself determines itself to an object toward which it has a non-necessary relation, as St. Thomas says in 1. p. q. 19. ar. 3, ad 5. Created will, however, is not pure act, but has participated freedom, which includes some potentiality; therefore, in order to pass into act, it must be premoved and physically predetermined by God, and morally predetermined by the object.

To the fourth argument we reply by denying the antecedent. For one of the causes prerequisite for a person actually to act well is moral and physical predetermination, as was said: one of these reaches the act physically, while the other reaches it only morally.

XIV. To the fifth argument, it has already been shown expressly above, in Disputations 18, 22, and 23, how sufficient help is so called and is truly and really sufficient for conversion or pious action, even if another help that physically predetermines is additionally necessary for a person in fact to act piously.

To the sixth argument we reply that this efficacious help is necessary by way of a principle, or the ultimate complement of first act, as was said above. Hence, without it, help that is simply sufficient for conversion or pious action is indeed given, but not sufficient in every respect, as was explained in Disputation 23, no. 32.

To the seventh argument we reply that, as will become clear in Disputation 112, God grants everyone, in the proper place and time, sufficient help by which they can act well, and at the same time offers efficacious help by which they may actually act well; but it is through their own fault that they do not receive such efficacious help. Therefore it must be attributed to their will that they do not elicit a pious action. We have said more about this in Disputations 18 and 23.

To the eighth argument we reply that exciting grace alone does not physically predetermine free choice to consent, as the argument evidently proves; rather, helping grace does this, and it includes physically operating and cooperating grace. In answer to the refutation, we should say that operating grace must not be confused with exciting grace, for it is really distinct from it, as was shown above. As for the objection about helping or cooperating grace, we should say that, insofar as it cooperates, this grace precedes the free influx of our free choice, as was said in Disputation 82. Hence it can indeed physically predetermine free choice to consent.

As for the other arguments indicated there, especially those that contend that physical predetermination destroys the freedom of free choice, or the indifference that is of the essence of that same freedom, I think they have already been answered sufficiently in the preceding disputations, and more will be said about the same argument in what follows, while explaining the definition of free choice.

To the ninth argument advanced on behalf of the second opinion, we reply easily from what was said above: St. Augustine and Thomas taught quite clearly that created will, however perfected by a habit it may be supposed to be, needs God’s prior efficacious motion for each good act, especially supernatural ones, as is clear from the passages cited in Disputations 18 and 23 and in this same disputation. St. Thomas nowhere taught or insinuated the contrary. As for the passage cited from I–II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3, it was already answered above in Disputation 22, no. 39; now we say briefly that when the holy Doctor says that God sometimes moves some people to will something determinate, as in those whom he moves through grace, he does not exclude but rather presupposes the general motion by which God moves all secondary causes to their operations, as he teaches elsewhere. He only affirms that God by special help moves free choice through grace to will something determinate that is truly good. Since this assertion is doctrinal, it is equivalent to a universal statement, as if he said that God always moves by special help to will something determinate those whom he moves through grace. But he does not always move free choice by this help, because free choice is not moved by God through special help for acts of the natural order; rather, it is moved by another general motion, common to all secondary causes, although he moves each one in a manner conformed to its nature.

To the confirmation we reply that, when the will is moved by God to the good in general, it is moved in such a way that it does not move itself through deliberation, as was said above. But with respect to a particular good, or to means, it is both moved by God and moves itself through deliberation. The teachings of Cajetan and Conrad should be understood according to this doctrine.

To the tenth argument we reply that those words of St. Thomas, “God moves the will in such a way that he does not determine it necessarily to one thing,” should not be understood as though he were saying that God need not move the will to one of the alternatives in order for the will to act, as the argument seems to suggest. Rather, the meaning is that, although God determines created will by his motion to act in each good operation, he does not determine it to act by necessity, as he determines natural causes, but to act freely, or with the mode of freedom, as is fitting to its nature, as was shown in Disputations 22 and 23. This explanation is clearly gathered from the whole context of St. Thomas’s article and from the argument to which he replies. As for the other passage from q. 80, we reply that it proves only that God does not move or determine created will to evil. Yet from this one cannot rightly infer that he does not move it by efficacious help to each good act, especially supernatural acts, as is clear from what was said above.

To the eleventh argument we reply that all the reasons gathered there have already been considered and answered above. For the first we offered two solutions in Disputation 24. One is to admit that God premoves by a physical motion to the act of sin insofar as it is an act and a being, as was shown to be St. Thomas’s mind in that same disputation. The other solution is that it does not follow from God’s moving and predetermining created will to each good act, especially supernatural ones, that he premoves it to evil acts, even insofar as they are acts, as was explained in the same Disputation 24, no. 37. The second reason was answered in Disputation 23, no. 33; and if it proved anything, it would also apply against the authors of the first opinion. For they admit that efficacious prevenient help premoving the will is necessary for certain supernatural acts, namely, the act of faith and contrition by which a person rises from sin, and perseverance to the end. Therefore, just as exhortations and precepts are not idle or superfluous with respect to these acts, even if God’s efficacious premotion must be awaited for the will actually to elicit them, so too they will not be idle with respect to other supernatural acts, even if we admit that God’s efficacious motion must be awaited for the free choice of a person already justified to produce any one of them.

To the twelfth argument we deny the antecedent. In answer to the proof, we say that St. Thomas, in I–II, q. 109, a. 9, body, gives two reasons why one who has obtained justifying grace still needs to be moved by God to act rightly. First, for a general reason: because, as was said above, no created thing can pass into any act except by the power of divine motion. Second, for a special reason, because of the condition of the state of human nature. Although grace heals it as regards the mind, corruption and infection remain in it as regards the flesh, through which it is subject to the law of sin, as is said in Romans 7. A certain obscurity of ignorance also remains in the intellect, because of which, as is also said in Romans 8, we do not know what to pray for as we ought. For, because of the various outcomes of things and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot know fully what is expedient for us, according to the saying of Wisdom 9: “The thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our plans uncertain.” Therefore we need to be directed and protected by God, who knows all things and can do all things. And although the holy Fathers and Councils, when they ruled against Pelagius that special help of grace is necessary for acting rightly, often assigned the second reason, they also often assigned the first, as is clear from passages cited both in this disputation and in Disputations 18 and 23.

To the thirteenth argument we reply first that, if it proved anything against our doctrine, it would also apply against the authors of the first opinion. For they admit that efficacious help premoving free choice is necessary for a person to be converted from unbelief to faith and from the state of sin to God through penance. Yet they neither deny nor will deny that true sufficient help is given for faith and penance even to those who do not have efficacious help within themselves and are not converted to God by an act of faith or contrition. Therefore the argument presents no special difficulty for the opinion that asserts efficacious help premoving free choice is necessary even in a justified person for each supernatural act, which does not also arise for the opposing opinion. Second, we reply that efficacious help is not necessary in order for a person truly to be able to perform supernatural acts, but in order for him actually to perform them. Hence, even if a person does not receive efficacious help by which he may act piously, true sufficient help by which he can truly act piously if he wills is still preserved in him, as was explained in Disputation 18, no. 20.

One argument nevertheless remains to be resolved, to complete this and the preceding disputation. Some doctors try by it to prove that efficacious grace does not predetermine free choice to consent. For, although the efficacy of this same help does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice with prevenient grace, it nevertheless depends on a certain negative disposition of free choice, that is, on its not resisting. Therefore efficacious help does not truly, by efficient causality, predetermine free choice to consent. The consequence is proved: predetermining help presupposes no disposition at all in free choice, not even a negative disposition or non-resistance, since of itself alone it has the power to overcome any resistance and bring it about that free choice consents infallibly. But the antecedent seems to be St. Thomas’s teaching in III Contra Gentiles, ch. 159., where he says that it is in the power of free choice to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace. From this he infers that it is not undeservedly imputed as a fault to one who provides an impediment to the reception of grace.

This is confirmed: the innate freedom of free choice in relation to supernatural acts can scarcely be preserved unless this kind of negative disposition on the part of free choice, or non-resistance, is presupposed for the efficacy of prevenient grace, by which it allows itself to be premoved by efficacious grace to consent.

This argument must be resolved expressly in Disputation 105, where we must discuss the efficacy of the gift of perseverance. For now we say that the efficacy of help does not depend on the aforesaid negative disposition or non-resistance of free choice, nor does it presuppose this disposition as arising from the power of nature. For the same inconveniences, and perhaps greater ones, would follow if one admitted that the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace depends on the aforesaid negative disposition; these are the consequences, as we showed above, of asserting that the same efficacy depends on a positive disposition or on the free cooperation of free choice with exciting grace. This will have to be proved in the cited Disputation 105.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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